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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis reassesses the years 1945-1955 as a hingepoint in British culture, a 
moment when literature, film and art responded to the wartime hiatus of consumer 
capitalism by resisting the turn towards conspicuous consumption and self-
commodification. This resistance can be discerned in a gothic impulse in post-war 
culture, in which uncanny encounters with haunted, recalcitrant or overassertive 
objects proliferated, and provided a critique of the subject/object relationship on 
which consumerism was predicated.  
In the opening chapter, the ubiquity of bombsite rubble is brought into dialogue 
with mid-century mural painting both in literature and at the Festival of Britain. In 
the second chapter, Barbara Jones’s Black Eyes and Lemonade exhibition of 
ephemera is considered alongside the work of the Independent Group. The third 
chapter examines how the period’s new media and computing hardware further 
complicated the status of the subject, through an analysis of the work of George 
Orwell, Alan Turing and William Grey Walter.  
In the fourth chapter, haunted furniture and domestic ephemera threaten to 
become rival subjectivities, in works including Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the 
Day and Marghanita Laski’s The Victorian Chaise Longue. The fifth chapter 
considers the ways in which mid-century clothes and apparel enabled or restricted 
the autonomy of their wearers, through a comparative analysis of the Coronation, the 
British Everest expedition, and Britten’s coronation opera Gloriana. Finally, the 
onset of atomic anxiety is explored through stories about bombs, prosthetics and 
bodily penetration including Powell and Pressburger’s The Small Back Room. 
The thesis concludes that the intimacy and agency of these unruly objects 
remain as half-submerged cultural signposts offering an alternative understanding of 
twentieth-century materialism.   
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Mid-century things: An introduction 
 
The new human type cannot be properly understood without awareness of 
what he is continuously exposed to from the world of things about him, even 
in his most secret innervations. 
Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia.1 
 
This thesis reassesses the years 1945-1955 as a hingepoint in British culture, a 
moment when literature, film and art responded to the wartime hiatus of consumer 
capitalism by resisting the turn towards conspicuous consumption and self-
commodification which threatened to be – and arguably would become – definitive 
of the later 1950s and 1960s. This resistance can be discerned in a gothic impulse in 
postwar culture, in which uncanny encounters with haunted, recalcitrant or 
overassertive objects proliferated, and provided a critique of the subject/object 
relationship on which consumerism was predicated. A sense of otherness connects 
the objects collected here: it is found in the rubble and detritus of wartime bomb 
sites; in mass-produced items reappreciated as art; in media hardware that commands 
and undermines the subject’s autonomous physical existence; in haunted junk 
invested with glamour and value; in costumes and equipment which enable access to 
heterotopic forms of existence; and in bombs with compact, inscrutable interiors that 
contain a vast zone of emptiness and devastation. Such disorderly objects evade or 
complicate the smooth workings of economic and libidinal exchange, and even when 
they are bought and sold, their value and meaning is disturbingly fluid, either 
because they are wrecked, salvaged or repurposed, or because they are ritualized, 
intangible or unobtainable. 
This research developed out of a Masters dissertation on the Festival of Britain, 
called ‘Lost and found: disorientation and misreadings at the 1951 South Bank 
Exhibition’. That summer-long theme-park of British postwar identity has 
sometimes been dismissed – or nostalgically celebrated – as a mere exercise in 
kitsch, or an attempt by the establishment to distract the masses, but I argued that the 
uncanny dissonance between its futuristic agenda and its grimy and battered 
surroundings summed up the ambiguous quality of the mid-century as a threshold 
                                                
1 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. 
Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005), p. 40. 
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moment. The South Bank was a gothic space in which a sanctioned story about 
national identity and optimism could be disrupted by the unruly interplay between 
the visitors and the exhibits; it was haunted by both the past and the future – visited 
by the sighing spectres of the blitz and the chain-rattling spectres of modernism’s 
suddenly superannuated promises of the world to come. And while the guide-
catalogue claimed that it ‘develop[ed] its themes by means of things you can see and 
believe’,2 it proved surprisingly difficult to codify the meaning of its haphazardly 
curated displays and objects in order to align them with a pre-planned message. One 
anecdote, recalled by the exhibition’s Director of Design, Misha Black, summed up 
the way a spirit of resistance and liberation could be invested in and expressed 
through the thing-world within this liminal space. Black describes a dinner laid on in 
the giant Dome of Discovery just before it opened, given for the disgruntled workers 
who were labouring in difficult conditions to complete it on time: 
 
A few naked bulbs gave illumination, the dark areas were greater than the lit, 
braziers glowed with minimal warmth. The speeches of exhortation to greater 
effort and fewer trade-union disputes were dreary and misconceived. The 
atmosphere became as frigid as the night, when suddenly one man sent his 
paper plate (food eaten) whizzing across the void. In a moment a thousand 
plates were spinning, until the whole volume of the Dome was alive with 
white discs, as though invaded by flying fish. This was a magical moment.3 
 
These humble plates, repurposed as playthings and sent across the dark void, became 
animate and uncanny in their moment of flight: an image of the liberated potential of 
the mid-century thing, which had more resonance than any of the carefully placed 
and exhaustively explained exhibits which would later fill the Dome. This thesis 
seeks out similar objects which, as Adorno points out in the quotation above, offer a 
secret insight into what was new about the people of the mid-century, and the ways 
in which the things around them demonstrated the powerful agency, and the 
suffocating intimacy, of a different kind of materiality. 
                                                
2 South Bank Exhibition London: Festival of Britain (London: HMSO, 1951), p. 9. 
3 Misha Black, ‘Architecture, art and design in unison’, in Mary Banham and Bevis 
Hillier, eds., A Tonic to the Nation: The Festival of Britain 1951 (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1976), pp. 82-85 (p. 85). 
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The mid-century moment 
The middle of the twentieth century was a time that seemed, to some contemporary 
cultural commentators, dangerously indistinct and contingent on the past, and 
urgently in need of a defining identity. Cultural forms which had developed in the 
interwar years had been in hiatus since 1939; at the end of the war there was a clear 
sense that modernism had become stale and new ideas were needed, but not much 
clarity about what they would be or where they would come from. In her 1953 essay, 
‘English Fiction at Mid-Century’, Elizabeth Bowen considered postwar literature in 
terms of the uncomfortable and almost embarrassing persistence of what she felt 
were juvenile modernist tendencies. ‘A century halfway along its course may be 
considered due to declare maturity,’ she suggests:  
 
The twentieth century’s development, however, has been in some directions 
so violently forced, in others so notably arrested as to seem hardly to be a 
development at all or at least to be difficult to recognize if it is one. […] Life 
and art are still seeking their footing in their actual time – both have the 
stigmata of an over-long drawn-out adolescence.4  
 
Describing the development of modernism after World War I, she notes that the 
conflict had produced ‘a cracking and splintering of the social mould’ which  
 
accounted for a shift, as to the subject, from outer to inner – from man as a 
public being, in public play, to man as a seat of isolated, and in the main 
suffering, private sensibility. For the greater part of the interwar years, 
subjectivity hazed over the English novel […] The intellectually respectable 
English novel for some time concentrated upon, insisted upon, the victim-
hero.5  
 
For Bowen, modernism’s self-absorption was akin to teenage angst. If the birth of 
the twentieth century had triggered an inappropriate fascination with the fragmented 
                                                
4 Elizabeth Bowen, ‘English Fiction at Mid-Century’, in People, Places, Things: 
Essays by Elizabeth Bowen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), pp. 321-
24 (p. 321). 
5 Bowen, p. 322. 
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subject, then, what theme was the century in middle age to pursue? For Bowen, who 
was born in 1899 and might have considered herself to have grown up alongside the 
century, this was a question that demanded a prompt answer. However, she frames 
the predicament of the age obliquely, in terms of the Festival of Britain and its 
demand for a grand, nation-defining public spectacle:  
 
The call for an exhibition may therefore be said to have taken us by surprise, 
and found us unready, in disarray. […] Individually, no potential exhibit is 
not expressive: how, however, is each so to be placed as to bring out its 
relationship with the others? The warrant for and point of an exhibition must 
be its overall significance and expressiveness. In this case, one is tempted to 
ask, of what?6  
 
She answers her own question by concluding that the trauma of World War II must 
be the mid-century’s primary subject, but that modernistic navel-gazing is no longer 
appropriate. The interwar novel, she writes, ‘was somewhat “out” in its concept of 
what makes tragedy. It did not finally diagnose the modern uneasiness – 
dislocation.’7 The sense of things being out of place was not just a matter of a 
generation of potential young writers being sent abroad to fight; Bowen was also 
interested in the gothic dislocation of things and people who appear as uncanny 
apparitions in the everyday world, out of place or out of time. The stream-of-
consciousness approach adopted by novels of the psychic interior was not sufficient 
to convey this new disruption of the orderly boundaries between public and private: 
 
The salutary value of the exterior, the comfortable sanity of the concrete, 
came to be realised only when the approach of the Second World War forced 
one to envisage wholesale destruction. The obliteration of man’s 
surroundings, streets and houses, tables and chairs, sent up, for him, their 
psychological worth. Up to now, consciousness had been a sheltered product: 
its interest as consciousness diminished now that, at any moment, the 
physical shelter could be gone.8  
                                                
6 Bowen, p. 321. 
7 Bowen, p. 322. 
8 Bowen, pp. 322-23. 
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While the chaos and disruption of war robbed novelists of the time and space in 
which to focus on long-form literature, that very lack of a safe material space in 
which to work began to unpick the modernist subject and – which amounts to the 
same thing – the modernist subject-matter. The certainty that interior truth is the only 
expression worth striving for came to be replaced, Bowen argues, by ‘moral drama’ 
driven by ‘plot, action’. ‘A sort of aesthetic neo-conservatism may be found to have 
set in,’ she suggests.9 
This conservatism can be remarked, too, in the films of the period, which tended 
to forego formalist experiment in favour of dramatic momentum and moral hazard. 
Raymond Durgnat’s influential 1970 study, A Mirror for England: British Movies 
from Austerity to Affluence, argues that, in the wake of the 1930s documentary 
movement which combined serious social commentary with expressionist visual 
flourishes – and before the advent of kitchen-sink realism – postwar British films 
suffered in critical terms from their unabashed desire to entertain: 
 
The ‘documentary’ school of critics was grinding an obvious axe […] The 
relationship between these Sunday school teachers with their sound civic 
pieties, and all the fleshpots, fake, fun and fiddle of show business too rarely 
was one of mutual understanding.10  
 
He traces the development of British cinema from the successful populist fare of the 
late 1940s, including well-received war films, Ealing comedies and adaptations of 
the classics, to the early 1950s slump caused by the dominance of Rank, which lost 
money on expensive flops like 1949’s Christopher Columbus and changed course to 
churn out cheap, commercial pot-boilers instead. Looking beyond these obvious 
currents, and going against the film-theory grain of the time, Durgnat championed 
Michael Powell, Terence Fisher and Roy Baker, but he also defended the films of 
less distinguished directors; to do otherwise, he writes, would be to conform to ‘one 
of the principal distortions of film criticism’: ‘The impression is conveyed that run-
of-the-mill movies never say anything, that vivid or insightful remarks or situations 
                                                
9 Bowen, p. 323. 
10 Raymond Durgnat, A Mirror for England: British Movies From Austerity to 
Affluence (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 2. 
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are a monopoly of a few prestigious individuals. In fact many fascinating moments 
occur in generally mediocre films.’11  
The idea that 1950s culture didn’t ‘say anything’ until the late appearance of a 
radical avant-garde ushering in 1960s counterculture, has for a long time been 
axiomatic in studies of the 1950s. Alan Sinfield’s Literature, Politics, and Culture in 
Postwar Britain, for instance, makes a polemical distinction between the courteous 
and old-fashioned postwar years from the late 1940s to the early 1950s and the new 
era Sinfield identifies as ‘a vivid phase of cultural and political challenge’ which 
began in the middle of the decade.12 He accounts for the supposed lack of vividness 
in the arts during the early 1950s by describing how modernism crossed the Atlantic 
after the war, leaving Europe a duller place: 
 
Economically, politically and militarily, the United States was taking over in 
the 1940s roles that had belonged to European states; cultural centrality 
followed. Its mode was Modernism, led by Jackson Pollock and Abstract 
Expressionism […]. In other forms similarly, techniques of and affiliations to 
Modernism were developed [in the US] in the late 1940s: Beat and 
confessional poetry; novels by Vladimir Nabokov, John Barth and Thomas 
Pynchon; the music of John Cage and Morton Feldman; modern jazz.13  
 
Although he critiques US late modernism’s ideological timidity, he suggests that its 
influence was all that saved Britain from ‘traditional mores and local structures of 
wealth, class and cultural capital’.14 Sinfield’s determination to construct a narrative 
which ends with the triumph of British social realism forces him to ignore or elide 
the original achievements of British writers, film-makers and artists between 1945 
and 1955. It is certainly the case that British culture changed towards the end of the 
1950s, but I would argue that this earlier postwar phase tackled a distinctive and 
equally lively set of questions, and was far from being exclusively a time of polite 
conformity among chinking teacups. Durgnat dismissed a prevailing critical 
narrative in film studies which wanted to assume that kitchen-sink drama somehow 
                                                
11 Durgnat, p. 4. 
12 Alan Sinfield, Literature, Politics, and Culture in Postwar Britain (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989), p. 4. 
13 Sinfield, p. 185. 
14 Sinfield, p. 192. 
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arose directly from the 1930s documentary movement, miraculously avoiding 
contact with the films made in between; likewise, I will argue that the counterculture 
of late 1950s and 1960s was not simply the distant relative of interwar modernism 
and social experimentation, nor a British response to abstract expressionism, as 
Sinfield suggests, but developed out of the political concerns and aesthetic 
experiments of a wartime generation moulded by dislocation, deprivation and 
aspiration towards a better life.  
More recent studies of mid-century culture have also tended to focus on its 
relationship with modernism and be pitched in terms of a trajectory of decline. Jed 
Esty’s Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England, for instance, 
is concerned with the question of ‘what accounts for the apparently coterminous 
lifespans of high modernism and high imperialism in the British sphere’, identifying 
a constellation of late-modernists including Woolf, Forster and Eliot who ‘measured 
the passing of British hegemony not solely in terms of a vitiated imperial humanism 
but also in terms of a recovered cultural particularity’ in order to ‘actively manage 
the cultural transition between empire and welfare state’.15 For Esty, it is European 
rather than American modernism which sets the agenda; his characterization of 
British ‘semi-modernized modernism’ which just about managed to ‘inject some of 
the excitement of continental thought and art […] into the bloodstream of an 
otherwise conventional literary scene’ paints a bleak picture of a cultural milieu 
which he only partially redeems by arguing than an ‘anthropological turn’ after the 
war enabled the more self-aware ‘English intellectuals’ to find a ‘distinctive way to 
respond to the imminent collapse of British hegemony’.16  
Marina MacKay’s Modernism and World War II ascribes the prevailing sense 
of melancholy she finds in the work of Woolf, Rebecca West, Eliot’s Four Quartets, 
Henry Green and Evelyn Waugh to the simultaneous ‘realisation and dissolution’ of 
modernism, and to the anxiety and trauma of the war.17 More positively, Kristin 
Bluemel has attempted to redefine the literature of interwar, wartime and immediate 
postwar culture as belonging to a distinct period and style she calls Intermodernism. 
The collection of essays gathered under the title Intermodernism: Literary Culture in 
                                                
15 Jed Esty, Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 1-2; p. 3. 
16 Esty, p. 5; p. 10. 
17 Marina MacKay, Modernism and World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain focuses on the ‘fascinating, compelling and grossly 
neglected writing’ of George Orwell, Storm Jameson, William Empson, Elizabeth 
Bowen and Stella Gibbons (among others) in order retroactively to define a 
movement which encompasses the ‘radically eccentric’, the non-canonical and the 
middlebrow, and expresses ideological concerns ignored by high modernism, such as 
social and class conflict.18 
Another critic who identifies a radical seam in the literature of the 1950s is Nick 
Bentley, whose Radical Fictions: The English Novel in the 1950s argues against the 
prevailing view of the decade as ‘a period in which white, middle-class, middle-
aged, heterosexual men still held sway, before the “barbarians” […] began to 
challenge the citadels of power.’19 He contends that ‘the dominant critical reading of 
fifties English literature as anti-modernist, anti-experimental and representing a 
return to traditional or conventional realist forms is a distortion of the actual 
heterogeneous nature of the novel produced during this period.’20 On the contrary, he 
argues convincingly, the period produced ‘radical’ literature which experimented 
with narrative techniques and articulated the concerns of marginalised groups. 
However, his radical examples all date from the late 1950s: Muriel Spark’s The 
Comforters, Robinson and The Ballad of Peckham Rye (1957, 1958 and 1960 
respectively); Colin MacInnes’s City of Spades and Absolute Beginners (1957, 
1959); and Sam Selvon’s The Lonely Londoners (1956). He discusses Kingsley 
Amis’s Lucky Jim (1954) and John Wain’s Hurry on Down (1953) only to dismiss 
them as ‘aggrieved, but hardly radical’ in their treatment of class.21 This emphasis on 
the late 1950s is strange, given that he quotes Doris Lessing’s pointed refutation 
(written in 1969) of the idea that ‘everyone knows’ 1956 was ‘a watershed, a 
turning-point, a cross-roads’ because it was the year of the Suez crisis and the 
Hungarian Uprising: 
 
It has become the year that everyone refers to: oh yes, that year of course! 
[…] So that now, looking back, the people who lived through it say, for the 
                                                
18 Kristin Bluemel, Intermodernism: Literary Culture in Mid-Twentieth-Century 
Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 1. 
19 Nick Bentley, Radical Fictions: The English Novel in the 1950s (Oxford: Peter 
Lang, 2007), p. 12. 
20 Bentley, p. 16. 
21 Bentley, pp. 23-24. 
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sake of speed and easy understanding: 1956, and what is conveyed is the idea 
of change, breaking up, clearing away, movement. 
Yet the air had cleared well before 1956.22  
 
Bentley, Esty, Warner and Bluemel restrict their accounts of the mid-century to 
the literary sphere; by taking a more interdisciplinary approach, it is possible to 
perceive alternative currents in the intersections between writing and culture in the 
mid-century, and new directions which began to emerge as early as the 1940s. In The 
Spiv and the Architect: Unruly Life in Postwar London, for instance, Richard 
Hornsey provides a compelling account of the interactions between disorderly queer 
culture and the disciplinarity of 1950s urban life, through an examination of such 
disparate cultural products as the Festival of Britain, The Lavender Hill Mob, Francis 
Bacon’s engagement with the photo booth and the collages of Joe Orton and 
Kenneth Halliwell.23 Clearly, considering the postwar period simply in terms of a 
dialogue with declining modernism, or with later avant-garde experimentation, is to 
ignore the mid-century’s own distinctive relationship with modernity, which found 
expression not only in literature but in visual art, film and material and technological 
culture. Taken as a whole, these postwar artefacts not only reflect the sense of crisis 
and liminality which characterized this historical turning-point, but also raise urgent 
questions about autonomy, self-determination and meaning. By considering these 
interlocking historical, aesthetic and philosophical concerns, I would argue that it is 
possible to illuminate a moment when culture problematized, and attempted to resist, 
the onrush of consumerism, reification and fetishization offered by the mass 
marketization of society.  
 
 
Theories of objects and things 
The mid-century’s preoccupation with things reflected this new relationship of 
mutual commodification between the human and the inanimate, but of course the 
broader insight that things can tell tales was not new. Eighteenth-century It-
narratives, for instance, such as The Genuine and Most Surprizing Adventures of a 
                                                
22 Doris Lessing, The Four-Gated City (London: Paladin, 1990), pp. 307-08. 
23 Richard Hornsey, The Spiv and the Architect: Unruly Life in Postwar London 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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Very Unfortunate Goose-Quill (1751), or Richard Fenton’s Memoirs of an Old Wig 
(1815), instigated a craze for moralizing or comical object autobiographies, which 
has been acutely observed by Jonathan Lamb in studies such as The Things Things 
Say.24 Over the following century the advent of mass production and bourgeois 
domestic accumulation allowed the Victorians to perfect the art of staging identity 
and status through elaborate displays of material accoutrements.25 Gradually, in the 
twentieth century, things entered the academy and were reappraised as primary 
historical source-material, recognized by the archaeologist or the anthropologist as 
often the most suggestive – and in some cases the only extant – evidence of ancient, 
oral and folk cultures.  
History’s ‘material turn’ in the 1990s, heralded by the cultural anthropology 
brought together by Arjun Appadurai’s The Social Life of Things (1986), by The 
New Cultural History, edited by Lynn Hunt (1989), and Christopher Tilley’s 
Reading Material Culture (1991), exalted humble objects by insisting that 
ethnographic, anthropological, archaeological and even linguistic paradigms could 
be applied to them. But as cultural historian Harvey Green warns in a 2012 essay 
‘Cultural history and the material(s) turn’ the rise of the triumphant object can lead 
to an anthropomorphizing fallacy. Such an approach 
 
usually relies on a linear narrative in which much of the complexity of 
history is brushed aside in favour of a heroic story of a humble substance. 
Often included are tales of determined individuals who persisted in the face 
of elite or bureaucratic opposition, a ‘great man’ (and, less commonly, 
woman) theory of the history of ordinary things.26  
 
This is not the approach taken in this thesis. Rather than asking the objects of the 
mid-century to explicate their cultural contexts after the fact, the focus will be on the 
                                                
24 Jonathan Lamb, The Things Things Say (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2011). See also Jonathan Lamb, ‘Modern Metamorphoses and Disgraceful Tales’, 
Critical Inquiry 28 (Autumn, 2001), 133-166. 
25 See for instance Elaine Freedgood, The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the 
Victorian Novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) and Catherine Waters, 
Commodity Culture in Dickens’s ‘Household Words’: The Social Life of Goods 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). 
26 Harvey Green, ‘Cultural history and the material(s) turn’, Cultural History, 1.1 
(2012), 61-82 (p. 74). 
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period’s own experience of things as culture, on the often uneasy interface between 
things and the people who owned, found, bought, collected or curated them, and on 
the various cultural practices which attempted to draw, or erase, the boundary 
between ‘mere’ things and objects of art, science and political power. This approach 
has to some extent been influenced by Bill Brown’s ‘Thing Theory’, which states 
that ‘Things’ are distinguishable from objects when they resist disciplinary 
categorization, or when they fail to perform the function assigned to them: 
 
We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: 
when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy, when 
their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, consumption and 
exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily.27 
 
For Brown, Things have a special relationship with human subjects; the two exist in 
a dialectical balance of mutual production and definition. This analysis is useful in 
the context of mid-century culture and the debris of the postwar thingscape, when 
things were shaken out of their accustomed use and defamiliarized by fragmentation 
or dislocation. But his distinction between useful objects and dysfunctional Things is 
problematic, since an object’s thingly agency can be manifested as much by an 
overabundance of utility as the lack of it; and the idea that Thingliness is a kind of 
dormant quality only activated by misuse ignores the conflict and resistance that can 
arise even when the object is fulfilling its predetermined purpose. In ‘The Tyranny 
of Things’, Brown developed his analysis of ‘the dialectic by which human subjects 
and inanimate objects may be said to constitute one another’, suggesting that objects 
imbued with too much metonymic and descriptive power take on a sinister aspect 
which he links to Marx’s gothic descriptions of uncannily articulate and animate 
commodities.28 Brown’s analysis relies on the troubling unwillingness of these 
objects to ‘abandon [their] physicality’ in spite of their apparent abstraction into 
fungible units of value by the fetishization of the economic system. But by 
examining the relationship between mid-century subjects and objects, negotiated at 
the very point when that system was in crisis in the economic aftermath of a global 
                                                
27 Bill Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, Critical Inquiry, 28 (Autumn 2001), 1-22 (p. 4). 
28 Bill Brown, ‘The Tyranny of Things (Trivia in Karl Marx and Mark Twain)’, 
Critical Inquiry, 28:2 (Winter, 2002), 442-469 (p. 446); see pp. 447-50. 
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conflagration, we can draw conclusions about how this stubborn physicality and 
symbolic recalcitrance opened up a minatory, if fleeting, perspective on the workings 
of the new consumerist ideology which was to take hold in the later twentieth 
century.  
Postwar consumerism differed from industrial-age economics in the extent to 
which it demanded that human subjects become more like things in order to 
participate in the process of exchange as buyers, and not just as workers. In 1923, 
Georg Lukács described, in History and Class Consciousness, the process of 
reification which the proletariat underwent when they were inculcated into the social 
relations required by industry, which treated them as functioning (or malfunctioning) 
units in a machine and robbed them even of the power to perceive their own 
reification.29 After World War II, the rise of mass culture and advertising turned 
consumers, and not just workers, into things, by encouraging a kind of self-
commodification through an endless cycle of identity-crisis, desire, and imperfect 
fulfilment. In 1954, J. B. Priestley coined the term ‘Admass’ to describe the society 
he found in Texas, and which he correctly saw was the future for Britain: 
 
This is my name for the whole system of an increasing productivity, plus 
inflation, plus a rising standard or material living, plus high-pressure 
advertising and salesmanship, plus mass communications, plus cultural 
democracy and the creation of the mass mind, the mass man.30  
 
This new perception of the detrimental effect of mass consumption on individuality 
and personal agency coincided with the increasing sophistication of the new 
psychological techniques being used in marketing. In his 1957 book The Hidden 
Persuaders, Vince Packard identified the ‘startling beginnings’ being made in an 
ongoing quest to mould consumers into the custom-built products of the advertising 
industry.31 What he termed ‘the depth approach’ aimed to overcome ‘the apparent 
perversity and unpredictability of the prospective customers’ by making them 
identify with products on a psychical level, rather than offering them a logical 
                                                
29 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/> [accessed 24 June 2015]. 
30 J. B. Priestley and Jacquetta Hawkes, Journey Down a Rainbow (London: 
Heinemann/ Cresset Press, 1955), pp. 51-52. 
31 Vince Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (London: Penguin, 1960), p. 16. 
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rationale for purchase.32 In one example, for instance, he described how a Chicago 
grocery chain decided to ‘take on the traits “we like in our friends”. Those were 
spelled out as generosity, courtesy, cleanliness, patience, sincerity, honesty, 
sympathy and good-naturedness.’33 By identifying with the brand, consumers ratify 
and reinforce the norms it stands for, creating more and more pressure to conform 
and eliding the distinction between consumer and product. But if such theories aimed 
to enforce ‘desirable’ behaviour by flattening the distinction between subjects and 
objects, and ascribing personality, morality, autonomy and agency to the inanimate 
realm, then narratives about the recalcitrance of the thing-world offered a submerged 
revolutionary subtext: people, too, might stubbornly refuse to sit quietly in their 
place. 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s critique of mid-century mass culture 
identified the gothic undertow to this commodity economy as early as the 1940s. In 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) they contrasted the instrumentality and 
rationalization of capitalism with older cultural forms which could never be 
completely repressed. They argued that independent thought and the idea of the self 
had been subsumed into a purist ideal of the Enlightenment subject, which could be 
understood and quantified by logic and economics:  
 
The technical process, into which the subject has objectified itself after being 
removed from the consciousness, is free of the ambiguity of mythic thought 
as of all meaning altogether, because reason itself has become the mere 
instrument of the all-inclusive economic apparatus.34  
 
This modern subject has been cleansed of meaning, all the better to conform to the 
machinic regime of productivity and acquisition; and for Adorno and Horkheimer, 
ambiguity is the essential condition for meaning, because it disrupts the sterile purity 
of Enlightenment reason, which encourages the repression of the ambiguous self just 
as it strives to replace unruly things with objectively quantifiable products.  
 
                                                
32 Packard, p. 17. 
33 Packard, p. 47. 
34 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cumming (London: Verso, 1997), p. 30. 
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For civilization, pure natural existence, animal and vegetative, was the 
absolute danger. One after the other, mimetic, mythic and metaphysical 
modes of behaviour were taken as superseded eras, any reversion to which 
was to be feared as implying a reversion of the self to that mere state of 
nature from which it had estranged itself with so huge an effort, and which 
therefore struck such terror into the self.’35 
 
As Lamb’s study of It-narratives shows, the impossibility of perfect objectification 
within a prescribed semantic framework was already apparent at the start of the 
Enlightenment, but for Adorno and Horkheimer mass culture posed an even greater 
threat in the modern world. The gothic return of a repressed allegorical fluidity of 
meaning can be discerned in mid-century attempts to resituate the self in relation to 
the thing-world: the auratic autonomy of newly re-mythologised objects such as 
antiques, ruins, and royal regalia on the one hand, and the technological mythology 
of televisual objects, nuclear bombs, mass-cultural pop objects on the other, 
reintroduces the autonomous self at the expense of the reified subject. The whole 
project of reification is endangered by objects which themselves stake a claim to 
selfhood and irrationality. Such objects offer – to use a phrase I borrow from Isobel 
Armstrong in Chapter 3 – a ‘moment of difficulty’, an impediment to the frictionless 
transit of the subject through the machine of economics.36 If we accept Adorno’s 
distinction between self and subject, and consider it in concert with Brown’s 
distinction between Thing and object, we can see that, whereas the economic 
arbitrage of subject and object is an attempt by each to gain decisive mastery over 
the other, the fluidly ambiguous relationship between self and thing is liberatingly 
dialectical, and offers a way out of the self’s eternal striving towards rational 
subjecthood. 
 
Mid-century gothic 
In identifying a gothic turn in mid-century culture, it is possible to reconcile its 
appeal to the mythologies and symbol-structures of the past with its historical 
specificity. The gothic mode is one in which the very persistence of the 
                                                
35 Adorno and Horkheimer, p. 31. 
36 Isobel Armstrong, Victorian Glassworlds: Glass Culture and the Imagination 
1830-1880 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 12. 
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superannuated into the present and future is not only a defining trope but the 
essential problematic being explored; that it originally arose as a form of resistance 
to the Enlightenment indicates its provocative intransigence towards to the sterility 
of rationality. When Horace Walpole wrote The Castle of Otranto: a Gothic Story 
(1765) he was summoning a cultural ghost along with the castle’s broken suit of 
haunted armour; his book’s romanticized medievalism allowed him to scrutinize the 
fragmentation and generational anxiety of his modernity. And in fact, the uncanny 
revenance of gothicism itself, as a style or genre, is one of its prevailing 
characteristics. Later revivals featured other eructations of the ancient caused by a 
rift in the now; Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein was a ‘Modern Prometheus’, Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula was an ageless immortal, Robert Louis Stevenson’s Edward Hyde 
was a dis-evolved throwback to man’s animal origins. Nineteenth-century gothic 
called on an antiquarian mystique to illuminate the alienation of the human subject 
buffeted by the onrush of high-speed industrial progress, and indeed each successive 
era uses the gothic to illuminate itself.37 To remark on the existence of a distinctive 
mid-century gothic is to observe merely that the undead had risen again. Each new 
manifestation not only enacts the persistence of superannuated objects, desires, and 
ideas, but attempts to console itself with just those gothicisms that previous 
modernities had reached for: themes of fragmentation, doubling, hauntings, 
uninhibited sexuality and psychic spaces producing and being produced by the 
troubled, dislocated subject.  
The gothic helps to organise temporality through its simultaneous belatedness 
and freshness, and challenges realism without the need for avant-garde experiment. 
In his introduction to Gothic and Modernism, John Paul Riquelme argues: 
 
Stylistically, the Gothic has always been excessive in its response to 
conventions that foster the order and clarity of realistic representations, 
conventions that embody a cultural insistence on containment. The 
essentially anti-realistic character of Gothic writing from the beginning 
creates in advance a compatibility with modernist writing.38  
                                                
37 For an analysis of nineteenth-century gothic as a critique of industrialization, see 
for instance Fred Botting, Gothic (London: Routledge, 1996). 
38 John Paul Riquelme, ed., Gothic and Modernism: Essaying Dark Literary 
Modernity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2008), p. 4. 
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The essays he collects to support this claim find traces of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century gothic in modernist writers like Woolf and Beckett, as well as later 
twentieth-century texts including Brett Easton Ellis’s American Psycho, but they 
pass over the mid-century in its entirety. A more coherent assessment of the 
imbrication of gothicism and modernism – along with Marxism – can be found in 
Margaret Cohen’s Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of 
Surrealist Revolution.39 In a chapter called ‘Gothic Marxism’, she delineates ‘the 
contours of a Marxist genealogy fascinated with the irrational aspects of social 
processes, a genealogy that both investigates how the irrational pervades existing 
society and dreams of using it to effect social change.’40 The Enlightenment, she 
points out, was ‘always already haunted by its Gothic ghosts, and the same can be 
said of Marxism from its inception.’41 For Cohen, French surrealism was among ‘the 
first efforts to appropriate Freud’s seminal twentieth-century exploration of the 
irrational for Marxist thought’, and Benjamin’s contact with André Breton and the 
surrealist movement helped him to fuse psychoanalysis and materialism and spurred 
the revolutionary impetus of his work.42 Her aim in accessing gothic Marxism as a 
critical practice is to rediscover ‘the realm of a culture’s ghosts and phantasms as a 
significant and rich field of social production rather than a mirage to be dispelled’ 
and to valorize ‘a culture’s detritus and trivia as well as its strange and marginal 
practices’.43 Gothicism marks the incursion of the dream into society and culture, 
and the recognition of the dream is what leads to its rupture. As Benjamin wrote in 
The Arcades Project, ‘Every presentation of history [must] begin with awakening; in 
fact it should treat of nothing else.’44  
The idea that the gothic is a revolutionary form, which externalises a dreamlike 
world of enigmatic, overdetermined symbols and psychological tensions in order to 
pathologise it and precipitate its rupture, concords with the mid-century gothic which 
                                                
39 Margaret Cohen Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of 
Surrealist Revolution (Berkeley: University of California, 1993). 
40 Cohen, pp. 1-2. 
41 Cohen, p. 2. 
42 Cohen, pp. 2-3. 
43 Cohen, p. 11. 
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this thesis identifies. The dreams of postwar Britain were founded on materialism; 
politically, socialism and the welfare state were pitted against a resurgent capitalism, 
and the things people needed or wanted were the battleground on which they fought. 
In this context, narratives about gothic objects not only expressed the psychological 
residues which attached to mid-century things, but carried political freight.  
I have chosen to characterise such objects as ‘uncanny’, although my definition 
is not wholly derived from Freud. Freud’s uncanny is explicitly linguistic and 
literary; his 1919 essay begins with a long lexicographical tour of the semantic 
terrain of the German word unheimlich, and turns on an idiosyncratic and highly 
selective reading of E. T. A. Hoffman’s gothic tale ‘The Sandman’.45 Freud’s essay 
performs its own disruptive and troubling self-reading, demonstrating the limitations 
of etymological insight, and the uncanny doubling of meaning, by proving that 
heimlich and its opposite, unheimlich, can share the same meaning. Freud then 
reframes this radically uncertain semantics as an opportunity for repressed truth to 
emerge, as Hoffman’s story is reappraised through the Freudian spectacles of 
psychoanalysis.  
It is important to note, however, that Freud has little to say about uncanny 
objects as such. Indeed, the opening of the essay defines its own subject matter as an 
‘aesthetic investigation’ into ‘emotional impulses’; he wants to circumscribe the 
‘affective nucleus’ relating to this ‘specific conceptual term’, rather than 
enumerating material instances which trigger uncanny feelings.46 He rejects Ernst 
Jentsch’s contention, in his 1906 essay ‘On the Psychology of the Uncanny’, that the 
uncanny primarily resides in the uncertainty about whether an object is animate or 
inanimate; the presence of the lifelike doll Olimpia in Hoffmann’s tale is 
subordinated, in Freud’s reading, to the repeated theme of eyes and their loss, which 
he firmly equates with the castration complex. However, if we follow his conclusion 
that the eye-stealing Sandman is the nexus of uncanny feeling in the story, we might 
interpret the extracted eyeballs as uncanny objects in themselves, which were once 
integrated parts of the human body but, having become detached from the subject, 
cross the divide into thingliness. In Hoffmann, the eyes ‘start out bleeding from [the] 
heads’ of naughty children who will not go to bed; they are then collected in a bag to 
                                                
45 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’, in The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock 
(London: Penguin, 2003) pp. 121-162. 
46 Freud, p. 123. 
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feed the Sandman’s owl-like children. For the story’s protagonist Nathaniel, fear 
attaches, not to an abstract threat, but to solid objects which remind him of eyes: 
telescopes, spectacles and even barometers – objects which access the real, mediate 
it and then output it in the symbolic realm.  
Since Freud’s definition of the Unheimlich depends on a kind of analogical 
glitch – in which something is both familiar and strange, close but not quite the same 
– then the analogy between the cultural objects of academic study and the material 
objects with which cultural output concerns itself (the latter nested within the 
former) represents a similar kind of troubling proximity. To say that any cultural 
study has an ‘object’ is to construct a binary relationship between a more or less 
enigmatic thing and the subject which seeks to grasp it conceptually or physically. 
Thus we can trace analogues between the processes involved in studying cultural 
objects, and the culturally mediated accounts of grasping – or failing to grasp – 
enigmatic things. The cultural critic, like the wakeful children in Hoffmann’s story, 
may witness her own watchfulness metonymically transformed into a prosthetic 
mechanism of mediated apprehension. This is a violent and fearful process, as both 
the naughty children with the bleeding eye-sockets, and the deranged and ultimately 
suicidal Nathanial, can attest.  
 
‘The world of things’: Chapter summaries 
The six chapters of the thesis divide into two parts, with Part One focusing on the 
uncanny agency of aesthetic and technological objects. In the opening chapter, the 
ubiquity of bombsite rubble is brought into dialogue with mid-century mural 
painting through an analysis of Joyce Cary’s The Horse’s Mouth (1944), Evelyn 
Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited (1945) and Rose Macaulay’s The World My 
Wilderness (1950). Murals, in their scale and trompe l’oeil quality, offer an uncanny 
portal into another space and time, but they depend on the continuing existence of 
the solid wall that holds them in order to do so. By examining the relationship 
between the artist and his or her materials, the chapter introduces the mid-century’s 
preoccupation with objects which problematise human access to fetishized 
abstraction.  
In the second chapter, the curatorial inclusiveness of Barbara Jones’s Black 
Eyes and Lemonade exhibition of ephemera (1951) is considered alongside the 
archaeology of the Sutton Hoo treasure hoard and the work of the Independent 
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Group, in order to examine how found objects instantiated absent subjects through 
their charismatic presence. This helped to redefine modernity by suggesting a new 
sense that identity is created by fluidity and ambiguity, and that new ways of seeing 
things will enable new identities to form. 
The third chapter examines how the period’s new media and computing 
hardware further complicated the status of the subject, as images began to command 
and undermine its autonomous physical existence; the works discussed here 
delineate a technological uncanny based on the mediation and transmission of the 
self, and include George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), Powell and 
Pressburger’s A Matter of Life and Death (1946), and the cybernetic research of 
Alan Turing and William Grey Walter. 
Part Two traces the treacherous intimacy with which uncanny objects became 
involved with the bodies of their human subjects. In the fourth chapter, haunted 
furniture and domestic ephemera become rival subjectivities with the power to 
define and transform their owners, in Robert Hamer’s The Haunted Mirror (1945), 
Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the Day (1948) and Marghanita Laski’s The 
Victorian Chaise Longue (1953). As objects change their value over time, they seem 
to offer new kinds of bourgeois self-determination; but these narratives show how 
the return of repressed attitudes and impulses make such transactions dangerous to 
the individual. 
The fifth chapter considers the ways in which mid-century clothes and apparel 
enabled or restricted the autonomy of their wearers, through a comparative analysis 
of the Coronation, the Ealing comedy The Man in the White Suit (1951), and 
Britten’s coronation opera Gloriana (1953). Fantasies of power and control are 
exposed in Powell and Pressburger’s The Red Shoes (1948) and Terence Young’s 
Corridor of Mirrors (1948), while the end of the British Empire is observed in 
attitudes to the synthetic fabrics and breathing equipment of the 1953 Everest 
expedition.  
Finally, the legacy of wartime injury and the onset of atomic anxiety is explored 
through stories about bombs, prosthetics and bodily penetration including Powell 
and Pressburger’s The Small Back Room (1949), the Boulting Brothers’ Seven Days 
To Noon (1950) and C. P. Snow’s The New Men (1954). The annihilating absence 
which nuclear weapons give birth to is set against the human sterility caused by 
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exposure to radioactivity; and a discussion of Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove signals the 
start of the 1960s and new ways of assimilating the thing-world into culture. 
In all these examples, the mid-century can be seen as a time of inversion: inside 
becomes outside; old becomes new; modernity becomes historical; junk becomes 
treasure. But while this sense of topsy-turvy possibility conferred a freshness and 
novelty not otherwise available to an essentially conservative and cash-strapped 
nation, it brought with it a nagging anxiety. Would the norms of society survive? 
Would value and authenticity lose their meaning? Would codes become illegible? 
Would objects break free of the meaning ascribed to them and begin to bleed 
history? 
In a Vogue article on the Festival of Britain, Marghanita Laski described the 
ubiquitous tapered shape that appeared in furniture, souvenirs, typography and the 
buildings themselves, and became its defining design emblem. She asked:  
 
What are we to deduce from the ubiquitous shape in the Exhibition, the top-
heavy pillar, the triangle on its apex, the inverted cone? [...] Is it excitement 
at the possibility of achieving these shapes architecturally by means of new 
techniques? Since we have lately been told that its converse shape, the 
obelisk, is a phallic symbol, have we here its antithesis, an unconscious 
symbolism of the decline of the west? Or does it symbolise an airy 
indulgence in fancy, an aspiring imagination no longer earthbound?47 
 
Her speculation ends on a warning note that the optimism of novelty will suffer its 
own reverse:  
 
Over everything hangs the shadow of the most important question of all – 
shall we remember the Festival as the beginning of the future it promises, or 
as the last pleasant dream before the nightmare?48 
 
This thesis attempts to explore both the dream and the nightmare – and to answer the 
question of what happens after the dreamer wakes up. 
                                                
47 Marghanita Laski, ‘The Visionary Gleam: Thoughts on the South Bank 
Exhibition’, Vogue, June 1951, pp. 73-78 (p. 78). 
48 Laski, ‘The Visionary Gleam’, p. 78. 
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PART ONE: AGENCY 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Rubble, walls and murals: the threshold between abstraction and materiality in the 
novels of Cary, Waugh and Macaulay 
 
In the first days of bombing […] one marvelled at pure debris; but soon this 
became usual and to lift the human interest it took a bare tree gibbeted with 
hanging scarecrows from a blasted old-clothes shop, or an unbroken mirror 
hanging high-up on the façade of rooms disappeared.  
William Sansom, The Blitz: Westminster at War 49 
 
It is impossible to account for the material turn which characterized mid-century 
culture without examining how it developed out of the experience of World War II. 
The blitz, in particular, exploded people and things out of their familiar contexts: an 
arbitrary redistribution of the personal, the meaningful and the mundane blurred the 
distinctions between these categories, while the sudden and widespread visibility and 
banality of dead bodies, or body parts, meant that objects and human forms became 
uncannily interchangeable. The writer William Sansom, who worked as a fireman in 
Westminster during the blitz, ascribes such ‘freakish effects’ to the defamiliarized 
city, the ‘strange light and strange textures’ of the bombscape: 
 
[W]ith the pale plaster crumbled out on the street, with the puppety figures 
of rescue workers in their flat bowlerish hats covered also with pale dust, 
with the dead and wounded collapsed and unmoving – there was some of 
the atmosphere of the doll-shop, the shop for making plaster figures or 
people of wax.50  
 
Just as clothes blasted into a tree might become quasi-human amid this strange new 
scenery –– either as scarecrows or even the ‘gibbeted’ victims of an execution – so 
people here become uncanny simulacra of human forms which are only hazily 
                                                
49 William Sansom, The Blitz: Westminster at War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), pp. 12-13. 
50 Sansom, The Blitz, p. 75. 
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defined (‘puppety’, ‘bowlerish’). Perhaps because Sansom was putting out fires in 
the West End, he found that bombed buildings conjured up a sense of gothic 
theatricality: 
 
Here a pantomime was afoot, in the empty street a sudden festival booth 
had been erected and the play was on. At the root of this appearance lies 
something of the sympathy between grand guignol and the clown. Both, 
though one may laugh, are festivals of the macabre, of torchlit, painted 
terror.51  
 
Such descriptions as these suggest the limitations of considering World War 
II bombsites as spaces which fit comfortably into the cultural narrative of ruins; of 
what Leo Mellor, in Reading the Ruins: Modernism, Bombsites and British Culture 
calls the ‘ever-present interest in the ruin and the fragment, the incomplete or 
decayed structure that offers an implicit dialogue with the past through its very 
continued existence’.52 Mellor’s inclusion of 1940s bombsites within this wider 
category of ruins is modulated by his argument that such places had a unique double 
relationship with time: 
 
They are inherently both a frozen moment of destruction made permanent; 
as much as they capture the absolute singular moment, the repeated cliché 
of the stopped clock exposed, battered by blast but still affixed to a wall in a 
bombsite; yet they also act as a way of understanding a great swathe of 
linear time previously hidden or buried, offering history exposed to the 
air.53  
 
The bombsites’ ability to access both restless history and a frozen moment certainly 
accounts for some of their uncanny quality, but I would argue that their supercharged 
power also derives from the macabre pantomime that Sansom describes – the sense 
that these are transitional spaces where a transformation, or even an inversion of 
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normality, is performed. This chapter will argue that the interaction between 
bombsites and time becomes even more complex when one takes into account the 
temporal (and indeed socio-cultural) vertigo of the human subject who haunts these 
contemporary ruins.  
Mellor’s choice of the stopped clock as the paradigmatic bombsite image 
underscores his argument that bombsites are broken timepieces which no longer tell 
human time; yet when Sansom wanted to describe a similarly telling detail, he chose 
‘an unbroken mirror hanging high-up on the façade of rooms disappeared.’54 
Sansom’s mirror is a subtly different metaphor, suggesting that these resonant 
bombsite objects offer to reflect back the plight of the subject, even while they 
appear to rise haughtily above human concerns in their ‘unbroken’ indifference. 
Later still, he suggests, even ‘the unscathed mirror or picture hanging exposed on the 
wall became platitudinous – and it then took a row of ten grey Ascot toppers exposed 
in their open cupboard to raise an eyebrow.’55 Sansom considered such objects, 
because they map so closely onto the particular idiosyncrasies of vanished 
individuals, more interesting than the ‘pure debris’ which was itself a marvel in the 
first days of bombardment; but in this chapter I want to place such metonymic 
personal possessions back, as it were, into the rubble, and look more closely at the 
thingly residue of the walls on which reflective objects – and in particular art-objects 
– precariously hung. A piece of rubble, I would argue, is the blitz’s ur-object, utterly 
abject and empirically meaningless, yet nevertheless freighted with narrative; it tells 
the story both of the building from which it derived, and of the catastrophic moment 
of its transliteration from coherent wall to disorderly debris. Rubble, in its blunt 
materiality, contains within it a narrative of catastrophe and wreckage; yet it is also 
an abstracted form, blasted out of history into a pure and irreducible eternity, remote 
from its former spatial and personal meaning.  
By accessing eternity in this way, bombsites became a refuge for those who 
wanted to escape from modernity, and so a theme of conflict with modernism often 
characterizes the cultural examples in this chapter. Modernism, with its enthusiasm 
for bricolage and fragment, seemed – as Mellor suggests – to have predicted the 
ruinscape of the 1940s, but I would argue that, as a way of looking at the world, it 
was put under strain by the sudden actualization of its metaphors. In the wake of the 
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First World War, high modernism had implied a promise to pull both the world and 
the word apart in order to make experience new, but for those who had lived through 
the blitz, World War II seemed to have completed only half the job. The dialectical 
machinery of historical renewal had malfunctioned: the kaleidoscope had been 
shaken, but no new picture had formed. 
In this chapter, the search for this picture – for an aesthetic ratification of the 
suffering and destruction of the war – will be traced through six different cultural 
responses to rubble and the walls from which it derives. Murals, in particular, are 
evoked as a special category of art-object, one that had gained popularity under 
modernism but which now seemed to mark a point of conflict between implacable 
materiality and the fugitive abstract idea. Strikingly, the murals of the mid-century 
seem to presage or bring about the destruction of the very walls on which they are 
painted, and these tumbling walls become an image of revolutionary remaking 
instigated by the uncanny power of art.  
 
‘A wall will fall in many ways’: William Sansom’s war stories 
For someone with William Sansom’s experience as a blitz fireman, the idea that 
walls and buildings were possessed of both agency and animation was self-evident – 
under bombardment, they were not solid but moved, writhed, lashed out with deadly 
force at the human beings in their ambit. In ‘Building Alive’, Sansom gives an 
hallucinogenic first-person account of being inside a bombed building and knowing 
that another flying bomb is on its way.56 He notes the arbitrary nature of these robot-
bombs’ deathly, machinic force – ‘It could drop anywhere. It was absolutely 
reasonless. It was the first purely fatal agent that had come to man for centuries, 
bringing people to cross their fingers again, bringing a rebirth of superstition’ – and 
contrasts it with the feral intent which he ascribes to the building’s eerily inorganic 
ecosystem, with its ‘creakings, a groan of wood […]A legion of plastermice […] 
pattering up and down the walls’57. In the devastated cityscape ‘all the laborious 
metropolitan history had been returned to its waste beginning’, but something post-
apocalyptic and post-human was beginning to stir amid the tangle of broken 
pipework: 
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Only the little sounds sucking themselves in hinted at a new life, the life of 
leaden snakes, hesitating and choosing in whispers the way to blossom. […] 
A new growth was sprouting everywhere, sprouting like the naked 
plumbing, as if these leaden entrails were the worm at the core of a birth, 
struggling to emerge, thrusting everything else aside.’58 
 
The narrator survives this encounter with living architecture only by chance – he 
watches as the building opposite collapses instead, crushing a man on a stretcher 
who has only just been pulled out of a different bombsite.  
The horror of being buried by rubble is a frequent theme of Sansom’s wartime 
stories, and is a submerged presence even in those which do not feature the blitz 
directly. In ‘The Wall’ – a story written during the blitz and published in Sansom’s 
1944 collection Fireman Flower, his fireman narrator finds himself entranced by the 
pattern of symmetrical rectangles in a wall which is suspended over him, on the 
brink of falling. Like the flying bombs, walls are awesome in their inhuman 
arbitrariness:  
 
A wall will fall in many ways. It may sway over to the one side or the other. 
It may crumble at the very beginning of its fall. It may remain intact and fall 
flat. This wall fell as flat as a pancake. It clung to its shape through ninety 
degrees to the horizontal. Then it detached itself from the pivot and 
slammed down on top of us.59 
 
The fireman is transfixed by the moment, ‘hypnotized, rubber boots cemented to the 
pavement’ with ‘ton upon ton of red-hot brick hovering in the air.’60 He finds 
himself ‘immediately certain of every minute detail’ of the wall and its windows, 
where ‘alternating rectangles of black and red […] emphasized vividly the extreme 
symmetry of the window spacing: each oblong window shape posed as a vermilion 
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panel set in perfect order upon the dark face of the wall.’61 Sansom’s characters 
frequently experience a kind of sensory bleed at such moments of extremity, a 
dreamlike merging of distorted vision, haptic sensation and emotion:  
 
The oblong building, the oblong windows, the oblong spacing. Orange-red 
colour seemed to bulge from the black frame-work, assumed tactile values, 
like boiling jelly that expanded inside a thick black squared grill.’62 
 
Yet these bulging fiery rectangles are what save him when time finally moves again 
and the wall ‘detache[s] itself from the pivot and slam[s] down on top of us’. 
Although buried under rubble, he and two colleagues survive because they have 
‘been framed by one of those symmetrical, oblong window spaces’; it is the wall’s 
Victorian patterning, its manmade, cultural symmetry, that provide a hiatus in its 
merciless material force – a recess in which the men can shelter.63 The firemen can 
slip between the chunks of masonry because, at the moment of their most dangerous 
agency, such walls prove porous. In chapter six we will see that, later in the postwar 
period, bombs would be the archetypal technological object capable of exploiting the 
porosity of the human subject; here, while the war was still being fought, Sansom’s 
stories show the human subject exploiting the porosity of the bombed object.  
 
 
‘A good wall will paint itself’: Joyce Cary’s The Horse’s Mouth 
In Joyce Cary’s novel The Horse’s Mouth, published the same year as Fireman 
Flower in 1944, walls problematize the primacy of materiality in a different way. 
Although set just before the onset of war, it responds to the frightening instability of 
the fabric of London’s blitzed cityscape with a fable about mural-painting, the 
commodification of art, and the uncanny agency of the thing. 
The narrator of Cary’s novel is Gulley Jimson, a painter whose artistic vision 
constantly threatens to overwhelm his grip on the material world. Whereas Sansom’s 
characters experience the aloof materiality of the objectworld as a threat to the 
bodily materiality of a vulnerable, mortal human, Gulley has little interest in his own 
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physical form, and indeed strives towards the condition of pure abstraction that 
exists inside his head. But an artist must make art, and he struggles constantly to 
realise these concepts, and not only because of the gap between idea and expression; 
he is forced to steal or swindle goods or money simply to live and work. Gulley’s 
madness, Cary implies, originates in his belief that such recalcitrant materiality can 
express the transcendental.  
Despite enjoying critical success early in his career, Gulley is, in old age, a 
liminal character, unable to function according to the codes and rules of society. 
Frequently arrested and jailed for petty crimes, he is pushed to the spatial margins 
too, working first in a derelict boathouse by the Thames in west London, and then 
being forced to move to a doss house and paint on any surface he can access. 
Through his eyes, the reader finds everyday life receding to a dull background roar, 
as his imagination intuits the world as a series of sublime shapes and colours and 
converts them into wildly ambitious visual compositions. He processes the natural 
world platonically; he conceptualizes his paintings in the first instance as pure, 
eternal form, then struggles to understand what they might represent: 
 
[I] knew what I wanted to do. That blue-grey shape on the pink. The tower. 
The whatever it was, very round and heavy. Something like a gasometer, at 
full stretch without its muzzle. Or possibly an enamel coffee-pot. And 
chrome-yellow things like Egyptian columns or leeks or dumb-bells or 
willows or brass candlesticks, in front.64  
 
As he works, however, he finds these shapes demand to be expressed figuratively, as 
animals, plants and human flesh which aspire to live and breathe. He is only satisfied 
when they manage both to exceed life and to embody it; when their thingly aloofness 
from petty human frailties combines with a vigorous sense of agency and vitality.  
His self-image as a Romantic seer is backed up by his obsession with 
William Blake, whom he quotes incessantly as part of the internal monologue of his 
imaginative practice; but unlike Blake, Gulley has no social or revolutionary 
philosophy underpinning his spiritual visions. He is unmoved, for instance, by the 
political arguments of his friend Plantie, who organizes anarchist meetings; Gulley 
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only comments drily that ‘I don’t like converters. You never feel safe with them. 
They’ve always got some knuckleduster up their sleeve.’65 In the end, however, it is 
Gulley who uses violent force against others: when he kills his former wife and 
muse, Sara, because she won’t give him back a sketch he did of her (which he 
wishes to sell in order to fund his next project), the once-charming mystical aesthete 
is revealed as a narcissistic psychopath who sees Sara, finally, as just another 
material obstacle in the way of his totalizing artistic vision. 
The book continually reiterates the tension between abstraction and 
materiality; Gulley’s artistic practice is both enabled and confounded by the thing-
world through which he moves. The book’s enigmatic title is reflected in a 
metaphorical motif which runs through the narrative, with Gulley using horse 
imagery whenever he encounters a problem with the authenticity of art and its ability 
to materialise abstract form. Early in the book, for instance, when he is working on a 
depiction of the Fall of Adam and Eve and groping towards representation as the 
conduit of meaning, the equine image comes at the epiphanic moment: 
 
I can do something with the foreground now, it’s as empty as a beer jug 
with the bottom knocked out. […] And all at once I made a thing like a 
white Indian club. I like it, I said, but it’s not a flower, is it? What the hell 
could it be? A fish? And I felt a kick inside like I was having a foal. Fish. 
Fish. Silver-white, green-white. And shapes that you could stroke with your 
eyebrows.’66  
 
However, Edward H Kelly, in ‘The Meaning of The Horse’s Mouth’ has argued 
convincingly that the title is a reference to the story of the artist Apelles (which 
Horace attributed to Petronius) ‘who, when in despair because he could not 
satisfactorily paint the foam on Alexander’s horse’s mouth, angrily dashed his brush 
against the canvas, and by mere accident or luck achieved that which had eluded his 
painstaking care’. 67 In Kelly’s reading, Cary’s novel thus becomes a meditation on 
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the role of luck, or divine intervention, in the creative process; yet, given that the 
Apelles anecdote depends as much on the intervention of the brush as it does on the 
will of the gods, it could just as easily be seen as a gloss on Gulley’s fraught 
relationship with the thing-world.  
Critics in the two decades after the novel’s publication tended to read it in 
terms of questions about free will and the author’s attitudes to his amoral 
protagonist.68 Read from the perspective of mid-century attempts to grapple with the 
agency of the thing, on the other hand, Gulley’s outrageous anti-social behaviour and 
fascistic psychopathy become instead the portrait of an artist so preoccupied by the 
threshold between the animate and inanimate, and art’s capacity to straddle that 
divide, that he wants to transform into a human art-object, entirely free to exist and 
express himself. Yet despite Gulley’s repeated meditations on philosophical and 
aesthetic questions, the material world shakes off this discursive scaffolding by 
rendering it irrelevant; like Apelles’s brush, Gulley’s materials have an agenda and 
an aesthetic project of their own, which will be pursued no matter what the cost to 
Gulley. In the end, the artist’s subjective will and creativity (Gulley repeatedly 
insists he is a genius) always depend on his precarious grasp of the material world: 
on his ability to buy or steal paints and brushes, unearth used canvases in junk shops, 
find walls with the right texture and surface and – in all cases – on his ability to 
preserve and hold on to these things through the storm of incident that swirls around 
him. 
Gulley is aware of the fact that, as soon as he gets his ideas down in paint on 
walls or canvas, he renders them precarious; either they will suffer the depredations 
of materiality and be vulnerable to theft and damage, or they will be absorbed into a 
commodity system in which they will once again become abstract and fluid. With 
other objects, he has come to accept this; after each spell in prison, he expects to find 
his possessions have ‘just melted’ (as Marx warns everything solid will do in a 
commodity culture),69 though he is shocked when his artworks fall prey to the same 
process:  
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I hadn’t expected to see the frypan and kettle again. You can’t leave things 
like that about for a month in any friendly neighbourhood and expect to find 
them in the same place. But [the painting of] the Living God with his 
stretchers and stiffeners weighed a couple of hundredweight. […] Someone 
said the landlord took it for the rent. The landlord swore he had never seen 
it. I daresay he had hidden it somewhere in an attic, telling himself that it 
might be worth thousands as soon as I was dead.70  
 
Throughout the novel, his canvases revert to their status as vulnerable material 
objects – they are variously stolen, vandalised with an air-gun and a knife, used to 
patch a leaking roof, or simply lost – but Gulley’s bitterest complaint is that they 
have been sold for inflated sums without his permission and without any financial 
benefit to him. Yet despite his repeated attempts to retrieve past paintings and 
sketches in order to sell them to a collector he has met, he never quite manages to do 
so, partly because he understands all too well that the market turns solid objects into 
abstractions and that retrieving their value in fact devalues them: 
 
What do you mean, for instance, when you say a picture is worth five 
thousand pounds or five hundred or five bob? A picture isn’t like chocolate, 
you can’t eat it. Value in a picture isn’t the same thing as the value in a pork 
chop. […] For instance, one might say that pictures haven’t got any value at 
all in cash. They’re a spiritual value, a liability. Or you might say that they 
hadn’t got any real value till they’re sold. And then the value keeps on 
going up and down.71  
 
Cary gives Gulley this speech at the very point when his friend, Coker, is attempting 
to defend his right to be compensated for the loss of pictures seized to repay his 
debts: in other words, at the very point when he might have succeeded in receiving 
cash for his work. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, published the same year as The 
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Horse’s Mouth, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer pinpoint the same paradox 
which skewers Gulley: ‘Pure works of art which deny the commodity society by the 
very fact that they obey their own law were always wares all the same.’72 Gulley’s 
answer is to commit a series of wilfully self-sabotaging acts whenever he comes 
close to a profitable engagement with the social and financial systems he despises. 
None of the paintings he begins over the course of the novel is finished – the 
implication being that he deliberately avoids the moment when the completed 
artwork will break free of his creative authorship and realise its own potential 
autonomy. But in any case, this autonomy is inevitably compromised as soon as the 
work changes hands as a commodity.  
This is clearly the case with the sketch which provokes Sara’s murder. This is 
an early study for his masterpiece – a portrait of Sara in her bath – and is the object 
most closely indexical to the encounter between artist, muse and art-object which led 
to his consummate artistic achievement. The sketch remains a powerful object, but 
only as long as it stays in Sara’s possession, where it continues to articulate a truth 
about the particularity of its moment. Despite this, owning it brings her no 
happiness; she admits to looking at it often, though ‘not for pleasure. It makes me so 
sad I could cry.’73 For her it is a souvenir of her disastrous marriage to Gulley and 
her lost youth and beauty: her emotional history is congealed within it. For Gulley, 
who finished with it, and her, long ago, it has become a dead thing, at best a frozen 
moment of technical virtuosity, and perhaps merely a token of congealed financial 
value. When they look at it together, Sara admires her own youthful body, while for 
Gulley her beauty is inextricable from his skill at rendering it. ‘Look at the vein 
there,’ he says, ‘just a drag of the brush across the grain. Yes I could handle paint 
then.’74 They fight over it until Gulley threatens to cut her with a box-opener – 
foreshadowing her later death when, determined to seize the sketch, he coshes her 
and throws her down a flight of stairs. At the end of this first struggle over the 
painting, Sara gets the better of him, however: offering to wrap the picture for him, 
she secretly switches it for a bundle of old newspaper. This deception fittingly 
encapsulates their differing understanding of the sketch as an object: because it has 
meaning for her, she sees it clearly and is bound to it, even though it brings her grief. 
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On the other hand, reduced to mere objecthood in Gulley’s eyes, the picture easily 
slips out of sight and away from his grasp. 
The role of the model as the primary witness to, and victim of, artistic 
objectification is crucial to Cary’s exploration of the relationship between artist and 
artwork. Indeed, Gulley’s first vision of ‘The Bath’ comes to him the first time he 
hits Sara – subjugating her flesh in the service of spirit and Ideal form, as he 
interprets it: 
 
As Billy [Blake] would say, through generation into regeneration. […] 
Materiality, that is, Sara, the old female nature, having attempted to button 
up the prophetic spirit, that is, Gulley Jimson, in her placket-hole, got a 
bonk on the conk, and was reduced to her proper status, as spiritual 
fodder.75  
 
Gulley’s sense of authorial self-empowerment – the artist bending people and things 
interchangeably to his will – implicates art itself in the process of dehumanization. 
Gulley’s confusion between the painted Sara he ‘could handle […] then’, and the 
ageing, vulnerable real-life Sara who stands in his way now, is mercilessly revealed 
as an aspect of his identity as an artist and not merely a crime of acquisitive 
ruthlessness within the superstructure of a commodity system.  
Gulley’s delusion of power arises from the tension between his notion of 
pure art and the commodity culture within which he must practice; and from that 
between his natural affinity with the destitute characters he lives alongside and his 
own aspirations to bourgeois acceptability. As the ‘pork chop’ speech quoted above 
points out, an artwork is a poor vessel for a would-be capitalist’s reservoir of 
exchange value because its price is so volatile and subject to fashion. This potential 
abjection of the commodified art-object is most starkly illustrated when Gulley visits 
a junk shop in search of old canvases he can paint over. Junk shops appear in 
narratives of mid-century memory and value with remarkable frequency, and will be 
discussed in more detail in later chapters; this early example gives clear indications 
of how the trope will develop as a critique of commodity culture in the 1950s. Here, 
already, is the archetype of a shop that fails to function as a shop; and Gulley is the 
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archetypal customer who fails to behave as a customer. Indeed, the shopkeeper is 
equally dysfunctional; Cary presents him/her as a hazily defined fixture (‘a widow 
like a cottage loaf’; ‘a little man shaped like a flower-stand’)76 doomed to be 
destroyed by the eternally cursed premises: 
 
Ikey’s is a shop that never has any luck. It changes hands about every six 
months. It has murdered more people than even the haberdashers opposite. 
[…] I walked in and bought a fine junk-shop Romney with a few holes, etc., 
and some boot-marks on the lady’s face, for two and sixpence. Of which the 
two was not perhaps altogether British mint silver. But the young gentleman 
was in such an excited state […] that you could have paid him in a Bank of 
Engraving note and taken change. I often wished I had, for a week 
afterwards he hanged himself over the stairs.77 
 
The shop’s current incumbent, however, is more circumspect; Gulley fails to con 
him out of the large canvas he has seen there (‘Fifteen by twenty. Birth of Moses, by 
Antonio Something, 1710. Italian style, turnips and gravy’),78 and which has inspired 
him to plan a new version of The Fall. Crucially for the novel’s denouement, his 
failure to procure it leads him to revert instead to his favourite medium: walls 
themselves. It is not that he believes walls to be more permanent than canvases – 
walls ‘fall down or get knocked full of holes by charwomen’s brooms,’ he declares, 
whereas ‘Canvas is more portable. All the National Galleries like you to paint on 
canvas. They can’t hang walls.’79 Rather, it is the brute materiality of walls which 
attracts him, despite their lack of portability and durability. When he is invited into 
the home of a smart art collector, Beeder, Gulley soon contrives to take up residence 
while his host is abroad, and immediately sees the potential of the walls as a site for 
his own art. The satirical point is implied: collectors want authentic art-objects to 
hang in their fashionable ‘studio’ flats, but in this case Gulley turns the space – 
through a process of stealing, pawning and destroying all Beeder’s possessions – into 
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an authentic artist’s studio, impoverished, half derelict, invaded by the destitute, and 
covered in paint. 
 
[W]hen I took down the water-colours in the studio to have a look at the 
other walls, I made a discovery. A good wall is often ruined by pictures, and 
I have found most excellent material in unexpected places, for instance 
behind a collection of old Masters. And this was a gem. […] A good wall, 
as they say, will paint itself. And as I looked at this beautiful shape, I saw 
what it was for. A raising of Lazarus.80  
 
Like his previous obsession, The Fall, and his final project, The Creation, Gulley’s 
Lazarus picture takes the relationship between matter and eternity as its subject. 
While the Fall depicts divine beings transforming into mortals, and Lazarus crosses 
the threshold between death and life, The Creation – which Gulley paints on the wall 
of a derelict chapel – not only features the creation of matter by a supernatural force, 
but wields a supernatural force of its own, acting with uncanny agency on its creator: 
 
I used to wake at night shivering all over, thinking the vampires were eating 
my toes; but it was only the Creation sticking its great beak into me. I used 
to laugh all at once and jump up in the street […] but it was only because I 
felt cold hands down my back, hands of Creation.81 
 
Artwork and artist are locked here into the kind of dialectical subject-object 
relationship described by Bill Brown in ‘Thing Theory’; each producing and being 
produced by the other. In The Creation, Gulley at last believes that he will be able to 
marry form and meaning together, since he has found a way to make art itself the 
subject of his painting. ‘This set [of forms] came up nearly complete. Not a gap 
anywhere,’ he says, though he must still negotiate the gap between conception and 
materialization: ‘As every mural painter knows […] the line that is as lively as 
spring steel in the miniature, may go as dead as apron string on the wall. And what is 
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a living whole on the back of an envelope can look as flat and tedious as a holiday 
poster, when you draw it out full size.’82  
The scale of the mural is a corollary of its implacable materiality: just as the 
falling wall towered over the fireman narrator in William Sansom’s story, so this 
wall dwarfs Gulley, who has to crawl about on its vertical surface via a complex 
system of pulleys and moving platforms. This is a dangerous encounter for the artist. 
Gulley had earlier condemned his painting of Adam and Eve because ‘it didn’t hit 
you hard enough. It wasn’t solid enough’: ‘What was the Fall after all. The discovery 
of the solid hard world, good and evil. Hard as rocks and sharp as poisoned thorns. 
And also the way to make gardens.’83 It’s inevitable, then, that he should be drawn 
not only to the solidity of a wall as an artistic medium but also to its potential to lash 
out violently at the human subject. Indeed the chapel’s solidity is as illusory as 
Gulley’s authorial jurisdiction over the artwork he creates: the chapel has been 
condemned as unsafe even before Gulley applies the first stroke of paint, and as he 
continues to work it is literally demolished around him. When he finally succumbs to 
a fall of his own (echoing both Adam and Eve’s and Sara’s fall down the stairs), he 
is working on a the large, black form of a whale, which dominates the composition 
and symbolizes the painting’s power to swallow Gulley as if he were the Biblical 
Jonah. In the novel’s final scene, whale and wall become one as the fabric of the 
building cracks open under the paint, and the spectacle of Gulley as the mad artist is 
revealed to a waiting audience of curious onlookers: 
 
And just then the whale smiled. Her eyes grew bigger and brighter and she 
bent slowly forward as if she wanted to kiss me. […] And all at once the 
smile broke in half, the eyes crumpled, and the whole wall fell slowly away 
from my brush. […] When the dust began to clear I saw through the cloud 
about ten thousand angels in caps, helmets, bowlers and even one top hat, 
sitting on walls, dustbins, gutters, roofs, window sills and other people’s 
cabbages, laughing. That’s funny I thought, they’ve all seen the same joke. 
God bless them. It must be a work of eternity, a chestnut, a horse-laugh.84  
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For Adorno and Horkheimer, laughter marks the triumph of the culture industry over 
art: ‘Laughter […] always occurs when some fear passes […] It is the echo of power 
as something inescapable’:  
 
To laugh at something is always to deride it, and the life which […] in 
laughter breaks through the barrier, is actually an invading barbaric life, 
self-assertion prepared to parade its liberation from any scruple should the 
social occasion arise. Such a laughing audience is a parody of humanity. 85 
 
As his art crumbles, Gulley seems to be transmuted into mere entertainment, like the 
cartoon character who (in Adorno and Horkheimer’s terms) epitomizes barbaric 
mass culture by demonstrating that ‘the breaking down of all individual resistance is 
the condition of life in this society’.86 Yet Gulley’s fall creates a dialectic of 
laughter, the hilarity of his audience echoing the ‘horse-laugh’ of eternal artistic 
divinity and turning the masses into ‘ten thousand angels’ who, like Benjamin’s 
Angel of History, are onlookers to the inevitable pile-up of rubble.87 This fatal 
encounter in which both wall, mural and artist are simultaneously destroyed 
coincides with the collapse of materiality and produces a shattering moment of 
revolutionary revelation, a glimpse of the semantic fluidity in which art and meaning 
are eternally deferred. Gulley’s attempts to bluff, evade and negotiate his way 
through a commodity system can finally be redeemed as a protest against reification: 
as Adorno and Horkheimer argue, only through imprecision and semantic fluidity 
can an alternative to the deadening conformity of enlightenment rationality be 
glimpsed. Gulley’s artistic vision may become garbled and fragile in the process of 
taking material form, but reification is the site of true meaninglessness, because it is 
‘free of the ambiguity of mythic thought as of all meaning altogether’.88 Gulley’s 
embrace of ambiguity enables him to escape the instrumentality of enlightenment 
reason, even as his brush with eternity destroys him. 
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The novel finishes with Gulley seriously ill in hospital, muttering to an 
uncomprehending nurse that laughter is the same as prayer. His transcendental 
epiphany at the brink of death coincides with the impending loss of his own 
materiality: matter, for Gulley, turns out to be a matter of life, not death. But it is not 
just Gulley’s life, art and autonomous selfhood which are at stake at this threshold 
moment: the entire culture is facing the onset of war and the material wreckage it 
will cause. Gulley’s apprehension of art as essentially a violent attempt to wrestle 
abstraction into materiality extends to blaming himself for the impending 
conflagration. ‘For me to paint a wall on any building,’ he says as he begins work on 
the chapel painting, ‘is as good as asking it to catch fire, or get struck by lightning, 
or fall down. And as this thing I’m doing is the biggest I’ve done yet, it will 
probably bring up an earthquake or a European war, and wreck half the town.’89  
In this way, art, which Gulley repeatedly decries as a form of madness or 
addiction, can be rescued from the triviality of commoditized culture; it may leak 
value and surrender to accident and contingency, but it is also the prime mover of 
history. Comparing himself to an ‘admiral on the bridge of a new battle ship […] 
cleared for action,’90 Gulley races to complete The Creation before he is arrested for 
Sara’s murder, and before the chapel’s demolition is completed, while the reader 
perceives another looming deadline – the declaration of war and the blitz which 
really will ‘wreck half the town’. Stubbornly oblivious to politics, Gulley declares, 
‘All wars are due to modern art […] That’s the trouble. It’s a disturbing influence.’91 
Hitler’s motivations are reduced to the complaint that he ‘never could put up with 
modern art. It’s against his convictions.’92 Yet fascism, which despises modern art, 
in a sense creates it in the form of total warfare. Gulley is at times a pitiless tyrant 
like Hitler, obsessively trying to shape reality to match his vision – his murder of 
Sara is the self-aggrandizing action of a megalomaniac. Yet he is also the victim of 
an overbearing state, and for all his lies and rationalizations he wields no empirical 
power to shape the world or make it succumb to the kind of totalizing discourse that 
characterizes fascistic output; on the contrary, Gulley is slippery and erratic, self-
contradictory and inconsistent. Instead, he attributes Hitlerian attributes to art itself; 
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there is something in Hitler’s gaze that Gulley wants to co-opt for the enormous 
whale which is gradually taking over his mural. ‘And all at once I saw Hitler’s blue 
eyes fixed on me. So that’s it, I thought. Yes, that’s what the whale’s wanted all the 
time. Pale sky-blue in slate, to pick up the sky.’93 
In his Epilogue to ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducability’, Benjamin counters the Futurists’ manifesto of ‘Fiat ars – pereat 
mundus’ [Let there be art – let the world perish] with the charge that mankind’s 
‘self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction 
as an aesthetic pleasure’.94 Gulley sees art’s annihilating power as analogous to 
Nazism, but he does not want to ‘politicize art’ because he is sure that both art and 
fascism are doomed attempts to manifest abstract concepts, and by implication must 
end in violent, destructive failure. ‘He’s got ideas that chap,’ he says of Hitler. ‘And 
he wants to see them on the wall.’95  
 
 
‘An ivy-clad ruin in the foreground’: the murals of Brideshead Revisited 
Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited is another story of a painter who makes 
pictures on walls only to see his art threatened by the impermanence of its material 
context. Its milieu is far removed from the dosshouses frequented by Gulley Jimson, 
yet it is just as haunted by death and destruction. It is, indeed, haunted by ruins, both 
actual and potential, and both literal and metaphorical. At the beginning of the novel, 
Charles Ryder, the bourgeois agnostic who has struggled all his adult life to read the 
indecipherable codes of the aristocratic and Catholic Marchmain family, arrives at 
their house, Brideshead Castle, with his army unit, unaware until that moment that 
the house he once knew so well has been commandeered for war-use. The scenes set 
in 1944 frame the main narrative of the novel, and lend an elegiac air to Charles’s 
first-person narration of his youthful friendship with the alcoholic Sebastian Flyte 
and his later engagement to Sebastian’s sister Julia. The shoddy current state of the 
house is contrasted with the baroque glories of its heyday earlier in the century; the 
ruin of Brideshead crystallizes the growing hostility to modernity which Charles has 
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internalised over the years, as he has succumbed to the allure of Marchmains’ 
traditions and beliefs.  
It is telling that he first finds his artistic vocation, as a young student in the 
1920s, while painting a mural of an ivy-clad ruin in a disused garden room at 
Brideshead which was itself now ‘derelict’.96 Like Gulley Jimson, Charles finds 
artists’ materials taking on an uncanny autonomy at the moment when inspiration 
strikes: first a tin of old paints appears in the room and gives him the idea of 
decorating the walls; and when he begins he finds that ‘the brush seemed somehow 
to do what was wanted of it’.97 Charles is not attempting to access a lofty stratum of 
metaphysical truth with his art, but instead seeks to tether in material form a vision 
of the picturesque, creating a wistful mural of hermetically sealed unreality featuring 
‘a landscape without figures, a summer scene of white cloud and blue distances with 
an ivy-clad ruin in the foreground’.98  
In the final chapter Charles learns that this room has been ruined for a second 
time: his commanding officer comments that ‘it was a signal office and they made 
absolute hay of it; rather a shame.’99 Like all muralists, Charles must accept the 
symbiosis between his supposedly timeless ruinscape and the temporal exigencies of 
its context. Mural-painting epitomises the immersive possibilities of material art – 
which can superimpose one location and temporality onto the fabric of another – but 
also its fragility. While the building stands, a mural creates a counterfactual parallel 
space to trick the eye; but should the building fall, the trick fails and the illusory 
vistas are snuffed out along with the fantasy of timelessness which they are meant to 
suggest. The eternity Charles wants to access is entirely different from the sublime 
vision experienced by Gulley during his near-death epiphany. Charles, in contrast, is 
engaged in a project to create a well delineated but counterfactual reality, in which 
aristocratic privilege and taste will not be diminished by time. 
As Waugh concedes in his preface to the 1959 edition, however, the novel’s 
intended theme – the supposedly imminent ruination of the kind of house that 
Brideshead represents – never in fact transpired, thanks to a turn in postwar fashion 
towards the nostalgic: 
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It was impossible to foresee, in the spring of 1944, the present cult of the 
English country house. It seemed then that the ancestral seats which were 
our chief national artistic achievement were doomed to decay and spoliation 
like the monasteries in the sixteenth century.100  
 
Waugh is sheepish about the novel’s overwhelming nostalgia for an architectural 
legacy he assumed would soon disappear, but which, embarrassingly, persisted into 
the postwar period. ‘I piled it on rather, with passionate sincerity,’ he admits. ‘Much 
of this book […] is a panegyric preached over an empty coffin.’101 In hindsight, he 
presents the novel itself as an anachronistic curio: 
 
It would be impossible to bring it up to date without totally destroying it. It 
is offered to a younger generation of readers as a souvenir of the Second 
World War rather than of the twenties and thirties, with which it ostensibly 
deals.102  
 
Thus, like the buildings whose demise he anticipated, the book is overlaid with a 
sense of its own potential or actual ruin; its destruction has been averted, but only 
through a temporal sleight of hand, so that it becomes a memorial of a more complex 
kind, with the once-urgent moment of its creation folded into the sense of general 
nostalgia. The extratextual post-hoc analysis contained in Waugh’s preface tacitly 
acknowledges the dialectic of ruin and nostalgia which runs through the novel; 
historical linearity turns out to be circular, like the Niezschean ‘eternal return’ which 
Benjamin evoked to explain the uncanniness of superannuated fashions.103 As the 
war creates new kinds of ruins and a new attitude to the past, the very idea of ruins – 
and their symbolic correlative – is threatened with superannuation.  
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By mentioning sixteenth-century monasteries, Waugh draws an explicit 
comparison between the demolished country seats of the aristocracy and the gothic 
ruins of the Romantic imagination – the kind of ruins Charles had originally painted 
onto Brideshead’s walls. In his mature artistic career, he also paints ruins, but ruins 
which haven’t yet come into being: he specialises in capturing the likenesses of large 
houses which have been earmarked for demolition or redevelopment, beginning with 
Marchmain House, the London home of Sebastian’s family. This first house painting 
is as important for his aesthetic development as the first garden-room mural, and 
once again, Charles is temporarily transported out of self-consciousness as the paints 
begin to work autonomously: 
 
I could do nothing wrong, At the end of each passage I paused, tense, afraid 
to start the next, fearing, like a gambler, that luck must turn and the pile be 
lost. Bit by bit, minute by minute, the thing came into being. There were no 
difficulties; the intricate multiplicity of light and colour became a whole; 
the right colour was where I wanted it on the palette; each brush stroke, as 
soon as it was complete, seemed to have been there always.104 
 
His inspiration comes from the fact that he is working ‘against time, for the 
contractors were only waiting for the final signature to start their work of 
destruction.’105 Yet as his fame as a house-painter grows, this antagonism towards 
time binds him into the very progress of destruction which he deplores: 
 
I was called to all parts of the country to make portraits of houses that were 
soon to be deserted or debased; indeed, my arrival seemed often to be only a 
few paces ahead of the auctioneer’s, a presage of doom.106 
 
Charles is caught in a temporal paradox; by seeking to arrest progress and lock 
himself into an eternal fantasy, he becomes an unwilling harbinger of modernity. He 
goes in search of a gothic ahistoricity, hoping to engage with a superannuated 
aesthetic which might persist into the present. But he cannot call it into being at will 
                                                
104 Waugh, p. 204. 
105 Waugh, p. 204. 
106 Waugh, p. 212. 
 49 
because he is too determined to pin it down; instead he encounters something more 
uncanny – the agency of his own painting materials and of other objects – but is 
blind to its import. His failure as a mid-century artist arises from his unwillingness to 
understand the new gothicism, in which the objects of modernity, as abject and 
unauthenticated as they may be, can engage the human subject in accessing a new 
kind of meaning about the circularity of time and history. No wonder that, in despair, 
he decides to leave this successful house-painting career behind to seek alternative 
ruins which are – in his narrow terms – properly distant, both in time and space. 
Travelling in Central America, Charles 
 
sought inspiration among gutted palaces and cloisters embowered in weed, 
derelict churches where the vampire bats hung in the dome like dry seed-
pods and only the ants were ceaselessly astir tunnelling in the rich stalls; 
cities where no road led, and mausoleums where a single, agued family of 
Indians sheltered from the rains.107  
 
As Marina MacKay points out in Modernism and World War II, the only character in 
Brideshead who remains unconvinced by Ryder’s colonial neo-romanticism is the 
‘modernist survivor’ Anthony Blanche, who first appears in the novel broadcasting 
Eliot’s ‘The Waste Land’ from an open window, and who glories in his outsider 
status as a homosexual who is ‘part Gallic, part Yankee, part, perhaps, Jew; wholly 
exotic’. 108 He is Ryder’s only critic, decrying his gentlemanly art for its dead-eyed 
insularity, and comparing it to ‘a dean’s daughter in flowered muslin’.109 He cuts 
straight to the inauthenticity of Ryder’s attempt at exotic gothicism, calling it ‘t-t-
terrible t-t-tripe’ (‘Where, my dear Charles, did you find this sumptuous greenery? 
The corner of a hothouse at T-t-trent or T-t-tring?’ 110) MacKay finds Waugh’s 
simultaneous sympathy both for Charles’s nostalgia and for Blanche’s contempt 
‘perverse’ and the sign of a novel ‘rebelling against itself’,111 but arguably this is a 
factor of the mid-century moment in which it was created. MacKay mistakes Charles 
for a ‘would-be modernist’ but there is little evidence of this ambition in the novel; 
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112 on the contrary, Charles is paralysed by his inability to come to terms with 
progress. His love for Julia is bound up with his desire to possess Brideshead as an 
aristocratic time-capsule: his desire to marry her only arises with the revelation that 
she, not her brother, will inherit the house. Even sexual intercourse with Julia is 
described in terms of house ownership: ‘It was as though a deed of conveyance of 
her narrow loins had been drawn and sealed,’ Charles muses. ‘I was making my first 
entry as the freeholder of the property I would enjoy and develop at leisure.’113 
Yet he loses the deeds to both Julia and Brideshead by the end of the novel, 
and he is robbed of them by the very tradition which so beguiles him: Julia rejects 
him in favour of a return to Catholicism. At this moment, Charles finally capitulates 
his one remaining modern attitude, the agnosticism which has defined him and 
which has set him apart from the family. Charles loses something once central to his 
identity, but finds comfort in his newfound faith because through it he can finally 
access eternity and escape from time. He has been battling time ever since he came 
to Brideshead and was overwhelmed by the tantalizing inaccessibility of the past, 
which persists in the objects and fabric of the building but cannot be experienced 
except by an imaginative dissociation from the haptic present, with all its urgent 
bodily and material requirements. The property motif finds its way into his 
experience of the onset of religion, too: in an extended metaphor, Charles imagines 
the emergence of Julia’s (and ultimately his own) faith through the image of a hut 
engulfed in an avalanche: 
 
Quite silently a great weight forming against the timber; the bolt straining in 
its socket; minute by minute in the darkness outside the white heap sealing 
the door, until quite soon when the wind dropped and the sun came out on 
the ice slopes and the thaw set in a block would move, slide, and tumble, 
high above, gather weight, till the whole hillside seemed to be falling, and 
the little lighted place would open and splinter and disappear, rolling with 
the avalanche into the ravine.’114  
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This brutal wipe-out leaves no ruin behind. Through Catholicism, Charles hopes – 
like Gulley Jimson – to be released from materialism, not through a vision of the 
sublime but by walling himself into a frozen version of history.  
The contemporary ruins of the blitz are curiously absent from this ‘souvenir 
of the Second World War’, but they make a tangential appearance, arguably, in 
Charles’s disgusted contemplation of a half completed housing estate, which he sees 
through the gaze of a future archaeologist: 
 
The Pollock diggings provide a valuable link between the citizen-slave 
communities of the twentieth century and the tribal anarchy which 
succeeded them. Here you see a people of advanced culture, capable of an 
elaborate draining system and the construction of permanent highways, 
over-run by a race of the lowest type.115 
 
These unfinished buildings are, like ruins, porous and readable, but what Charles 
sees there is not the glory of a lost civilization but a hollow reduction of modern 
culture to mere systems of waste disposal and transport, while his snobbish (and 
indeed racist) disgust at the ‘tribal’ beings into which he imagines humanity will 
degenerate is reminiscent of H. G. Wells’s time traveller encountering the barely 
human Morlocks of the distant future. As is fitting for a character who wishes to 
reverse time so that he might become a present-day ghost who haunts the past, his 
vision of the destruction of humanity does not have to wait for an apocalypse in the 
distant future because it has, to all intents and purposes, already happened. Charles 
ends the book drifting around Brideshead like a ghost, muttering ‘Quo modo sedet 
sola civitas. Vanity of vanity, all is vanity.’116  
 
 
 
‘A place of stillness, a place apart’: Hugh Casson and the bombed churches of 
London 
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While Charles Ryder was vilifying the suburban schemes which had been interrupted 
by the war, an idealistic young technical officer at the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning was busy drawing up more plans for cheap, quick solutions to the housing 
crisis. But Hugh Casson was, in his way, also preoccupied with ruins. In 1945, 
several years before his emergence as a respected architect, he wrote an illustrated 
booklet called Bombed Churches as War Memorials.117 It elaborated an idea which 
had first been proposed the year before in the Architectural Review, and was 
supported by a letter to The Times signed by, among others, John Maynard Keynes 
and T. S. Eliot – namely, that a number of war-damaged City of London churches 
should be selected for preservation as ruins, with gardens designed around them 
which would provide urban spaces for relaxation, contemplation and 
remembrance.118 The fact that he assumed they would not simply be rebuilt and used 
for worship indicates how far the role of churches, bombed or not, was changing at 
this time. Nine years later in 1954, Philip Larkin would write ‘Church Going’ in 
which he wondered ‘When churches fall completely out of use | What we shall turn 
them into’ and then concluded, much like Casson, that people will still haunt these 
places of ‘grass, weedy pavement, brambles, buttress, sky’ because they are 
somehow ‘proper to grow wise in, | If only that so many dead lie round.’ 119 
The church, as we have seen, is a common motif in these mid-century ruin-
narratives: the deconsecration of Lady Marchmain’s Art Deco chapel at Brideshead, 
for instance, marks a key point in Waugh’s novel, while in the last scene, set in 
1944, Charles finds comfort in the reanimation of the chapel, which now shelters ‘a 
Blitzed RC padre […] jittery old bird, but no trouble’ who conducts masses for any 
soldiers, including Ryder, who want to worship.120 A similarly jittery blitzed priest 
will haunt the ruins of Rose Macaulay’s The World My Wilderness – discussed later 
in this chapter – and find no comfort there; but both the elaborate chapel at 
Brideshead – all ‘angels in printed cotton smocks, rambler-roses, flower-spangled 
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meadows, frisking lambs, texts in Celtic script, saints in armour’121 – and the derelict 
chapel reduced to rubble by the uncanny power of Gulley Jimson’s Creation in The 
Horse’s Mouth, attest to the affinity of spaces which house art and religion. Church 
architecture, like art, attempts to materialise an abstraction, and thus sits in a 
dangerously liminal zone where ideas are transubstantiated into things. Like Cary 
and Macaulay, Casson placed ruined churches at the vanguard of a new approach to 
meaning and memory. As Gaston Bachelard wrote in The Poetics of Space (1958): 
‘Space contains compressed time. That is what space is for.’122 He was theorizing 
domestic rather than public space, but his concept of topoanalysis – which he defines 
as ‘the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives’ – is just as 
applicable to the idea that church ruins could provide both a material link with 
personal memories, and a sanctuary in which to house them.123 The war and its ruins 
haunt Bachelard’s notion of domesticity and homeliness as an absent presence; 
Casson’s pamphlet was an attempt to devise new architectural treatments of 
bombsites within a process of cathexis for traumatized Londoners, reframing them in 
a way that anticipates Bachelard’s argument that, in material spaces, ‘our memories 
have refuges […] All our lives we come back to them in our daydreams.’124  
Casson took it for granted that these churches should be deconsecrated, but 
argued that they could nevertheless retain their spiritual identity, with the buildings 
existing simultaneously as quasi-churches, as ruins, as gardens and as memorials. 
Linking these four definitions was an anxiety about time and history which reflected 
the emotions of a nation for whom modernity was no longer a revolutionary dream, 
but the harbinger of fascist ideology and mechanised death from the sky.  
The Bombed Churches pamphlet was part of a wider acculturation of 
London’s new bombscapes. Elizabeth Bowen was already incorporating ruins into 
the psychic landscapes of characters struggling to come to terms with peace 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 3), while Lorenza Mazzetti’s Together (1956) 
(discussed in Chapter 2) and the Ealing Comedy Hue and Cry (1947) commandeered 
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them as playgrounds of imaginative possibility.125 Casson’s crucial point was that 
the transformation of bombed churches into war memorials should involve a 
transformation of the object-witnesses of the blitz – the fallen stones themselves – 
into a particular type of art: ‘Preservation […] involves an understanding of the ruin 
as a ruin, and its re-creation as a work of art in its own right, keeping the essential 
forms but enhancing them with an imaginative and appropriate background.’126 This 
definition of art implicitly rejects the model of the Duchampian readymade – ruins 
are to be understood as art only once they have been ‘enhanced’ by the application of 
a carefully designed contextual frame. Like the neo-Romantic artist John Piper, who 
created a series of melancholy, enigmatic bombsite paintings, Casson’s ruins are not 
to be perceived as modernist harbingers of upheaval and atomization, but as the kind 
of Romantic objects Charles Ryder would have recognized, in which the sublime, 
the picturesque and the gothic coalesce. Yet the ruins of London in 1945 were not 
isolated, distant features in visual dialogue with nature, but part of an extensive and 
ugly streetscape of rubble; and they did not provide imaginative access to the sweep 
of history through the longevity of their survival, but offered a snapshot of a moment 
of sudden, recent devastation. Casson nevertheless insists that they partake of the 
charisma of ‘creepered and bird-haunted’ places like Tintern Abbey or Raglan 
Castle: ‘Even though a ruin to-day is as common a feature of the street scene as a 
pillar-box, it still has this power to stir the heart. Even though we live and work 
among ruins, they still possess the beauty of strangeness.’127 Just as nature provides a 
backdrop which enhances the impact of old ruins, Casson imagines that a new 
material context will enhance the strangeness of the bombed churches once the City 
has been rebuilt around them:  
 
Against the scale of our century the churches would acquire a new meaning 
as monuments, small, intimate, and informal, contrasting frankly and not 
competing with the giant facades surrounding them. The simplicity of the 
modern style of building is particularly suitable to act as a screen against 
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which old buildings with their more intricate and more human forms look 
their best.128 
 
Thus the churches’ aesthetic legitimacy – which contradicts their practical 
redundancy – depends on the shortcomings of modernity: like Waugh, Casson fears 
that the future city may have no room for ancient architecture; it is taken for granted 
that the gigantic new buildings surrounding the ruined churches will be anything but 
intimate or human, and will need to have their bombastic blankness softened by 
contiguity with something old and intricate.  
Casson argues that the new city must make room for the past within 
aestheticized ‘communal’ spaces which must not, for all their communality, 
succumb to everyday banality.  
 
In its neighbourhood then should be placed the memorial, close enough to 
be touched by the friendly atmosphere, but not so near that its quiet is 
disturbed by the bustle of daily life. A memorial should not be remote, but it 
should be withdrawn a little from the noise and distractions of human 
contacts. It should be a place of stillness, a place apart.129 
 
This memorial space replaces acts of worship with a different form of imaginative 
and emotional work. As well as remembrance, the purpose of this space is to absorb 
trauma – to circumscribe and contain it and, by materializing it outside the suffering 
human subject, to cathect it. This is not an act of forgetting; indeed, the very 
language Casson uses emphasizes continuity with the painful past. The ‘stillness’ of 
the memorial space recalls the motionlessness of death, while its ‘apartness’ evokes, 
not only physical separation, but also fragmentation, the memory of buildings and 
lives falling apart under bombardment, which is also materialized literally in the 
ruins themselves. The very stones become uncanny cyphers for human suffering: 
‘They are aloof,’ he writes, ‘but have not lost contact with us, and with us they have 
undergone the physical trials of war, and bear its scars.’130 For Casson, this function 
is even more important than religion because these object witnesses are inoculated 
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against time and contingency by the very fact that they continue to exist. A church is, 
he argues, ‘even when scarred and broken, a piece of architecture, sometimes 
perhaps a masterpiece. Every stone – whether fallen or in place – is a fragment of the 
past, part of the pattern of history.’131 Art, architecture and spirituality are conjoined 
here to a particular definition of history structured by an underlying anti-teleological 
rationale. It is not just the scars of war that Casson’s aloof stones must bear witness 
to: modernity itself is destroying old masterpieces. In 1948, Casson published an 
article (with G. M. Kellman) called ‘Metropolis in Transition’ which described the 
changing demography of London brought about by new transport links and ribbon 
development out into the suburbs. In it, he blames urban sprawl on ‘building 
societies, and the BBC […] chain stores and 50-shilling suits […] cinemas and the 
Green Lane’ and mourns the fact that ‘London stretches over most of SE England. 
Metropolis has become Metroland.’132 Moreover, the article claims that London’s 
transformation involves a shift towards the material objects of mass culture and 
away from the fetishized, metaphysical commodities of a bourgeois, ‘Metropolitan’, 
economy presided over by a middle-class elite of which Casson might well count 
himself a member: 
 
Metropolitan activities […] are largely of the mind. They are concerned 
with the abstract notions of business and finance, with the ramifications of 
politics, with fashion, entertainment and learning. The carrier of city culture 
is the intellectual, the aesthete, the professional man, and the politician.133 
 
For Casson, culture must be mediated – indeed aestheticised – by an elite if it is not 
to lose touch with its proper purpose. He describes, in Bombed Churches, the kind of 
time-honoured communal space he hopes to emulate, in which a fantasy of social 
cohesion and harmony exists because it has arisen organically from within the 
community:  
 
                                                
131 Casson, p. 11. 
132 Hugh Casson and G. M. Kallman, ‘Metropolis in Transition’, in A. G. 
Weidenfeld, ed., The Changing Nation: A Contact Book (London: Contact, 1948) p. 
1. 
133 Casson and Kallman, p. 1. 
 57 
Every city and village has some such place which has been naturally 
selected by those who live there as a focus and meeting-place for the 
community. It may be the city square, it may be a certain group of trees, or 
just a patch of well-worn grass. It is a place chosen, as a rule, not for its 
beauty but for its associations. The children play there, the young people 
meet there, the old remember it.134  
 
The social politics underpinning this idyllic scene are revealed, however, when they 
are set beside a description of Leicester Square in the 1948 article, which acts as a 
gloss for the rose-tinted nostalgia of the earlier pamphlet: 
 
The monstrous club-foot of the Odeon towers over Leicester Square where 
all the visual horrors of the modern metropolitan scene can be found in their 
most degraded form. Against this fantastic scenery of neon and hoardings, 
even the trees seem an unwelcome intrusion and the patch of trampled 
grass, hemmed in by the circling traffic, becomes a corral for morons 
instead of a promenade for citizens.135 
 
Placing this reactionary polemic beside the romanticism of Bombed Churches 
highlights Casson’s contempt for the ‘degraded’ mass of human subjects who might 
intrude upon his bourgeois vision of the ruins. Indeed, in many of the illustrations 
which accompany his essay in the pamphlet, human figures are absent, or retreat to 
the margins of the spaces. Romantic ruins, he reminds us, are places we have 
traditionally ‘made expeditions’ to; they maintain their sublimity by shrugging off 
the human desire to claim and define them. Casson’s postwar church-ruin-garden-
memorials are similarly to be grasped by the mind, as a symbol of remembrance – 
not necessarily experienced directly by bodily occupation, and definitely not 
trampled by the masses. 
The spectral quality of these spaces is addressed more generously in the 
pamphlet’s final section, written by Czech émigré Jacques Groag, and detailing his 
suggested architectural treatment of St Anne’s in Soho. Here, Groag’s sketches do 
contain numerous human figures, shown relaxing on a bench or leaning over a 
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balustrade to contemplate a water feature, chin in hands. People are especially 
visible in the interior views, in which mournful, shadowy figures haunt the memorial 
chapel housed in the ruin’s basement. In his design, this is approached via a low-
ceilinged, dark passage covered with a mural which ‘should have some of the terror 
of medieval cycles of the Dance of Death: death in battle, death in the midst of 
pleasure, death coming suddenly from the sky, and death coming as a solace to the 
wounded.’136 The figures in the mural and the living visitors are sketched in the same 
scale and with a similar vagueness, so that they merge together, emphasizing the 
elision of life and death, artwork and subject, within this dark, crypt-like space 
punctured with sudden shafts of daylight from above. 
In the end, St Anne’s was not remodelled as a memorial ruin, and nor were 
any of the other churches alluded to in the pamphlet. Casson’s idea had numerous 
opponents, including the distinguished architect Herbert Baker, who had designed a 
number of war cemeteries and memorials after the 1914-18 conflict. In a letter to The 
Times he condemned the idea outright, arguing that ‘a war memorial should lift up 
our thoughts to the hills of loving remembrance’ while ‘a war-blasted church left in 
ruins would surely lower them to the inferno where hate and revenge dwell’.137 
Another correspondent to The Times, L. Munday, called such preserved ruins ‘a 
morbid commemoration of a successful assault by the forces of evil upon the 
Christian faith’ and suggested that, ‘surmounting the wreckage, the only appropriate 
finial would be the swastika in substitution of the overthrown cross.’138 The church 
authorities, meanwhile, largely ignored the proposal. The Bishop of London’s 
Commission on the Future of the City Churches produced a report in 1946 which 
placed the twenty bombed churches of the Square Mile into three categories: eleven 
were to be restored, five should be demolished and the land sold, and four should be 
demolished and the sites used for alternative church purposes ‘with the primary 
object of administering to the needs of youth.’139  
Yet some church ruins were preserved as war memorials; most famously, a 
new Coventry Cathedral was built beside the bombed remains of the old. Even 
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among the City of London churches, room was finally found for fragments of ruins 
to be preserved, although not in any schematic way: the churchyards of Christchurch 
Greyfriars, St Dunstan-in-the-East and St Swithun London Stone remain as public 
gardens, as does the footprint of St Mary Aldermanbury, though that church’s ruins 
were transported wholesale to Fulton, Missouri in 1966, where they were rebuilt as a 
memorial to Churchill. Other remnants have been adapted for modern use: useable 
parts of Christchurch Greyfriars and St Augustine Watling Street were listed for 
preservation in 1950, and the tower of St Alban Wood Street is now a private home, 
and sits alone on a traffic island, dwarfed by office blocks, perhaps belatedly 
fulfilling Casson’s vision of an intimate antiquity in dialogue with the inhuman scale 
of its modern context – and only to be experienced directly by the privileged few. 
 
‘The nature of the wall’s surface’: ruins as refuge in The World My Wilderness 
By coincidence, the same artist – Barbara Jones – illustrated the covers of both 
Casson’s Bombed Churches pamphlet and the first edition of Rose Macaulay’s 
postwar novel set amid London’s bombsites, The World My Wilderness.140 Jones’s 
work as a curator is examined in the next chapter, but these illustrations demonstrate 
that she had a keen eye for the combination of horror and mundanity which 
characterized blitzed bombsites and also informed her practice as a collector. Both 
covers are deceptively simple pen-and-wash sketches which combine the immediacy 
of contemporaneous record with a romantically idealized vision of sunlit and 
picturesque decay. Macaulay’s novel contains a crucial scene which takes place in a 
bombed City of London church, St Giles Cripplegate – one of a number of ruins 
adopted as an alternative home by a population of drifters and troublemakers. These 
include the novel’s teenage protagonist, Barbary, who has been transplanted into 
London from her wild, barefoot childhood in Provence, and who is traumatized in 
equal measure by her experiences at the fringes of the French resistance, her guilt 
over her collaborationist step-father’s execution, and by this sudden attempt to turn 
her into a civilised English art student.  
Rose Macaulay would have agreed with the critics of Casson’s scheme; 
‘bombed churches and cathedrals,’ she wrote in The Pleasure of Ruins (1953), give 
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 us ‘nothing but resentful sadness’.141 Her own house was destroyed by an incendiary 
bomb in 1941, and she felt that the blitz had changed the meaning of ruins for her 
contemporaries: 
 
Ruinenlust has come full circle: we have had our fill. Ruin pleasure must be 
at one remove, softened by art […] or centuries of time. Ruin must be a 
fantasy, veiled by the mind’s dark imaginings: in the objects that we see 
before us, we get to agree with St Thomas Aquinas that quae enim 
diminutae sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt, and to feel that, in beauty, wholeness 
is all.142 
 
She admits, however, that these ‘wholesome hankerings’ may simply be ‘a phase of 
our fearful and fragmented age’, and she balances two temporal perspectives in her 
account of contemporary bombsites. 143 In the present, they lack meaning, displaying 
only a ‘catastrophic tipsy chaos’. They seem promiscuously candid and available, 
buildings broken apart by bombs offering the cheap melodrama of a ‘domestic scene 
wide open for all to enjoy’.144 She follows the gaze of spectators who have come to 
witness the interiors of a ‘drab little house’ transformed into something ‘bright and 
intimate like a Dutch picture or a stage set’ and who are both fascinated and repelled 
by the idea that they too may undergo such a squalid – or perversely glamorous – 
transformation: 
 
Tomorrow or tonight, the gazers feel, their own dwelling may be even as 
this. Last night the house was scenic; flames leaping to the sky; today it is 
squalid and morne, but out of its dereliction it flaunts the flags of what is 
left.145 
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In contrast to this chaotic and conflicted rush of emotion, she looks forward to a 
future time when human lives will be irrelevant and ‘the ruin will be enjungled, 
engulfed’ as ‘trees [thrust] through the empty window sockets’. She writes: ‘All this 
will presently be; but at first there is only the ruin; a mass of torn, charred prayer 
books strew the stone floor; the statues, tumbled from their niches, have broken in 
pieces; rafters and rubble pile knee-deep.’146 In The World My Wilderness, Macaulay 
presents London, through the eyes of Barbary, as if this ‘enjungling’ had already 
taken place. But Barbary is on the run from history as much as Charles Ryder; she 
may not haunt these spaces, like he does, as a would-be time traveller seeking an 
aesthetic and conceptual conduit to the past, but instead sets herself up as the 
prototype of a new type of ruin-dweller who might inhabit the stones in an eternal 
future tense which does not require her to undergo any process of recuperation and 
renewal.  
As an artist, Barbary refuses to make any claims about meaning in art; she 
can’t take her studies at the Slade seriously but likes to paint postcards of bombsites 
to sell to the citizens who come to gawp at them. Like Gulley Jimson she paints a 
mural on a church wall, but this intervention takes place long after the building’s 
ruin, rather than bringing it about, and lacks any of the destructive power of Gulley’s 
paintbrush: 
 
Barbary and Raoul stood before the east wall, whereon a Judgment Day 
painting now faintly burgeoned: God the Father, with the blessed souls 
smiling on his right hand, on his left the wicked damned taking off for the 
leap into the flames. They were pleased with this painting, which had 
admirable clarity of design, though, owing to the nature of the wall’s 
surface, the colours did not stand out very distinctly.147 
 
Later in the same scene, a crazed vicar suddenly enters the church and insists on 
saying mass – a service which ends with an anguished sermon about his own 
personal hell: 
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Fire creeps on me from all sides; I am trapped in the prison of my sins […] 
The flames press on; they will consume my body, but my soul will live on 
in hell, forever damned […] Trapped, trapped, trapped there is no hope […] 
For this is hell, hell, hell. 148 
 
A younger clergyman arrives and explains that Father Roger has been traumatized 
by being pinned under a beam in his burning church. ‘I’m afraid he frightened you,’ 
he apologizes. ‘No,’ Barbary replies. ‘Not more than I was already.’149 Without 
access to her own history and the chance to come to terms with it, Barbary lives in a 
state of perpetual fear; unlike in Casson’s pamphlet, the burnt-out church is not a 
sanctuary or a site of therapeutic remembrance, but an actively frightening place 
which threatens to trap its inhabitants in a perpetual loop of unresolved trauma. Like 
Sansom’s fireman, this clergyman understands that walls enclose a space where you 
can be ‘trapped, trapped, trapped’ and find yourself erased from the world; but for 
Barbary, the aftermath of catastrophe is a space of freedom, full of voids and 
absences. Barbary’s solution to trauma is to accept this sense of emotional and 
physical wilderness, just as she and Raoul accept that ‘the nature of the wall’s 
surface’ – it’s pocked and fire-blasted ruination – will define their painting of 
Judgment Day. 
The novel’s vivid descriptions of London’s shattered postwar landscape as an 
enchanted jungle of weeds and greenery empties them of people and any sense of 
urban life: when Macaulay writes that ‘the paths ran like streams and the ravines 
were deep in dripping greenery that grew high and rank running over the ruins as the 
jungle runs over Maya temples, hiding them from prying eyes’ she is herself painting 
a kind of mural on top of the bombsites, creating a counterfactual space-within-a-
space and turning a few overgrown streets into a vast landscape. Like the Mexican 
ruins amongst which Charles Ryder attempted to find some essence of ahistoric 
profundity, Macaulay’s fecund bomb sites have a hellish quality of damp decay, and 
this reflects Barbary’s perception of herself as a lost sinner without hope of 
redemption. Yet she is willing to embrace novel forms of escapism, as long as they 
do not demand any self-examination or acknowledgment of her troubled past; 
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indeed, her perception that the ruins are a place where ‘one belongs more’150 makes 
her more, not less, amenable to the idea of turning herself into a consumer, the ideal 
prototype of frictionless ahistoricity. Naturally, though, she accesses this new realm 
of nihilism via criminal rather than economic activity. She is egged on in this project 
by a street-smart shoplifter called Mavis, who first advises her she needs to ‘doll up’ 
if she is going to pass for a shopper. Thus disguised, Barbary trawls a department 
store for things she might steal in order to create a new sense of a future in which 
history and authenticity will no longer exist: 
 
She saw much. Galaxies of desirable objects, glittering into the focus of 
attainability, shone with a new moonish lustre, as of fruit ripe for plucking 
and within reach. They slid like dropping peaches into her bag […] She was 
carried away by the bounty of opportunity and the ease of performance. 151 
 
Barbary’s physical transformation into the painted image of a consumer with ‘rouge 
on her cheeks, crimson lipstick on her mouth, and scarlet polish on her nails’ is a 
carefully staged illusion; like Sansom’s sense of blitz ‘pantomime’ or Macaulay’s 
own description of bombsites as a ‘stage set’, Barbary understands instinctively that 
these transitional places require a greasepaint performance. The sense of lush 
possibility she finds at the shops echoes the alien fecundity of the bomb sites, and 
her newfound acquisitiveness is real: 
 
Barbary said she would like to keep some of the things, such as a musical-
box, a yellow scarf decorated with black kittens, a paint-box, a canary with 
a whistle, a cushion with a handle, and a small alarm clock.152 
 
Suddenly burdened by possessions which might be lost or stolen, she calls on the 
‘sly secrecy of the maquis’ and hides them among the ruins;153 and Macaulay pauses 
at this crucial turning point for an extended meditation on the commercial history of 
the streets through which Barbary travels with her stolen goods, reflecting that they 
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had recently been ‘stately with ingenious men who had manufactured hats, mats, 
ties, underwear, accounting books, typewriters, fancy goods, gloves and buttons’;154 
these merchants have been ‘blown sky high’ and in their place ‘the new traders, the 
pirates, the racketeers, the black marketeers, the robber bands, roam and lurk.’155 It 
quickly transpires that Barbary’s wartime cunning will be no match for the blunt 
bullying tactics of the spiv Horace, who has followed her to her hiding place and 
effortlessly relieves her of her spoils. 
Barbary has learnt a sharp lesson about postwar consumerism: things 
‘glittering into the focus of attainability’ may prove as ephemeral as the commodities 
‘blown sky high’ by the war. Barbary’s drift from the anarchism of the unmediated 
ruins to the trap of consumerism and the lure of objects of desire leaves her little 
choice but to retreat even further into her fantasy that she is still in Provence and on 
the run from the Gestapo, rather than fleeing British policemen hunting for spivs and 
shoplifters. When Barbary undergoes her own seemingly inevitable Fall, ‘plung[ing] 
steeply down a chasm into the stony ruins of a deep cellar’, it is not – like Gulley 
Jimson’s – an epiphanic escape from materiality, but a definitive re-entry into the 
world of things: 
 
[She] lay still beneath a thorn apple bush, among the medieval foundations 
of Messrs. Foster, Crockett and Porter’s warehouse. They – Messrs. Foster, 
Crockett and Porter – had been used to make surgical instruments, which 
were what she would now require.156 
 
‘Exploding the Regatta Restaurant’: murals at the Festival of Britain 
When Macaulay’s novel was published, plans were already well advanced to channel 
the memories of blitzed citizens into the desires of modern consumers on a 
population-wide scale, via the South Bank Exhibition of the 1951 Festival of Britain. 
Six years on from his work on Bombed Churches, Hugh Casson had taken on 
responsibility for the architecture of Festival. This piece of immersive, three-
dimensional rhetoric was designed and conceived as an exercise in concrete 
discourse, turning the abstractions of British character, achievement and potential 
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into a coherent national story. The event had an undisguised agenda; it was to act as 
a ‘tonic to the nation’ and model, via its experimental architecture and aspirational 
exhibits, a cultural turn towards materialism.157 In the 1940s, Hugh Casson had 
wanted to imagine a new Metropolis built on abstract ideas, where a middle-class 
elite could cathect the trauma of war via a return to the picturesque and the soothing 
notion that the past could be preserved in a carefully framed aesthetic space 
dedicated to memory. By the 1950s, he had realised – or been forced to accept – that 
London’s transformation would be demotic and dynamic, with wartime relics and 
residues reimagined in a collective Traumarbeit which enabled the population to re-
embrace the idea of modernity. His 27-acre architectural experiment was built 
literally on a foundation of bombsite rubble. The pavilions – commissioned from the 
brightest young designers Casson could find – combined clean lines and bold forms 
with exactly the kind of humane details and a friendly sense of proportion and scale 
which Casson had warned would be missing from the new builds in the City. Here, 
visitors would imbibe a vision of a hygienic and smoothly contoured future while 
they drank their tea amid comfortingly familiar landscape features. Like ruins, these 
spaces incorporated voids and openings which made them porous and accessible, 
and their thematic treatment – each housed a different aspect of British culture or 
achievement – put them in touch with both the recent and the ancient past.  
Unlike the reverent historicism of the Bombed Churches proposal, though, 
the South Bank site invited not remembrance, but wonder. It may have been ‘a place 
apart’ – contained behind turnstiles in a waterside strip between the Thames and a 
brightly painted palisade – but it was not a place of stillness: it was a playground, 
designed for crowds to explore and dream in. And whereas Barbary’s dreamspace 
was the site of nightmares, a perpetual future tense in which both past and present 
were nothing more than traps, the South Bank Exhibition sought to provide its 
visitors with a sensorium which retold the past as a glorious progression and 
actualized a progressive future in tangible form. 
However, the idea of progress supposedly built into the sanctioned ‘story’ of 
the exhibition and performed by visitors following its carefully mapped ‘way to go 
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round’ was undermined by the crowded chaos of the reality on site. Visitors, for 
instance, tended to arrive, not as expected via Waterloo Station, which marked the 
‘beginning’ of the story, but by crossing the pedestrian bailey bridge across the 
Thames, which came at the ‘end’ of the exhibitionary narrative, where the 
architecture was at its most robustly modern.158 Thus they arrived next to the Regatta 
Restaurant, designed by Misha Black, where they were confronted at point-blank 
range by an uncompromising architectural statement in International Style, visually 
detonated by a large-scale spiral mural by Victor Pasmore. 159 Rather than being 
painted, this design – consisting of graphic black swirls on a white background – had 
been fired onto ceramic tiles and used as the building’s cladding. William Feaver, 
writing in 1976, called Pasmore’s mural ‘the most positive contribution by a painter 
to the South Bank’, and described its ‘roughcast textures and cosmic overtones’ as a 
key Festival motif.160 Pasmore had carefully considered the relationship between his 
work and the building where it would be displayed; he wanted to make a case for 
‘the purely abstract style’ and its ‘validity […] when brought to bear emotionally on 
the cubic and utilitarian functionalism of modern architecture.’ Disdaining the option 
of ‘reinforcing [the architecture] harmonically by repeating its forms’, he wanted to 
‘transform it optically by means of contrast’. 161 As a recent convert to abstraction, 
he was rejecting the idea of the figurative mural as a counterfactual scene obscuring 
its architectural host; instead, he imagined the confrontation between wall and 
artwork as a moment of crisis – a deliberate statement about fragmentation in a piece 
Pasmore based on ‘the idea of “exploding” the Regatta Restaurant’.162 
There were other disconcerting touches in the Regatta Restaurant too, like 
Mitzi Cunliffe’s gothic bronze door handles shaped like disembodied hands, which 
inescapably referenced the bombed body parts of the blitz (and which the sculptor 
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Barbara Hepworth ‘refused to touch as she associated them with amputation’).163 For 
newly landed inhabitants of old London, all this contributed to a kind of 
defamiliarizing cinematic jump-cut from their war-damaged capital into the shiny 
micro-city of the future, where fragmentation and confusion could be a deliberate 
design strategy rather than (or as well as) a traumatised blitz memory. Rather than 
cling to a Romantic idea of ruin and loss, which must be aestheticized within a 
picturesque conceptual and physical landscape, the South Bank Exhibition rebooted 
the idea of an exploded building as a legitimate modern statement about materiality 
and abstraction. 
Around a hundred murals in total were commissioned for the South Bank, 
most of which were destroyed at the end of the Festival of Britain.164  John Piper’s 
The Englishman’s Home, which made walls both the subject of the work and its 
medium, was a rare survivor. Commissioned for the southern façade of the Homes 
and Gardens Pavilion, the painting shows a collection of monumental buildings – 
including a Moorish mansion, a Palladian edifice, the suggestion of Tudorbethan 
gabling and some bricky Victorian gothic – jumbled together in a parade of 
architectural styles which never quite amount to a sense of wholeness or safety. 
Inside the pavilion, stylish room-sets staged an ideal of modern domesticity, but 
outside, the buildings in Piper’s mural made a dark statement about the 
impenetrability of the English mindset. As they soar to the top of the mural, they 
seem to shoulder each other out of the way, jostling to command the foreground. A 
dead white tree reaching hand-like into a fiery red sky makes a gothic statement on 
the left of the picture, and various examples of a fortress aesthetic – railings, turrets, 
a heraldic shield – remind us that an Englishman’s home is a place to be defended at 
all costs. None of the windows and doors seems to be a real opening, and even in 
places where perspective suggests you could walk in, the way is barred by thick 
shadows. A courtyard walled with topiaried box hedging is filled with swirling murk 
lightened only by puffs of smoke. And in the sky, adrift amid the gathering storm 
clouds, hangs a wispy streetscape of back-to-back terraces: this is a statement about 
class too. If the enigmatic blocks inhabited by the bourgeoisie are all too substantial 
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and impassive, the city streets are barely real, clinging precariously to the idea of 
form as they mingle with the dark and tumbled sky. 
Six months later, the South Bank was itself a ruin, the pavilions dismembered 
and the site sold off to developers. Its passing was publicly mourned by Casson 
himself, who appeared in a film, Brief City, in which he stalked through the wind-
blown debris while reminiscing about the Festival’s success.165 The mournful figure 
of Casson – contrasted with footage of the crowded Festival in full swing during the 
summer – emphasizes the loneliness of the desolate, wintry site and returns the 
viewer to the idea that architecture somehow invites its own destruction. In its ruined 
state, the South Bank completes the cycle begun by the blitz: it is transformed from a 
chaotic place of communal possibility into a self-contained unit of space, entirely 
explicable (at the very moment when it slips into absence) by Casson as the figure of 
the artist pronouncing magisterially on its definitive meaning. Yet this idea of the 
human subject describing and defining the art object was already insufficient; as the 
next chapter will show, objects at this time were beginning to describe, define and 
materialize missing human subjects in their turn.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
Seeing things: found objects and the eye of the beholder in the exhibitions of 
Barbara Jones and the Independent Group 
 
In the early summer of 1939, amateur archaeologist Basil Brown began excavating a 
large mound in the grounds of Edith Pretty’s East Anglian estate at Sutton Hoo.166 
Having investigated three other mounds nearby the previous year, he was not 
expecting to find much more than some minor evidence of a looted grave, but when 
he unearthed a single iron rivet he began to realise that he had found a rare Anglo-
Saxon ship burial. Not only that, but it soon became apparent that the ship contained 
an undisturbed burial chamber. The excavation eventually yielded a magnificent 
hoard of gold, silver, jewelled and highly decorated objects of unparalleled artistic 
quality, evidence that a powerful king had been interred there. Or had he? 
Early accounts of the find naturally focused on the idea that the items were 
ritually buried alongside a king or chieftain’s corpse – the sword was ‘by his side’; 
there was a ‘deliberate placing of precious objects for the man’s use and enjoyment 
in another life.’167 Then on 23 February 1940 The Times reported a lecture given by 
C.W. Phillips to the Society of Antiquaries, which contradicted these speculative 
conclusions in the light of the absence of any human remains on the site. The 
‘remarkable feature of the deposit was that it was not associated with a body […] 
The whole had the character of a cenotaph for a great man whose body could not be 
recovered, possibly through being lost at sea.’168 When the Sutton Hoo treasure was 
exhibited for the first time in 1946 – having spent the war in the depths of Aldwych 
tube station – it was presented as the avatar of a missing Anglo-Saxon, who, despite 
being ‘lost’, could be conceptually reconstructed from the traces his absent body left 
on the world in the form of his weapons, armour, and symbols of power. 169 At a 
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time when the postwar population were still grieving for those missing in action, this 
was a powerful idea. 
The excavation itself was carried out in a hurry as war with Germany became 
inevitable. C. W. Phillips took over from Basil Brown as head of the excavation after 
it became clear that the find was substantial. His 1956 account of the dig shows how 
much the glamorous objects he unearthed impressed him, and how clearly they 
spoke to him. He recounts the first visit made to the site by T. D. Kendrick, then 
keeper of British and Medieval Antiquities at the British Museum (a post later taken 
over by Phillips), and his excitement at sharing the treasure with his superior: 
 
I went to meet him at Woodbridge station and took with me one of the best of 
the small jewelled buckles, carefully wrapped, in a tobacco tin, so that he 
could have an advance idea of what he was to see when we reached the main 
treasure at Mrs Pretty’s house. It was a dramatic moment when I drew him 
into the waiting room to show the buckle, and the scale of the discovery 
became clear to him.170 
 
It is a tellingly intimate detail; by placing the buckle in a humble tobacco tin and 
pocketing it, not only was Phillips staking a personal claim to it, he was instinctively 
performing a symbolic act of regeneration, transforming it from a dead relic into a 
modern object. His action can be read as a rejection of the norms of archaeological 
practice, which demands that finds should be treated with strict reverence, yet it also 
exemplifies the subject/object exchange inherent to an archaeologist’s relationship 
with his finds. Phillips, by turning it into his private accessory, was both restoring 
the buckle to life through active use and movement, and appropriating its power and 
articulacy by letting it speak for him. Other objects, too, seemed to come alive for 
Phillips during the dig: he remembers the huge and elaborately carved whetstone, for 
instance, part of the royal regalia, ‘projecting upwards, and the sinister-looking 
bearded human heads carved on the emergent end gave it a daunting look’.171 A 
stack of upended silver bowls is remembered as giving ‘the most odd performance’: 
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‘It stood quietly in the rays of the setting sun for some time and then suddenly 
heaved upwards slightly with a metallic click,’ he wrote. On examination, it turned 
out that the bowls had been corroded and compressed by the weight of the sand and 
soil, and ‘as the mass dried out with the overlying weight of sand removed, it sprang 
apart like an opening concertina.’172 But while the objects blossomed into 
subjecthood without the burden of the soil to restrain them, the missing human 
subject became the object they narrated and evoked. Later research would indicate 
that the burial had in fact once contained a body, which had dissolved in the acidic 
local soil; but for the mid-century, the supposed cenotaph seemed to provide 
historical backing for a modern shift in ideas about identity and material culture. If 
Anglo-Saxon things achieved so much charisma and meaning that they could ritually 
materialise their missing owner, what did this say about the objects of modernity?  
For conservatives, the comparison might simply reveal the extent to which 
culture had declined: the Sutton Hoo hoard was the property of a king, and his 
ceremonial, hand-crafted weaponry and regalia not only spoke of power and wealth 
but demonstrated it too; in contrast, the idea of future treasure-hunters poking 
through the mass-produced detritus of the twentieth century provoked a snobbish 
cringe. In Brideshead Revisited, Charles Ryder’s disgusted contemplation of the 
‘Pollock diggings’ displayed the kind of class panic that was interlaced with the 
nostalgia for pharaohic glamour evoked by the Sutton Hoo hoard. At a time when 
economic austerity coincided with a crisis of national identity, the evocation of a 
mythical past in which gold-plated overlords bestrode the Anglo-Saxon fenlands 
provided a haven for those in revolt against postwar socialism, as well as reaffirming 
the ancient provenance of a certain definition of Englishness.  
Yet the Sutton Hoo treasure caught the popular imagination. The agency of 
charismatic things brought into focus a new sense of the power and autonomy of 
objects which surrounded and interpellated the modern consumer, while the foreign 
flavour of Anglo-Saxon material culture, with its exotic zoomorphic motifs and non-
Christian theology,173 also acted as a reminder of Britain’s heritage as a nation of 
immigrants – ‘one of the most-mixed people in the world’ as the South Bank 
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Exhibition guide put it.174 The England evoked by the Sutton Hoo hoard, though 
magnificent, was essentially a dangerously foreign place. In the guide’s potted 
history, the Anglo-Saxons were ‘pirates’ who ‘rushed in to rub out all traces of the 
Roman touch’ – ‘barbarians’ who only settled when they ‘could find no more cities 
to sack’.175 An anonymous archaeology correspondent writing in the Manchester 
Guardian saw Sutton Hoo as cheering proof that art could transmit civilizing ideas 
across centuries and between cultures: 
 
Art knows no frontiers is a platitude which is more clearly illustrated in [the 
relics’] story than any other. Insular Britain owes the first impetus of its 
Saxon art to the style which had already over twelve hundred years of life in 
the Middle East. The Sutton Hoo finds, if for no other reason, are of the 
highest importance to the history of our art because of this.176 
 
A 1951 article on Sutton Hoo by R. L. S. Bruce-Mitford in Scientific American 
began with the admission that  
 
the story of the birth and beginnings of the English people is remarkably hazy 
[…] The early Anglo-Saxons left no temples, no pyramids, no cities, roads, 
aqueducts or colossal figures, no written documents. […] The archaeology 
[…] is an archaeology of little things – “nothing larger than a bucket or 
longer than a sword.”’177  
 
With the discovery of Sutton Hoo, such ‘little things’ brought an unknown culture 
vividly out of the darkness and into the modern world, where they could act once 
again as avatars of the dead. 
This chapter will examine how collections of things that were curated and 
interpreted in the years after the war echoed this combination of attributes: both 
instantiating absent subjects through their timeless presence, and expressing the 
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fluidity of time, space and identity. A new inclusive approach to the vernacular, in 
exhibitions mounted by Barbara Jones and the Independent Group, challenged the 
verticality of aesthetic systems of taste and value. Change and the movement of 
history provoked the fear that something essential to British identity might be lost, 
but were a necessary part of postwar regeneration and recuperations. Profound 
ideological conflicts were played out in debates about the eye, the gaze and ways of 
seeing, and the idea of mediation – by taste, custom, or the machinic intervention of 
the camera – haunt the cultural outputs of the mid-century.  
 
‘I know what I like’: Black Eyes and Lemonade 
Barbara Jones was particularly alert to the disruptive power of new ways of seeing. 
Having studied mural-painting at the Royal College of Art in the 1930s, Jones 
worked at the intersection of public, commercial and fine art, and was also a much-
commissioned book illustrator and graphic designer. By the time she was invited by 
the Society for Education in Art (SEA) to curate an exhibition of popular and 
traditional art at the Whitechapel Gallery, under the aegis of the Festival of Britain in 
1951, she was already a passionate observer and collector of the aesthetics of 
everyday life. She exceeded her brief spectacularly, conceiving Black Eyes and 
Lemonade as a celebration of the modern vernacular and a challenge to the art 
establishment, and although her plans initially alarmed the SEA, the show proved to 
be a hit with the public, with a total of 30,754 visitors making it the most successful 
exhibition at the Whitechapel in the 1950s.178 Many of the pieces on display came 
from her own private collection, and all of them were selected according to the 
personal and idiosyncratic preferences of Jones and her co-organiser Tom Ingram 
(‘It will […] be noticed that we are prejudiced in favour of cats and commerce,’ she 
joked in the catalogue’s introduction).179 Jones was clearly determined to operate 
from first principles in the absence of any precedent for such an exhibition; among 
other methods of selection, she canvased acquaintances, asking them  
 
When you think of the posters you can remember seeing as a child, what 
comes up first? That question evoked for a surprising number of people the  
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Start-Rite shoes poster of the little girl and boy, back view, setting out down 
a long road lined with poplar trees, so we had that.180  
 
She recalled how she and Ingrams bought an old London taxi and toured Britain 
following such leads and scooping up things that caught their eye. She described a 
warehouse on the Regent’s Canal crammed with advertising material from Thorley’s 
Agricultural merchants: 
 
The latest discards were near the door, clean and new, but beyond them far to 
the back were rolls and bundles thickly black with London grime. We peeled 
off the top layers to find more than a century’s advertising: posters, tin plates, 
leaflets that unfolded to show chicks bursting from the egg, and portraits in 
oils of prize animals fed on Thorley’s. The collection filled a whole room of 
the gallery.181  
 
This anecdote combines the cheerful opportunism of Jones’s curatorial practice with 
a quasi-archaeological methodology: by digging up a buried past, she is also 
highlighting a continuity of popular taste which is endlessly refreshed and renewed 
but retains its essential character. For Jones, popular art required a new type of 
seeing. She draws a distinction, in the catalogue introduction, between the instinctive 
good judgement of the ‘popular eye’ which ‘arranges stripes on butcher’s aprons and 
lobsters and soles on the fishmonger’s slab’182 and the ‘museum eye’ achieved by 
education within an elite cadre of connoisseurs, which ‘must be abandoned’ if the 
visitor is to understand the collection of objects at the Whitechapel as an exhibition 
of art. 183 Both the catalogue’s cover and its poster feature strong graphic 
representations of unblinking eyes, though they are arranged, not horizontally as on a 
face, but vertically, as if to emphasise that a new kind of gaze will be required by the 
exhibition’s visitors. The effect was successful: ‘People began to realise that indeed 
they were [works of art],’ she claims, noting that the arrangement of the exhibition 
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inculcated them into a performance of this new mindset: their progress through the 
galleries brought about their change of mind: 
 
Visitors were eased into the idea by a row of ships’ figure heads and cases of 
other acceptable art-objects, and were brought gradually to accept comic 
postcards and beer labels. All through the exhibition the new and 
commonplace were seen near the old and safe, and by the end most people 
felt able to accept a talking lemon extolling Idris lemon squash and Bassetts 
Liquorice Allsorts isolated under a spot light.’184  
 
It is the eye of the beholder, then, and not the essence of the object, that contains 
aesthetic merit in Jones’s scheme. Cultivating a new eye is the only way that 
connoisseurs can possibly distinguish popular art from the deluge of everyday kitsch 
– and even then, canon-formation is necessarily hampered by the vagaries of 
personal taste. ‘We have not been able to find a satisfactorily brief and epigrammatic 
definition of Popular Art,’ she wrote in the catalogue introduction,185 but an early 
draft in the Whitechapel Gallery’s archive shows her attempting to locate one 
through an analysis of what it is not: fine art. ‘We see the fine arts from a judicious 
distance,’ she wrote. ‘They stay in museums, and between the covers of large[…] 
books on the bottom shelf, and usually we see them only when we wish to. We are 
therefore prepared for them, on our toes.’186 In contrast, ‘the popular or vernacular 
arts, on the other hand, only get into most museums as sociological exhibits, and 
they surround us overwhelmingly all day, everywhere, undocumented and 
uncatalogued.’ She goes on: 
 
But we can stick up a few firm poles of definition in this flood: objects of 
popular arts are created either by or for people with no training in art or in its 
appreciation: ‘I know what I like’ belongs to all of us at first. By education or 
self-discipline, it can be ironed out into ‘I know what I should like’. Later 
with luck and hard work it can be creased back into ‘I know what I like’ 
again, but this is the zenith of appreciation, so the first ‘I know what I like’ is 
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the criterion of popular art. We can also say that though the fine arts express 
the artists’ mind and eye, the sole aim of popular art is to please the 
consumer. It may please, with charm, gaiety, luxury or horror, but it will 
never seek to exalt.187  
 
Although the traces of a vertical hierarchy of taste are apparent here in ‘zenith’ and 
‘exalt’, Jones is arguing that the ‘education and self-discipline’ traditionally required 
by the connoisseur should give way to natural and intuitive preference. Jones invited 
her visitors to experience a new way of seeing through the suspension of good taste. 
A newspaper cartoon about the exhibition evoked the fastidious elitism, which relied 
on a rejection of tactility, that was being challenged by the haptic familiarity of the 
objects on display. In the cartoon, amid a heap of canal-related bric-a-brac, one 
exhibit stands out: ‘Bargepole,’ reads the caption. ‘Please do not touch’.188 
If many of her exhibits seemed informed by a kind of perverse nostalgia for the 
nearly-old and the not-quite-good, the exhibition as a whole laid out a manifesto for 
a distinctively modern measure of quality which deliberately overturned traditional 
distinctions between art, design and rubbish. As she wrote in the catalogue: 
 
The things in this exhibition are seldom found in museums and galleries. 
Some of them are big and bright, visible enough, but others we hang on the 
bedroom wall, accept in the shops and cinemas, stare at blankly on the bus 
and rarely consider closely.189 
 
Jones was not alone in wanting to challenge such blank stares. In 1946, Penguin 
began a series of four accessible books about everyday design called The Things We 
See, three of which featured a large stylised eye on the cover, and all of which were 
produced under the guidance of the Council of Industrial Design (CoID). The CoID 
had evolved out of the pre-war Council for Art and Industry, though it was also a 
product of wartime governmental interest in consumer goods triggered by the 
restrictions required by rationing. Its purpose when it was launched by the Board of  
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Trade in 1944 was both to encourage manufacturers to produce better designed 
products, and simultaneously to educate the public to recognize and demand such 
goods.190  
The first book, Indoors and Out, was written by Alan Jarvis – then on the staff 
of the CoID – and set the hectoring tone of the series; in his introduction, ‘Seeing is 
Believing’, he laments the loss of a golden age of seeing: ‘The capacity for 
distinguishing the differences between things,’ he writes, ‘is discrimination and was, 
for Aristotle, the mark of the educated man.’191 His gendered terms of reference – 
though standard issue for the 1940s – nevertheless reflects the books’ agenda, which 
contrasts the ‘educated man’ with the presumably female purchaser of domestic 
objects so shoddy that they are actually ruining the eyes of the nation’s children: 
 
The result, socially, of the indifference of the vast majority of us to our visual 
environment is the increasing degradation of our surroundings: the 
shabbiness, ugliness, clutter and squalor amongst which so many children are 
growing up, in which they will learn to see, and by which their discrimination 
will be dulled.192 
 
The solution his book proposes is to introduce ‘the consumer’ to the principles of 
proper looking via the carefully arranged and mediated objects in his book. ‘If the 
reader spends three quarters of his time studying the pictures and one quarter reading 
the accompanying text, he will fulfil the author’s intentions,’ he writes in a prefatory 
note.193 The illustrations provide polemical comparisons and contrasts: an over-frilly 
bedroom is placed next to a photograph of sickly-sweet iced cakes, for instance, 
while on the opposite page a plain and simple bed and dressing table are pictured 
beside a wholesome loaf of bread. ‘The camera eye’, he explains ‘teaches us to 
concentrate on the object itself’; quoting Lewis Mumford’s 1934 study of the 
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machine, Technics and Civilization, Jarvis instructs his readers to look at, and if 
possible take, photographs in order to ‘clarify the object’ and ‘recognize [objects] in 
the independent form created by light and shade and shadow’. Thus photography 
accesses the platonic abstractions which underlie mere decorative or utilitarian 
qualities. Words are less valuable because ‘words are not the same as things’, and 
abstract nouns like ‘shape, form, contour, colour, texture, surface and so on’ need to 
be glossed by photographic explanations before they can be applied to objects in the 
round.194 Adjectives in particular are ‘innumerable and they are even more difficult 
than are the nouns to use precisely’.195 Instead he presents a bizarre ‘word-picture 
game’ juxtaposing images of animals with pieces of furniture – a chair with a 
greyhound, a chesterfield sofa with a hippo: 
 
How often […] do we find a Chippendale chair described in such terms as 
graceful, light, strong, or some Victorian design described as clumsy, heavy, 
awkward. We can use such descriptions more accurately if we use metaphors, 
and say ‘as graceful as…’, ‘as clumsy as…’, and we will understand design 
better, and make our judgements of taste more clearly if we picture these 
analogies as well as verbalize them.196 
 
Such visual similes, for Jarvis, are the key to training the half-blind consumer, who 
has been confused by the abstracted commodities of mass production: ‘Whatever 
their nature, the articles displayed [in shops] are in a sense mysterious, for they were 
made elsewhere, designed elsewhere, distributed by some impersonal agency.’197 It 
is up to her to make the effort to break the ‘vicious circle […] whereby the 
manufacturers make what they think we want and we buy it just because it is there 
on the shelves.’198 Unlike Jones, who questions the need for ‘education and self-
discipline’, Jarvis is a stern task master. For all his chummy adoption of the first 
person plural, he is clearly delivering an edict to the masses from his privileged 
position as an Aristotelian ‘educated man’: ‘It takes time and effort, no doubt,’ he 
warns, ‘because it is a matter of looking twice, and because it is a matter of 
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understanding more about the things we buy.’ Nevertheless the responsibility must 
not be shirked: ‘The debasement of quality in mass-produced goods lies not in the 
machine or mass production processes, but with ourselves.’199  
 
‘Much better to have real, smaller things’: Jones and the ‘camera eye’ 
For Jarvis, then, mass-produced objects were enigmatic agents of cultural 
debasement which demanded a concerted attack from an army of informed 
purchasers in order to preserve the principles of beauty and pleasure in daily life. For 
Jones, on the other hand, such objects, though equally lively and mysteriously 
autonomous, reflected and promoted a similar recalcitrance in the human subjects 
they interpellated. Given the prevailing atmosphere of public improvement and 
careful mediation, it is not surprising that Jones’s idiosyncratic selection and 
arrangement of her exhibits proved to be controversial. Gillian Whiteley, in her 
essay ‘Kitsch as Cultural Capital: Black Eyes and Lemonade and Populist Aesthetics 
in Fifties Britain’, tracks evidence of an increasingly heated debate between the SEA 
on one side, and Jones and Hugh Scrutton of the Whitechapel Gallery on the 
other.200 The SEA had originally agreed that their aim was ‘to develop the 
imagination and creative powers of the whole rising generation and to establish an 
indigenous expression of art in the everyday life of the community which is based on 
common experience and interest in the environment’.201 Once Jones had begun 
sourcing her exhibits, however, they became nervous, protesting that  
 
the lowest levels of taste are not worth exhibiting and bring the exhibition 
down to a trashy level. We need not bring in greenish hairdressers models 
and fluffy kittens – still less the dull and ugly enamelled tin advertisements 
which are not even the result of popular taste, but sordid practical 
commerce.202  
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In the light of this evidence, Jones’s catalogue introduction becomes a pointed 
retort: 
 
There are a number of ways in which an exhibition of popular art could have 
been arranged: historically, sociologically, geographically, by categories of 
materials used, by occupations, by artistic themes, and so on. But it was 
finally decided to set up a series of arbitrary categories which reflect most 
forms of human activity without creating bogus sociological implications, 
and which also did make the exhibition physically possible to arrange.203  
 
Thus, Jones’s exhibits were grouped broadly by theme, with ‘Transport’ coming first 
in the sequence as if to introduce the idea of an aesthetic journey into the unknown. 
Next came ‘Toys, Hobbies and Pets’, including contemporary toys from the 
Hamley’s store alongside Victorian train sets, a doll’s house and a zoetrope. Within 
this section, ‘Pet’s Corner’ included taxidermy, a kitten calendar and numerous 
anthropomorphised animals dressed and posed as humans. ‘The Home’ was a large 
section featuring Staffordshire figurines, china, worked pictures and needlework, and 
a model Victorian house ‘made chiefly of marble chips and beads, with dolls’. Most 
of the items collected in ‘The Home’ were nineteenth-century, with a few 
contemporary pieces of china and home crafts representing modernity; on the other 
hand, in the next two sections, ‘Food’ and ‘Birth, Marriage & Death’, that ratio was 
reversed, with only a few old examples providing a foil for an unabashed display of 
twentieth-century design (including the spotlit Liquorice Allsorts). The Thorley 
collection found in the Regent’s Canal warehouse featured in the next section, 
‘Agriculture’, alongside a selection of other posters, show rosettes and corn dollies. 
After that came ‘Festivity and Entertainment’, by far the largest section in the 
exhibition. Here were Christmas cards, fireworks, and fishing tackle, followed by an 
exhaustive collection of ephemera devoted to fairs and circuses, much of it from 
Jones’s own collection. Although theatre, music, and even Punch and Judy shows all 
had their own displays, Jones didn’t find room for any material connected with  
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cinema or photography; she does not comment on this omission, but the catalogue 
introduction does suggest one rationale: 
 
Selection has been difficult: of course there is only room for a tiny fraction of 
the possible material, so we have left out architecture, furniture, gardening, 
heavy industry, railways, road transport, aviation, shop-windows and a lot of 
other things, because they are far too big to get into the gallery, and it is 
much better to have real, smaller things than photographs.204  
 
This implied rejection of the ‘camera eye’ demonstrates that the new gaze that Jones 
is promoting should be mediated by an instant and instinctive aesthetic response 
rather than the indexical realism of a photographic reproduction: she is interested in 
the aura and tactility of the individual object, and what it expresses. After sections on 
‘Printing’ and ‘Religion’, a whole display was devoted to ‘Man’s Own Image’, and 
that image was definitively not a photographic one: instead, the visitor was greeted 
by waxworks, hairdressers’ busts with wigs, a ventriloquist’s doll and a carnival 
head: three dimensional objects with a disturbingly uncanny resonance. Close by – 
after the tattoos of ‘Personal Adornment’ – came ‘Pictures’ which presented another 
kind of image-making. This was far from any idea of canonical fine art: here were 
anonymous amateur paintings of eccentric subjects, including the ‘primitive’ work of 
the spiritualist Miss M. Willis, whose canvases were produced, as she claimed, by 
the method of ‘automatic’ painting guided by the spirit world. The specific Willis 
painting chosen by Jones for display was ‘Lord Kitchener in his coffin’ – a vision 
that no human eye had ever witnessed, since he was lost at sea in 1916 when HMS 
Hampshire struck a German mine off the coast of Orkney. The fact that his body was 
never recovered led to a famous hoax in which a coffin supposedly containing his 
remains was passed off by a conman called Frank Power, but was opened to reveal 
that it was empty.205 In Willis’s picture, like the Sutton Hoo ship burial, a missing 
corpse is made present despite its absence, through the agency of a material thing.  
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‘Monstrosities and curiosities’: outsider cultures and disrupted temporality 
Spirituality was left behind for the climax of the exhibition, which focused on the 
most everyday objects. The ‘Commerce and Industry’ section featured wrappers, 
labels, carrier bags and advertising material, throwaway items which would blend 
into the material world outside the gallery and – Jones hoped – encourage visitors to 
take their newly calibrated aesthetic framework with them when they left. Clearly, 
Jones’s purpose was not just to expand the traditional aesthetic canon to include the 
best of the vernacular. Rather, she expressed a desire to situate her revolutionary 
aesthetic within the mid-century’s new appreciation of how objects can become focal 
points in the restless onrush of history and time. Her instant classics, which become 
collectable as soon as they are manufactured, speed up the inevitable process by 
which time confers a patina of acceptability onto humble things. Like ‘the great 
collector Pachinger’ mentioned by Benjamin in The Arcades Project, who stoops to 
pick up ‘a misprinted streetcar ticket that had been in circulation for only a few 
hours’ and yet has been the object of his search for weeks, Jones’s practice 
telescopes, accelerates or reverses temporal linearity.206 This untethering of objects 
leads, according to Benjamin, to a radical uncertainty about the status of ordinary 
things: ‘[Pachinger] hardly knows any more how things stand in the world; explains 
to his visitor – alongside the most antique implements – the use of pocket 
handkerchiefs, hand mirrors, and the like.’ Moreover, Benjamin’s collector can 
repurpose any object into an optical instrument, seeming ‘to look through them into 
their distance, like an augur’.207 For Jones, the disruption of time implied by her 
curation of the everyday also leads to a new way of seeing value and identity. In the 
traditional understanding of popular art, a century-old Staffordshire Spaniel ‘may be 
safely admired’, she writes, yet a contemporary ceramic gilded Alsatian is ‘beneath 
critics’ contempt’. She goes on: 
 
England is at this moment crammed with popular art before which most art 
lovers quail in alarm, but still most of them will ultimately become QUAINT, 
then CHARMING and at last GOOD.208 
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She makes it clear that the link between social acceptability and the passage of an 
object from present to past (and from private to public) is part of the stratification of 
taste which she is hoping to disrupt. In the book (based on her series of articles in 
Architectural Review) that accompanied the exhibition, The Unsophisticated Arts, 
she writes: 
 
[The objects’] steady ritual progress will follow clearly ordained lines; via 
the appreciation of the common man into almost total oblivion, out again to 
the intellectual home, onward to the antique shops and finally to permanent 
deification in wealthy drawing rooms and museums.209 
 
During the blitz, this spatial and temporal schema had been reversed; in Powell and 
Pressburger’s The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp (1943), for instance, a collection 
of taxidermied hunting trophies undergo a profound transformation when his house 
is bombed: they are picked out of the rubble by the Demolition Squad, who are first 
baffled, then amused by their archaic appearance. Freed from their fixed meaning as 
status symbols or witnesses to skilful marksmanship, they are presented first as 
mere, dusty rubbish to be cleared away with the rest of the detritus, but finally are 
recognized as potential playthings. ‘It’ll do for hoopla anyway’, says one man of a 
buffalo head he has pulled out of the rubble, before using a large boar as a jokey 
prop when he’s queuing for his cup of tea.210 The drawing-room status-symbols, 
which had calcified into quasi-museal artefacts in the trophy room, lose this meaning 
once their material context has been dismantled; they transform smoothly into low-
status novelty items which can be repurposed on a whim as toys. It’s the opposite 
trajectory to the one by which ancient and folk items, once in everyday use, accrete 
value over time as items of novelty, then connoisseurship, and finally reverence as 
historic artefacts; once this linear evolution of objects has been overthrown, Jones is 
free to confer museal status even onto things as ephemeral as sweets and paper bags.  
Yet it is not by accident that she exhibited the objects in an art gallery rather 
than a museum. Museums, as Tony Bennett has shown, are places where power 
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relations are reified in order to achieve or reinforce social schemata. As Bennett puts 
it in ‘The Exhibitionary Complex’: 
 
Through the provision of object lessons in power – the power to command 
and arrange things and bodies for public display – [museal institutions] 
sought to allow the people, and en masse rather than individually, to know 
rather than be known, to become the subjects rather than the objects of 
knowledge.211 
 
In Bennett’s Foucauldian analysis, however, this invitation to subjecthood comes at a 
disciplinary price: 
 
Yet, ideally, they sought also to allow the people to know and thence to 
regulate themselves; to become, in seeing themselves from the side of power, 
both the subjects and the objects of knowledge, knowing power and what 
power knows, and knowing themselves as (ideally) known by power, 
interiorizing its gaze as a principle of self-surveillance and, hence, self-
regulation.212 
 
For visitors to the Whitechapel Gallery, however, any institutional performance of 
power was compromised by the bold claims being made by the objects to the status 
of art, rather than ethnographic or sociological specimens. If – by seeing themselves 
in everyday objects and popular decorative practices – visitors were invited to 
participate in a process of knowing and being known, then this was a complication of 
the subject/object distinction rather than a simple reversal. As presumptive art-
objects, the chaotically displayed paper bags, Christmas crackers and advertising 
posters were refusing to lie quietly in their aesthetic categories, and their 
recalcitrance offered a mirror to visitors who might also resist hierarchies of taste 
and culture. And in showcasing the visual culture of fairs, circuses and other 
‘outsider’ cultures, Jones was evoking the kinds of public display-spaces which 
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preceded the establishment of educative institutions, and which were associated, 
according to Bennett, with ‘riot, carnival, and, in their sideshows, the display of 
monstrosities and curiosities which, no longer enjoying elite patronage, were now 
perceived as impediments to the rationalizing influence of the restructured 
exhibitionary complex.’213 
 
‘A little dog is nice’: autonomous objects gaze back 
An earlier exploration of traditional decorative arts, Noel Carrington’s 1945 Popular 
Art in Britain had focused on craft objects like horse brasses, smocking and 
ironwork hinges and had expressly placed them outside the system of taste, thus 
inoculating visitors from any revolutionary potential they might suggest.214 
Carrington instead prescribed a moratorium on rational critique as the best strategy 
for appreciating such handwork. ‘The real test of merit in such works is certainly 
emotional,’ he states. ‘To classify and rationalise too far will not prove 
rewarding.’215 Jones, in contrast, wanted to challenge taste and engage criticism in a 
new way; indeed, she asserted that the objects she exhibited were doing valuable 
work by tackling subjects that serious art was not addressing, namely the discomfort 
and even horror produced by the surreal juxtapositions of everyday life. In spite of 
its profusion of sentimental ephemera involving birthday cakes and dressed-up 
kittens, her catalogue explicitly rejects irony as the defining rationale of her 
curatorial practice. The introduction deliberately peels away the layers of potential 
‘charm’ with which nervous connoisseurs might want to excuse their appreciation of 
the objects in the exhibition. First, she allows that some of the more abstract exhibits 
happen to chime with ‘current art fashions’ and ‘could go straight into an exhibition 
of modern art’. Dismissing that as an invalid criterion for acceptance, she then 
concedes the temptation to read other items through the lens of patriotic ideas about 
the ‘vigour, humour and precision’ of British art. But finally she insists that we look 
frankly at the objects ‘we think[…] are ugly’, the ‘artificial flowers, bus tickets, lino 
[…] and Brumas hotwater bottles’.216 ‘The popular arts’ she says, 
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also keep certain other characteristics which are at this moment less evident 
in the fine arts, such as horror, and realistic representation. Realism is a 
strong vernacular urge – a little dog is nice; let us have one for our calendar, 
our mantelpiece, for a doorstop or a fireplace. He is made of flock paper, 
pottery, iron or tiles, as like as may be. He expresses the artist, of course, but 
not deliberately: the dog is more important than the man.217 
 
This rejection of Romantic self-expression was exemplified by the profusion of 
animals, both in effigy and stuffed, which strayed into most sections of the 
exhibition, from ‘Agriculture’ to ‘China’ and ‘Pet’s Corner’ to ‘Drinking’. Here, the 
animal gaze that meets the spectator’s critical eye suggests a rival subjectivity 
inhabiting the object. A taxidermied animal can be understood as the ultimate in 
tautological realism: the object is fashioned out of the very thing it is called upon to 
represent; it is what it is. On the other hand, it speaks also of the ‘horror’ that Jones 
refers to as lacking in fine art: the stuffed simulacra represent the uncanny 
persistence of the dead in life, the porosity of the border between presence and 
absence.  
Taxidermy could also be called on to provide a gloss on the class-stratification 
of cultural expression. In The Unsophisticated Arts, Jones notes the difference 
between hunting trophies in standard poses, fashioned from the ‘reliable parcels’ 
sent home by experienced safari veterans, and the sentimental souvenirs of pet-
owners. ‘The sorrowful,’ she says, ‘have ideas. They try to explain, with gestures 
and inadequate grey snapshots, the little ways of Rover.’ It’s a typically wry 
observation, but it also implicitly challenges the vertical model of aesthetic value. 
Rover’s preserved pelt has as much meaning stuffed into it as the hunter’s masks or 
rugs; perhaps more, because the ‘sorrowful’ want to preserve the particularities of 
subjective affect, not just make a symbolic statement about status and power. The 
bereaved pet-owner requires an object that will look back at its maker/spectator, and 
collaborate in the production of meaning in the space between. 
Now the uncanny begins to intrude into the fantasy of mimesis. The reason we 
have always liked stuffed animals until today, Jones explains, is that ‘many of them 
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[were] enclosed in their accustomed cases, removed from us into their special glass 
world’. In contrast, modern specimens ‘stand free, and come too close to us.’218 And 
while she praises the anthropomorphic tableaux of Walter Potter’s Museum 
collection of taxidermied scenes (the most famous of which, ‘The Death and Burial 
of Cock Robin’, was displayed at the Black Eyes exhibition) as ‘magnificent – 
stuffed Academy painting’219 she closes the chapter on a shudder, with a description 
of a mermaid ‘sold to gullible sailors’ that is  
 
half baby anthropoid ape and half fish, stuffed together and embellished with 
breasts and a wig. Today it is old and shrivelled and deceives nobody, but its 
demi-semi humanity is horrible, and fills one with pleasure that the law, or 
some technical trouble with the skin, prevents us from having dead Auntie 
stuffed to hold a standard lamp.220  
 
The unheimlich hybrid, too close to home for comfort, is central to Jones’s 
conception of popular art as both a reservoir and release-valve for horror. The horror 
of death-in-life and life-in-death appears in her tentative definition of the difference 
between the embalmed corpse of folk art and the restless transience of the popular 
(‘most of the folk arts are dead, or self-consciously preserved by societies’).221 And 
it’s there in her valorization of objects that ‘lean to disquiet, the baroque and 
sometimes horror’: 
 
Fear is concealed by sophisticated man, and today in any case he has less of 
it to express, as urban amenities are driving the dark edges round the cities 
further and further towards the sea. But horror still appears suddenly in 
peaceful streets and fields, finding expression in Punch and Judy or the 
Police Gazette, in a ventriloquist’s dummy, in sad wooden architecture by 
riversides, in the little tents that house the freaks at a fair.222 
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But in choosing the image of ‘dead Auntie stuffed to hold a standard lamp’ as the 
closing line of her chapter on taxidermy, Jones is perhaps also alluding to the 
infamous case of Ilse Koch, widow of the Buchenwald camp commandant, who had 
been sentenced to life imprisonment in the US in 1948 for atrocities including 
making lampshades of out the tattooed skin of Jewish prisoners. Released on appeal, 
she was subsequently retried for the same crimes in Germany, the case running from 
November 1950 to January 1951, just when Jones was preparing her exhibition and 
writing her book. The complication of subject and object, homely and horrific, which 
characterises Jones’s theory and practice, gets a chilling final twist with this buried 
Holocaust reference to humans transformed into objects as the most radical extreme 
of murderous othering. 
The recalcitrant objects in Jones’s exhibition, which often hint at the uncertainty 
of aesthetic systematization, also offer a paradigm of resistance to such othering. 
Whether art or quasi-art, they refuse to be harnessed to the service of the subjectivity 
that creates or contemplates them, instead achieving an agency of their own by 
slipping between semantic categories and conferring similarly fluid status onto their 
makers, owners and users. Many are objects disguising their utility and identity by 
adopting the form of something else: thus we have doorstops in the shape of a sheep, 
loaves in the shape of cottages, a whisky decanter in the shape of a monk (‘head is 
detachable as a cork’)223 and a ‘model of the rotunda of Brighton Pavilion containing 
a nutmeg grater’.224 Jones’s observation that the dog is more important than the man 
had been conditioned by the sensorium of war and postwar displacement, in which 
familiar objects, defamiliarized at the point of their potential annihilation, seemed 
disturbingly close to declaring their own subjective intent. Jones’s curatorial practice 
was a response to this uncanny fusion of life and art, subject and object. The 
cornucopia of tinsel pictures, grave goods, corn dollies, fairings and swag at the 
Black Eyes exhibition was not just an evocation of plenty, or an exercise in nostalgia; 
it was a room full of uppity witnesses, staring back at the art insiders who came to 
judge them.  
For the critic Nevile Wallis, writing in The Observer in August 1951, Jones’s 
exhibition compared unfavourably with another at the RBA Galleries called British 
Taste which traced fashions in art over a century to conclude that ‘every age sees 
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with different eyes, and the work of revaluation is endless’.225 Evidently Wallis 
could not see that such revaluation would ever encompass the objects in Black Eyes 
and Lemonade: 
 
If the vagaries of ‘informed’ taste are unpredictable, unwavering is the 
loyalty of the wholly uninstructed […] The arts of the pavement artist, the 
wedding cake baker, and the toymaker prove as sure as the early food posters 
and the tile fireplace in the form of an Airedale, that popular art exists only to 
satisfy the simplest human curiosity. 
 
A month later, however, another review appeared in The Observer. Patrick 
O’Donovan praised Black Eyes as ‘wickedly entertaining’ and attempted to meet it 
on its own terms: 
 
The things – hung on the wall and piled in cases – range from china dogs to 
fireworks and memorial cards to footstools. They have a few qualities in 
common. They are all cheap; they are very complicated; they are bright and 
they are often sentimental or cruel. There is none of the realism that is said to 
be an essential quality in Peoples’ Art. Indeed there is a hankering after 
splendour here, much dreaming of Marble Halls. And the general effect is not 
so much ugly as sad, a sense of indefinable loss under all the cheerfulness 
and noise.226 
 
Crucially, O’Donovan understood that ‘there is no attempt to pass any aesthetic 
judgment’. Unlike Wallis, who found no meaning in the objects but concluded 
ironically that their ‘perfect naiveté results in purest art’, O’Donovan saw that Jones 
was using them suggestively, like the Sutton Hoo treasures, to describe what wasn’t 
directly represented: ‘Whether they are beautiful or not is beside the point. This 
exhibition is a better portrait of England than some of the more portentous displays 
on the South Bank.’227 
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‘Oriental flavour’: popular alterity and mass alienation 
Yet the touristic overtones of Black Eyes and Lemonade also begs questions about 
the orientalization of working-class culture. To some extent, an implied exoticism 
simply helps to situate the objects within their newfound gallery context by 
comparing them to the expressions of geographically or temporally distant cultures. 
But many of the Black Eyes exhibits also demonstrate how the stylistic promiscuity 
of the popular naturally infuses indigenous British subcultures with the tang of 
otherness. The exhibition’s title borrows its evocation of an easily assembled 
festivity from the orientalist poet Thomas Moore: ‘A Persian’s heaven is easily made 
| Tis but – black eyes and lemonade.’228 This quotation was chosen, according to 
Jones’s introduction to the exhibition catalogue, because it ‘seem[ed] to express the 
vigour, sparkle and colour of popular art rather better than the words “popular 
art”[…] Even the oriental flavour is valid, for English decoration is always 
susceptible to exotic influences.’229 In her early draft she had expanded on this 
theme: ‘Today,’ she wrote, ‘there can hardly be an alien style left in the world that 
has not first excited the artists, been absorbed or discarded by the various 
movements of British painting, then taken up by the cultured and at last adopted 
generally or left high and dry.’ And while ‘decorative impulses from foreign parts 
during the eighteenth century […]were at least fifty years filtering down’ from high 
to low culture, such tardiness is no longer the norm: ‘If it does catch the popular eye 
it can sweep England in a month, produced by the million – Mickey Mouse.’230 
The reference to Disney – epitome of disposable American cinema, with 
Mickey Mouse as the ultimate merchandisable commodity – reminds us that US 
culture was still considered exotic in the mid-century. It was this alterity which the 
Independent Group were to harness in the name of pop art; Eduardo Paolozzi, in 
particular, had been collecting American magazine illustrations since the 1940s, and 
reimagining them for collages about restless consumer desire, such as Dr Pepper 
(1948). Indeed, he presided over the first meeting of the Independent Group in 1952, 
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where he displayed a series of such images via an epidiascope and called the 
resulting collection Bunk!.231  
The connection between Jones and the Independent Group has not always been 
generally accepted. Anne Massey’s seminal 1995 study argues that the Independent 
Group were defined by their antipathy to folk revivalism and the pre-masticated 
light-modernism of Festival of Britain style.232 She lumps Jones in with Noel 
Carrington and the other heritage-fanciers who provided a distraction from ‘the 
realities of living in ugly, bombed-out cities’,233 but in quoting Jones’s observation 
that ‘mass production makes its own traditional arts’234 Massey misses the radical 
redefinition of tradition that this implies. In fact, Jones’s desire to bring ordinary 
material objects into the conceptual fine-art space of the gallery not only references 
the readymades of Marcel Duchamp (although she would reject the idea that, by 
being exhibited as art, such things are inducted into a new mode of being), but also 
provides a commentary on André Malraux’s ‘Le Musée Imaginaire’, in which he 
proposed the abolition of the strictures which the museum placed on the definition of 
art, and which influenced the Independent Group in the early 1950s. More recently, 
Catherine Moriarty recreated some of the original displays for a 2013 exhibition at 
the Whitechapel, Black Eyes and Lemonade: Curating Popular Art and explicitly 
traced the connections between the Independent Group and Jones’s project, 
specifically comparing Jones’s ‘quality of pathos’ to the work of Nigel Henderson. 
Indeed Henderson also contributed an exhibit to Black Eyes, ‘Bookie’s tickets from a 
racetrack: 1950’, which appeared in the ‘Transport’ section under the heading ‘The 
Horse’. Moriarty is wary, though, of overstating the connection: 
 
‘Perhaps 1951 is best considered as an unusual moment of collision between 
the concerns of a thirty-nine year old designer and those of a younger 
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generation when, albeit briefly, their approach to the popular and the 
exhibition as a site of enquiry, were aligned.’ 235 
 
Yet arguably, the connection was more long-lived than Moriarty is prepared to 
allow: Lawrence Alloway, for instance, praising Dada in 1956, used terms that 
closely echo Jones’s Black Eyes catalogue when he asserts that ‘a work of art may be 
made of bus tickets or it may look like an advertisement. It may be an ad.’236 Gillian 
Whiteley, meanwhile, argues that ‘Black Eyes pioneered not just a “popular 
aesthetic”, but […] is connected to a contemporaneous burgeoning anthropological 
approach to the “populous”’, which she also traces in Eduardo Paolozzi’s work in 
particular.237 Jones herself rejected the anthropological approach, as can be seen in 
her handwritten catalogue draft, in which she drew a distinction between her own 
curatorial ambitions and the way vernacular arts enter most museums as 
‘sociological exhibits’.238 Instead of using her displays merely to present 
contemporary mass culture as an exotic curiosity, she was interested in how 
otherness was being reinterpreted and ultimately inducted by the popular arts. 
As we shall see later in this chapter, the Independent Group harnessed 
American otherness to make claims about the future of British art and society; Jones, 
on the other hand, wanted to show how the historical and geographical Other had 
already been assimilated. To an extent, her exhibition’s narrowly ‘British’ frame of 
reference was in line with the rest of the Festival of Britain’s inward-looking agenda. 
As Becky Conekin has noted, ideas about empire, decolonization and migration were 
notably absent from the Festival; she argues that this silence was due to a 
combination of embarrassment about the end of the empire as a ‘loss of British 
power and prestige in a period already filled with disappointment and uncertainty’ 
and a new emphasis on science, rather than foreign adventure, as the motor of British 
discovery.239 One exception was an exhibition of ‘Traditional Art and Sculpture 
from the Colonies’ at the Imperial Institute, and its catalogue, written by William 
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Fagg (then the assistant keeper of anthropology at the British Museum), provides a 
curious echo of Jones’s in that it emphasises the importance of a recalibration of 
perception: 
 
The European who seeks to ‘understand’ what is usually called ‘primitive’ 
art, to cultivate a state of mind and heart receptive to its strange forms and 
rhythms, must begin by divesting himself of some of the assumptions which 
are so fundamental in modern European thought that he is probably 
unconscious of the part which they play in forming his own reactions to art 
and to life.’240  
 
The idea that modernity would have difficulty with the aesthetic of African art had 
recently been rejected by the ICA’s Herbert Read, who in 1948-49 had staged 40,000 
Years of Modern Art in an attempt to draw comparisons between the two. However, 
the air of self-congratulation evident in the press conference Read gave prior to its 
opening suggests a similarly condescending attitude to non-Western culture: 
 
The art of primitive people is no longer to us merely a manifestation of the 
disgusting idol worship of savages and cannibals. We have discovered in it 
powers of invention and expression which fill us with amazement and seem 
to point the way to new forms of art which can combine primitive vitality 
and vision with modern technique and sensibility.’241  
 
Both Read and Fagg were asserting that non-Western art was so inexplicable and 
foreign that only viewers with an elevated level of connoisseurship would be able to 
understand it. The ‘oriental’ flavour that Jones found in British popular art, on the 
other hand, argued that assimilation of the Other into twentieth-century mass culture 
could be almost instantaneous. She was working at a time when postwar ‘displaced 
persons’ were still in the news; in 1945, there were between twenty and thirty 
million stateless refugees in Europe, ‘myriads of desperate, sick and starving 
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people’, as Lord Reading put it in a House of Lords debate.242 A year later, this 
figure was estimated to be down to 500,000 and the UNO’s short-lived Special 
Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons was wound up. 243 By 1951 Britain 
had absorbed 85,429 refugees, mainly from Eastern Europe.244 The 
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was set up that year and 
resettled 155,000 people in its first two years, many to America, Canada, Australia 
and South America, but by this time there were also significant new Polish 
communities in Britain, both in London and in the ‘temporary’ camps – some of 
which existed into the 1960s – which were set up in rural areas after the Soviet 
annexation of Eastern Poland.245 Outside Britain, the creation of Israel in 1948, while 
solving part of Europe’s refugee problem, was seen to have ‘created a large and 
intractable problem of displaced Arabs’, as a Times editorial put it in 1956.246 This 
editorial also noted that 70,000 refugees still remained in 200 European Displaced 
Person camps. Meanwhile, colonial immigration was beginning to influence British 
urban culture sufficiently to interest social anthropologists like Michael Banton, 
whose 1955 study of Cable Street in Stepney, The Coloured Quarter: Negro 
Immigrants in an English City, set out the problems of the newly coined ‘racial 
relations’.247   
Jones’s collection was heavily influenced by the culture of displacement: barge 
decorations, fairground attractions, circuses and ships’ figureheads were the work of 
travelling people whose internationalism was embedded in their style. Jones’s point 
was that creativity is restless and unbounded; by borrowing the Moore quotation for 
her exhibition’s title, she was making explicit the connection between modern 
aesthetic promiscuity and the respectable borrowings of the Arabian Nights boom 
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which had inspired Moore’s Intercepted Letters. This craze had been triggered in 
1704, when the French translator Antoine Galland had published The Arabian Nights 
Entertainments based on three volumes of Syrian manuscripts he had collected while 
working in the Middle East.248 These appeared in English in a Grub Street version 
published in the London News between 1723 and 1726, and sparked a craze that, as 
Marina Warner puts it, ‘fired a train of imitations, spoofs, turqueries, oriental tales, 
extravaganzas, pantomimes, and mauresque tastes in dress and furniture: the sofa, 
the brocade dressing gown, coffee itself.’249 As Ros Ballaster points out in Fabulous 
Orients, the passage of these stories was not a straightforward cultural translation: 
 
Stories are not simple freight; in their passage from East to West they are 
often radically altered to become hybrid commodities and the bearers of 
multiple new meanings. Thus, through their ostensible depiction of life in the 
eastern harem, the Arabian Nights Entertainments could, amongst other 
things, provide a window for English readers into the ‘précieuse’ culture of 
the eighteenth-century French salon.250  
 
The visual markers of Oriental style had washed out, by the middle of the 
twentieth century, to the margins of popular culture, where Jones found them in the 
arabesque patterns of painted bargeware and the miniature Brighton Pavilion nutmeg 
grater. But Jones’s intervention sought to reverse this trajectory, reinstating to this 
style the prestige of the museum, and incidentally dispelling any notion that cultural 
value could only be authentic when fixed by a static class system of taste.251 On the 
contrary, Jones finds value in the unruly translations and tireless reiterations by 
which an archaic and exotic text could be transmitted into the homely visual and 
material cultures she encountered. Indeed, it was the disconnection of culture from 
texts that accounted for the popularity of intricate decoration in vernacular art: 
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Complexity is obviously the legacy of illiteracy and a simple way of life; only 
those who cannot read and write remember long ballads, or elaborate 
smocking patterns; only those who live such a separate and lonely life as that 
of canal boatmen will create elaborate layers of decoration round their daily 
lives.252  
 
The restlessness of the rich patterning never allows the eye to wallow in easeful 
contemplation; like the travelling populations that preserve them, popular arts are 
‘complex, unsubtle, often impermanent, they lean to disquiet.’253  
Jones’s theorization of the vernacular thing-world also turns on what Marina 
Warner terms the ‘dream of plenitude’.254 Mauresque furniture and pleasure à la 
turque had challenged the Enlightenment’s hard-headed denial of magical thinking 
along with the hard edges of Georgian and Regency design. In the mid-century, an 
analogous process was happening in relation to the strictures of high modernism and 
its status as the taste of an elite audience. Jones, though, was taking this process one 
step further, removing the artist as mediating subjectivity and attempting to tap into 
the cultural resonance of objects in themselves, via a curatorial practice that relied on 
the chaotic contiguity of the junk shop to throw up a kind of ‘found’ meaning.255 She 
was less interested in the kind of Mass-Observation-style valorization of ordinariness 
that had characterised pre-war counter-modernism, than in the elevation of a new 
category of the extraordinary, neither pseudo-primitive nor sophisticated, but shouty 
and unselfconscious.  
 
‘Torture through the ages’: laughing machines and working-class dreams 
Alongside the ad-hoc exoticism of popular baroque, Jones was also fascinated by 
modern, machine-made faux-luxuries:  
 
To draw a rigid line between hand and machine-made works of art is 
unrewarding […] Somewhere there is a dividing line between tool (allowed 
as hand) and machine, but it is very difficult to say exactly where, and so far 
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the human brain has always dictated just what the machine shall produce. It 
will be interesting to see what popular arts are produced by cybernetics.256 
 
Her interest in post-human art shows that she was prepared to look towards a 
technological future in which human subjective expression was entirely redundant, 
not as the gloomy end-point of traditional craft, but as an exciting new efflorescence 
in the arabesque progress of the vernacular, with the products of man and machine 
on a continuum of decorative and creative possibility. But others saw the 
intervention of machines into mass culture as symptomatic of cultural aridity. 
Lyndsey Anderson’s 1953 film short O Dreamland was a portrait of Margate’s 
Dreamland amusement park, featuring a static funfair, penny arcades, bingo, a 
‘Swiss beer garden’ complete with jerky automata, and an animatronic freak show 
displaying torture through the ages. The film touches on similar themes to the Black 
Eyes and Lemonade exhibition – horror, animals, uncanny human simulacra – but 
there is no affection for the flimsy baroque of the seaside, and no sense of a coherent 
aesthetic pulling the disposable novelties together. Instead, the tone is one of frank 
disgust: against a soundtrack of false, recorded laughter and the robotic sing-song of 
the bingo-callers, Anderson shows crowds of silent, unsmiling visitors trudging 
along litter-strewn walkways, caged animals pacing glumly up and down, and 
assembly-line fun as a weary substitute for freedom from work. By lingering over 
the scenes of torture rigged up as a form of entertainment, Anderson seems to be 
suggesting an analogy between the mechanical spectacle and mechanical 
punishment, although he finds no scope for sympathetic exchange between the 
reified fun seekers and their robotic counterparts on the rack and the electric chair. 
The film was one of three which formed the National Film Theatre’s first Free 
Cinema programme in 1956: the others were Lorenza Mazzetti’s Together and 
Momma Don’t Allow by Karel Reisz and Tony Richardson. They were not filmed as 
a group effort, although some of the personnel overlapped; instead, it was Anderson 
who gathered the films, ad hoc, under the Free Cinema banner and wrote a short 
manifesto retrospectively, which proved to be an excellent way of garnering interest 
and publicity: 
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No film can be too personal. 
   The image speaks. Sound amplifies and comments. 
   Size is irrelevant. Perfection is not an aim. 
   An attitude means a style. A style means an attitude.257  
 
In a television programme he made in 1985, Anderson placed Free Cinema in a 
direct line from the 1930s documentary movement, Humphrey Jennings and Mass 
Observation, to the Angry Young Men of late-1950s theatre and the films of the 
British New Wave in the 1960s. He does not comment on the group’s links with the 
Independent Group, despite the obvious temperamental sympathy between film-
makers and fine artists who all wanted to engender a new way of looking at mass 
culture. This link was exemplified by the casting of Eduardo Paolozzi as one of the 
actors in Together. Set in the East End, Mazzetti’s film tells the story of two men 
(brothers or perhaps just friends) who work together on the docks and share a mean 
little room in a boarding house. They are deaf-mutes, and communicate with each 
other in sign language, signalling their self-contained isolation from the rest of 
society but also suggesting the beguiling possibility of secret cultures which are not 
susceptible to outside interpretation. Whereas Anderson’s camera intruded into 
Dreamland with appalled close-ups of ‘buttocks encased in grey, shapeless material 
[that] spread and crease over stools at counters’,258 Mazzetti’s holds back from her 
characters, framing them carefully within the urban landscape of dusty bombsites, 
narrow streets and the river’s sudden watery vistas. Paolozzi and the painter Michael 
Andrews (then a student at the Slade, where Mazzetti also studied) play the men with 
a kind of intense stillness; they pass in silence through the uproar of the docks, the 
local pub and even a funfair (represented here as a chaotic but not detestable place). 
In these public spaces they form a discrete unit but they find acceptance within the 
adult world, and even – for Andrews’s character – a thread of sexual fantasy. 
Tension arises, though, from the children who haunt the streets and follow them 
everywhere, taunting them for their difference. This childish bullying precipitates the 
film’s tragic climax, as Andrews’s character is pushed off a wall into the Thames 
and drowns in the water.  
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In a 2012 interview with Christophe Dupin in Sight & Sound, the Italian film-
maker explained that Together was an exercise in personal postwar recuperation. 
Both Mazzetti’s parents died when she was young and her aunt, who was bringing 
her up, was killed by the SS, along with her cousins; her uncle later committed 
suicide. She told Dupin: 
 
I had serious psychological problems because of my past, but as no one knew 
about it, the only way to express my anxiety was to translate it unconsciously 
into a film script […] I’d projected my own feeling of being different onto 
these characters, who were constantly followed by a group of children who 
shouted things they couldn’t hear.259  
 
Like harbingers of the future, the children seem to represent the break-down of a 
social order atomized by the bombs along with the fabric of the buildings. As the 
film’s title implies, the deaf-mute men will survive only as long as they stay 
together; Paolozzi’s character, the more withdrawn of the two, has trouble with the 
daily routines of washing and dressing, while Andrews’s, though more competent 
and cheerful, is physically weak and vulnerable. It is their co-operation that allows 
them to function in the world, and the heart-breaking upshot of the drowning is that 
the Paolozzi character, who had wandered away for a few minutes, returns to the 
baffling absence of his companion and can’t think of anything to do except continue 
to wait for him.  
According to her recollections in the 2012 interview, when Mazzetti first 
conceived it the film was originally called The Glass Marbles because of the 
fascination these objects have for Paolozzi’s character. He picks them up from the 
street, where we had previously seen the children playing with them, and then carries 
them everywhere with him, taking them out of his pocket from time to time to look 
at them and roll them in his hands. They are solid symbols, something to hold onto 
in a world often reduced to inexplicable abstractions because of his inability to 
communicate. An image of his self-containment – and reminiscent of the uncanny 
eyes plucked out by Hoffmann’s Sandman to feed his children – they also perhaps 
represent the camera’s glass eye and its ability to create a miniature world; they are 
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like Jones’s ephemera, too, in that Paolozzi’s character picks them out of the dross of 
the mundane and animates them with a new meaning and value. It is impossible, 
given the casting, not to see these characters as representing artists – and perhaps 
Mazzetti herself. Through these glass symbols of the artistic gaze, Mazzetti is surely 
saying something about the concrete vision of her semi-documentary filmic practice. 
The film’s lack of synchronized sound (a necessity of the low-budget techniques she 
and other Free Cinema film-makers used) is used to create an oneiric counterpoint to 
the everyday setting and to show the characters’ deaf-mute experience redefining 
their world with a supercharged visual perception. Mazzetti remembered rejecting 
some script additions by her then boyfriend Denis Horne, because what he wrote 
‘had lots of dialogue and what I really wanted was silence.’260  
But the marbles are also playthings, and symbolise the feral children who have 
tormented the men: at one point Paolozzi, in frustration, picks up a child and throws 
him upside down like a toy. If the glass eye of the artist is a toy, it is one that 
threatens loss as well as perception. Paolozzi takes care to hold on to the marbles, 
but he loses his brother. In the film’s closing moments, Mazzetti includes a shot of a 
barge chugging away down the river, oblivious to the violent drama that has just 
taken place. There is no Sutton Hoo-style object-enabled resurrection here – just a 
man who has sunk without trace. 
 
 
‘So different, so appealing’: the Independent Group’s mediation of art and objects 
Free Cinema’s examination of the ‘camera eye’ echoed many of the preoccupations 
of the Independent Group (IG). In 1951, for instance, Richard Hamilton chose to 
mark Festival year by displaying enlarged but otherwise uninterpreted scientific 
images of natural morphology. The exhibition he curated at the ICA in Dover Street 
was inspired by a new illustrated edition of D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson’s On 
Growth and Form. It investigated how photography facilitates the scientific and 
technological mediation of nature, encouraging viewers to understand that natural 
artefacts, rather than offering sublime objects for Romantic contemplation, shared 
characteristics of rational design with machine-made products. Nigel Henderson, in a 
draft proposal for the exhibition, argued that it could influence ‘design trends’ and 
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promote the view of Sigfried Giedion, in Mechanization Takes Command (1948), 
that ‘the evolution from material and mechanistic conceptions must start from a new 
insight into the nature of matter and organisms’.261 Moreover, like Black Eyes, 
Growth and Form placed non-art images and objects into a gallery context, 
implicitly questioning the boundaries between art, design and ‘real life’, and 
problematizing the possibility of qualitative judgements based on socially derived 
semantic schemata or dependent on the provenance of the object and the 
connoisseurship of the viewer. Growth and Form thus creates a link between Black 
Eyes and the Independent Group’s 1953 ICA exhibition Parallel of Life and Art, as 
well as the 1956 ‘pop art’ exhibition at the Whitechapel, This is Tomorrow, all of 
which developed the idea of what an exhibition could be.  
When Parallel of Life and Art opened, Nigel Henderson made a speech at a 
panel convened at the Architectural Association in London to coincide with the 
exhibition, in which he explicitly referred to André Malraux’s Le musée imaginaire, 
describing the exhibition’s genesis, during which he and his collaborators brought 
together items from their ‘own private “imaginary museums”’. Rather than arising 
from a theoretical appreciation of the images’ artistic merit, the images themselves 
gave rise, through the act of their curation, to a theory after the fact: 
 
We often found that this exchange resulted in confirmation of our beliefs that 
we had happened upon something significant, that others responded in the 
same way to the visual impact of a particular image. Up to a point, that is, we 
found that we had a common working aesthetic, though we could none of us 
formulate a verbal basis for it. Eventually we decided to pool the material we 
already had and to continue to collect more in an attempt to elucidate what 
we had in common and the nature of the material moving us.262  
 
This puts the image-based practice of Henderson and his collaborators in a 
dialectical relationship with that of Jones, who enacted a redefinition of art not by 
noticing that non-art objects might resemble modern art by accident, but by insisting 
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that the museum encompass the somatic experience of unmediated materiality, and 
that the things she curated need not compromise their ‘unsophisticated’ thingliness 
for the sake of being understood as art. But could the viewer simultaneously perceive 
her objects’ art and artlessness, while recognizing the Whitechapel Gallery as an art-
space rather than a junk shop? And could the objects and artworks captured in 
Parallel of Life and Art retain their aesthetic status even when they were deliberately 
remediated and divorced from their auratic singularity? For Bill Brown, the ability of 
simple objects to appear in an exhibition is what distinguishes them from subjective 
Things. In his 2001 essay ‘Thing Theory’ he acknowledges resistance to the 
conjunction of ‘things’ and ‘theory’,  
 
not […] because things reside in some balmy elsewhere beyond theory but 
because they lie both at hand and somewhere outside the theoretical field, 
beyond a certain limit, as a recognizable yet illegible remainder or as the 
entifiable that is unspecifiable. Things lie beyond the grid of museal 
exhibition, outside the order of objects.263 
 
For the Independent Group, inspired by Malraux, things could be translated into art 
only by becoming images. As Hal Foster interprets it, Malraux’s validation of 
photographic reproduction does not shatter canonical tradition but 
 
provides the means to reassemble the broken bits into one metatradition of 
style, a new Museum without Walls whose subject is the Family of Man – 
and it is the very flow of a liquidated aura that allows all the fragments to 
course together in the River of History.264 
 
His language here evokes the defamiliarized sensorium of war-damaged cities, and 
indeed Malraux also conceived his idea of new perception in terms of exposure to 
exotic and uncanny new sights. He wanted photographic reproduction to open the 
eyes of art students not only to great paintings but to ‘a host of second-rank pictures, 
archaic arts, Indian, Chinese and Pre-Columbian sculpture of the best periods, 
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Romanesque frescoes, Negro and “folk art”, a fair quantity of Byzantine art’.265 
Similarly, Henderson looked to imagery from ethnography and anthropology to find 
echoes of the modern vernacular and a justifying aesthetic which might reconcile 
them. But whereas Read, in 40,000 Years of Modern Art, had looked to ancient, non-
Western art as theoretical cover for modernist transgressions against classicism, the 
Independent Group, and Henderson in particular, introduced the idea of alterity into 
practices much closer to home. 
From 1948-1952, Henderson lived and worked in Bethnal Green, where his 
wife Judith, a sociologist, was studying working-class social rituals on Chisenhall 
Road (and in particular, those of the family next door, the Samuels, whom 
Henderson also photographed extensively):  
 
Judith’s job was to take responsibility for a course called ‘Discover Your 
Neighbour’ [...] with the object of putting before professional people such as 
doctors, lawyers, probation officers, priests etc [...] an analysis of the 
historical conditioning forces acting on a community and bringing, over time, 
a cohesive system of attitudes, sympathies, prejudices – what you like – 
which would in some measure represent such a community.266 
 
His Bethnal Green photographs often feature the marks and scratches made by non-
artists on the walls and pavements of the streetscape – graffiti and hopscotch both 
appear – just as Jones featured billboards, shop signs and Mr McErnean the live 
pavement artist working on the gallery floor.267 Like the muralists and ruin-dwellers 
in the previous chapter, Henderson’s eye was informed by the strangeness of war 
damaged buildings: 
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Houses chopped by bombs while ladies were still sitting on the lavatory, the 
rest of the house gone but the wallpaper and the fires still burning in the 
grate. Who can hold a candle to that kind of real life Surrealism?268  
 
His response to this question of dismantling the boundaries that separate art 
from its spectator was Parallel of Life and Art, which presented photographic images 
as the fabric of an overwhelmingly immersive walk-through experience, suspending 
them from the ceiling and at all angles so that the viewer’s eye was flooded with 
competing perspectives. Visual consistency was instilled in the diverse array of 
radiographs, diagrams of spacesuits, and scenes from tribal ceremonies by the simple 
means of presenting them all in photographic form. This amounted to a rejection of 
the haptic and auratic properties of things and artworks. Original works by 
Henderson and Paolozzi were presented as photographs of themselves, and their 
American hero Jackson Pollock appeared in the form of a candid shot of him 
working in his studio, photographed by Hans Namuth and published in Life 
magazine. Photography was becoming, for Henderson, a way of creating distance 
between artist and object, which disrupted the authorial subject’s claim to self-
expression while at the same time allowing for the autonomy of the thing being 
observed. Reviewing the show in Art News and Review Bryan Robertson of the 
Whitechapel Gallery noted: ‘The exhibition […] leaves the spectator with the feeling 
that the barriers between the artist, the scientist and the technician are dissolving in a 
singularly potent way.’269 Other barriers were broken down as well: the juxtaposition 
of photomicrographs, aerial views and x-rays, alongside images from newspapers 
and books, dismantled hierarchies of scale and spatiality – an effect heightened by 
the installation, which suspended the panels in different planes and insisted on a 
novel perspective. Time, too, was disrupted and flattened, with ancient artifacts 
brought into dialogue with modern art, and both placed next to timeless natural 
forms. As Ben Highmore has pointed out, when Henderson photographed the 
installation, he placed his own young daughter Justin into shot beneath a photograph  
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of the remains of a dead child excavated at Pompeii;270 it is as if the Roman child, 
who was transformed into a thing first by the hot volcanic ash which encased it, and 
then by the act of unearthing it and turning it into an archaeological piece, has been 
resurrected within the suggestively open, dialogical and anachronic installation. 
Henderson’s interest in the recuperative potential of photography had already 
informed his experiments with photograms, a photographic technique (invented by 
Lázlo Moholy-Nagy) which turned everyday objects – he particularly favoured 
bomb-site debris – into images which combined a timelessly simple aesthetic with a 
scientistic diagram of their material form. This involved placing them in a 
photographic enlarger and passing light through them onto photosensitive paper to 
produce an image halfway between an x-ray and a technical drawing. But by the 
time he was working on ‘Patio and Pavilion’ in 1956, Henderson was confident 
enough of the articulacy of objects to remove the frame of photography and rely on 
the installation to mediate them. This shed-like space, which he created with 
Paolozzi and Alison and Peter Smithson for This is Tomorrow at the Whitechapel 
Gallery, was filled with artfully arranged junk and debris, much of it retrieved from 
bombsites. Some of them were simply placed on the floor or arranged on tables, 
others were placed on the translucent corrugated plastic of the pavilion’s roof, so that 
their ghostly forms were visible from within the structure, like a kind of three 
dimensional photogram. 
Members of the Independent Group made up twelve of the thirty-six 
participants in This is Tomorrow, which was conceived as a series of individual 
environments grappling with ideas about design and spatial habitats. It was described 
by Lawrence Alloway in the catalogue’s introduction as ‘a lesson in spectatorship’: 
 
[It] cuts across the learned responses of conventional perception. In This Is 
Tomorrow the visitor is exposed to space effects, play with signs, a wide 
range of materials and structures, which, taken together, make of art and 
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architecture a many-channelled activity, as factual and far from ideal 
standards as the street outside.271 
 
Patio and Pavilion took this definition to its most abstract extreme. As the 
Smithsons explained in a BBC radio programme about the exhibition: 
 
We worked on a kind of symbolic habitat in which are found responses, in 
some form or other, to the basic human needs […] The actual form is very 
simple, a ‘patio’ or enclosed space, in which sits a ‘pavilion’. The patio and 
pavilion are furnished with objects which are symbols for the things we need: 
for example, a wheel image for movement and for machines.272 
 
Presided over by Henderson’s large but enigmatically blank photocollage of a head 
(glossed in the catalogue as ‘for man himself – his brain & his machines’) and 
reverently displayed in a roped-off zone, the bombsite fragments of Patio and 
Pavilion resembled the precious relics retrieved from an archaeological dig. Robert 
Melville’s review in the Architectural Review found homeliness in the collection, 
commenting that the installation ‘returned us safely to the bicycle shed at the bottom 
of the garden in a singular tribute to the pottering man’.273 Yet Reyner Banham 
instead described the mesmeric accumulation of ‘objects, images, shards of real and 
imaginary civilizations dredged up from the subconscious of Eduardo Paolozzi, 
Nigel Henderson […] a kind of personal archaeology which you just had to stand 
and look at.’274 
The most famous image of the This is Tomorrow exhibition, though, must be 
Hamilton’s ‘Just what is it that makes today’s homes so different, so appealing?’, 
which evokes a different kind of visual articulacy: the mythopoeic aesthetic of 
consumer desire as expressed in American advertising imagery. In Hamilton’s 
collage, the walls of ‘today’s homes’ are unpunctured by bombs and unravaged by 
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time, but stand firm in their uninflected modernity. Yet the influx of exotic (they are 
exclusively American) mass-cultural signifiers nevertheless testifies to their porosity. 
The domestic scene is no more private here than it was for the lady sitting on the 
toilet of her blitzed house. The naked human form is as commoditised and rectified 
as the utilitarian label on the can of tinned meat; the Eve-figure’s lampshade hat 
recalls both Jones’s stuffed Aunty and, perhaps, Ilse Koch’s idea of ‘appealing’. This 
is collage as curated objets trouvés, the taxidermied appropriation of the materiality 
of real life. The television – which shows only the image of a one-sided telephone 
conversation – and the emphatically foregrounded reel-to-reel tape recorder, 
accentuate the capitulation of mass-media, which once promised utopian fluidity, to 
the sterility of the closed loop.  
Marshall McLuhan called advertising ‘the folklore of industrial man’,275 
connecting the domesticated desire for exotic plenitude with the ancient myth-
making of communal oral tradition. Hamilton’s picture seizes on American visual 
culture to solicit the same dialectic of estrangement and familiarity implicated in 
Jones’s decision to follow the traces of Oriental decoration from the street into the 
art gallery. Past, present, homely and strange come to occupy identical space-time in 
the uncannily shifting sands of postwar culture. The Sutton Hoo chieftain’s missing 
body has been replaced by a parodically power-wielding body builder, a place holder 
for the subject’s ultra-presence in advertising’s rhetoric of elusive identity. 
Confronted by objects and spaces which no longer frame experience in an easily 
interpretable way, material culture comes to be haunted by the idea of human 
subjectivity. As Jones puts it:  
 
A human figure stands perpetually behind each of us, and in solitude or 
darkness moves into the margin of focus, but never stands square in sight. 
Those of us who are most afraid seek to exorcise this figure by making its 
portrait, the horrid simulacra of man.276  
 
In the next chapter, the materiality of the body itself comes into focus as visual 
technologies enable new kinds of simulacra to stand in for the human subject. If the 
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gaze was a site of ideological conflict in the mid-century exhibition, the invention of 
television, and the spectrality of its images, would open up further questions about 
autonomy and power. 
  
 115 
CHAPTER THREE 
Machines and spectrality: the gothic potential of technology in Orwell, Grey Walter 
and Turing 
 
‘You need not be there.’ An advertisement for Pye television sets published in 1949 
strikes a surprisingly negative note about the new technological object it was 
promoting. The television set brought with it an unsettling sense of the uncanny: this 
apparatus which seemed to materialize things out of thin air, evoked a paradox of 
presence and absence. To compensate for any resistance this might cause in the 
buying public, Pye promoted its product as a way of dispensing with the nuisance of 
mere physical presence in favour of a superior ability to oversee and master the 
world. The accompanying illustration presented the undesirable, outmoded 
alternative to televisually mediated experience: a small, clownish cartoon figure is 
trying to view an unspecified spectacle, but is dwarfed by a solid wall of blank backs 
belonging to taller, more modern and – it is implied – more capable and assertive 
men. ‘Bert always likes to be there, but personally we prefer to see it, and we’re sure 
you do too,’ runs the caption. ‘There is no better way of doing this than by a Pye.’277 
The implied binary stand-off between vision and presence – ‘being there’ versus 
‘seeing it’ – marks the definitive moment of the television age partly because of the 
way it intersected with philosophical questions current at the same time, about 
whether or not human consciousness has a physical presence or is entirely 
immaterial. Of course, television was not the first visual prosthesis to materialize 
philosophical speculation. Indeed, machines in general, as a special category of 
object, had been susceptible to metaphorical appropriation since the Enlightenment, 
when Descartes compared certain aspects of the human mind (but not the soul) to 
clockwork: 
 
I should like you to consider that these functions (including passion, 
memory, and imagination) follow from the mere arrangement of the 
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machine’s organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other 
automaton follow from the arrangement of its counter-weights and wheels.278  
 
In the early twentieth century, Freud’s essay on ‘The Uncanny’ had pondered the 
confluence of optical instruments and automata in E. T. A. Hoffman’s ‘The 
Sandman’, which described a kind of technologically enhanced vision which made 
dolls look like living women, and real women look like mechanical trickery. In the 
decades leading up to Freud’s 1919 essay, photography and cinema had enlarged the 
scopic capabilities of the culture on a diachronic plane by carrying visual imprints of 
the past into the present; now, in the mid-century, live television promised to 
telescope space within a synchronic instant, bringing the spectacle into the home or – 
as in the Pye advertisement – carrying the home viewer into the spectacle as it 
happened. Thus the viewer is implicated in the process of dematerialization and 
rematerialization which the apparatus achieves; he or she is there and not there 
simultaneously. Arguably, the meeting point of viewer and spectacle is experienced 
as a third, middle zone, inside the medium itself. The idea of being ‘present’ escapes 
both time and space. 
This technological enhancement of human vision coincided with new ideas 
about human consciousness to contribute to a distinctive cultural turn. In this 
chapter, I will argue that one of the mid-century’s cultural responses to this 
prevailing atmosphere of innovation and uncertainty was a new iteration of the 
gothic, a genre which created its own kind of ludic ‘third space’ in which the 
uncanny resonances of modernity – its revenant truths and haunting perspectives, its 
other worlds and alternative life-forms – could be examined and confronted.279 The 
gothic mode, from Walpole onwards, has been characterized by the interventions of 
supposedly inanimate things into the human realm, in which they operate as solid 
metaphors for internal mental processes. Reading Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four as 
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a mid-century gothic text, it is possible to see how the medium of television could 
transform a real, solid thing, with an apparently immutable adhesion to the linearity 
of time and the geometry of space, into a historical anchor for, and sometimes a 
hostile witness to, human mutability. Conversely, new objects such as televisions 
and computers seemed capable of enabling the disruption of linearity and geometry, 
and of assuming a quasi-lifelike power over time and space. As we shall see later in 
the chapter, the gothic turn is clearly discernible in the writings of mid-century 
scientists investigating human thought, such as William Grey Walter and Alan 
Turing. Philosophical, neurological and cybernetic enquiry raised questions about 
the exact relationship between abstract thought and brain activity. Technological 
metaphors for human consciousness were revisited and redrawn to take account of 
new types of machine. Lacan’s mid-century development of Freud’s ideas depended 
on the age’s new technologies of presence and vision, while the novel images which 
came into being via the development of the cathode-ray tube gave rise to new ideas 
about what images themselves might be capable of.  
In the two previous chapters, I have examined what happened to the idea of art 
when everyday objects erupted into the realm of aesthetics; this chapter explores 
what happened to the idea of objects when images (mediated by technology) began 
to intervene in the territory of things. The analogy between images and objects – or 
images as objects – is itself essentially a gothic one, in that the blurring of 
boundaries between categories, coupled with an unease about the disruption of 
proper spatial and temporal order, produces an uncanny effect and supercharges the 
objects and images with meaning – meaning which often buckles and flexes under 
such semantic pressure. This idea is central to the postmodern theory of uncanny 
visual culture expounded by W. T. J. Mitchell in What Do Pictures Want?, in which 
he evokes the paradigm of Bill Brown’s Thing Theory to ‘shift the question from 
what pictures do to what they want, from power to desire, from the model of the 
dominant power to be opposed, to the model of the subaltern to be interrogated or 
(better) to be invited to speak.’280 Indeed arguably, he takes Brown’s theory even 
further into the gothic, attributing to picture-things not just a Thing-like interrogation 
of the subject/object dialectic but an agglomeration of qualities (‘animation[…] 
vitality[…] agency, motivation, autonomy, aura, fecundity’) that suggest that 
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‘pictures are something like life-forms’.281 The new televisual images of the postwar 
period seemed to contemporary audience to possess just this quality of life-likeness. 
Such images, for Mitchell, become tropic figures, like dream-objects, which reflect 
the consciousness of the human subject. Art, and by extension all media, create the 
essential context in which pictures manifest themselves as Brownian Things: ‘If 
images are life-forms, and objects are the bodies they animate, then media are the 
habitats or ecosystems in which pictures come alive.’282 But as thresholds or 
conduits for meaning, they are in a constant state of crisis, sucking in and spewing 
forth interchangeable subjects and objects:  
 
Perhaps this is the fundamental paradox built into the concept of media as 
such. A medium just is a ‘middle’, an in-between or go-between, a space or 
pathway or messenger that connects two things. […] The problem arises when 
we try to determine the boundaries of the medium. […] If media are middles, 
they are ever-elastic middles that expand to include what look at first like their 
outer boundaries. The medium does not lie between sender and receiver; it 
includes and constitutes them.283 
 
Jeffrey Sconce argues, from a similarly postmodern position, that television 
instantiates a ‘flowing metatextual empire’284 in which viewers ‘like ghosts and 
psychotics […] wander through a hallucinatory world of eternal simulation.’285 His 
history of Haunted Media describes American cultural responses to technological 
telepresence in terms of a repeated return to the gothic mood. His analysis identifies 
three recurring fictions – ‘disembodiment, teleportation and anthropomorphization’ – 
which respond to telecommunication’s ‘power to atomize and disperse both body 
and consciousness across the vast expanses of the universe.’286 He is less interested, 
though, in the dialectical relationship between this atomization and the world of solid 
objects which, I will argue, defines the mid-century in British culture.  
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Visions of the uncanny: cathode-ray tubes, telepresence and the mediated subject 
When the BBC television service launched in London in 1936, it had its own theme 
tune, sung by Adele Dixon. Intercut with exciting shots of hulking cameras and lab-
coated technicians sitting in front of banks of switches, the song referred to 
television’s ‘new enchantment’ and included the lines 
 
A mighty maze of mystic, magic rays 
Is all about us in the blue, 
And in sight and sound they trace 
Living pictures out of space 
To bring a new wonder to you.287 
 
This veneer of mysticality is striking but it was not unusual. All along, the 
technology which made television possible had been presented to the public as an 
uncanny phenomenon. An early US newspaper report about the invention of the 
Coolidge vacuum tube – a forerunner of both x-ray and cathode-ray tubes – 
describes the apparatus as ‘an alchemist that changes solids into liquids and liquids 
into solids’.288 Its tone is a mixture of awe and disquiet and its sub-headline, ‘what 
will it do for Humanity?’, hints at the related but less comfortable question: what 
will it do to Humanity? A Scientific Monthly article in 1926 continued the theme of 
the disquieting agency of cathode rays, remarking on various miraculous phenomena 
associated with the passage of electrons through a sealed glass tube, including a haze 
of light in the air, the materialization of a new yellow compound, and the 
observation of long- and short-lived luminescence in various substances.289 By the 
time the CRT was developed into a screen by devising a way to control the 
luminescence with electro-magnetic fields, these hand-blown pieces of heavy glass 
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were firmly understood as a kind of crystal ball, where messages materialized out of 
the ether. Viewers peering into one of the early television sets, which reflected the 
screen in a mirror lid, were invited to perceive themselves, not only as cutting edge 
early adopters, but also as soothsayers interpreting strange signs from another realm. 
From a scientific point of view, the discovery of cathode rays provided proof of the 
existence of subatomic particles and inaugurated the development of electronics. But 
the CRT also promised to redefine materiality. Whereas x-rays enabled human 
vision to access the inner lives of familiar things and human bodies, cathode rays 
seemed able to conjure new things into existence, and to access the inner life of the 
human mind.  
The uncanny was, like those magic mystic rays, ‘all about us in the air’ in the 
age of electronic technology. The BBC song shows a shaky grasp of the science 
involved and was based on the misconception that cathode rays are transmitted 
through the ether: they have leaked out, so to speak, from the television set and 
become confused with the rather less exotic radiowaves which actually transmitted 
the signal over the air. But this sense that cathode rays were ‘all about us’, an 
enveloping cloud out of which wonders would materialize, demonstrates how these 
new viewers became conceptually imbricated with the technology; the human 
subject was no longer merely a receiver of signs, but was understood as part of the 
picture.  
Freud’s essay on ‘The Uncanny’ is much concerned with reading and writing, 
and the double or ambiguous meanings which create an uncanny effect by allowing 
us to glimpse the traces of the unconscious: 
 
An uncanny effect often arises when the boundary between fantasy and 
reality is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something that we 
have until now considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full 
function and significance of what it symbolizes.290 
 
The cathode-ray screen similarly performs and makes apparent the process of 
interpretation and inscription: it operates as an autonomous reader and writer, 
reading an electronic code and reinscribing it in a palimpsest of pixellated lines, their 
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outputs operating independently of any human agenda. The cathode-ray tube might 
be described as an uncanniness machine, not only generating uncertainty about 
reality, but also exposing and dramatizing the machinery of semiotic response. 
Freud’s own chosen exemplar of unheimlich story-telling, E. T. A. Hoffmann’s ‘The 
Sandman’, itself dramatizes this process via the agency of a piece of scientific 
apparatus, in repeated encounters between a flawed reader, the neurotic Nathaniel, 
and the Sandman himself, who appears first as the alchemist Coppelius who 
threatens to burn out the young Nathaniel’s eyes, and later as the technician – Freud 
calls him an optician – who peddles barometers, telescopes, and other scientific 
prosthetics for human vision. For Freud, this emphasis on eyes was proof that the 
uncanny was connected with the post-Oedipal castration complex, but it is notable 
that his formulation of the Unheimlich depends on concepts which themselves 
uncannily duplicate the potentiality of cathode-ray tubes: not only the prioritization 
of ocularity and the gaze but the relationship between perception and deception, and 
the temporal and spatial displacement of objects which appear in the ‘wrong’ place.  
The crucial difference between television and earlier visual media like film 
lies in the way it visualizes and interprets time and space. For Benjamin, writing in 
the 1930s, film defined modernity; the immersive experience of the cinema seemed 
to him to be of a piece with modernism in its alertness to cutting and fragmentation 
and its unflinching surgical gaze; but the CRT screen was perhaps the first post-
modernist object, revealing the magical intimacy of subject and object and eliding 
completely the difference between artwork and audience. The television-viewing 
subject cannot partake of the powerful gaze described, for instance, in Laura 
Mulvey’s analysis of film as a constructed representation of desire.291 Cinema’s 
sense of occasion, its dark spaces and gigantic representation, invite complete 
absorption, whereas the flickering CRT image, around which the subject hunches 
and squints, cannot flatter the ego in this way. Because of the simultaneity of the 
image, the viewer perceives herself as projected through time and space, into the 
scene she is observing: she becomes another apparition, encountering the image in a 
middle zone, inside the medium itself. The idea of being ‘present’ shifts and curdles 
into telepresence.  
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Freud’s attribution of the Unheimlich to the return of superannuated emotions 
that have been repressed similarly describes a time- and space-shifted notion of 
presence; the uncanny effect is the flicker of recognition we experience when 
confronted with something that is both repressed and visible, both present and not-
present. Telepresence produces this strange and troubling flicker because we want to 
understand images as asynchronic, as pieces of congealed time, like paintings and 
photographs. Television, instead, like a mirror, presents the present, and then erases 
it. But unlike a mirror, it has no indexical relationship with reality. Freud’s definition 
of the uncanny describes a conflation of the familiar with the enigmatic, and the 
same nearness/strangeness binary is disrupted by telepresence and television. The 
images appearing on cathode screens slip between categories: they are mirrors and 
maps, they are pictures and they are codes. They operate in the Symbolic realm, the 
realm of mediation – of language and signification; and whereas – as in the Lacanian 
Mirror Stage – the mirror provides a glimpse of the imaginary wholeness of the ego, 
these uncanny television images withhold this wholeness and elide the ego and the 
mirror into a cyborgian hybrid. 
Hoffmann’s tale is concerned with an analogous piece of visual trickery: the 
telescope that Coppola sells to Nathaniel perverts his perception, allowing him to see 
the mechanical doll Olimpia as a real woman, and making his real fiancée Clara 
appear to be a false contraption. Freud writes: ‘It becomes clear that the author wants 
us too to look through the spectacles or the spyglass of the demon optician, and even, 
perhaps, that he has looked through such an instrument himself.’292 For Freud, 
Coppola’s apparatus enables Nathanial to spy on Olimpia; to broadcast himself 
across the space, as it were, between his room and her window in the opposite house, 
to bridge the gap between inalienable categories of signification, and thus to access 
the world of fiction and symbolism. But it also initiates an operation where the 
mediation and remediation of the Real causes devastating consequences for the 
imaginary ego. It reifies the human as well as animating and vivifying the fictional. 
At the end of the story, when Nathaniel stands at the top of a tower and tries, like a 
human transmitter, physically to throw himself into the rift of his mediated vision, he 
plunges to his death. 
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‘Involuntary and compulsive transmitters’: radar and the ghosts of war 
An early instance of the intersection of broadcast media and the gothic is the basis of 
Powell and Pressburger’s A Matter of Life and Death (1946).293 The film’s ghost – 
the fighter pilot Peter Carter, who cheats death and then must fight to stay out of 
heaven – is initially presented as a technological phenomenon; he avoids annihilation 
when he bails out of his plane without a parachute, because his spirit has become 
tethered, via his final radio broadcast, to a radio operator called June. Knowing he 
cannot survive, he insists on telling June the particulars of his life, first in a parody 
of bureaucratic form-filling – ‘Age: 27, 27 do you get that, that’s important. 
Education: interrupted, violently interrupted. Religion: Church of England. Politics: 
conservative by nature, Labour by experience’ – and then by way of Romantic 
lyricism, as he quotes his favourite poetry. Mind meets Sublime in Romantic fashion 
as Peter’s expression of soul is beamed out on radio waves into the universe. The 
film opens in deep space with a voiceover tour-guide pointing out galaxies and 
nebulas, and then gradually homes in on earth, which seems to be enfolded in a 
cacophony of radio voices. Finally, Peter’s voice is picked out and we follow it into 
the wrecked and burning aircraft where he straddles the threshold of life and death. 
By transmitting his spirit into the ether along with his voice, he manages to 
rematerialize, unharmed, on earth, but the film immediately puts this Romantic 
interpretation in doubt: both June and the local medic Dr Reeves believe the whole 
episode to be a hallucination brought about by a neurological blockage. A caption at 
the start of the film makes this conflict between psychopathology and imagination 
explicit: ‘This is the story of two worlds, the one we know and another which exists 
only in the mind,’ it reads, before scrolling upwards to reveal the rest of the 
sentence: ‘…of a young airman whose life and imagination have been violently 
shaped by war.’ 
When Peter is recalled to heaven, he lodges a legal appeal on the basis that he 
has fallen in love with June. But at his court case, his only witness is a material 
object – June’s fallen tear caught on a pink rose and solidified into glass in the 
timeless realm of the heavenly court. This object-witness helps to entrench the film 
within the gothic tradition, however firmly Peter’s ghostliness is excised by the 
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surgeon’s knife as he undergoes brain surgery. Moreover, Peter’s supernatural 
revenance is as much technological as medical, as he stresses himself when he 
mentions the ‘important’ fact of his age; since the film is set in May 1945, Peter 
must have been born in 1918, at the end of World War 1, and the beginning of the 
radio era. As a child of the medium, he can exist in it as his natural element – a 
facility which, as we will see later in this chapter, contrasts sharply with the fate of 
George Orwell’s Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four, born in ‘1944 or 1945; it 
was never possible nowadays to pin down any date within a year or two.’294 Winston 
was also born at the end of a war and the start of a new medium; but this condemns 
him to death rather than reprieving him from it. 
It was World War II that precipitated the superannuation of radio 
telecommunication by the development of visual media. By 1944, the invention of 
television’s military doppelgänger, radar, had started to be reported in the press. In 
November The Times reported the existence of a ‘complex mechanism […] known 
to RAF crews as the “gen-box” and to Americans as “mickey”’ which ‘enables 
bombs to be aimed with uncanny accuracy through cloud, smoke, haze, or 
darkness.’295 A month later, the Illustrated London News carried a full-page article 
featuring an artist’s impression of the technology and a more detailed explanation of 
how ‘the transmitter sends a downward signal at 186,00 miles per second, this hitting 
the earth beneath and bouncing upwards again at the same speed to the aircraft’.296 
Known as the ‘gen-box’ or ‘black-box’, the apparatus ‘receiving the echoed signals, 
translates them by an electronic system, employing the television principle, into a 
reproduction of the landscape in shadow-tone outlines on a fluorescent screen.’297  
In Optical Media, Friedrich Kittler asserts that television ‘would not have risen 
to world power without World War II’, and adds (borrowing from Paul Virilio’s War 
and Cinema) that its military forerunner did not simply enable but had the power to 
command perception: ‘Radar is an invisible weapon that makes things visible […] 
because it converts objects or enemies that do not want to be seen or measured at all 
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into involuntary and compulsive transmitters.’298 As the war progressed, this power 
extended, so that what had started as a defensive technology assumed an attacking 
role: radar stations were initially ‘connected by radio throughout all of southern 
England, and they could report attacking Messerschmitts or Heinkels of the German 
Luftwaffe even while the approaching planes were still invisible.’299 Later, ‘airborne 
radar first made their blind enemies on the Luftwaffe’s side visible, but after 1943 it 
also made the rivers, streets, and cities of the empire visible, which were destroyed 
by the carpet bombing of fighter-supported long-range bombers.’300 Finally, when 
television was used to guide German V2 rockets, the war ‘produced the first self-
guided weapons systems, which have since made people, the subject of all modern 
philosophies, simply superfluous. With the end of the subject, a television audience 
became possible in the postwar period.’301 This is a provocative cancellation of the 
generally accepted equivalence of audience and viewer – in Kittler’s analysis, an 
electronic prosthesis for subjective human vision ends by displacing the autonomy of 
the subject entirely. But his point of view finds an echo in the first major imaginative 
response to television culture to be published in Britain, George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four.  
 
 
‘A tiny world with its atmosphere complete’: the telescreen and the glass 
paperweight in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four 
In the militarized dystopia of Oceania, television is primarily a technology of 
surveillance; the enhanced eye belongs to the Thought Police, and its object – the 
‘involuntary and compulsive transmitter’ – is the citizen. The wall-mounted 
domestic telescreens, which cannot be turned off, do not offer entertainment but a 
stream of propaganda; they telescope space, not by transporting the viewer to a 
distant event, but by allowing the state to enter the private spaces of the individual.  
In an earlier essay, ‘Poetry and the Microphone’ (1943), Orwell had deplored 
the ‘totalitarianization’ of state-controlled media, on the basis of its effect on radio’s 
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content – and the fact that (unlike the Romantic Peter Carter), he cannot imagine 
‘poetry on the air’: 
 
Few people are able to imagine the radio being used for the dissemination of 
anything except tripe. […] Indeed the very word ‘wireless’ calls up a picture 
either of roaring dictators or of genteel throaty voices announcing that three of 
our aircraft have failed to return.302  
 
As a similar mechanism for the output of tripe, the telescreen is relatively easy for 
Winston to ignore or dismiss; compared to the visceral immersivity of the communal 
Two Minutes Hate, which is more analogous to a cinema screening or a political 
rally, the screen ‘babbling away about pig-iron’ in Winston’s flat has little impact as 
a form of psychological control; 303 the control comes from the paranoia of being 
continuously present to the eyes of Big Brother: 
 
Always the eyes watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, 
working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed – no escape. 
Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimetres inside your skull.304  
 
Being both spatially and temporally ‘present’ is the key to survival for the general 
ranks of Outer Party Oceanians. The prohibition against attempts to escape the eye 
of the state is matched by the impossibility of escape into the private perspective of 
individual memory. As the book opens, Winston is attempting to ‘squeeze out some 
childhood memory that should tell him whether London had always been quite like 
this’.305 Later he tries to collect memories of the past from an old man in a pub, but 
‘the old man’s memory was nothing but a rubbish-heap of details’:306  
 
The few scattered survivors from the ancient world were incapable of 
comparing one age with another. They remembered a million useless things, a 
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quarrel with a workmate, a hunt for a lost bicycle pump, the expression on a 
long-dead sister’s face, the swirls of dust on a windy morning seventy years 
ago: but all the relevant facts were outside the range of their vision.307  
 
The irony is that such individual memories are exactly what gives the past its human 
dimension, but Winston, hungry for a countervailing system to challenge the Party’s 
hegemonic dominance, can no longer interpret such scraps of individuality as 
historically valid. If Winston’s own vision wasn’t so faulty, he might see that these 
junk memories tell him what he needs to know, which is that intellectual freedom 
and autonomy will not come by accessing an impossibly lucid, premasticated 
historical account, but from a collage of idiosyncratic observations and priorities, 
individual to each subject. A child of his times, Winston can only conceive of the 
failure of individual memory as an optical limitation: the past no longer exists, 
because it is outside the reach of technologically unboosted human perception. For 
Orwell, the real political importance of the new medium is in its resonance with a 
more general obliteration of individual vision, which can leave no mark in a culture 
which has stamped out history and time, and within which Party-sanctioned things 
bear the standardized branding of the Big Brother portrait, watching its human 
objects ‘on coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners, on posters, and on 
the wrappings of the cigarette packet – everywhere’.308 
For contemporary audiences, the fact that television had no memory – was 
unrecorded and unrecordable – was its primary selling point. The Daily Mail 
Television Handbook makes much of the charms of ‘liveness’: 
 
The fact that actors are acting at the very moment that you are looking at them 
– and may faint or fluff or forget their lines – gives television a sense of 
immediacy and excitement which is unknown in the cinema […] The fact that 
personalities of every description are brought visually into your own sitting-
room or lounge at the very moment in which they are engaged in interesting 
and intriguing activities, alone introduces a completely new element into home 
entertainment.309 
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But the same quality of existing in an eternal present, unable to be recorded or fixed, 
makes television the ideal medium for Oceania. Paper records have to be continually 
rewritten and ‘rectified’ by Winston and his co-workers at the Ministry of Truth, to 
make them conform with the present version of reality; he clings desperately to the 
memory of once holding a photograph which contradicted the Party’s sanctioned 
version of events, even though he unhesitatingly destroyed it moments after it fell 
into his hands. Television needs no rectification: what is broadcast one day can be 
contradicted the next without any historical friction. In such a culture, even when he 
is in possession of contraband paper and pen, Winston feels powerless: 
 
In front of him there lay not death but annihilation. The diary would be 
reduced to ashes and himself to vapour[…] How could you make appeal to the 
future when not a trace of you, not even an anonymous word scribbled on a 
piece of paper, could physically survive?310  
 
Winston is trying to create a personal text to counteract the Party’s totalizing 
rhetoric, but he abandons this attempt when he finds himself scrawling an 
uncontrolled stream-of-consciousness account of his most grubby desires – a kind of 
bastardized version of modernist self-absorption. It’s not just the inanity of his 
personal record that makes Winston feel powerless, but the fragility of the paper 
medium itself, which he takes as a portent of his own utter deniability. Later he 
thinks he has found his text in the illicit Goldstein book passed to him by the man he 
takes for a rebel leader, O’Brien, although in fact, like the forbidden notebook and 
pen, this object is a plant, a trap to provoke him into treason. The only accurate 
records are those held by the Thought Police, as O’Brien proves when he confronts 
Winston with the meticulously stacked-up evidence of his thoughtcrimes. ‘Who 
controls the past controls the future,’ runs the Party slogan, ‘and who controls the 
present controls the past.’311 
Eventually Winston attempts to find an anchor, not in words or human 
memories, but in inanimate objects, which have survived from the past and thus bear 
witness to the passage of time. It is a more mid-century solution to the problem of 
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self-containment: he decants his longed-for identity as a complete man, a lover and a 
thinker, wholesale into a glass paperweight with a tiny piece of coral inside:  
 
It was as though the surface of the glass had been the arch of the sky, enclosing 
a tiny world with its atmosphere complete. He had the feeling that he could get 
inside it, and that in fact he was inside it, along with the mahogany bed and the 
gateleg table, and the clock and the steel engraving and the paperweight itself. 
The paperweight was the room he was in, and the coral was Julia’s life and his 
own, fixed in a sort of eternity at the heart of the crystal.312  
 
The glass dome contains not only Winston’s sense of autonomous self-hood, it also 
paradoxically seems to contain the room in which he places it. This is the upstairs 
room of the junkshop where he bought it, a love nest offered to him by the 
shopkeeper, Mr Charrington, as a museum of pre-Party life, which appears to have 
no telescreen, and thus promises a haven in which Winston and Julia can meet for 
awkward trysts and shared readings of the Goldstein book. 
W. T. J. Mitchell’s analysis of found objects and readymades – objects which 
take on the properties of images when they are redescribed as art – speaks to the 
mid-century junkshop mythos which informs not only the nostalgia trap of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, but also Barbara Jones’s curatorial practice, and the gentrification 
aesthetic of Marghanita Laski’s The Victorian Chaise-Longue (discussed in the next 
chapter). Mitchell highlights the importance of a remediating process in the uncanny 
doubling of trash and treasure; referencing Lacan’s anecdote about an empty sardine 
can bobbing in the sea, he writes: 
 
Everyone knows that there are just two criteria for a found object: (1) it must 
be ordinary, unimportant, neglected, and (until its finding) overlooked; […] 
and (2) its finding must be accidental, not deliberate or planned. One doesn’t 
seek the found object…One finds it. Even better: it finds you, looking back at 
you like Lacan’s sardine can.313  
 
                                                
312 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 121. 
313 Mitchell, p. 114. 
 131 
Lacan’s anecdote describes a trip in a fishing boat, during which a boy, Petit Jean, 
points out a floating sardine can with the words ‘You see that sardine can? Do you 
see it? Well it doesn’t see you!’ 314 Lacan uses this to introduce an analysis of the 
gaze and the potential or actual interchange between observer and observed: the can 
may not ‘see’ Lacan but it nevertheless occupies a point in space and time that 
implies his visibility. The agency of the found object described by Mitchell relies on 
a kind of suggestively porous and even creative intersubjectivity between human 
consciousness and the thing-world, but it also creates the disquieting suggestion of 
non-human surveillance of the subject. Once the object finds you, a moment of 
remediation occurs: 
 
Once found […] it may undergo an apotheosis, a transfiguration of the 
commonplace, a redemption by art […] If it really works, however, we have a 
sneaking suspicion that the transfiguration was a trick, a comic ruse engineered 
by a deus ex machina; and the plain old thing with its homely familiar name, is 
still there, blushing and smirking at us in the spotlight of aesthetic attention or 
(better) ignoring us totally.315  
 
Mitchell’s sense of being tricked recalls Freud’s feeling of dissatisfaction on reading 
a gothic text that ‘tricks us by promising everyday reality and then going beyond 
it’;316 the uncanny object, once it finds the subject, stakes a claim to a rival 
subjectivity and is endowed with a potential for malevolent mischief.317 Yet whereas 
the found art-object is redeemed by the aesthetic context in which it is understood, 
the charisma of the junk-shop object depends on its attendant narrative. This 
junkshop mythos relies on certain key signifiers, which can be traced back at least as 
far as Balzac’s La peau de chagrin (1831).318 The powerful object around which 
desire coalesces is usually found in a shop which seems to appear out of nowhere to 
a protagonist who has lost his way. The shop is full to the point of excess, piled up 
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with rubbish, yet despite this the person who is destined to encounter the object will 
spot its potential immediately, displaying an instinctive connoisseurship which 
attaches him to the object and makes him determined to have it. Here he encounters 
another crucial element of the paradigm: the reluctant shopkeeper who tries to 
distract him with other, worthless goods which he insists will suit his needs better. 
Often, this reluctance to sell – the very opposite of functional capitalism – comes 
along with a warning that the desired object is haunted, cursed, or otherwise 
undesirable. Once pulled out of the dark corner and rubbed like Aladdin’s lamp, the 
abject object suddenly blossoms into treasure, but also threatens to exact a great 
price from the buyer who has performed this transformation. Smith’s encounter with 
Mr Charrington and the paperweight follows this paradigm closely, although Smith, 
cut off from cultural memory, cannot possibly read the danger signs; Orwell is 
placing him inside a ‘junked’ mythos which has the same museal quality as the 
staged anachronism of the little room with its steel engraving and gateleg table. The 
junkshop represents a form of materialized memory, but the story behind it, which 
Smith cannot access, contains a warning he cannot read. 
 The romance of the junkshop was a popular theme in the mid-century, although 
it was often framed in terms of a sense of unease. ‘To those whose heads are turned 
firmly backwards every junk shop is a menace and every cathedral town a snare,’ 
wrote Alan Shadwick in the Manchester Guardian in 1948. ‘Half concealed in the 
dim, religious light of those interiors, the antique dealers lurk, affecting an 
indifference that deceives nobody.’319 His sense of entrapment derives as much from 
his own addiction to the past as to the wiles of the shopkeeper, however; merely 
reading an old book from his collection invariably triggers dissatisfaction with the 
present: 
 
Who shall blame the modern reader […] if his brooding gaze should stray 
from the printed page to dwell dangerously upon the 1935 table, with its 
twisted legs like four sticks of barley-sugar the whole carried out in fumed 
oak? […] And so once more into the antique shop, where, with a sinking 
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heart, one learns that they have the very thing in the warehouse across the 
yard.320  
 
The phenomenon was at a turning point, however. In 1952, The Times published a 
feature piece called ‘Decline of the Junk Shop’ in which the writer decried the new 
breed of shop presided over by ‘young men in flashy ties and well-oiled hair and 
brassy young women in trousers and beads’. 321 Here, electric light illuminated once 
excitingly dingy corners, and the stock was all ‘badly made bric a brac of a period 
that delighted in pretentious impedimenta’; in other words the Victorian and 
Edwardian decades. This is a consequence of the ‘modern vogue for antiques’: 
‘Commercialism has penetrated even to those ancient dusty shops where, unmolested 
by “sales technique”, we could while away an hour or two turning over forgotten 
relics of past ages and come away the richer for finding something that took our 
fancy.’ 
In the mid-century, the prize find was not necessarily a high-quality (and 
preferably ludicrously underpriced) antique, but was perhaps something whose value 
depended on the quirk of individual taste – as we will see in the next chapter, this 
might even be a piece of kitsch Victoriana that could be made ‘charming’ by being 
placed within a fashionable middle-class decorative scheme. And so the gothic 
potential of the found object changed too – it became not so much an uncanny 
amulet through which the past erupts with the all-purpose destructive energy of a 
curse, but a heterotopian portal into an alternative time and space which addressed 
the individuality of the finder. The paperweight’s auratic presence in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four as a kind of solid metaphor helps to focus the book’s delineation of the 
power of images and the relation between the symbolic and the real, and can usefully 
be compared to Mitchell’s stipulation that found objects must be ‘objectionable 
objects, object lessons, or even abject objects that have been disgraced, and 
discarded.’322 Like a multistable gestalt image such as Wittgenstein’s Duck-Rabbit, 
the found object doubles time and space by being two different things at once: both 
trash and treasure. The paperweight’s very materiality, its thingliness, marks it out as 
an abject object, a thought crime in material form (‘It was a queer thing, even a 
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compromising thing, for a Party member to have in his pocket’) because its symbolic 
freight, as an emblem of interiority and as a portal to the past, cannot be burnt, 
vaporized or edited out of existence. 323 Yet its ‘found’ meaning turns out to be a 
trick, just as the art-mediated readymades were to Mitchell: the paperweight has 
been planted in the junkshop as a lure, and like the hidden room that it both contains 
and is contained by, it has deceptively magnified Winston’s sense of individuality 
and freedom. He discovers this at the point when both the illusion and the 
paperweight are destroyed by the dawn raid of the Thought Police: 
 
Someone had picked up the glass paperweight from the table and smashed it to 
pieces on the hearth-stone. The fragment of coral, a tiny crinkle of pink like a 
sugar rosebud from a cake, rolled across the mat. How small, thought Winston, 
how small it always was!324  
 
Winston’s paperweight, which he thinks is simply bearing witness to the past, has 
acted as a mendacious magnifying lens that enables an illusory prosthetic perception, 
just as the glass screen of the television set makes distant objects visible without 
putting them within tangible reach. Its final metaphorical flourish, delivered at the 
point of its destruction, finally emerges from the mediating glass to enable Winston 
to access a gustatory sensation from a distant past that he supposedly has found 
impossible to remember – a pink sugar rosebud decorating a pre-Oceanian cake. 
That this image seems to reference both Orson Welles’s Citizen Kane and the 
Proustian madeleine of A la recherche du temps perdu (and echoes, perhaps, the pink 
rose holding June’s tear in A Matter of Life and Death) emphasizes the object’s 
former promise as a nexus of memory and narrative, and the hopelessness of 
Winston as he contemplates the impossibility of such a thing continuing to exist.325 
The idea of glass itself as a medium has been explored by Isobel Armstrong in 
Victorian Glassworlds, in which she traces the impact of glass technology on the 
mid-nineteenth-century imaginary. In this period, 
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a glass dialectic marked contradiction, a subject in difficulties, rather than 
smooth transitivity. Transparency posited an oppositional world, not invisible 
mediation but marks on the surface, scratches, fingerprints. Minuscule 
impurities and bubbles of air, internal impediments to vision, signified and 
created internal contradictions.326  
 
It is the physicality of the glass and its origin in the body of the glassblower that 
makes it a medium rather than a frictionless conduit of light: 
 
Transparency is something that eliminates itself in the process of vision. It 
does away with obstruction by not declaring itself as a presence. But the 
paradox of this self-obliterating state is that we would not call it transparent 
but for the presence of physical matter, however invisible – its visible 
invisibility is what is important about transparency. It must be both barrier and 
medium.327 
 
A century after the period Armstrong is examining, and with vast expanses of 
flawless industrial plate-glass no longer providing such signifiers of subject/object 
mediation, another form of high-tech glass offered a different problematic of 
transparency. The thick glass of a television screen frames the same dialectic but in a 
very different way: it is understood to be transparent, since images can be seen 
through it; yet what is seen is not there, and what is there – the inside of the box – is 
not seen. Unlike the window or the mirror, the screen obliterates itself without 
becoming invisible. And when the apparatus is switched off, it reverts to solid, 
uniform opacity. Armstrong goes on to point out that when Merleau-Ponty uses the 
metaphor of transparency to critique the ‘classical’ Cartesian subject, he refers to the 
‘self-transparent thought, absolutely present to itself’ which ignores a ‘natal pact 
between our body and the world, between ourselves and the body.’328 By inserting a 
mediating third term between subject and object, a ‘moment of difficulty’, 
experience is rescued from the purity of abstraction and aestheticization. 329  
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In the telescreen’s ocular reversal, Big Brother is the viewer and the citizenry 
are the spectral presences flickering into and out of existence at the viewer’s whim. 
Thus it is their sheer corporeality that Winston and Julia are trying to assert in their 
secret junk-shop trysts, and it is by physical pain that the Party enforcer O’Brien 
finally succeeds in breaking through Winston’s resistance to the looking-glass logic 
of doublethink, which demands that individual consciousness rewrites itself 
reflexively to conform to a communal lie, and then forgets not just the act, but even 
the concept of forgetting. This requires a complete semantic breakdown, a severance 
of the link between real and symbolic, as exemplified by the annihilation of the 
unambiguous arithmetical notation of Winston’s mental touchstone, 2 + 2 = 4. It’s 
this act of untethering that puts Nineteen Eighty-Four within the genre of mid-
century gothic, which brings together cultural artefacts which tend to perform and 
problematize semantic unreliability of the kind that Freud used in his definition of 
‘uncanny’. O’Brien completes his remediation of Winston by confronting him with 
the disconnect between his body and his mind: first, after weeks of torture, he stands 
his broken form in front of a triple mirror so that Winston can experience a total 
alienation from his reflected self; and then he demonstrates the potency of the 
Party’s mind-control by confronting him with his worst fear in Room 101. Winston 
relinquishes any hope that his physical persistence in time and space will help him to 
remember his individual identity. He is only the flickering apparition visible on a 
television screen; he is the ghost in the Party machine. 
 
 
Ghosts, machines and ‘the thing in the head’: reflection and speculation in the 
human brain 
For Gilbert Ryle, who coined the phrase ‘the ghost in the machine’, this ghost was a 
myth, the impossible spectre of a consciousness untethered to the material fact of the 
body. Published the same year as Nineteen Eighty-Four, Ryle’s The Concept of Mind 
(1949) is concerned with many of the same questions that Orwell’s novel asked 
about subjective identity.330 As we will see, Ryle’s ideas were quickly superseded by 
the inauguration of cognitive science triggered by neurological advances and the 
dawning of the computer age, but his theory illuminates the definition of 
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consciousness within which Orwell was staging his thought-experiment. Starting 
from a critique of Descartes’s prioritization of abstract thought, Ryle sets out to 
dismantle the notion that the mind is ‘a second theatre’, entirely separate from the 
theatre of sensory evidence, and ‘that its consciousness and introspection discover 
the scenes enacted in it.’331 Drawing a line from phenomenological philosophical 
enquiry to behaviourist psychology, he argues that, rather than needing a mysterious 
‘Privileged Access’ to subjective awareness, ‘the sorts of things that I can find out 
about myself are the same as the sorts of things I can find out about other people, 
and the methods of finding them out are much the same.’332 In Orwell’s Oceania, the 
abolition of the ghostly theatre of the mind was achieved by flushing out ‘the few 
cubic centimetres inside your skull’ through technological supervision. 333 The 
logical behaviourists of the Thought Police could not read minds; they had to deduce 
thought crimes from the words and actions of their targets. They got round this by 
decreeing that anyone who claimed to possess a discrete consciousness, a ‘tiny world 
with its atmosphere complete’, inaccessible to Big Brother’s disciplinary optics, 
must ipso facto be a criminal, since this self-reflective and self-illuminating cranial 
space could not exist inside an obedient party member. The result for Winston, 
though, was not the kind of rescue from immateriality that Ryle aspired to, but rather 
a total retreat from his own tortured body into a state of unthinking abstraction. 
Without his own theatre of the mind to act as a buffer, he was subsumed within the 
stream of insubstantial and endlessly rewritten Doublethink emitting from the 
telescreens. 
Indeed, the technology of television might almost have been designed to refute 
Ryle’s radical empiricism. Along with his metaphor of the theatre, he employs the 
idea of phosphorescence to explain the impossibility of consciousness; he uses the 
simile of ‘tropical sea-water, which makes itself visible by the light which it itself 
emits’.334 For Galileo and Descartes, he writes,  
 
‘consciousness’ was imported to play in the mental world the part played by 
light in the mechanical world. In this metaphorical sense the contents of the 
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mental world were thought of as being self-luminous or refulgent […] 
[Locke] called this supposed inner perception ‘reflection’ (our 
‘introspection’), borrowing the word ‘reflection’ from the familiar optical 
phenomenon of the reflections of faces in mirrors. The mind can ‘see’ or 
‘look at’ its own operations in the ‘light’ given off by themselves. The myth 
of consciousness is a piece of para-optics.335  
 
Ryle treats this as an impossibility, but the cathode ray screen offers a concrete 
example of just such a self-luminous optical instrument, revealing a ‘theatre’ in 
which insubstantial subatomic particles are transformed into real sensory 
perceptions. Ryle’s refutation of ghosts, which wanted to reveal such gothic ideas as 
irrational fictions, was being overtaken by the inherent gothicism of an apparatus 
which could make apparitions appear in time and space. And indeed, one scientist, 
William Grey Walter, was already attempting to make the ‘theatre’ of the mind 
literally visible, on a television screen. 
Grey Walter is remembered as a pioneer of cybernetics, but his experiments in 
robotics grew out of his neurological research at the Burden Institute in Bristol, 
which tackled the question of how far, if at all, human consciousness could be 
considered identical to its corporeal medium, the brain. He approached the question 
from the opposite direction to Ryle’s, proving, for instance, that the brain could 
physically react to stimuli before any conscious awareness was experienced. To do 
this, he first needed to refine the process of electroencephalography, or EEG, into a 
medium through which ‘brainwaves’ could be manifested in the outside world; only 
then could he attempt to understand the brain from the inside out, by building 
mechanical models of neurological feedback systems which could be set the task of 
contemplating themselves.  
His final EEG breakthrough, described in his 1953 popular science book The 
Living Brain, depended on the cathode-ray tube as a means of visualizing the 
‘moving panorama’ of the brain’s electrical activity.336 It built on the strides taken in 
the 1930s by Hans Berger, who had brought an investigation of electrical brain 
activity out of the séance room and into the laboratory, but had depended on 
superannuated technology as its output-medium. Berger’s method involved inserting 
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silver wires under the subject’s scalp and recording the brain’s electrical pulses using 
a string galvanometer. This apparatus consisted of a long, thin filament of silver-
coated glass which vibrated in response to electrical impulses in the subject’s brain, 
the result being recorded in the form of a wavy line on a photographic plate. By the 
1950s, this had already been widely replaced by the ink-writing oscillograph, which 
responded to the brain’s electrical vibrations by moving a set of pens across a roll of 
constantly moving paper. The process resulted in images of thickly scribbled wobbly 
lines, a gestural output analogous to a pre-alphabetic handwritten mark. For Grey 
Walter, this had the disadvantage of unravelling the picture of the brain across time 
and space, so that its message was accessible only through a laborious act of readerly 
reconstruction: ‘EEG records may be considered,’ he wrote, ‘as the bits and pieces of 
a mirror for the brain, itself speculum speculorum [a mirror of mirrors]. They must 
be carefully sorted before even trying to fit them together.’337  
Grey Walter’s need for an alternative method for recording, expressing and 
conceptualizing the brain’s electrical signals led him naturally to the cathode-ray 
tube, which could turn any electric signal into an integrated visual image. Like the 
strings of wavy marks on paper, this involved fragmenting the image of the brain to 
make it visible, but the technology also included a mechanized process of reading, 
which reintegrated and interpreted the pixellated information by streaming it onto the 
screen in the form of rapidly written and rewritten lines. It was a kind of mechanical 
version of the self-legibility which Gilbert Ryle had argued was impossible. 
For Grey Walter, though, the key advantage of a CRT output was that it enabled 
him to untether brainwaves from the materiality of photography or pen and paper 
(both technologies which had failed Winston Smith as reliable receptacles for 
history). By translating them from one medium of flow (the brain) into another (the 
CRT screen), he could endow them with a perceptible presence in a virtual space-
time, mapping them onto a three-dimensional representation of the brain which he 
likened to the cartographer’s Mercator Projection. His cathode-ray EEG anticipated 
much later breakthroughs such as CT scans and MRI by drawing a map of a mind in 
the act of thinking. Thus, brainwaves, which had first been studied by spiritualism-
inclined psychologists as an argument for the possibility of telepathy and life after 
death, promised for Grey Walter to lead to a new type of optics on a par with 
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diagnostic x-ray, electron microscopy and radar. He could see that EEG would 
enable scientists to look inside the black box of the brain and see what was 
happening without having to open the skull or dissect neural fibres, which had 
hitherto been the limit of neurophysiological methodology. This meant, in effect, 
that the human mind could begin to contemplate itself. 
Grey Walter’s chapter on EEG, entitled ‘A Mirror for the Brain’, opens with a 
quotation from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass which emphasizes his 
intuition that cathode-ray technology could undergo a transformation from mirror 
into threshold:  
 
Let’s pretend there’s a way of getting through it somehow, Kitty. Let’s pretend 
the glass has got all soft like gauze, so that we can get through. Why it’s 
turning into a sort of mist now, I declare! It’ll be easy to get through.338 
 
Crucially, he contrasts this fairy-tale suggestion with a phenomenological theory of 
mind limited by an empirical adherence to the materiality of flesh: ‘The Greeks had 
no word for it,’ he begins; ‘To them the brain was merely “the thing in the head”.’339 
He goes on: 
 
More curious still is Greek negligence of the brain, considering their famous 
oracular behest, ‘Know thyself’. Here indeed was speculation, the demand for 
a mirror, insistence upon a mirror. But for whom, for what? Was there, among 
the mysteries behind the altar, concealed perhaps in the Minerva myth, a 
suspicion of something more in the head than a thing, and that the organ which 
had to do the knowing of itself must be an organ of reflection?’340  
 
Ryle’s logical objection to consciousness and introspection rested on what he saw as 
the fallacy of self-reflection, and the insistence that the mind, insofar as the term was 
meaningful, was identical to the brain. But for Grey Walter it was the brain’s 
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‘insistence upon a mirror’ which defined the difference between brain and 
consciousness, since speculation could only take place in a conceptual realm which 
was enabled, but not confined, by ‘the thing in the head’. By mapping consciousness 
onto empirical neuroscience, Grey Walter hoped to locate the intersection between 
the two. 
For Jacques Lacan, the distinction between mind and body was most starkly 
dramatized during the infant Mirror Stage, in which the physical reflection of the 
child’s body allows access to the Imaginary in the form of the unfragmented self, 
while at the same time emphasizing the fact that this imaginary whole self is 
external, and other. But the mirror metaphor is not the only scopic analogue he 
employed to explain his reading of consciousness. In his Second Seminar, he refers 
to early computers as a symbolic medium, operating linguistically through codes.341 
Television, however, straddles these two categories within the Lacanian triad. At one 
point he uses the analogy of a triode lamp – a forerunner of the cathode-ray tube – to 
explain how the Imaginary intervenes in the coded outputs of language and symbols: 
 
Let us try to light up the magic lantern a little. We are going to take on a 
mechanical outlook, which is the enemy of man, by imagining there to be a 
triode lamp at the point of intersection of the symbolic direction and the 
passage through the imaginary. Let us suppose that a current passes down the 
circuit. If there is a vacuum, a bombarding of electrons takes place between 
the cathode and the anode, thanks to which the current passes. Besides the 
anode and the cathode, there is a third ode, a transverse one. You can make 
the current pass through it by making it positive, in such a way that the 
electrons are led towards the anode, or else by making it negative, cutting the 
process short – what emanates from the negative is repelled by the negative 
you’ve interposed.342 
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By selecting which electrons pass and which are reflected back, the lamp or screen 
becomes the medium for an image, and for Lacan, such technological image-making 
demonstrated the interdependence of the symbolic and the imaginary, since his 
triode lamp needed both in order to produce its effect. The cathode tube provides a 
material analogy for the fragmentary subject: it produces itself autonomously 
through a process that is fluid, conflicted, and ‘at best […] contradicts itself, cuts 
itself off, grinds itself up.’343  
Television’s self-legible autonomy helps to explain its uncanniness to its early 
users, but is somewhat different to the medium’s characterization by later theorists 
such as Marshall McLuhan and Friedrich Kittler as being defined only by 
fragmentation. As Kittler puts it (borrowing from McLuhan): 
 
Film is a hot medium because its widescreen illusions result in a decrease in 
the spectator’s own activity, while television is a cool medium because it only 
supplies a moiré pattern comprised of pixels that the audience must first 
decode back into shapes again in an active and almost tactile way.344  
 
Arguably, the necessity for the human eye to ‘decode’ the pointillism of television’s 
pixels is no more or less ‘cold’ than the reliance of film on the persistence of vision 
which smooths out the flicker of rapidly cycling celluloid images. Kittler himself 
goes on to outline his reservations about McLuhan’s hot/cold distinction, detailing 
how the invention of high-definition television has created a more film-like intimacy 
with television’s spectator-subject. In his earlier work, Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter, he had associated film with the imaginary realm and with Lacan’s 
mirror, while early gramophone recordings of undifferentiated and uninterpreted 
sounds gave access to the ungraspable realm of the real, and the encoded 
communications of typewriters figured the symbolic realm.345 In Optical Media he 
updates his reading of Lacan’s Mirror Stage and suggests that the intractable real is 
not (as in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter) best expressed by analogy with auditory 
recordings, but is more persuasively accessed through the machine-mediated 
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indexicality of sophisticated computer-generated media – although he also suggests 
that in modern technology the symbolic and the real may not be ‘absolutely 
independent’.346 In fact, even in their mid-century infancy, cybernetics and 
computing were already starting to instigate new questions about the relationship 
between reality, consciousness and codes of meaning, and complicate the definition 
of human subjectivity. 
 
 
‘Jigging like a clumsy Narcissus’: Grey Walter’s neurotic robots 
Grey Walter set out to create a mechanical model which could mimic the brain’s 
ability to process sensory input and use the object-world to feed back information 
about itself. This research was to make him famous when he unveiled his ‘tortoise’ 
robots at the Festival of Britain Exhibition of Science, staged at the South 
Kensington Museum in 1951. The simple robots, which he called machina 
speculatrix, were ‘designed to illustrate […] the uncertainty, randomness, free will 
or independence so strikingly absent in most well-designed machines.’347 Their 
apparent independence – they would move towards light, avoid objects in their path, 
and return to their ‘hutches’ to recharge when necessary – was the result of an 
electronic feedback system involving a light source, a light-sensor, and a simple 
circuit which specified how various inputs should be acted upon. 
In his 1976 recollection of visiting the Festival, Brian Aldiss remembered his 
sense of anticipation about seeing these revolutionary machines: 
 
What I was after was a glimpse of the future […] what I most wanted to see 
was Grey Walter’s electronic tortoises. So, first, to the Science Museum 
where they were housed. The electronic tortoises were animals begot 
between a new science, cybernetics, and a new technical development, 
automation (both labels coined during the forties). These chelonian hybrids 
were clumsy creatures of metal, not at all prepossessing to look at, but they 
did something that no mechanical had done hitherto: they pottered about their 
cage and, when they were feeling hungry, returned to their power source and  
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replenished their batteries of their own accord. […] Although I understood 
how the metal tortoises worked, I wanted to see them for myself – to feast 
my eyes on them, in that expressive phrase. So I did. Squat, unlovely, but full 
of significance, they sat in their unlit tank, unmoving, gathering dust. A 
notice on the exhibit said ‘out of order’.348  
 
The machines’ frequent break-downs helped to quell any suggestion that science had 
created a rival to human thought and subjectivity. The official Festival book was at 
pains to stress the limitations of these lumbering but endearing quasi-animals:  
 
These ‘tortoises’ designed by Dr Grey Walter, are purely mechanical but 
have very simple ‘brains’ […] Simple as they are, they copy certain patterns 
of man’s behaviour and help us with human problems.349  
 
Similarly, a newsreel on Grey Walter’s research described them as ‘pets’ named 
Elsie and Elmer and showed their inventor and his wife smiling fondly as he teased 
them by pushing objects into their path.350 The guide-catalogue for the Science 
Exhibition, meanwhile, almost ignored the robots, with the guide’s writer Jacob 
Bronowski limiting himself to a terse parenthetical mention of the tortoises within a 
detailed description of the nervous system: 
 
The senses send their findings rather like electric signals along the nerves. 
Such a signal may set off an automatic or reflex action; this is how a shadow 
across the eye makes us blink, or an insect moves towards the light. A 
mechanical “animal” can be constructed to steer itself towards the light in 
this automatic way.351 
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For Grey Walter himself, however – as his 1953 account shows – the real value of 
his robots lay not in their power to amuse the public but to demonstrate a 
neurological basis for consciousness. He felt he was able to demonstrate the 
appearance of sentience by introducing a mirror and attaching headlamps to the 
tortoises, so that the light-seeking feedback system induced the machines to move 
towards their own reflected light. The increased light level as they got closer to the 
mirror then caused their light to switch off; but once the reflected light had 
disappeared, the machine was programmed to switch its own headlamp on again – a 
process repeated ad infinitum: 
 
The creature therefore lingers before a mirror, flickering, twittering, and 
jigging like a clumsy Narcissus. The behaviour of a creature thus engaged with 
its own reflection is quite specific, and on a purely empirical basis, if it were 
observed in an animal, might be accepted as evidence of some degree of self-
awareness.352 
 
The importance of this robotic Mirror Stage was emphasized in the illustration which 
found its way into the Guide-catalogue and many other written accounts of the 
Tortoises: one of the creatures is clearly seen admiring itself in a looking-glass. 
The cod-Linnaean name Grey Walter gave his robots, machina speculatrix, 
becomes clearer: these were not only speculative machines, but mirror-gazing 
machines. Like Lacan, he makes it a marker of consciousness that there is, first, an 
acknowledgement of the difference between self and other, and, second, a 
recognition of the self as other. This passage is reminiscent of Mitchell’s reservation 
about the ‘deus ex machina’ by which inanimate objects are remediated by art into 
quasi-sentient things – ‘the plain old thing […] is still there, blushing and smirking 
at us in the spotlight of aesthetic attention or (better) ignoring us totally.’353 The self-
absorption of Grey Walter’s robot suggests a rival subjectivity which appears able to 
ignore its human creator. Moreover, the greater the complexity of the programming, 
the more lifelike the behaviour becomes – if ‘lifelike’ is taken to mean irrational and 
unstable. Grey Walter’s 1951 paper ‘A Machine that Learns’ describes a 
phenomenon he dubs ‘experimental neurosis’, which he induced is his next-stage 
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robots, machina docilis, and which manifested as a state of perplexed paralysis. 
These were set up with ‘learning circuits’ which aimed to replicate the classical 
conditioning described by Ivan Pavlov, for instance by ‘training’ the robots to 
associate a ringing bell with a light stimulus. As soon as more than one learning 
circuit was added, however, the machines began to display dysfunctional behaviour, 
with one model losing its ‘“instinctive” attraction to light’ so that it ‘can no longer 
approach its source of nourishment’:  
 
This state seems remarkably similar to the neurotic behaviour produced in 
human beings by exposure to conflicting or inconsistent education. In the 
model such ineffective and even destructive conditions can be terminated by 
rest, by switching off or by disconnecting one of the circuits. These 
treatments seem analogous to the therapeutic devices of the psychiatrist –
 sleep, shock and psychosurgery.354  
 
Grey Walter’s anthropomorphic reading of a situation that modern computer-users 
would recognize as a simple ‘crash’ reveals his underlying agenda of using these 
robots to begin to describe the machinery of human consciousness, rather than purely 
to advance cybernetic research. The neurosis of M. docilis shows the man-made 
mind responding to self-awareness, not as Narcissus, but as Frankenstein’s creature: 
 
How was I terrified when I viewed myself in a transparent pool! At first I 
started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the 
mirror: and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster 
that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and 
mortification.355  
 
Grey Walter’s automaton is an essentially gothic apparatus, which enables the inner 
life of the mind to be made manifest, not via supernatural spectrality, but through the 
uncanny workings of technology. Indeed, Grey Walter himself draws this 
distinction: the impulse to impute supernatural life and agency to inanimate objects 
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must instead be understood only as yet another mirror by which the mind can 
contemplate itself:  
 
We are daily reminded how readily living and even divine properties are 
projected into inanimate things by hopeful but bewildered men and women; 
and the scientist cannot escape the suspicion that his projections may be 
psychologically the substitutes and manifestations of his own hope and 
bewilderment.356 
 
 
‘Machine wins’? Lacan, Turing and the problem of consciousness 
Speaking in his 1954 seminar ‘A materialist definition of the phenomenon of 
consciousness’, Lacan refers to Grey Walter’s mechanical tortoises as useful 
metaphors in his effort to dismantle the Freudian ego. Although he doesn’t refer to 
their attraction to mirrors, he does imagine what would happen if they were 
programmed to ‘jam’ unless they could see another machine of the same kind. He 
uses this to discuss the fascination and desire of the ego for the other:  
 
You see, by the same token, how a circle can be set up. As long as the unity 
of the first machine hangs on that of the other, as long as the other gives it the 
model and even the form of its unity, whatever it is that the first is oriented 
towards will always depend on what the other is oriented towards.’357  
 
The advantage of using what he calls ‘these courageous little animals’ as his model 
is that ‘it doesn’t in any way idolize the subject’; instead, it shows that ‘the subject is 
no one. It is decomposed, in pieces.’358 In other words, by describing consciousness 
in mechanical terms, he is hoping to demystify the ego and depose it from its 
reigning position within Freudian psychoanalysis. The attempt to make things that 
are more like humans inevitably suggests the possibility that humans might be 
‘mere’ things after all, since their claims to any kind of immaterial soul or essence 
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can be challenged by a material construct which seems to present an equivalent type 
of consciousness without the need to provide it with any supernatural element.  
For Lacan, the comparison between minds and machines bears fruit; in addition 
to tortoise robots, the metaphor of the computer enables him to show that the mind’s 
capacity for language can be best understood as a machinic process. It is the 
autonomy of the machine, its detachment from consciousness, that makes it 
analogous to the symbolic realm. Ryle’s logical objection to consciousness and 
indeed psychology rested on the improbability that the mind could be self-
illuminating and self-reflective; for Lacan, it is the machine-like language-code of 
the symbolic that provides the ‘light’ that illuminates consciousness. Yet this does 
not solve the problem of the nature of the subject, but merely goes to prove that the 
subject is fragmented or even nonexistent: ‘The machine is the structure detached 
from the activity of the subject. The symbolic world is the world of the machine. 
Then we have the question as to what, in this world, constitutes the being of the 
subject.’359 This is not so far, after all, from Gilbert Ryle’s contention that the ‘ghost 
in the machine’ concept falsely flatters an essentially biological human 
consciousness with intimations of the ineffable.  
The dialectic of consciousness and materiality took another turn in the research 
of Alan Turing into artificial intelligence. At the same time that Grey Walter was 
seeking to map consciousness onto a material medium, Turing was busy attempting 
to demolish completely the distinction between matter and thought. Computers, as 
Turing conceives them, both refute and support Ryle’s mechanistic description of 
thought, since they provide an instance of machinic, non-transcendental cognition 
but also demonstrate that thinking and learning are abstract processes which do not 
entirely succumb to materialist description. His famous 1950 paper ‘Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence’ proposes to answer the question ‘can machines think?’ 
by using what he calls ‘the imitation game’, in which an interrogator directs 
questions to a human and a computer and must choose, by examining their 
typewritten answers, which is the machine. 360 This idea appealed to Lacan, who 
discussed Turing’s still-hypothetical computers in relation to the codes of the 
symbolic realm and their detachment from physicality, and recognized that an 
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important moment had been reached in humanity’s ability to conceptualize the 
process of thought. The validity of the ‘Turing test’ has been debated ever since, but 
Turing’s original paper can be read, not just as a computing thought experiment, but 
as a mid-century gothic text, which responds to the culture’s growing sense of a 
disconnect between mind and body, signal and material, interior process and 
perceptible output. His stated intention in devising the game was to draw ‘a fairly 
sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man.’361 But 
Turing seems conscious that he is setting himself up to be another ‘modern 
Prometheus’ when he attempts to outline scientific methods for creating artificial life 
by disassembling and analysing fragments of the human – which may be why he 
specifically excludes as a viable option Victor Frankenstein’s chosen methodology 
of revivifying obsolete human fragments. Understanding intelligence in terms of its 
mere fleshly clothing, he points out, would involve a radical confusion of form and 
function: 
 
No engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material which is 
indistinguishable from the human skin. It is possible that at some time this 
might be done, but even supposing this invention were available we should 
feel there was little point in trying to make a “thinking machine” more human 
by dressing it up in such artificial flesh.362  
 
His quasi-human creature might undergo a process of learning and development 
analogous to that undertaken by Mary Shelley’s autodidactic monster, however; 
Turing speculates that the best way to make a machine that can imitate the brain of a 
human adult is first to ‘try to produce one which simulates the child’s’:363  
 
Presumably the child-brain is something like a note-book as one buys it from 
the stationer’s. Rather little mechanism, and lots of blank sheets. (Mechanism 
and writing are from our point of view almost synonymous). Our hope is that 
there is so little mechanism in the child-brain that something like it can be 
                                                
361 Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, p. 434. 
362 Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, p. 434. 
363 Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, p. 456. 
 151 
easily programmed. The amount of work in the education we can assume, as 
a first approximation, to be much the same as for the human child.364 
 
Just as Orwell’s Winston Smith saw the act of writing in a notebook as somehow 
essential to autonomous thought, Turing hopes that the artificial child-brain will use 
its blank sheets to formulate an autobiographical record which will underpin its 
intelligence. Whereas, for Grey Walter, learning was achieved by means of a circuit 
which prescribed invariable outcomes from given inputs, Turing’s notebook image 
emphasizes the retention of data and the ability to use it in order to deduce further 
information and instruction. But, like the Thought Police, he is in no doubt that this 
process will be programmable and controllable; his assumption is that the immature 
brain resembles an ink-writing oscillograph, mechanically responding to sensory 
inputs and recording them as coded data.  
Turing’s optimism about computer memory and its ability to enable original 
thought falters, however, on the admission that a mechanical child-brain could never 
learn exactly like a real child: 
 
It will not, for instance, be provided with legs, so that it could not be asked to 
go out and fill the coal scuttle. Possibly it might not have eyes. But however 
well these deficiencies might be overcome by clever engineering, one could 
not send the creature to school without the other children making excessive fun 
of it.365 
 
Turing clearly sympathizes with his bullied Pinocchio-robot, sent off to school to 
learn how to be a real boy, but he is making a serious point about what he sees as the 
essential similarity between machines and minds. Like Ryle, he argues against the 
idea that there is anything unassailably enigmatic going on within human thought 
processes, citing what he calls ‘the solipsistic view’ of the neurologist Geoffrey 
Jefferson’s Lister Oration in 1949, in which he proclaimed that ‘Not until a machine 
can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and 
not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain.’366 In 
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contrast to this cultural argument for human exceptionalism, Turing presents the 
image of onion skins to describe the hopeless task of trying to find the ghostly 
essence of creativity: 
 
In considering the functions of the mind or the brain we find certain 
operations which we can explain in purely mechanical terms. This we say 
does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin which we must strip 
off if we are to find the real mind. But then in what remains we find a further 
skin to be stripped off, and so on. Proceeding in this way do we ever come to 
the ‘real’ mind, or do we eventually come to the skin which has nothing in 
it?367  
 
Nevertheless, there is a tension in Turing’s writing between his insistence on the 
increasing perfectibility of a mechanical analogue for human thought and the inkling 
that there is a quality of ‘human-ness’ which can be discerned in disobedient 
machines, at the moment when they reject or supercede their programming. This, 
again, is an essentially gothic construction: the symbolic apparatus of gothic 
narratives often depends on the intervention of uncanny, recalcitrant things, 
especially those over-freighted with significance: Frankenstein’s creature is perhaps 
the archetype of the unruly object, but Winston’s dangerously overdetermined and 
disintegrating television/paperweight is another example. Gothicism refutes the idea 
of meaning as a simple code; it relies on slippage and elision between mechanical 
reality and mysterious intimation; it narrates the fragmentation and contingency of 
the subject and the ultimate illegibility of the thing-world. The out-of-order tortoises 
which so disappointed Brian Aldiss at the Festival of Britain Exhibition of Science, 
or the ‘neurotic’ ones in Grey Walter’s learning laboratory, or even the ‘jammed’ 
ones of Lacan’s thought experiment, all attest to the gothicism inherent in any 
project which hopes to manufacture a machinic subject, since this artificial 
consciousness turns out to be as bewildered as its human counterpart. In 1951, when 
Turing visited the Festival, he encountered the tortoises for himself, as recorded in 
an anecdote in Andrew Hodges’s biography. Turing and a group of friends 
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went to the Science Museum in South Kensington where the science and 
technology exhibits were housed. Grey Walter’s cybernetic tortoises were on 
show, though they seemed to be going round in circles, and Robin [Gandy] 
said they were suffering from General Paralysis of the Insane. However, they 
observed one nice and unexpected touch: the feedback-dance that the 
tortoises performed in front of a mirror.368  
 
Gandy’s joking reference to a form of dementia which occurs in late-stage syphilis 
was presumably intended to emphasize the absurdity of a machine exhibiting the 
frailty of flesh and blood, but the impression left by the ‘feedback dance’ suggests 
that Turing, like Lacan and Grey Walter himself, was intrigued by the possibility of 
cybernetic self-reflection. He and his friends then moved on to the exhibition’s most 
high-tech centrepiece, a computer named Nimrod supplied by the electrical 
engineering firm Ferranti, which was programmed to play the numbers game Nim. 
This basic game can be won in most cases by using a simple but somewhat counter-
intuitive strategy, and an algorithm enabled the computer to beat most members of 
the public who took it on. As Bronowski’s guide to the Science Exhibition put it, 
‘Although it will not always win, the machine cannot make a mistake!’369 Turing, 
however, also knew the winning strategy: 
 
The Ferranti people were pleased to see Alan and said, ‘Oh Dr Turing, would 
you like to play the machine? Which of course he did, and knowing the rule 
himself, he managed to win. The machine dutifully flashed up ‘MACHINE 
LOSES’ in light, but then went into a distinctly Turingesque sulk, refusing to 
come to a stop and flashing ‘MACHINE WINS’ instead. Alan was delighted 
at having elicited such human behaviour from a machine.370 
 
Although the computer was mentioned only in a single paragraph in Bronowski’s 
guide, Ferranti published a separate booklet, Faster than Thought: The Ferranti 
Nimrod Computer which explained Nimrod’s design and capabilities to a non-
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specialist audience.371 The anonymous author stresses that the terms ‘mechanical or 
electronic brains’ should be avoided, because they might give ‘the impression that 
automatic computers can think for themselves, which is not true’. However, the 
machine’s autonomy is stressed in the list of ‘three essential characters’ which define 
computers, namely,  
 
(1) They can calculate. 
(2) They can ‘remember’. 
(3) They can make decisions. 
 
The random access memory (as it is now known) which allows computers to process 
data independently is highlighted as the key to their complexity and power. Although 
Nimrod itself only needed a simple circuit to equip it with sufficient memory for its 
single task, more sophisticated machines were already in use which employed 
cathode-ray tubes for memory storage, with data transformed into patterns on a 
screen which could then be read back by the computer.372 In a sense, these memory-
enabled machines are the first objects which can claim literally to have a personal 
history, and not just – as in the case of the uncanny objects of gothic tales – carry the 
imprint of human histories through time. Nimrod’s communicative output is 
restricted to only two possible alternatives, but its malfunctional insistence on 
proclaiming ‘Machine wins’ – though amusing to Turing – had uncomfortable 
overtones of threat which were echoed in his 1951 lecture to the 51 Society at 
Manchester University, ‘Intelligent machinery, a heretical theory’, which ended with 
a warning that  
 
it seems probable that once the machine thinking method had started, it 
would not take long to outstrip our feeble powers. There would be no 
question of the machines dying, and they would be able to converse with 
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each other to sharpen their wits. At some stage therefore we should have to 
expect the machines to take control.373  
 
Once again, the question of whether autonomous objects model human 
consciousness or represent an alien other remains unresolved. Along with memory, 
language is at the heart of computers’ troubling potential for autogenesis. The 
opacity of computer code to the human reader, which appealed to Lacan as a 
metaphor for the occluded workings of the symbolic system itself, was also 
reflected, perhaps unwittingly, in the name Nimrod – a Biblical figure traditionally 
credited with building the Tower of Babel.374  
Even the fact that the leaflet provides a glossary of unfamiliar terms 
(‘computer’, ‘digital’, ‘binary’) suggests that technology is pulling away from 
ordinary human discourse. The explanation of binary, meanwhile, recalls the 
breakdown of Winston Smith’s forbidden arithmetical touchstone: while Winston 
had finally to accept that 2 + 2 = 5, readers unfamiliar with binary numbers were 
presented with the apparently nonsensical sum 1 + 1 = 10, and forced to recalibrate 
their perception of common sense in order to make it true. 
 
 
‘Ghosts and bogies’: machine intelligence and the supernatural 
The idea that computer technology might change or enhance the mechanics of the 
human brain was something that clearly interested Turing. In his essay ‘Digital 
Computers Applied to Games’, he records an experiment which took place at the 
Science Museum during the Festival: 
 
The Society for Psychical Research came and fitted up a room nearby in 
order to see if operations of the machine could be influenced by concentrated 
thought on the part of the research workers, most of whom were elderly 
ladies. When this experiment had failed they tried to discover whether they in 
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turn could be affected by vibrations from the machine and could tell from 
another room how the game was progressing. Unfortunately this experiment, 
like the first, was a complete failure, the only conclusion being that machines 
are much less co-operative than human beings in telepathic experiments.375 
 
It might seem that Turing was simply mocking the psychic ladies’ experiment, but 
even in ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, he was not afraid to tackle the 
uncanny potential of technologically enhanced thought. In one passage he considers 
at length, and with an apparently straight face, whether his ‘imitation game’ test for 
machine intelligence would be invalidated if the human participant were capable of 
extrasensory perception: 
 
These disturbing phenomena seem to deny all our usual scientific ideas. How 
we should like to discredit them! Unfortunately the statistical evidence, at 
least for telepathy is overwhelming. It is very difficult to rearrange one’s 
ideas so as to fit these new facts in. Once one has accepted them it does not 
seem a very big step to believe in ghosts and bogies.376 
 
A growing popular awareness that the electrical signals of the brain might be 
transmitted, mediated or made legible by technology resulted in the emergence of 
stories in which electronic appliances become haunted, although any sense of horror 
soon began to abate in the mid-century imaginary. By the time J. B. Priestley was 
writing his short story ‘Uncle Phil on TV’ in 1954, the technology was sufficiently 
accepted for the uncanniness to be put to comic effect.377 In this tale of lower-
middle-class internecine bickering, the Grigson family buy a television with the life-
insurance money paid out when their unloved long-term house guest dies of a heart 
attack. As soon as they get the set home, however, they begin to see Uncle Phil in 
every programme they watch, at first just in the background, but eventually in close-
up as he addresses them by name and accuses them of causing his death. The 
retributive haunting doesn’t merely take advantage of the idea of television as a 
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‘medium’ in the spiritualist sense; it implies a direct exchange between the 
aggravating uncle and the new set as a physical object dominating the room: ‘Clearly 
there was a general feeling,’ Priestley writes, ‘that fate had been kind in exchanging 
Uncle Phil, whom nobody wanted, for this new wonder of the world.’378 The joke is 
that the Grigsons haven’t managed to get rid of Uncle Phil at all, and Priestley is 
keen to show that his haunting of the new technology arises from the similarity 
between him and it, as well as hinting at the medium’s uncanny potential for 
surveillance. The Grigsons always disliked his ‘determined refusal to leave the 
fireside even when they were entertaining friends, and hated to have him there 
watching them.’379 His physical peculiarity, too, seems to be an omen of the stiffness 
of the televisual point of view:  
 
Some accident he’d had made him carry his head on one side, so that he 
always looked as if he was trying to see round a corner; and even this, to say 
nothing of the rest of him, got on their nerves.380  
 
The accusatory presence of Uncle Phil may be a distant descendent of the all-seeing 
eye of Orwell’s Big Brother, peering into the viewers’ living space in order to find 
evidence of crime. Like Orwell, Priestley reverses the relationship between watcher 
and watched, but here the television acts more like a traditional haunted object than a 
mediating third space, its materiality offering a new ‘body’ for the aggrieved spirit of 
Uncle Phil. In this, Priestley was responding to a common complaint about the new 
technology: its intrusiveness into the spatial relationships of the family home. In 
1949, House and Garden magazine published an article called ‘Make Room for 
Television’, which advocated putting the television near the fire ‘where chairs are 
usually gathered’ but warned ‘Most of the day your set will sit lifeless in the 
room[…] As the cabinet is bulky and creates special problems of accommodation, its 
position shouldn’t be obtrusive. Your room must be re-arranged for its new 
function.’381  
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The less upmarket readers of the Daily Mail Television Handbook were treated 
to extensive advice about the best size of set for small rooms in flats, and the 
maximum number of viewers possible ‘when an exceptional “high-spot” programme 
is announced’: 
 
For a 9" tube receiver we can say five or six adults when seated and under 
comfortable conditions, plus several standing. 
For a 12" tube receiver, add two or three more, if space permits. 
For a 15" tube receiver, about the same as a 12" tube, plus a few in the back 
row who may be permitted to stand on chairs, etc.382  
 
In 1947, a BBC audience researcher called R. J. E. Silvey had recorded a list of 
reasons why he would not buy a set if he did not already have one for his job; as well 
as poor picture quality, which meant that television quickly lost its novelty value 
when compared to cinema, he mentions ‘by no means the least potent factor 
militating against television in my kind of home’, namely ‘the sheer palaver involved 
in having to watch it. It means putting the light out, moving the furniture around and 
settling down to give the programme undivided attention.’383  
Mainly, though, he bemoans the lack of serious programmes for ‘people like us’ 
who ‘just aren’t Variety-minded’; his definition of ‘my kind of home’ includes clear 
class and intellectual judgements on the kind of home inhabited by people who 
might enjoy the programmes being broadcast. He was not alone in his dissatisfaction 
with the BBC’s output, however. Readers of the Sunday Pictorial were also warned 
not to expect great things from a medium which had once seemed a threat to every 
other form of entertainment, but in reality had trouble keeping up with its rivals:  
 
Are the programmes bad? 
Yes. Transmission most days is only an hour in the afternoon and about two 
hours in the evening […] Afternoon programmes are mainly old American 
films. They are terrible […] Major sports promoters are bitterly opposed to 
television because they know attendances will suffer. Consequently most 
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sportscasts are of amateur events […] Variety programmes are poor because 
the big combines put a television ban on their stars.384  
 
In 1954, Priestley depicted the Grigsons anticipating the luxury of being fully and 
individually satisfied by what television has to offer: George Fleming, their son-in-
law, sells it to them: 
 
What more d’you want? Gives you everything. Sport for me and Dad and 
Steve. Plays and games and all that for you women. Dancing and fashion 
shows too. Variety turns we’d all like. Serious stuff for Ernest.385 
 
When they install their set, though, the reality is less ideal. 
 
Una turned it on, not having any trouble at all, and it began showing them a 
film that looked like an oldish cowboy film, which wasn’t exactly their style, 
still it was wonderful having it in the sitting-room like that. The people were 
small and not always easy to see and their voices were loud enough for 
giants, which made it a bit confusing; but they watched it for quarter of an 
hour.386 
 
Despite its poor performance as a source of entertainment, television makes great 
demands on the family’s use of time and space:  
 
Joyce and Steve […] were in favour of what amounted to a continuous 
performance by the set. Dad and Ernest were dead against this idea, which 
they thought wasteful and silly. They wanted to make a sort of theatre of it, 
with everybody sitting in position a few minutes before the chosen 
programme was ready to start.387 
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Like the readers of the Daily Mail Handbook, they are prepared to make the 
experience as communal as possible, calculating that they could ‘manage a dozen’ 
viewers ‘if you brought up the old settee as a sort of dress circle.’388 In the end, 
though, they opt to retain the privacy of their space, but they cannot avoid the 
intrusion of the set itself, which demands a complex programme of tuning and 
adjustment to keep it in proper working order.  
Mid-century viewers pandered carefully to the needs of their sets. First they had 
to take into account the local topography in choosing and mounting their aerial, and 
then an engineer would be required to install the set and connect it to the network. 
Finally, they were responsible for undertaking a daily retune, as the Daily Mail 
Handbook explained: 
 
The BBC television Tuning Signal is radiated daily for about five minutes 
before each programme to enable viewers to adjust their Television receiver 
correctly in readiness for the start of the programme. For satisfactory 
reception it is important that the correct setting should be found.389 
 
And once the set was in place, it tied the householders to their home in a quite 
emphatic way: 
 
All receivers will be zoned by manufacturers for use in conjunction with the 
particular transmitter nearest to the home of the purchaser and, bearing in 
mind that each transmission zone will have its own particular wavelength, it 
automatically follows that a receiver specifically tuned at the factory for the 
London area will not work in the Birmingham area, and vice versa.390 
 
In this way conformity and social control were built into the very apparatus of 
television, and it was not long before anxiety about the loss of individuality began to 
shift from the medium to its message. In the same year that Priestley’s story was 
published, Adorno, writing in America, delivered a powerful attack on the 
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standardizing influence of mass culture, as epitomized by television, which (like 
Orwell) he saw as a conduit of social brainwashing: 
 
Rigid institutionalization transforms modern mass culture into a medium of 
undreamed of psychological control. The repetitiveness, the selfsameness, 
and the ubiquity of modern mass culture tend to make for automatized 
reactions and to weaken the forces of individual resistance.391  
 
The medium, he argues, creates its own generic context, which is the opposite of 
gothic in that it is designed to minimize shock and smooth out the violence of the 
subject’s apprehension of the world. Adorno describes an entirely un-uncanny 
televisual landscape in which no psychic eructations could spring from any 
subterranean realm: 
 
Every spectator of a television mystery knows with absolute certainty how it 
is going to end. Tension is but superficially maintained and is unlikely to 
have a serious effect any more. On the contrary, the spectator feels on safe 
ground all the time. This longing for ‘feeling on safe ground’ – reflecting an 
infantile need for protection, rather than the desire for a thrill – is catered 
to.392  
 
Like Orwell, he sees this bland cultural environment as inimical to individuality 
because it denies the possibility of internalization: ‘inwardness, inner conflicts, and 
psychological ambivalence’ give way to ‘unproblematic, cliché-like 
characterization.’393 This insistence on interiority may be at odds with the kind of 
quasi-mechanical ideas of consciousness which were emerging from scientific, 
psychoanalytical and philosophical innovations of the mid-century, but for Adorno 
culture was the essential mirror in which the subject could begin to see, not a perfect 
image of the whole self, but precisely the kind of non-identical mismatch between 
subject and object which would facilitate social and political rupture. Gilbert Ryle 
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had been Adorno’s supervisor at Oxford University in 1935, while he worked on a 
dissertation which attempted a critique of the ‘resigned, late bourgeois character of 
phenomenology’. 394 Adorno respected Husserl’s thought as ‘the final serious effort 
on the part of the bourgeois spirit to break out of its own world, the immanence of 
consciousness, the sphere of constitutive subjectivity’ but only a dialectical reading 
such as his, he argued, could break down the false consciousness of 
phenomenology’s bias towards all-encompassing rationality. It seems likely that 
Ryle’s phenomenological argument against introspection would have been read by 
Adorno as part of this effort, but one of the key differences in their approach is their 
treatment of culture. Ryle saw fiction and history as proof that the behaviourist 
paradigm was sufficient to encompass consciousness; ‘novelists, dramatists and 
biographers,’ he wrote, ‘had always been satisfied to exhibit people's motives, 
thoughts, perturbations and habits by describing their doings, sayings, and 
imaginings, their grimaces, gestures and tones of voice’, and psychology should not 
‘suffer unnecessary qualms of anxiety’ about ‘describing the merely mechanical’.395 
For Adorno, the quality of culture and its approach to interiority were vital, and to be 
satisfied with mere descriptions of plausible human behaviour, such as were 
common in the bland output of television, was to harm society. For Adorno, the 
novelistic paradigm of the individual’s struggle for autonomy may be essentially a 
‘middle-class “ontology”’ but he sees its modern, mass-cultural iteration as 
‘increasingly authoritarian and at the same time hollow.’396 He depicts the clichés of 
sitcoms and detective shows as a desperate attempt by the prevailing ideology to 
shore up the consistency and predictability of the population, since ‘the more 
inarticulate and diffuse the audience of modern mass media seems to be, the more 
mass media tend to achieve their “integration”’. Thus, when ‘the perennial middle-
class conflict between individuality and society has been reduced to a dim memory, 
and the message is invariably that of identification with the status quo’, then ‘the less 
the message is really believed and the less it is in harmony with the actual existence 
of the spectators’.397  
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The position in America, where television uptake had not been interrupted by 
the war and it was already a commercial, multi-channel enterprise, was somewhat 
different to the beginning of the state-sponsored television age in Britain. In 1948, a 
Times leader had celebrated television as a medium that could be comfortably talked 
back to by a disobedient and recalcitrant audience. Reminiscing about the joys of 
silent cinema when ‘if we shouted “Six to four the field!” as the sheriff and his posse 
galloped down a precipice […] we and our friends could be heard above the 
excitable tinkling of the piano’, the writer mourns the noisiness of the talkies and 
dismisses the possibility of talking back to the radio as unfulfilling. But,  
 
Television is another matter. There the behaviour of the actors in a play often 
calls for those comments, ribald or otherwise, which we have to repress in the 
theatre. If the play is a good one the occasion does not arise; but if, as 
sometimes happens, it is less than good, implausibility and over-emphasis 
can be lampooned without anyone being the worse off.398  
 
The BBC seems to have responded to accusations that its fare was bland or badly 
produced by raising the (gothic) stakes, until it was broadcasting such hard-hitting 
productions that Lord Morrison, among others, protested: 
 
Sir – How much longer is the British television service going to present 
Sunday evening plays of horror? For several months now these plays have 
been more and more morbid and brutal. Madmen, murders, shootings and 
stabbings, descriptions of eyes being gouged out, dead men arguing with 
each other […] Can someone please explain what useful purpose is served by 
these Sunday evening spectacles of brutality?399 
 
Responding, the BBC’s controller of television Norman Collins, wrote: ‘Lord 
Morrison’s letter is timely and, indeed, the corporation has received similar letters 
from certain of its viewers.’ In his defence, he lists a number of upcoming 
productions, promising lighter fare:  
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The plays already scheduled include Hobson’s Choice, with Mr Wilfred 
Pickles; March Hare, a comedy; Promise of To-Morrow, a new comedy 
specially written for television; a Shakespeare production for Shakespeare’s 
birthday; The Master Builder, Present Laughter, The Insect Play and a 
Galsworthy revival.400  
 
Clearly, Collins wanted to demonstrate a careful balance between the light 
entertainment of Wilfred Pickles and Noel Coward and the BBC’s bid for serious 
cultural credentials via Ibsen and Shakespeare. The battle-lines were already being 
drawn up in the argument over the corporation’s monopoly of broadcasting; a month 
later, the economist R. H. Coase launched a broadside in the form of a monograph, 
British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly, arguing that the lack of competition 
simultaneously gave the BBC too much power and weakened it through an ingrained 
institutional timidity.401 In its review of Coase’s book, the Times Literary 
Supplement agreed that, with the arrival of television, the nation’s culture and 
economy were in equal danger: 
 
The glum may think we have invented a toy (like the hydrogen bomb) 
beyond our means. And perhaps without centralized control it may be 
impossible to recover the cost of the most costly technique of 
entertainment ever devised. Culturally, too, television may share 
something with the hydrogen bomb.402 
 
As the 1950s progressed two landmark programmes showed that the BBC’s 
willingness to screen ‘evening plays of horror’ on a Sunday had not abated. In 1953, 
The Quatermass Experiment featured a dematerialized life-form that floats through 
space until it encounters a pioneering space rocket from earth. This ‘plankton of the 
ether’ – perhaps a metaphor for television broadcasting itself – has no body of its 
own, being ‘pure energy, without an organic structure’. Thus, it is able to penetrate 
the body of an astronaut, Victor Caroon, who returns to earth apparently physically 
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normal, but gradually transforms into an alien thing, half man and half cactus. 403 
The otherworldly life-form has turned the exploratory human subject into a kind of 
receiver for its remote-control signal, thus proving its technological superiority to 
Professor Quatermass’s team of human scientists, who lost radio connection with the 
astronauts at the start of episode one. The ground control team tracking the missing 
rocket indeed resemble radar operators, or even neuroscientists, in their use of 
complex instruments whose outputs must be interpreted; they hunch intimately 
around sleek boxes and take readings from screens. But like Powell and 
Pressburger’s Peter Carter, Carroon has detached himself from the earth in order to 
confront the enormity of space, and like Carter he crashes back into the domestic 
realm – in this case the cosy home of a harmless old lady – only to find himself 
drastically remediated by his journey, lost in translation after all.  
Television’s increasing interest in the gothic possibilities of its own technology 
came full circle a year later when the BBC broadcast a version of Nineteen Eighty-
Four. Adapted by Nigel Kneale, who had also written Quatermass, it caused such a 
sensation that five Conservative MPs tabled a House of Commons motion deploring 
‘the tendency evident in recent British Broadcasting Corporation television 
programmes, notably on Sunday evenings, to pander to sexual and sadistic tastes.’ A 
countering amendment conversely deplored ‘the tendency of honourable members to 
attack the courage and enterprise of the British Broadcasting Corporation’ and 
another expressed thanks that ‘freedom of the individual still permits viewers to 
switch off.’ The Times leader-writer had no truck with anti-television sentiment:  
 
If anything had been needed to underline the tremendous possibilities of 
television, the reactions of the last few days have provided it. Orwell’s novel 
has been in circulation for five years. It has been widely read and has made 
many thinking people uncomfortable […] [But] until last Sunday’s broadcast it 
could be said that the impact of Nineteen Eighty-four on the British public had 
been only marginal. This is no longer the case. Despite their use hundreds of 
times in newspapers, in broadcasts and in other ways, such phrases as 
‘totalitarianism’, ‘brainwashing’, ‘dangerous thoughts’, and the Communist 
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practice of making words stand on their heads have for millions of people 
suddenly taken on a new meaning.404  
 
Television had won the argument. Orwell’s gothic warning about its all-consuming 
media paradigm had not only been consumed by the medium’s insatiable appetite for 
new content, it had been spat out again in remediated form, just as Adorno had 
described, rewritten to fit into the prevailing Cold War political agenda of the time.  
Yet the mid-century’s concern with the domestication of uncanny objects was 
not confined to technological novelties. In the next chapter, the domestic interior is 
invaded by objects from the past which bear such a clear imprint of past trauma that 
they can override the present. And whereas computers and television screens helped 
to initiate a new cultural understanding of the abstractions of the mind, the haunted 
furniture of works such as Marghanita Laski’s The Victorian Chaise Longue began 
to redescribe the mid-century body. 
 
  
                                                
404 ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four and all that’, The Times, 16 December 1954, p. 9. 
 167 
PART 2: INTIMACY 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Neophilia and nostalgia: The trouble with gentrification  
 
Television was not the first uncanny object to disrupt private domestic space. 
Haunted furniture was an established feature of popular gothic from the beginning of 
the twentieth century, especially in stories which reflected the rise of suburbia and 
the new aspirations and mores it seemed to represent. It was no longer necessary for 
strange phenomena to manifest themselves in the ancestral homes of ancient 
families, as they had in Walpole, Radcliffe or Poe; nor were they necessarily 
expressions of a scientific or technological disquiet, as they were for Stevenson and 
later for Orwell. Instead, psychical disturbances – often female-gendered – might 
emerge out of the liminality of an upstart middle class who colonized developments 
thrust tactlessly into an older landscape in a way that reflected their occupants’ 
attempt to bulldoze traditional social structures. This chapter will trace this strain of 
gothic to discover how it reflected and articulated the cultural turn of the mid-
century, focusing in particular on two novels which straddle the divide between the 
prewar, modernist thing-world – in which subjects began to absorb and reflect the 
traces left by objects – and the postwar, liminal moment when objects began to stake 
out a more intimate claim on human subjectivity, opening the door for the 
consumerist ideology which was to define subsequent decades. Elizabeth Bowen’s 
The Heat of the Day (1948) will be brought into dialogue with Marghanita Laski’s 
novella The Victorian Chaise Longue (1953) to show how both authors were 
interested in modern negotiations between lost, dazed and traumatized characters and 
the things with which they chose – or chose not – to surround themselves. First, 
though, it is worth considering the precursors of this mid-century domestic gothic in 
order to understand how it developed and expressed its moment.  
 
It is Freud who first points out the uncanny frisson produced by the idea of haunted 
objects which might inhabit our most intimate spaces alongside us. Towards the end 
of his essay on ‘The Uncanny’ he mentions a tale published in The Strand magazine 
in 1917, which he read ‘during the isolation of the Great War’.405 He recalls: 
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a story about a young couple who move into a furnished flat in which there is 
a curiously shaped table with crocodiles carved into the wood. Towards 
evening the flat is regularly pervaded by an unbearable and highly 
characteristic smell, and in the dark the tenants stumble over things and fancy 
they see something indefinable gliding over the stairs. In short, one is led to 
surmise that, owing to the presence of this table, the house is haunted by 
ghostly crocodiles or that the wooden monsters come to life in the dark, or 
something of that sort. It was a quite naive story, but its effect was 
extraordinarily uncanny.406  
 
The tale Freud refers to – ‘Inexplicable’ by L. G. Moberly – conforms to the classic 
conventions of the haunted-furniture sub-genre, characterized by three essential 
elements: it features a young married couple making a home together; the source of 
its horror is a domestic object which acts as a conduit for emanations from another 
time and place; and its ghastly consequences arise from a conflict within the wife, 
who feels at once attracted to and repelled by an antique’s heterotopian promise.407 
Unlike in the junkshop paradigm discussed in the previous chapter, the purchaser in 
this case is not necessarily warned off by a reluctant shopkeeper – instead, it is the 
wife’s own reservations about the object that are ignored. In ‘Inexplicable’, the 
estate agent who shows a rental property to a house-hunting housewife goes out of 
his way to explain away the foul smell and the air of neglect attached to this ‘solidly 
built, commodious-looking’ house in ‘the very unromantic suburb of Prillsbury’.408 
This dwelling is an unfurnished house, not a furnished flat as Freud remembers, and 
the young woman, May, is surprised that the ornate and beautifully crafted crocodile 
table has been left behind by a previous tenant and ‘goes with the house’, as the 
agent explains, ‘as a fixture, or as lumber – whichever way one likes to look at it’.409 
May, who is the tale’s narrator, immediately replies, ‘I should prefer to look on it as 
a fixture’ – indicating her preference for semantic certainty: she does not want the 
table to fall into the interstitial category of junk or lumber. Despite reacting 
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physically to the table on first sight – she ‘shudder[s] and draw[s] away from it’, and 
finds that a ‘dimness’ has ‘temporarily descended upon [her] brain’ – she is 
motivated by social aspiration which over-rules her doubts; she gladly takes 
possession of an object which offers, like the ‘too good to be true’ house, an 
opportunity to assume a grander air than she and her husband can quite afford.410 
The table’s revenge takes the form of a sharp regression from the civility and 
gentility of May’s aspirations: along with the stench and the terrifying shapes which 
slither around in the dark, its apparitions regularly trip up the unwary, especially 
when near the staircase and its symbolic potential for upward (or downward) 
mobility. Freud does not remark on these aspects of the story, and indeed declines to 
provide any detailed analysis of it, but he prefaces his account with some remarks ‘of 
a general nature […] about animism and the superannuated working of our mental 
apparatus.’ The uncanny effect, he writes,  
 
often arises when the boundary between fantasy and reality is blurred, when 
we are faced with the reality of something that we have until now considered 
imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full function and significance of what 
it symbolizes, and so forth.411  
 
He remembers the example of the crocodile table because it features a carved image 
which comes to life – a figuration of an ancient force which jumps the threshold into 
reality and brings with it the repressed fear that rational modernity may be a fragile 
illusion. Given that this is a story about home-making, it is telling that Freud alerts 
us to the association of its uncanny effect with his own feelings of dislocation and 
homelessness by mentioning he read it while suffering from the shocks of war. 
Modernity wishes to assert its mastery of history by means of a style which breaks 
with the past: it must construct a homely sense of belonging entirely and 
unambiguously to its own contemporary moment, despite its constant awareness – as 
Walter Benjamin argued – of the piled wreckage of history which forms its 
context.412 The residues of that wreckage, however – in the form of old objects that 
‘go with the house’ – may force the repressed truth about time’s mockery of 
modernity (and forward-looking social aspiration) back up and out into the 
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consciousness of unwary couples who decide to move to a better neighbourhood. 
Throughout the story, May tries desperately to keep such thoughts repressed, doing 
all she can to dismiss the alarm of her servants and even her guests by desperately 
ascribing the strange phenomena they experience to an unseen and entirely blameless 
cat. Hugh’s solution is more decisive: he acknowledges the table’s ancient power 
and rids them of it through the primitive ritual of burning it. Even then, he is forced 
to concede that it may somehow persist. ‘It’s not a part of the house any more […] 
It’s not a part of anything, except in so far as matter never dies, and the smoke is 
doing some useful turn elsewhere.’413  
 
 
‘Something awful will happen’: ‘The Haunted Mirror’ and the murderous 
bourgeoisie 
The nearness of things in daily use, which shape and mould human experience 
through intimate proximity, was the theme of several late 1940s and early 1950s 
attempts to encapsulate the mid-century transition between the shocking newness of 
wartime atomization and the hesitancy of a postwar recuperation seeking to balance 
nostalgia with a neophiliac appetite for the future. The idea that furniture and 
household goods might be haunted, either literally with a malevolent spirit, or 
metaphorically with the ghosts of lost certainties, was a powerful mythology. 
One striking example is ‘The Haunted Mirror’, a short segment which forms 
part of Ealing Studios’ 1945 portmanteau film The Dead of Night – a film more 
usually remembered for Alberto Cavalcanti’s extended contribution ‘The 
Ventriloquist’s Dummy’, in which the murderous rivalry between man and object is 
played out as a psychiatric crisis.414 Directed by Robert Hamer, ‘The Haunted 
Mirror’ is no less interesting in its treatment of anxiety about the agency of 
inanimate objects. It concerns an affluent young couple and an antique looking-glass 
which, when brought home to their fashionably modern flat in Chelsea, insists on 
replaying an indelible recording of its gruesome past. Presented to her fiancé Peter 
by a young woman, Joan, this Chippendale antique is a trophy of shared taste, 
authenticity and luxury (‘It’s a beauty!’ Peter exclaims. ‘Very expensive,’ she 
assures him.) But when Peter looks into the glass he sees, not the bright and  
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streamlined modern furniture of his own room, but a gothic, wood-panelled bedroom 
complete with elaborately carved four-poster and a roaring fire in the grate. And the 
scene is not just a passive imprint of the past: ‘I feel as if that room were trying to 
claim me, to draw me in,’ he tells Joan. ‘If I cross that dividing line, something 
awful will happen!’ 
The decorative mirrors of the domestic interior serve a different function from 
the conceptual mirrors discussed in the previous chapter, which had been used by 
Lacan and others to elucidate the workings of consciousness. The haunted mirror in 
Hamer’s film is not a metaphor but an active agent – it reflects the intimate and 
submerged story of Peter’s long-dead precursor, and unleashes his own repressed 
antagonism to Joan. When she returns to the shop for more information about the 
troublesome mirror, she learns that it had been owned in 1836 by an invalid driven 
mad by being confined to a single room, who eventually killed his wife and himself. 
She returns to find Peter equally mad and apparently possessed by the mirror’s 
former owner; when he attempts to strangle her, she can only break the spell by 
smashing the glass. This moment of symbolic fracture allows the couple to make a 
definitive break with the past and restores their pact with modernity. Their haunted 
mirror is a gothically malfunctioning example of the type described in Jean 
Baudrillard’s The System of Objects, where mirrors are the sign of nineteenth-
century interiority; they ‘close off space, presuppose a wall, refer back to the centre 
of the room’.415 ‘[T]he mirror is an opulent object which affords the self-indulgent 
bourgeois individual the opportunity to exercise his privilege,’ he writes, ‘to 
reproduce his own image and revel in his possessions.’416 Peter’s mirror does indulge 
the privilege of its bourgeois possessor, but only by reverting to the interiority of the 
nineteenth century and the man who looked into it then.  
In Baudrillard’s system, which he proposed in 1968, antiques (along with 
folkloric and exotic objects) are given a special status as exceptions to his general 
rule of modern domestic interiors. Contemporary interiors, in his scheme, are ideally 
filled with modular, mass-produced objects which lack the auratic power of 
uniqueness and inwardness with which artisan-produced items are endowed, but 
instead are able to act as shells for their possessor’s postmodern identity, which is 
expressed dynamically within a system of relationships or ‘moves in a game’.417 
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Antiques, on the other hand, are ‘marginal’; they ‘fall outside the system we have 
been examining. They appear to run counter to the requirements of functional 
calculation, and answer to other kinds of demands such as witness, memory, 
nostalgia or escapism.’418 An antique mirror, then, combines bourgeois self-
indulgence and an inherent conflict with the dynamic selfhood required by 
modernity; in Hamer’s film, the mirror’s hold over Peter demonstrates the pull of an 
antiquated subjectivity which is – like the mirror’s original owner – nevertheless an 
emasculated and murderously repressed version of manhood. 
Baudrillard’s ideal of rational modern furniture was in fact anticipated in the 
British utility furniture experiment which accompanied the rationing of household 
goods from 1942-52. Indeed, as Gordon Russell, who chaired the Utility Design 
Panel from 1943, wrote a decade later in The Things We See: Furniture, the utility 
movement was intended as a way to introduce modern ideas to wider society beyond 
the bourgeoisie: 
 
The interesting feature of the scheme was that there was a definite and 
conscious effort to grade up both design and general quality standards. […] 
There is no doubt that the British public has become accustomed to a better 
type of design than was common before the war. In fact, it is true to say that 
the later war-time utility designs would only have been available, had they 
been evolved before 1939, in the more expensive shops.419  
 
At the time, however, the scheme had not gained universal support; in her 
memoir, Alix Meynell – an influential civil servant at the Board of Trade – recalls 
that it was the Board’s president, Hugh Dalton, who had pushed it through: 
 
We officials argued at first that it would be going too far along the road to 
state control to limit the production of furniture entirely to approved 
Government designs but Dalton was right; his was the only way to avoid the 
waste of wood, which was largely imported, and of skilled labour, on 
unnecessary frills. We were very keen on ‘clean lines and fitness for 
purpose’; claw feet, so often to be found in Victorian and Edwardian 
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furniture, was our symbol for all that we thought wasteful, unbeautiful and to 
be avoided in utility furniture. We started with six main patterns ranging 
from the best and priciest made by Gordon Russell and usually sold through 
Heal’s, to the everyday furniture mass-produced by Herman Lebus at his 
modern factory in Tottenham.420  
 
Meynall later embraced the utility philosophy so enthusiastically that she personally 
instigated the production of ‘white, undecorated, domestic crockery and handleless 
cups. I was unsympathetic to the suggestion that people would burn their fingers; it 
was a question, I said, of holding by the rim.’421 Her insights suggest some of the 
reasons why people who were forced to scorch their fingers, and to buy the less 
expensive furniture from Tottenham, rejected utility as soon as the war was over. 
This was much to Russell’s dismay, who accused the postwar furniture industry of 
‘indulg[ing] in an orgy of bad taste frequently accompanied, as bad taste so often is, 
by shoddy workmanship.’422 In this context, the desirability of old objects, whose 
value and quality has stood the test of time, is understandable; but old objects tell 
their own stories, and may resist their new owners’ attempts to recruit them as 
avatars of identity. 
 
 
‘Arrested energy’: Immovable objects in Bowen’s domestic gothic 
Freud’s early example of domestic gothic saw the hopes of aspirant modern youth 
successfully reasserted through Hugh’s intervention, so that, by the end of the story, 
the rented house finally did express the couple’s desired position in life, although for 
May ‘it was many a long day before I could live down those weird experiences.’423 
As the century progressed, however, domestic anxiety developed in more 
complicated ways. Elizabeth Bowen’s interest in domestic interiors and their ability 
to interpellate the human subject can be traced in the wartime stories collected in The 
Demon Lover. Writing a postscript in October 1944, Bowen looked back on the 
collection as a form of ‘resistance writing’ akin to the literature crossing the Channel 
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from occupied France. ‘Personal life here, too, put up its own resistance to the 
annihilation that was threatening it,’ she wrote. ‘To survive, not only physically, but 
spiritually, was essential.’424 But Bowen was not interested in the preservation of a 
communal or national particularity: cultural artefacts were a reservoir of something 
emphatically personal. To understand this, she turned for an analogy to the material 
things that the dispossessed instinctively held close: 
 
Every writer during this time was aware of the personal cry of the individual. 
And he was aware of the passionate attachment of men and women to every 
object or image or place or love or fragment of memory with which his or her 
destiny seemed to be identified, and by which their destiny seemed to be 
assured.425  
 
Bowen saw that individual self-expression had been curtailed, not just by the 
constraints on time and freedom imposed by the war, but by the very idea of 
communal effort and national emergency, which bound strangers to each other while 
severing the relationships between people and the things by which they were 
defined. 
 
You used to know what you were like from the things you liked, and chose. 
Now there was not what you liked, and you did not choose. Any little 
remaining choices and pleasures shot into new proportion and new value: 
people paid big money for little bunches of flowers.426  
 
But while rationing and shortages of once-plentiful commodities clearly 
contributed to this sharp new emphasis on things, it was the nexus of intimate 
meaning projected into personal objects that interested Bowen as a writer. In the 
collection, her characters find themselves adrift in London’s devastated cityscape, or 
tumble into a past – on a ‘rising tide of hallucination’ – that no longer offers the 
sunlit refuge of nostalgic certainty that it ought to promise. 427 And more often than 
not, the things they reach out for to anchor them reciprocate by reaching out, 
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disturbingly, in their turn: in ‘The Inherited Clock’, a woman receives a valuable 
bequest which unlocks a buried memory of childhood trauma, in which her hand 
became enmeshed in the mechanism of the timepiece; in ‘The Demon Lover’, 
another woman returns to her shut-up London house ‘to look for several things she 
wanted to take away’428 but finds instead a ghostly message from her dead fiancé, 
threatening to reclaim her like a piece of lost property. Things are not what they used 
to be; they invite their human counterparts to look at them differently. Bowen writes 
of the ‘new bare alert senses’ that were sharpened by the darkness of the blackout, 
and of her stories as ‘disjected snapshots’ which isolate the particular, ‘spotlighting 
faces or cutting out gestures’.429 The chaos of fragmentation yields sharply refocused 
perceptions, and this enhanced vision reveals once-humble things to be as resonant 
as literary and cultural reaffirmations of identity, and just as urgently re-collected 
from their atomized fragments in the aftermath of disaster: 
 
People whose homes had been blown up went to infinite lengths to assemble 
bits of themselves – broken ornaments, odd shoes, torn scraps of the curtains 
that had hung in a room – from the wreckage. In the same way, they 
assembled and checked themselves from stories and poems, from their 
memories, from one another’s talk.430  
 
These stories were written during the years when she was also composing The Heat 
of the Day; she describes them as ‘acting like releases’ for the pent-up thoughts 
which didn’t find a place in that novel: ‘Each time I sat down to write a story I 
opened a door; and the pressure against the other side of that door must have been 
very great, for things – ideas, images, emotions – came through with force and 
rapidity, sometimes violence.’431  
What they share is a strong sense that London in wartime was a place where 
time had been frozen, but identities were in flux. The most strikingly gothic of the 
stories, ‘Mysterious Kôr’, describes London at night as ‘the moon’s capital’, where 
‘the soaring new flats and the crouching old shops and houses looked equally 
brittle’, and ‘something […] immaterial seemed to threaten’, so that ‘people stayed 
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indoors with a fervour that could be felt’.432 Opening the collection, ‘In the Square’ 
describes a bright summer evening where the slanting sunlight ‘was able to enter 
brilliantly at a point where three of the houses had been bombed away’ and ‘the 
extinct scene had the appearance of belonging to some ages ago.’433 This is the story 
which seems most directly to be echoed in The Heat of the Day, with its central 
character of a woman living unencumbered by domestic niceties in a city populated 
by stripped-back survivalists.434 In a summary that was published as part of the 
publicity for The Heat of the Day, Bowen described how the wartime distortion of 
time seeped into the private spaces of her protagonist, Stella Rodney: 
 
The possibility of there being no present, nothing more than a grinding-
together of past and future, enters, at a point in the story, a woman’s thought. 
Against that, there is the actuality of moments, and the power of a moment 
to protract itself and contain the world. All through The Heat of the Day, 
what might be drama runs into little pockets: this is a domestic novel. Within 
view of the reader there is no violent act. Persons hesitate or calculate; and at 
the same time are inseparable from history.435 
 
Stella Rodney is a middle-aged widow who has used the opportunity of the war as an 
excuse to shake off the trappings of a social identity she was anyway forced to leave 
behind when her husband first left her in scandalous circumstances, and then 
abandoned her even more decisively by dying. Finding herself betrayed by the norms 
of domesticity, Stella has embraced the sense of ahistoricity which pervades the city; 
as Bowen writes, ‘It was characteristic of that life in the moment and for the 
moment’s sake that one knew people well without knowing much about them: 
vacuum as to future was offset by vacuum as to past; life-stories were shed as so 
much superfluous weight.’436 Stella locates herself instead in a new ‘habitat’, the 
‘hermetic world’437 of her affair with Robert, a stranger whom she met in the 
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heterotopia of the blitz and who, two years later, has now been unmasked as a Nazi-
sympathizing traitor by a blackmailer named Harrison. The fact that Harrison offers 
to keep Robert’s treason a secret if Stella agrees to sleep with him contributes to her 
nightmarish sense of being trapped within the closed-off world she has herself been 
determined to construct. At the same time, the decisiveness of unspoken secrets 
attests to Bowen’s sense of drama running into little pockets; the story hinges on the 
threatened return of repressed truths from these intimate and personal enfoldings.  
Indeed, Stella’s whole relationship with Robert has been conducted in an 
atmosphere of gothicism, having begun in the ‘heady autumn of the first London air 
raids’ when the dead refused to stay buried, 438 and ‘the wall between the living and 
the living became less solid as the wall between the living and the dead thinned’: 
 
Most of all, the dead, from mortuaries, from under cataracts of rubble, made 
their anonymous presence – not as today’s dead but as yesterday’s living – 
felt through London. Uncounted, they continued to move in shoals through 
the city day, pervading everything to be seen or heard or felt with their torn-
off senses, drawing on this tomorrow they had expected – for death cannot be 
so sudden as all that. Absent from the routine which had been life, they 
stamped upon that routine their absence.439  
 
Like a ghost, Stella has also become untethered from her prewar routines, but she is 
determined to avoid stamping herself onto her new environment. The truth about her 
failed marriage – that she was the wronged party, despite taking the blame – has 
been put away along with her possessions, which she has placed into storage so that 
she can move into an anonymous – and, again, time-locked – furnished rental:  
 
Here in Weymouth Street she had the irritation of being surrounded by 
somebody else’s irreproachable taste: the flat, redecorated in the last year of 
peace, still marked the point at which fashion in the matter had stood still – to 
those who were not to know this room was not her own it expressed her 
unexceptionably but wrongly.440  
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This description of her flat not only establishes Stella’s loss of faith in conventional 
constructs of selfhood, it also indicates that norms of female domesticity – 
represented here by fashion in home decoration – have been suspended while war 
rages in an unseen, external dimension. The blitz, already distant and 
sentimentalized in the middle years of the war, had created an illusion of communal 
purpose among the ‘stayers-on’, those ‘campers in rooms of draughty dismantled 
houses or corners of fled-from flats’.441 But by now this communal moment 
appeared ‘apocryphal, more far away than peace. No planetary round was to bring 
that particular conjunction of life and death; that particular psychic London was to be 
gone for ever; more bombs would fall, but not on the same city. […] This was the 
lightless middle of the tunnel.’442  
As in the Demon Lover stories, Bowen pays close attention to the other ‘stayers-
on’: the objects which persist in time and seem to interrogate human agency, despite 
Stella’s attempted rejection of them. Apart from the Weymouth Street flat, two 
sharply contrasted interiors reveal to Stella her own comparative weightlessness: the 
ancient house in Ireland, Mount Morris, which has been bequeathed to her son 
Roderick by a distant relative, and Holme Dene, the soulless late-Victorian manor 
house where Robert’s mother and sister continue to live, despite it having been 
officially for sale for several years. Holme Dene’s provisional status appals Stella, 
perhaps because it reveals the truth about her own relationship with the flat in 
Weymouth Street: ‘How can they live, anyone live […] in a place that has for years 
been asking to be brought to an end?’; but Robert’s reply suggests that his family 
considers objects and furniture to be mere props in an ongoing pretence of 
continuity:  
 
Oh, but there will always be somewhere else. […] Everything can be shifted, 
lock, stock and barrel. After all, everything was brought here from 
somewhere else, with the intention of being moved again – like touring 
scenery from theatre to theatre. Reassemble it anywhere: you get the same 
illusion.443 
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It is at Holme Dene that Stella – already alerted to Robert’s treason by Harrison 
– begins to understand that her lover is also adrift: ‘She, like he, had come loose 
from her moorings; but while what she had left behind her dissolved behind her, 
what he had left behind him was not to be denied.’444 Yet while Stella’s family 
background of impoverished gentility gives her a sense of a fixed origin, even if she 
has no fixed position in the world, Robert’s self-made, self-defining family offers no 
such armature of identity – an effect which is both suffocating and annihilating: 
‘Each time I come back again into it,’ he says of his old bedroom, ‘I’m hit in the face 
by the feeling that I don’t exist – that I not only am not but never have been.’445  
In contrast, Mount Morris emanates a sense of implacable permanence which 
also challenges its human inhabitants to confront their own dependence on, and 
vulnerability to, time. Its late owner, Cousin Francis, had responded to the weight of 
history by knitting himself into the material of the house, particularly in the library 
which he filled with objects which expressed his character (although not his wife’s, 
who has been banished to an English asylum). Visiting Mount Morris not long after 
the funeral, Stella encounters the collection of meaningful junk gathered in the 
library, including 
 
colourless billiard balls, padlocks, thermometers, a dog collar, keyless key 
rings, a lily bulb, an ivory puzzle, a Shakespeare calendar for 1927, the cured 
but unmounted claw of a greater eagle, a Lincoln Imp knocker, an odd spur, 
lumps of quartz, a tangle of tipless tiny pencils on frayed silk cords…446 
 
These objects immediately offer to resolve themselves into a pattern – the very fact 
that they are arrayed within a list makes their combination of the natural, the 
technological and the cultural tantalizingly suggestive. But in fact they are symbolic, 
not because they show signs of intentional curation by Francis, but because they 
have been curated by Bowen in order to testify to Francis’s engagement with his 
domestic space, and to demonstrate Stella’s surprising response to it. ‘The room was 
without poetry if this could not be felt in the arrested energy of its nature – it was in 
here that Cousin Francis had had his being,’ she notices.447 When Stella later tells 
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Robert, ‘It had not been possible to feel lonely among those feeling things,’ she is 
admitting for the first time that she does feel lonely in her carefully anonymized 
London.448 Freud located the uncanny in psychic symbols which sprang to life and 
demonstrated their own agency; Bowen finds a similar sense of agency in the 
objects, ‘arrested’ by death, which awaken with the shock of urgent symbols.  
That Mount Morris, like all inanimate things, continues to exist beyond 
Francis’s life-span gives it an uncanny quality which also infects Roderick when he 
visits the house. Roderick’s presence in the novel has been intermittent – he is in the 
army and appears infrequently when on leave – but his assumption of his legacy is 
an important driving force in Bowen’s narrative. He arrives in the dark and is 
stalked, not by ghosts of the past, but ‘by the sound of his own footsteps over his 
own land’.449 Taking possession of the master bedroom and laying his head ‘on the 
old’s man’s pillow’, he finds himself unable to sleep; he is haunted by thoughts of 
inheritance and succession, his possibly imminent death in battle, and the 
confounding persistence of the non-human: ‘It was a matter of continuing – but 
what, what? As to that, there ought to be access to the mindless knowledge locked up 
in rocks, in the stayers-on.’450  
By returning to the idea of ‘stayers-on’ which had first been applied to the 
Londoners who endured the blitz, Bowen brackets Roderick’s belief in the wisdom 
of the ageless rocks with the reckless impermanence experienced by people like 
Stella in 1940. In the blitz, the stayers-on had identified themselves with the 
shattered fabric of the city, and had lost their own sense of integrity in the process; 
Roderick is just as wrong to expect the frozen timelessness of Mount Morris to 
model a right way of living. Rather, it is for Roderick to imprint his own way of 
living onto the place, as Francis had done. The Heat of the Day thus encapsulates a 
key stage of the mid-century turn in domestic gothic: objects do not necessarily have 
to infest houses with their fearful presence and trip up the assumptions of an aspiring 
bourgeoisie, as Freud’s crocodile table did; in Bowen’s world, it is the humans who 
are uncanny, not the things that furnish their houses. Merely by outliving their 
owners, things can turn human subjects into spectral presences, barely able to inhabit 
a space once the inanimate has laid claim it.  
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Roderick’s rebellion against this annihilation takes the form of lighting match 
after match in the darkness, asserting his freedom to use and destroy objects at will. 
The matches comfort him, not just with the light they bring, but because they are 
objects without any afterlife, fully consumed as soon as they have fulfilled their 
single function. Even so, as Hugh pointed out in ‘Inexplicable’, burnt wood may 
persist at some mysterious molecular level outside human perception. The next 
morning, Roderick wakes full of plans to mechanize and update the estate, but 
Bowen denies him any triumphant reassertion of his will, giving the last word to the 
dubious servant Donovan. Roderick’s aspirations towards modernity may simply be 
a way to ‘sink a terrible lot of money’.451  
This late mention of capital serves to highlight how little importance money has 
had earlier in the narrative. Robert’s treason, for instance, has not been achieved by 
bribery but by an ideological commitment to the brutal simplicity of fascism: as he 
puts it, ‘I want the cackle cut.’452 Within the novel’s narrative logic, Robert’s suicide 
seems to precipitate the end of the war: ‘That day whose start in darkness covered 
Robert’s fall or leap from the roof had not yet fully broken when news broke: the 
Allied landings in North Africa.’453 After this, the postwar future begins to impinge 
on the hermetic existence of Stella, and is personified by the figure of Louie, a 
working-class girl whose search for love and meaning has been interwoven with 
Stella’s, although the latter has barely been aware of Louie’s existence. Like 
Roderick, Louie is young enough to invest in the future, and like him she is sure that 
spending money will enable her to assert her new identity. Having betrayed her 
soldier husband in a series of casual encounters with men, she has had a baby and 
faces potential disgrace. But when her husband is killed in action she is suddenly 
free to move out of London and assume the identity of a respectable war widow, ‘an 
orderly mother’ wheeling ‘a still handsome second-hand pram’.454 As the novel ends, 
she is ‘progress[ing] gapingly along the windows of shopping streets. The baby’s 
intention to survive put itself across her and taught her sense.’455  
In ‘Reimagining the Arts of War: Language & History in Elizabeth Bowen’s 
The Heat of the Day & Rose Macaulay’s The World my Wilderness’, Phyllis Lassner 
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argues that both novels are concerned with language, silence and lying, and express 
the negation of women’s experience and utterance in war, and the necessity of self-
invention in the face of this erasure.456 However, this emphasis on language ignores 
the other, material side, of Louie’s self-definition (and Stella’s refusal of self-
definition). The loss of identity concomitant with Stella’s loss of possessions is the 
necessary precursor of the consumerism and massification which rushed in to fill this 
material vacuum after the war. Whereas, in The World My Wilderness, Barbary’s 
attempt to conform to this consumerist imperative took the form of shoplifting and 
precipitated her literal and figurative fall, Louie is smoothly assimilated into the 
culture of retail desire by the social norms she has absorbed from the popular 
newspapers she avidly reads. For another novelist of the period, however, the 
postwar commodity had as much uncanny potential as the lost objects of the blitz: 
Marghanita Laski’s 1953 novella The Victorian Chaise Longue demonstrates how 
the self-defining act of making a purchase can also bring to light the clashing 
temporalities of the human and the inanimate. 
 
 
‘True purposes’: the thingly agenda of The Victorian Chaise Longue 
In attempting to emulate forward-looking survivors like Louie, Laski’s protagonist, 
Melanie Langdon, falls into the trap laid for her by a piece of haunted furniture, and 
finds herself stuck in an uncanny non-space and non-time. Louie had been guided by 
luck to her handsome second-hand pram, which she assertively ‘learned to wheel, 
brake, tilt, even tow behind her’.457 The smug and pampered young wife, Melanie, 
also wants to use her buying power as a way of repurposing old things, but she 
attempts a much more decisive intervention by disrupting the historical content of a 
stained Victorian couch, and unwittingly unleashes its past life into her own. Her 
junk-shop find is a time machine that absorbs her into itself and transports her into 
the past. 
Unlike Bowen, whose gothicism runs into little pockets of the domestic, Laski 
playfully acknowledges the conventions of popular gothic in this story. The parallels 
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with ‘The Haunted Mirror’ are clear in the theme of an old object acting as a witness 
of, and irresistible portal to, the past; both also concern newlyweds and the 
negotiations between masculinity and femininity. The Victorian Chaise Longue also 
echoes the idea that confinement and illness imbue domestic objects with a 
concentrated form of congealed emotion and desire; at the start of the novel Melanie 
is recovering from a bout of tuberculosis, and for the first time is given permission 
by her doctor to move from her sickbed to the antique chaise longue in the drawing 
room, which she had bought just before she fell ill. This chaise turns out to carry a 
kind of curse; when she falls asleep on it she wakes up to find herself in 1864, where 
she is trapped inside the body of another sick, trapped young woman, Milly Baines. 
The overt political freight of the fable is a warning against any retreat from women’s 
hard-won modern independence: the passive and dreamy Melanie is forced to 
‘remember’ the oppression suffered by the Millies of the previous century. Crucially, 
Laski chooses to draw this comparison in terms of the two domestic interiors and the 
objects that fill them: both spaces are described with a minuteness that reflects 
Melanie’s sense of enclosure and incarceration in both the 1950s and the 1860s, and 
tacitly connects the mid-century’s disgust at the congested thing-world of the 
Victorians with an ambivalence towards its own late-modernist tastes.  
In fact, the chaise longue is a dubious object from the start, but not because it is 
old. On the contrary, Melanie and her husband Guy are very modern in their 
willingness to discover latent value in old objects which have fallen out of favour 
with the mainstream. They live in a Regency house in Islington, which was at the 
time a daring choice: such properties had been rejected by the previous generation, 
and the Langdons enjoy ‘the shocked incredulity of both sets of parents who had 
insisted that no one could live there, back of the railways, down by the canal, why it 
was no better than a slum’.458 But the young couple have spotted that the area is on 
the cusp between romantic Bohemianism and middle-class respectability, and are  
 
able to point out that already an artist and architect had bought and reclaimed 
homes in this hidden forgotten Regency row […] and later two more homes 
had been reclaimed and converted, one by a young professor and the other by 
a senior Civil Servant […] leaving only one house still held firmly in 
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working-class hands, the object of complicated plots hatched by the other 
owners on summer evenings.459  
 
In short – although the term had not yet been coined – the Langdons are gentrifiers. 
The word gentrification was first used by Ruth Glass in her 1964 introduction to 
a report by the Centre for Urban Studies entitled London: Aspects of Change, and 
Laski’s description of the Langdons’ hostile takeover of their canalside 
neighbourhood conforms exactly to Glass’s disapproving characterization of this 
process: 
 
One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded 
by the middle classes – upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages, 
two rooms up and two down – have been taken over, when their leases have 
expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences […] Once this process 
of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district, it goes on rapidly until all or most of the 
original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social character 
of the district is changed.’460  
 
The danger, Glass implies, is of a social Darwinism: ‘London may quite soon be a 
city which illustrates the principle of the survival of the fittest – the financially 
fittest, who can still afford to work and live there’.461  
By 1979, such gentrification was, in Michael Thompson’s Rubbish Theory, a 
perfect illustration of his ideas about the dynamic of changing value, whereby 
material objects decline from being transient (currently valuable but subject to 
depreciation), to being rubbish (having reached maximum depreciation) but then, in 
some cases, can be plucked from the rubbish heap, re-appreciated, and placed in the 
category of ‘durable’, where they can stay forever, steadily accruing more value the 
older they get.462  
Such ‘durability’ had, in prewar decades of the twentieth century, been ascribed 
only to those houses like Mount Morris in The Heat of the Day (or indeed 
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Brideshead Castle) which were so far outside fashion that they would remain 
infinitely, and timelessly, valuable unless a final calamity befell them. By the time 
Laski was writing about the Langdons, however, a new kind of durability – re-
understood as bourgeois desirability – was being ascribed to houses which had once 
been considered ruins or slums. 
Like Laski, Thompson was to identify Islington as a primary case study, 
focusing on the streets and squares around Packington Street, near the Grand Union 
Canal, which were once prosperous, but were abandoned by the bourgeoisie who 
moved, like May and Hugh in ‘Inexplicable’, to the leafier suburbs now accessible 
by rail. He notes that this neighbourhood was once so dilapidated that when ‘a 
winkle-stall-holder and her husband’ were offered a four-storey Georgian house 
there, ‘free, by their landlord, they refused to accept it.’463  
The assumption that the working-class residents of a soon-to-be-desirable 
neighbourhood are simply unable to perceive the latent value in their surroundings is 
a conscience-salving elision of the truth (central to Glass’s account) that they simply 
lack the wherewithal to pay for the renovations necessary to realize that value. In 
both Thompson and Laski, the gentrifiers congratulate themselves on their proper 
alignment of appearance and value, which they see as disturbingly asymmetric when 
the properties are in working-class hands. Their ‘superior’ vision restores a ‘proper’ 
order, just as the houses’ external decorations are brought into harmony with each 
other, to form a robustly bourgeois mise-en-scène in which their owners can 
dramatize their supposedly quirky (but in fact rigidly codified) personal tastes. 
Thompson describes at length the contrast between the outward appearance of 
ungentrified properties (‘the front doors are often unpainted […] sometimes the 
tenant has modernized his front door by flushing it with hardboard in which case it 
displays a rusty chromium-plated letterplate-cum-knocker made of pressed steel and 
a collection of assorted plastic bell pushes[…] the door number is often simply 
crudely painted on’464 and the same house post-gentrification:  
 
Immaculately painted, Thames Green with orange front door complete with 
six fielded panels, brass dolphin knocker and huge brass letterplate to match. 
The leaded fanlight has been painstakingly repaired and, affixed to the 
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brickwork at the side of the door, is a blue-and-white enamel number plate: a 
little touch of provincial France proclaiming that the owner drinks Hirondelle 
Vin Ordinarie with his Quiche Lorraine.465  
 
Laski draws an intriguing distinction between house and front garden in describing 
the transformation of this public face, noting  
 
how much the houses had changed since the Langdons had first come there, 
two years ago. Then they had all looked alike, dirty brick and dirty paint and 
dirty lace curtains, and only the gardens were different, here a rockery and 
here a gnome and there some green-and-white miniature palings. Now the 
gardens were identical, each neatly paved with thick rectangular stones, and, 
set in each, spindly white-painted iron chairs and table, and it was the houses 
that had grown apart from their neighbours and changed, what with the grey 
front door and the turquoise, the shiny black and the consciously amusing 
light fumed-oak.466 
 
Thompson goes on to peek into the carefully staged interior of such a reclaimed 
house – which he can do through the ‘enormously enlarged basement window’ – and 
notes that the bourgeois possessions combine new technology (‘a two-bowl twin-
drainer stainless steel sink with mixer taps and waste disposal unit’) with a collection 
of gentrified junk-shop objects:  
 
We catch a glimpse of a stuffed pike in a bow-fronted glass case…. Some gilt 
letters in a bold type salvaged from a Victorian grocers’ shop front, and a row 
of large blue jars with ground glass tops, similarly salvaged from an archaic 
chemist’s and bearing in gold lettering the abbreviated names of assorted 
poisons.467  
 
Such objects constitute a message that can be ‘decoded’ by the cognoscenti: ‘Every 
feature, every lick of paint, once one has learned the language, [is] a clear statement 
proclaiming the presence of a frontier middle class.’ 
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Not surprisingly, the pioneering Langdons were early exponents of this magpie 
trend:  
 
Antique-shops, or junk-shops, as they called them, were their common 
hobby. On Saturday mornings, dressed, so they believed, like people who 
haggled not from pleasure but because they must, they would leave the car 
well away out of sight, and wander up and down the Chalk Farm Road, the 
Portobello Road, St Christopher’s Place, looking for the pretty sparkles that 
would embellish and cement the nest.468  
 
On the day Melanie is diagnosed with tuberculosis, she has spent the morning 
indulging this hobby on her own, looking for an antique cradle for the unborn baby 
she is carrying. The cradle is key object for Melanie, just as the pram had been for 
Louie in The Heat of the Day. Motherhood serves a dual symbolic purpose for a 
bourgeois mid-century wife, re-establishing her domesticity in the wake of wartime 
disruption of gender roles, and at the same time looking forward to the future by 
establishing a new generation. Yet the unarguable newness of new life also brings 
with it the fear of superannuation, the shock of the idea that the moment of 
modernity may be passing on to those who are younger, and complicating the 
smooth progress of the generations with anxiety and tension. Whereas Louie’s 
second-hand pram represents her aspiration to replicate as closely as possible the 
bourgeois version of ‘orderly’ motherhood to which she has no rightful claim, 
Melanie’s quest for an antique cradle shows her reaching for a timeless aristocratic 
ideal, even if she has to purchase her own heirlooms instead of inheriting them. No 
mass-produced cot will do for Melanie: this object is to be a kind of vehicle, 
transporting her and her family into a fantasy of ease and privilege:  
 
She remembered the cradle of Napoleon’s baby son, the King of Rome, that 
she had read of as a child, a cradle shaped like a boat with a gilded prow, and 
she imagined such a cradle standing on the needlework flowers of the rug 
before the drawing-room fire, rocked by her pretty foot to content the plump 
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drowsy baby who sucked his thumb oblivious of the decorous sherry-
drinking above his head.469  
 
But this time the ‘miracle fail[s]’. The cradle she finds in the Marylebone antique 
shop is ‘Jacobean, dark carved oak and hopelessly unfashionable’, and will, 
according to the shopkeeper ‘probably go to America. There’s quite a demand for 
them there, for keeping logs in, you know.’ Melanie experiences a thrill at these 
words which emphasizes her belief in the essential, but amorphous, quality of 
authenticity which has the power to bestow value when perceived by the eye of the 
gentrifier: ‘“My cradle will have a baby in it,” said Madeline proudly, and she 
enjoyed a moment of sympathetic superiority, the poor yet well-adjusted English 
who hadn’t lost sight of true purposes.’470 
The chaise longue’s true purpose, though, is initially obscure. Melanie spots it 
‘stacked upside down on top of a pile of furniture, its clumsy legs threshing the air 
like an unclipped sheep that had tumbled onto its back’. She decides it looks ‘rather 
exciting’ but adds cautiously, ‘Goodness knows what one would do with it.’471 Laski 
evokes two images simultaneously in this first encounter with the upside-down 
chaise longue. The first is that of the immobilized sheep, symbol of a compromised 
natural order, protesting clumsily at the unseen force which has imposed this reversal 
on it – a clear indicator of how Melanie perceives the chaise, as an object in need of 
rescue; the second, at a deeper level, surely evokes Marx’s famous commodity-table, 
which transforms from ‘an ordinary, sensuous thing’ into something with an 
uncanny independent agency, that ‘stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden 
brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own 
free will’472 – an image of the problematically animated chaise as it turns out to be. 
The fact that the chaise has been reversed in space holds a clue to the reversal in time 
which turns out to be its main narrative and political purpose, but for Melanie, its 
inverted state makes it an icon of the process of gentrification itself, which turns 
back time, perceives value in rubbish, and remakes historicity as the prime signifier 
of a ‘consciously amusing’ modernity.  
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The chaise tacitly evokes yet another image, too: that of Freud’s couch, the 
symbol of psychoanalysis. Laski’s emphasis on Melanie’s fantasies and daydreams 
clearly signposts a Freudian subtext to the narrative. Like the cradle of Melanie’s 
imagination, the chaise longue is to be a vehicle of desire, the embroidered 
berlinwork flower decoration on its felt echoing the ‘needlework flowers of the rug’ 
by which her dream-baby was to have slumbered obliviously. Yet the fantasy of 
motherhood falters when confronted by the problematic materiality of the object, 
with its ‘brownish stain on the seat […] as if something had been carelessly spilt 
there’:  
 
She tried to envisage the frail young mother in the floating clouds of negligee 
[…] but the picture remained in unfelt words, and instead of it there was only 
her body’s need to lie on the Victorian chaise-longue, that, and an 
overwhelming assurance, or was it a memory, of another body that painfully 
crushed hers into the berlin-wool.473  
 
Here, the contrast between the stained felt of the upholstery and the unfelt words of 
the maternal fantasy with which Melanie is trying to comply suggests that codes of 
taste and behaviour can be confounded by the materials that are supposed to 
transport them into the real, which instead of bestowing gentility revert back to more 
primal needs.  
To some extent, Melanie’s problems with the cursed chaise longue can be 
attributed simply to a gentrification misfire. She has failed to follow the rules which 
demand that reclaimed objects must be appreciated at an amused distance, with the 
eye of irony. Instead, ‘it was of love that Melanie had thought when she first saw the 
Victorian chaise-longue’, Laski notes.474 Even the junk-shop owner, perceiving her 
category-error – and conforming to the junkshop paradigm described in the previous 
chapter – tries to steer her away from the object of her desire. ‘There isn’t much 
demand for these late ones,’ he warns. ‘I’ve got a little Regency day-bed you might 
like.’ Indeed, Melanie realizes that ‘its Regency ancestor had probably been delicate 
and enchanting; this descendant was gross, and would certainly have been 
inadmissible in such a home as Guy’s and Melanie’s were it not for the singular 
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startling quality of the berlin-wool cross-stitch embroidery that sprawled in bright 
gigantic roses over the shabby felt, over the curved half-back and right from the top 
of the head-rest to the very end of the seat.’475 Melanie and the dealer find 
themselves exchanging roles:  
 
‘[The stain] hardly shows,’ said Melanie, as if she were the salesman now. 
‘Have you got room for it?’ he asked, he too accepting this reversal of roles, 
and discarding his proper duty of titillating and praising for the customer’s 
part of hesitant withdrawal.476  
 
The animated thrashing of the topsy-turvy chaise signals this unnatural reversal, 
and it also throws into the relief the deadness of Melanie’s clotted bourgeois 
femininity, symbolized by the smothering layers of replica flowers and frozen 
cherubs which surround Melanie’s sickbed. Tellingly, these are described at the very 
moment when she herself is turned into a kind of valuable domestic accessory by her 
physician, Dr Gregory, who advises her: 
 
‘We’ve got to go on exactly as we’ve been doing, no frolics, no excitement, 
the very utmost care and circumspection. You’ve got to treat yourself as if – ’ 
his eyes roamed round the pretty bedroom, over the creamy silky paper on 
the walls, the shiny cream curtains printed with huge pink roses, the 
rosewood bedhead decked with cavorting French brasses, and then to the 
mirror on the lace-frilled dressing-table, rosy-flushed cherubs clambering in 
and out of wreaths of coloured posies, and there he found his analogy and 
ended, ‘ – as if you were a piece of Dresden china.’477 
 
At this point Melanie’s husband – an up-and-coming barrister – interrupts the 
consultation with a bizarre outburst in which he unpicks this simile in tones of ‘mock 
– and yet not so mock – pomposity’. This is almost his only utterance in the whole 
novella, and it signifies the icy rigidity of his capitalist value structure: 
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‘The use of the phrase Dresden china as a synonym for expensive fragility 
suggests that there were lamentable gaps in Britain’s nineteenth-century 
supremacy over world markets. And how strange that it should be the 
Germans, themselves almost synonymous with heaviness, clumsiness, 
everything that is the antithesis of the object of which we speak, who have 
provided the very phrase that leaps into your mind when you feel the need to 
warn Melanie that she must be the object of our incessant, our unremitting 
care –’ it needed a new breath, after all, to complete the sentence; Guy took it 
as unobtrusively as possible, and ended triumphantly, ‘ – as of her own.’478  
 
The messy, female reality of motherhood has been edited out of this reading of 
Melanie: Gregory boasts that he and Guy have generously ‘presented [her] with a 
fine bouncing baby’479 – a son she has hardly been allowed to see and who remains 
as hypothetical as the nursery she can only picture in plan-view, so that ‘she could 
never perfectly visualise the rooms and be sure how the nursing-chair looked in three 
dimensions but saw it always as a rectangular patch on a piece of paper with 
“nursing chair” in Sister’s writing inside it.’480 Now the men deliver the infantilized 
Melanie into the cradle of the Victorian chaise-longue and stand ‘looking down on 
her in triumph’481 like proud parents, or perhaps conquering cartographers – or 
indeed, like the British bomber pilots who pulverized Dresden during the war. In 
contrast to notions of male-sanctioned female delicacy, the chaise’s lumpen ugliness, 
its resistance to gentrification, is never in doubt. Doctor Gregory calls it ‘a 
monstrous thing’ and the fact that he finally decides that ‘those hideous roses’482 
may be just the thing for an invalid like Melanie can perhaps be explained by a 
confusion with the ‘pink roses’, ‘rosewood bedhead’ and ‘rosy-flushed cherubs’ of 
her bedroom. 
But Laski’s narrative vehicle, the chaise longue, is not going to deliver the 
commodity fantasies of Guy, the infantilizing fantasies of Dr Gregory, nor even 
Melanie’s repressed libidinal desires: it is going to strike a blow at all three. Melanie 
drifts off to sleep ‘bathed in sweet soft air’, believing herself safely anchored in 
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modernity as she enjoys the sight of bramble flowers in the ‘bombed, still desolate 
waste’ across the canal and listens to the ‘soft continuous roar of traffic, the whine of 
the milkman’s electric car’483 and the muffled, reassuringly middle-class sound of a 
neighbour’s daughter practising the oboe. But instead of being the threshold to an 
aspirational and fashionably reclaimed version of history, the chaise-longue 
transports Melanie’s consciousness – permanently and fatally – into the body of a 
Victorian woman who is not only sliding rapidly down the social ladder, but is in the 
shameful position of being pregnant and unmarried and (Melanie somewhat 
belatedly realises) is at the very point of being viciously murdered by her sister.484 
The ambiguous desirability of Laski’s haunted chaise longue throws light on the 
problem Jean Baudrillard encountered in The System of Objects, into which antiques 
don’t quite fit. In one example, he describes a magazine article about the restoration 
of an old ruined farmhouse, which involved replacing nearly everything except three 
wooden beams and two stone blocks. These remnants are vital to the owner-architect 
because they ‘exculpate the whole enterprise from all the compromises struck by 
modernity with nature in order to make the place more comfortable.’485 This 
temporal sleight of hand extends to the decorative objects within the house, 
including a warming pan which, it is claimed, is used for its original purpose in 
wintertime. ‘If it is not used it will no longer be authentic, will become a mere 
cultural sign,’ Baudrillard points out. ‘If the warming-pan serves no purpose, it is 
merely a sign of wealth, and is thus of the order of having, of status, and not of the 
order of being […] The warming pan is therefore genuinely mythological; so, for 
that matter, is the whole house.’486 Although he doesn’t draw a clear distinction 
between the two categories, Baudrillard is explicating the difference between the 
mythological value of reclaimed junk and that of the valuable antique, which ‘no 
longer has any practical application, its role being merely to signify.’487 The antique 
which makes no claim to usefulness ‘has a very specific function within the system, 
namely the signifying of time.’488 The warming pan (or the cradle, or the chaise 
                                                
483 Laski, The Victorian Chaise Longue, pp. 21-22. 
484 The text is not quite clear about whether Melanie dies at the end of the book: 
certainly Milly dies, but for Melanie ‘at last there was nothing but darkness, and in 
the darkness the ecstasy, and after the ecstasy, death and life.’ See p. 99. 
485 Baudrillard, p. 82. 
486 Baudrillard, p. 83. 
487 Baudrillard, p .77. 
488 Baudrillard, p. 77. 
 194 
longue) in daily use enters the dynamic system of identity, and is of the order of 
being. 
Laski’s gentrifying couple specifically define themselves as junk-hunters rather 
than antique-worshippers. Melanie’s ability to read the inscription of time in the 
historicity of junk relies on a highly contingent system of signification which 
attempts to fuse – dangerously, as it turns out – a modern assumption that the 
domestic objects she possesses are the infinitely adaptable vessels of her fluid 
identity, with ownership of a ‘possessed’ object which asserts its own auratic 
presence, and demands to tell its own story through its human possessor. Only 
belatedly does Melanie look beyond the chaise longue’s mere oldness and into its 
history. Trapped inside Milly’s ailing, shamefully fecund body, and about to 
experience the violent attack which accounts for the stain she tried to ignore in 1953, 
Melanie finds herself in a nightmare where authentic identity (Melanie’s mind) can 
never be reconciled with external reality (Milly’s body), and she loses the ability 
both to read narrative and to recount history. Milly’s sister Adelaide constantly 
badgers her for information – the name of the baby’s father – that she does not 
possess; yet her own twentieth-century story begins to recede in her mind so that she 
can no longer speak the words for modern concepts like aeroplanes: 
 
What did I say, she asked herself when the effort had been made, something 
about machines that fly, or was it aeronautic machines? Wireless, she 
screamed in her mind, television, penicillin, gramophone-records and 
vacuum-cleaners, but none of these words could be framed by her lips.489  
 
Begging Adelaide to tell her about the chaise longue, she is subjected to a stream of 
family anecdote that she cannot comprehend because it is so at odds with her 
preconceptions (‘she would never have bought the thing if she had known the kind 
of background it had, this vulgar tradesman’s family, the reticences, the hints, 
Mother’s legs and Chalk Farm and Clapham’);490 yet the acceptable nineteenth-
century history she ought to know, and ought to be able to anchor herself with, also 
eludes her: 
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Instead of talking about these silly women and the weather and the bazaar, 
they should speak of Queen Victoria and Florence Nightingale and – But 
what should they be talking about? she asked herself. What did happen in 
1864? Not the Exhibition, of course, and the Crimea must be over. Is the 
Prince Consort dead? Who is the Prime Minister?491  
 
Imprisoned within a synchronic anomaly, history itself has been switched off: ‘I 
know what the Victorian age was like, of course I do, except that being here, it isn’t 
like that at all. It’s just like now.492 Through the eyes of Milly Baines, Melanie is 
disabused of the charm and glamour with which she had invested her carefully 
chosen junk with value. She gazes at a typically overburdened Victorian overmantel 
full of ‘so many small objects that she had only a confused impression of worthless 
trash’.493 Looking at ‘the conglomeration of crowded, tasteless, worthless objects 
[…] the comment came that these were junk, what you’d see in a junk shop, a real 
junk-shop, jostled in an open tray on the pavement on Saturday morning, anything 
for half a crown.’494 
But it’s not just the chaise-longue’s lower-class origins that imbue it with the 
power to misplace its incumbent in time; it is also its unfashionable date, since in the 
mid-century Victoriana in general was far from being reclaimed as fashionable. 
When Ralph Tubbs published his polemic of postwar modernization, Living in 
Cities, in 1942, Victorian design and architecture was precisely the bogey he wanted 
to vanquish: ‘The overcrowded homes of the poor […] rapidly became worse,’ he 
wrote of the nineteenth century. ‘Speculators discovered a most profitable business 
in building potential slums for workers. The layout of the town had no relation to a 
properly ordered social life.’495 Pictures accompanying this text show back-to-back 
terraces captioned ‘Dreary houses’, and a heavily frilled and cluttered interior which 
is captioned ‘Homes were filled with meaningless decoration.’496  
Gordon Russell’s book The Things We See: Furniture took a similarly negative 
line: ‘Some of [the Industrial Revolution’s] worst features were unplanned, squalid, 
and filthy towns, poverty of a most degrading kind side by side with flaunted riches, 
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and a kind of festering ugliness which spread over everything unchecked.’497 He 
decries the age’s pursuit of profit – ‘the more money was made the uglier things 
became’ – and its consequential reliance on inferior machine-made copies of once 
elegant furniture designs. For Russell, the ideal in furniture follows a modernist 
principle of form following function and a Loosian avoidance of ornament. As in the 
rest of the Things We See series, the mid-century is presented as an opportunity to 
cast off the past: 
 
It is worth noting that it is again in those things which had no ancestors, for 
instance the radio cabinet, that real advances in designing for machine 
production were made most rapidly. […] These skilled technicians – the 
engineers – have always been the guardians of precision workmanship and 
exceptional skill, and have never tolerated slapdash methods. Their whole 
training encourages them to calculate exactly in advance. Moreover, the 
engineer always has his eye on the future.’498  
 
Barbara Jones, meanwhile, in her 1954 illustrated survey English Furniture at a 
Glance makes a distinction between the simplicity of ordinary Victorian furniture 
and the fussiness of its over-decorated iterations.499 She separates the era into three 
phases, beginning with the Industrial Revolution, the ‘exciting inspirations’ of which 
were, she finds, largely ignored in favour of Puginesque gothic revival. ‘A tendency 
to clutter began to make itself felt, for pretty oddments were within reach of many 
more people,’ she admits, before brushing aside the knick-knacks because ‘they are 
in any case not furniture.’500 The mid-Victorian era precipitated by the Great 
Exhibition, she argues, has been unfairly coloured by the excesses of that spectacle:  
 
Clearly a giant penknife with 80 blades bore no closer relation to England in 
the ’fifties than the Test-match in butter at Wembley Exhibition bore to 
England in the ’twenties, but the impression is so strong that one’s mental 
picture of mid-Victorian houses shows them crushed under giant sideboards, 
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soaring state beds, drapery, fringes, gothic ornament, red plush curtains, 
marble statues and cases of stuffed frogs shaving each other.501 
 
In reality, she argues, ordinary household furniture was generally modest, though it 
tended to be ‘lumpish’ and ‘lacking […] the elegant starkness of the end of the 
eighteenth century’, despite the occasional experiments of designers who ‘had a 
nagging feeling that furniture should now be more exciting’.502  
Melanie’s erotic excitement at discovering her piece of Victorian junk can be 
understood if we read it through a Benjaminian lens, for fashion and death were 
never far from each other in the Paris’s nineteenth-century arcades, coded as they 
were with subterranean meaning and haunted by cobwebby layers of stuff sloughed 
off during modernity’s first stirrings.  
 
Here fashion has opened the business of dialectical exchange between 
woman and ware – between carnal pleasure and the corpse […] For fashion 
was never anything other than the parody of the motley cadaver, provocation 
of death through the woman, the bitter colloquy with decay whispered 
between shrill bursts of mechanical laughter. That is fashion. And that is why 
she changes so quickly; she titillates death and is already something different, 
something new, as he casts about to crush her.503  
 
For Benjamin, newness was a kind of divination, with ‘each season bring[ing], in its 
newest creations, various secret signals of things to come.’504 But this kind of novel 
hermeneutics comes via the churn and return of history, not by uncritical nostalgia:  
 
Each time, what sets the tone is without doubt the newest, but only where it 
emerges in the medium of the oldest, the longest past, the most ingrained. 
This spectacle, the unique self-construction of the newest in the medium of 
what has been, is what makes for the true dialectical theatre of fashion.505  
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The gentrification of old objects mimics this process of extracting the new from the 
old, but it scrambles the signals by creating a new vehicle for value without 
fashioning a new materiality to contain it. For Benjamin in pre-war Paris, the 
department store is the primary modern retail space and a direct descendent of the 
arcades in its dream-like interiority and its optical ability to focus desire. But in mid-
century British culture, the department store is strangely absent, replaced by the 
nostalgic image of the old curiosity shop groaning with untold narratives and 
embedded in the mythology of what Angus Calder, in The Myth of the Blitz, calls 
Deep England.506 A symbol of timelessness, the junk shop is also a vortex of retail 
fluidity, where value slips out of the grasp of economics – shopkeepers give 
warnings instead of sales pitches, yet shoppers feel an unbearable desire for 
something they don’t want and shouldn’t trust. The wartime breakdown of supply 
and demand brought on by rationing disrupted the eternal return of consumer society 
which Benjamin read in the ruins of the arcades. In its place came a desire not for 
novelty but authenticity, while reclaimed junk was arguably more desirable than 
priceless antiques because it bore witness not just to the past but to the new owner’s 
excitingly modern eye. Indeed, junk’s status as junk seems almost to guarantee 
authenticity, since no one bothers to fake a worthless throw-away. Nor is the 
retrieval of this authenticity quite the same as a straight retrieval of hidden value; it 
can magic up value in something – like the Victorian chaise longue – that wasn’t 
worth much even when new. Like Aladdin’s lamp, gentrified junk releases its 
uncanny power of wealth-creation and wish-fulfilment for the price of a quick clean-
up. And by this logic, it follows that haunted junk is the most unambiguously and 
overwhelmingly genuine category of all. Its authenticity is so real, it’s out to get you: 
it broadcasts its repressed narrative, and it inscribes its unhomeliness onto its new 
home: it consumes its reader instead of being passively consumed. Benjaminian 
‘aura’ is weaponized; a deadly game-changer in the battle between people and 
things. 
In the next chapter, things will acquire even more physical intimacy with the 
human subject, not just inhabiting and defining domestic spaces but, in the form of 
clothes, coming into close physical contact that describes and defines the human 
body. The uncanny garments of ritual and conquest which appeared in the mid-
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century created gothic disruptions in place and time, and the narratives told about 
them were threaded through with questions about power and resistance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Strange beauty: Costume, performance and power in 1953 
 
In 1948, a student production called The Masque of Hope was presented to the future 
Queen Elizabeth when she visited University College, Oxford. Written by Nevill 
Coghill and devised and produced by Glynne Wickham, this specially commissioned 
piece referenced a dramatic form which flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, but it tackled contemporary concerns, celebrating nationalization and the 
NHS and featuring the abruptly contemporary figure of Black Market, alongside 
Fear, Gloom and Rumour, as one of the forces vanquished by the power of Hope, 
Joy, Liberty, Health and Labour. The Masque of Hope typified the mid-century’s 
uneasy doubling of incompatible binaries: glorifying tradition while rejecting the 
past; revering monarchy while exalting in the breakdown of privilege; returning to 
old forms while improvising new content. Meanwhile, the production of The Masque 
of Hope materialized its ambiguous claim on modernity through its costumes: 
although the traditional characters wore highly decorated outfits based on traditional 
Jacobean designs, Black Market wore a bowler hat and bow tie; and many of the 
clothes were fashioned from the most contemporary of textiles, black-out material 
and sacking – the only fabrics which were not rationed at the time.  
This tendency towards temporal hybridity was echoed five years later in a much 
grander production, the premiere of Benjamin Britten’s opera Gloriana, which 
similarly played with early-modern forms and conventions, juxtaposing them 
provocatively with radically contemporary musical and thematic ideas. This chapter 
will trace the way performance and costume expressed this problematic attempt to 
reconcile the future and the past, as the very materiality of mid-century apparel 
began first to enable, and then to demand, new definitions of authenticity, class and 
national identity. These new definitions inform key cultural artifacts of the period, 
from Powell and Pressburger’s 1948 fairy tale The Red Shoes and the 1951 Ealing 
Comedy The Man in the White Suit to Gloriana itself, as well as finding expression 
in the accoutrements of both the Coronation and the ascent of Everest in 1953. 
Considered together, these very different performances reveal a distinctively mid-
century investment – literally a putting-on of clothes – in the power relationships and 
temporal duality inherent in significant garments. 
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The revivification of the past was a theme frequently brought into play in 
postwar discourse to offset the futuristic overtones of the prevailing rhetoric of 
recovery and progress. During the Festival of Britain, for instance, a resurgent 
interest in architectural modernism – which had been on hold during the war years – 
was tempered by incorporating updated elements of the traditional within the sleek 
Scandinavian-inspired pavilions – a compromise that came to be known as ‘Festival 
style’.507 Similarly, Humphrey Jennings’s Festival film, Family Portrait, placed a 
determined emphasis on the survival of eternal British qualities even while urging its 
audience to embrace social and technological novelty; expressed in a series of 
voiceover paradoxes such as ‘we adore innovations and love tradition’, it defined the 
British character by its ability to combine the ‘poetry’ of imagination and symbolism 
with the ‘prose’ of science and progress.508 Yet the very fact that this theme required 
constant reiteration suggests that it was not universally accepted as inevitable or 
desirable. This was apparent during Elizabeth’s 1948 visit to Oxford at which The 
Masque of Hope was staged. This engagement was occasioned by the presentation to 
her of an honorary Doctor of Civil Law degree, after which she gave a speech 
praising the university as a place ‘where the finest traditions of the past mingle so 
easily and unaffectedly with the march of events and of ideas’: 
 
Here we can see, better perhaps than anywhere, that peculiar genius of the 
British people for blending the old and the new, without desecrating the one 
or blunting the ardour of the other, so that progress may be tempered with 
wisdom and tradition may be an object of respect rather than a cause of 
frustration.509  
 
Frustration with tradition needed to be assuaged by devising a construct which could 
hold old and new in the correct balance. The ritual performance of the doctoral 
ceremony itself suggested performance as just such a construct, and gave Elizabeth a 
traditional stage from which to outline the standard idealized notion of past and 
future in harmony. Yet the masque at University College implicitly critiqued this 
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vision of transhistorical concord, not through its (inevitably somewhat anodyne) 
scripted sentiments, but by foregrounding the metonymic processes of its ironized, 
obsolete form. The past was presented as a set of trappings and conventions, antique 
accessories which carry no meaning other than oldness itself, disguising or 
costuming new ideas rather than nurturing them and bringing them into fruition. The 
future queen’s position as another kind of ritualized object was likewise inscribed 
into the drama. By choreographing a stylized battle between allegorical figures in 
order to tell a modern story about social justice, Coghill not only co-opted the 
Golden Age mythology of Merrie England, he also recruited the future Queen as one 
of the allegorical performers. The Masque of Hope did not merely present a spectacle 
to the princess and her retinue, but transfigured the royal guests into actors in the 
drama. As The Times report noted: 
 
The Princess was received at the main gate of the college with a fanfare of 
trumpets and cheers. She took her place in a little pavilion flanked by chairs 
occupied by senior members of the University in the sunny, many-windowed 
quadrangle, and the masquers used their immemorial privilege of addressing 
their royal guest directly.510  
 
By seating the princess prominently within the performance space of the ‘many-
windowed’ Radcliffe Quad, and addressing her by name, the Masque invoked 
Elizabeth’s own symbolic freight as a walking anachronism. The theatricality of the 
costumes, props and other trappings of performance which sustain the monarchy in 
the modern world were thus revealed, and she was implicated and incorporated into 
a moment which folded together three temporalities: the fictive time of drama, the 
progressive sweep of history and the contemporaneous moment of performance – in 
this case a unrepeatable occasional drama entirely reliant on the specificity of time 
and space for its meaning. The mid-century may have been a time of self-conscious 
aspiration for the future, but it was also a moment of anxiety about the fragility of 
past certainties – norms which might vanish if a sense of tradition and national 
identity was lost. The adoption of an early-modern dramatic form here reiterated the 
link between the two eras, yet the use of ritualized performance to express this 
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insinuated a subtle critique of the processes of display, fictivity and artifice at work, 
not only in the theatrical celebration, but also in the reframing of the royal 
figurehead as a totemic object called upon to embody both antique changelessness 
and thrusting modernity. 
 
 
‘It’s the Red Shoes that are running away’: the uncanny power of costume  
The same year that the future queen experienced her double performance in Oxford, 
she was also in the audience for a more intimate spectacle: a private screening of 
Powell and Pressburger’s The Red Shoes, attended by her parents and her sister 
Margaret and organized by Alexander Korda. In his memoir A Life in Movies, 
Powell relishes the effect the film had on its royal audience: ‘[Korda] told me they 
were all devastated by the ending of the picture, as they were intended to be, and 
thanked him with tears streaming down their faces for showing them “such a lovely 
– boohoo! – picture”.’511 The film takes its title from the Hans Christian Andersen 
fairytale about a vain and selfish girl whose red shoes are bewitched to punish her 
for her godless ways: they dance day and night and cannot be removed. Even when 
she asks a woodcutter to chop off her feet, the amputated shoes continue to dance 
and prevent her from going to church to repent. Finally a merciful angel arrives, 
bringing such grace that the girl’s heart bursts with joy and she dies. In their very 
different version, Powell and Pressburger replace the tale’s Christian morality with 
an aesthetic imperative, framing it around a conflict between art and reality which 
the film itself performs. Here, the bewitched shoes are not a punishment for vanity 
but become a symbol of the brutal sacrifices required by art; Moira Shearer plays a 
ballerina, Vicky, torn between the demands of her charismatic and demanding 
mentor Lermontov (Anton Walbrook) and the domestic role offered by her husband 
Julian (Marius Goreing). At the climax of the film, with both men demanding her 
absolute commitment to them, she runs from the theatre, wearing the red shoes, and 
leaps from a parapet onto a railway track to her death. On a psychological level, the 
explanation for this act is that she has committed suicide rather than choose between 
her two identities, but the film (and the source tale) strongly imply an uncanny 
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material intervention: Powell states in his memoir ‘It isn’t Vicky who’s running 
away from the theatre, it’s the Red Shoes that are running away with Vicky’.512  
Indeed, the shoes’ magical powers have already been established in the lavishly 
staged and expansively shot Red Shoes ballet which forms the film’s centrepiece. 
Here, the shoes’ demonic agenda is made explicit, although Andersen’s Christian 
motivation is absent and the unnamed Girl, as danced by Vicky, is tormented by the 
shoes’ demands simply because she has made the mistake of admiring them in a 
shop window. Their power is not limited to mere unstoppability either – from the 
point of view of the film, they appear able to subvert time and place: the ballet is 
ostensibly performed on an ordinary theatre stage, but the dance unfolds within a 
dreamlike, filmic space which extends and contracts according to the demands of the 
choreography rather than adhering to any realist constraints. The film thus 
foregrounds the artifice of staged performance, with the shoes acting as a focus for a 
prosthetic enhancement of reality and the ambiguous status of the actor/dancer’s 
body. When Shearer puts them on her feet, she is called upon to represent a 
collection of nested identities: she is the ballerina Vicky as well as her various stage 
personas; she is the character of the Girl in the Red Shoes ballet, as played by Vicky 
as played by Shearer; and as far as the audience is concerned, she is also presenting 
the character of ‘Moira Shearer’, a newly minted film star in her first acting role, and 
thus another deliberately constructed identity. Clothes played a crucial part in this 
latter transition. Powell’s memoir describes at length how Shearer reacted to her 
traumatic induction into the sartorial demands of her profession: she arrived on her 
first day already ‘at the end of her tether. With our fittings and the ballet fittings and 
make-up tests, she had not had a second to herself for about three weeks.’513 Her first 
day of filming began with Vicky’s death-leap from the balcony: 
 
She is only in the air for about eight frames, but it is one of the most beautiful 
cuts in the film. By now the camera crew were her devotees. The whole 
sequence of her running out and dying on the track was completed by 
lunchtime. Moira spent the afternoon having fittings with Mme Jacques Fath 
and her dressmakers for the clothes in the film. Towards six o’clock she had 
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hysterics, went to bed and slept for twelve hours. Her career as a film star had 
begun.514 
 
Powell’s account suggests that Shearer’s lengthy encounters with her new wardrobe 
were as exhausting and traumatic as the physically and emotionally demanding 
death-leap; by conflating the two, he implies that her ‘hysterical’ reaction is a much 
to do with the shocking redefinitive power of her new apparel as it is to do with 
stress or fatigue. It is the red shoes – the one constant feature which remains 
changeless throughout Vicky/Shearer’s many transformations – that mark the body 
as the site of these multiple meanings. Yet, as gothic objects of the mid-century 
moment, these shoes also critique their own symbolism, calling into question the 
ritualistic power invested in costume.  
Critics including Andrew Moor have commented that the role of Lermontov, as 
the demanding star-maker, echoes that of Powell himself, who is thus interpolating 
himself into the film’s complex system of identity-doublings.515 Lermontov often 
appears wearing sunglasses, and while this can be interpreted as a visual signifier of 
his shadowy nature, the glasses also signal a Powell-like vision which mediates the 
world through an aesthetic lens, and links Lermontov with the demonic optician in 
Powell and Pressburger’s other ballet-film, Tales of Hoffmann.516 Lermontov’s 
quasi-supernatural ability to discern and develop raw talent in his dancers is also 
expressed in the screenplay through a sartorial metaphor: ‘Not even the best 
magician in the world,’ he says, ‘can produce a rabbit from the hat if there isn’t 
already a rabbit in the hat.’ This debunking of the conjurer’s trickery subtly 
problematizes the notion of the magic shoes as the implacable agents of the film’s 
narrative: the hat appears to possess the magical power, but the audience knows it 
can only express the work of the magician who has carefully secreted the rabbit in its 
place. Likewise, the shoes appear to kill Vicky, but it is her own dual impulses, as 
artist and wife, that has done the preparatory work. Hat and rabbit, shoes and dancer 
form a dialectical image of the work of art as both the most intimate expression of 
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the agency of the artist, and the autonomy of the finished work which threatens her 
annihilation.  
To the royal audience who wept their way through Korda’s screening, Vicky’s 
relationship with the costume and trappings of her public role might have had a 
particular resonance. In a key early scene, Vicky is invited to Lermontov’s villa for 
what she thinks will be a party, and arrives dressed as a princess, in full-length 
evening gown complete with cloak and coronet. Instead of enjoying a social evening, 
she discovers that she is being recruited as the company’s new prima ballerina and 
will have the lead in the Red Shoes ballet created specifically for her. Although her 
royal costume is inappropriate at the level of narrative realism, it is not, after all, a 
mistake: Vicky has been inducted into an artificial world, like royalty, in which her 
public identity – marked by theatrical spectacle and ritualized costume – attempts to 
obliterate her individual will and simultaneously implicates her in her own 
obliteration. Vicky – whose upper-class background is indicated in the film’s first 
scene, when she is seen in a private box at the ballet – seems to have been stripped of 
the trappings of aristocratic finery when she enters Lermontov’s ballet company and 
dons the practical workwear of the rehearsal room, but in reality she is merely 
exchanging one regime of symbolic apparel for another. Yet although she cannot 
escape this oppressive over-determination, the red shoes turn out to have 
unexpectedly subversive potential: they bring about a rift in the spectacle, first by 
shattering the hermetic space of the stage on which the ballet is supposedly 
performed, and then dragging its principle performer out of the theatre completely 
and flinging her to her death. 
Jonathan Faiers’ study Dressing Dangerously: Dysfunctional Fashion in Film 
identifies several categories of filmic garments which exceed the ‘fundamentally 
recognized function of clothing to protect from the elements and preserve modesty’ 
– clothes that ‘manifest an excess of meaning’ such as the film noir trench coat or the 
stained and torn costumes of melodrama.517 Such ‘objects of sartorial agency’ 
establish a ‘negative cinematic wardrobe’, Faiers argues, which accesses directly the 
viewer’s personal experiences with clothing, rupturing the narrative and 
‘interrogat[ing] the authority of mainstream film’s ability to immerse the viewer  
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within the film’s action.’518 He invokes Lacan’s formulation of the term suture – as 
adopted by the film theorist Jean-Pierre Oudart – to describe the process by which a 
spectator is ‘stitched’ into the action of a film, and argues that the unstitched nature 
of dysfunctional garments creates ‘an oscillation between our lived experience of 
clothing and the fantasy of cinematic clothing’ that troubles this immersive 
suturing.519  
In The Red Shoes, however, it is not the shoes themselves that come undone, but 
the woman wearing them; while Faiers sees sartorial dysfunctionality in terms of 
clothing that is lost or torn away from the body, the mythical red shoes are 
impossible to take off, even when cut from the legs with an axe. Their intimacy 
derives from the wearer’s consenting decision to be enchanted and defined by them. 
The cinematic suturing achieved, according to Oudart’s theory, by the montage 
effect of film’s shot/reverse shot formulation is thus presented by the film as a 
warning against such tight fastening; the spectator is shown an image of her own 
destruction as she is all too firmly stitched into a spectacle initiated by 
Lermontov/Powell but followed through to its inhuman conclusion by the shoes’ 
own thingly agenda. 
 
 
‘Clothes disappear’?: Libidinal transactions in Corridor of Mirrors 
Terence Young’s Corridor of Mirrors tells the story of a man, Paul Mangin (Eric 
Portman), who believes he is the reincarnation of a Borgia princeling and lives in a 
grand palazzo-style house somewhere near Regents Park.520 When he meets 
Mifanwy (Edana Romney) in a nightclub, he is struck by her resemblance to a 
fifteenth-century portrait of the woman he believes betrayed and abandoned him in 
his previous life in Renaissance Italy. She in turn is seduced by his otherworldly 
charm and by the elaborate dressing-up games that they play in his corridor of 
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mirrored closets, all containing mannequins uncannily resembling her and wearing 
sumptuous gowns, robes, tiaras and jewellery that Paul has commissioned or 
collected over many years, apparently waiting to find the right woman to wear them. 
He begins to dictate every aspect of her appearance and behaviour and their sexless 
affair becomes more and more involving for Myfanwy until she discovers that 
another woman, Veronica, has been hidden in the house all the time, watching them. 
Veronica claims that, far from being unique, Myfanwy is merely one of a series of 
playthings and that Paul will soon tire of her. Myfanwy ends the affair and gets 
engaged to another man, choosing to break the news to Paul at an elaborate 
Renaissance-themed costume ball he is holding in her honour. The next day a 
woman, who had been drunk at the party, is found dead in Paul’s house; he admits to 
murder and is duly hanged, and only later does Mifanwy discover that Veronica was 
the true killer and Paul was, after all, just a chivalrous eccentric with a penchant for 
old clothes. 
The film has some interesting similarities to The Red Shoes in its fairytale 
overtones (this time it is Bluebeard that is evoked) and its makeover fantasy 
involving a man who wants complete control over his creation, and a woman who 
gradually cedes her autonomy as she comes under the spell of a fictional world and 
the very specific costume that goes with it. But whereas Vicky’s personhood was to 
be abstracted and subsumed into Lermononov’s artistic vision, Myfanwy’s 
transformation is far more solidly material: at the very beginning of her affair with 
Paul she is alarmed by an image of herself as a faceless and sexless mannequin, but 
later she comes to accept this role, even describing herself as ‘a wax doll – all head 
and shoulders’. The clothes, she implies, not only hide but have entirely replaced her 
body, so that sex becomes an impossibility; even her head and neck have been 
reduced to mere place-holders for a succession of accessories. This reification seems 
to be the primary intention of the libidinally repressed Paul, and it extends to 
himself, too, since he is also turned to wax; after his execution, his effigy is 
displayed in the Chamber of Horrors at Madame Tussaud’s. Indeed, because the film 
is told in flashback while Myfanwy gazes at this simulacrum, the waxwork precedes 
the appearance of the living actor, who is introduced via a dissolve which blends 
wax and flesh into a single image. 
Since Paul also dresses in antiquated garb, he is equally implicated in the 
negation of autonomous subjecthood into which he inducts Myfanwy, but it’s also 
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his practice as a collector which brings him into dangerously close proximity to the 
object world. A collector has what Walter Benjamin called ‘the most intimate 
relationship that one can have to objects. Not that they come alive in him, it is he 
who lives in them.’521 The collector creates an artificial world in which he believes 
he can live freely, without reference to the rest of society; but this apparent liberty is 
a trap: he is consumed by his own collection. The film makes the hermetic 
isolationism of the collector explicit: the couple always stay inside the house when 
they are dressed up, because to go outside would break the spell; Paul’s fatal crisis 
occurs when he makes the mistake of opening up their private world for a public 
party. Benjamin’s collector experiences ‘the most profound enchantment’ of 
‘locking[…] individual items within a magic circle in which they are fixed as the 
final thrill, the thrill of acquisition, passes over them.’522 But by finding Myfanwy, 
Paul is on the point of completing his collection and losing this acquisitive drive; he 
is thus destined to move definitively, via death, to the status of objecthood himself. 
In The System of Objects Baudrillard suggests that  
 
One cannot but wonder whether collections are in fact meant to be 
completed, whether lack does not play an essential part here […] If so, the 
presence of the final object of the collection would basically signify the death 
of the subject, whereas its absence would be what enables him merely to 
rehearse his death (and so exorcize it) by having an object represent it.523  
 
Both Benjamin and Baudrillard emphasize that objects in a collection accrue 
value which is outside the system of mass-produced commodities: ‘The purchasing 
done by a book collector has very little in common with that done by a student 
getting a text book,’ Benjamin writes, and goes on to detail the thrill of auction 
bidding and the ways in which his own drive to collect has influenced his travels – 
‘How many cities have revealed themselves to me in the marches I undertook in the 
pursuit of books!’524 But historical authenticity is not a necessary attribute for the 
clothes in Corridor of Mirrors, where the pseudo-sexual thrill of the chase is 
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replaced by a painstakingly elaborate pastiche. In the original novel by Chris Massie, 
the collector, here called Douglas, has filled his wardrobes both with antiques and 
with replicas made to his own specifications because he has been unable to find 
sufficient original pieces: 
 
Have you ever thought, Mifanwy, how extraordinary it is that clothes 
disappear so quickly, as quickly as the fashions they illustrate? People 
preserve books and furniture from generation to generation, but clothes 
disappear. Have you ever wondered about that?525  
 
In Young’s film version, Paul is seen visiting a dressmaker to order clothes for 
Mifanwy, and there is less emphasis on his interest in genuine antiquities: he is 
presented as fabricating an elaborate fantasy around one true antique, the painting of 
the Renaissance woman whom Mifanwy uncannily resembles. The problem of which 
is the original – the portrait which Mifanwy is manipulated into impersonating, or 
Mifanwy herself as the painting’s sitter, reborn – coalesces around clothing’s 
negative dialectic and its libidinal transitionality: clothes must not be allowed to 
disappear in an act of intimate undressing. Mifanwy’s costumes are commodities 
which both express and negate the fluidity, cyclical temporality and 
commodification of fashion, and at the same time they both stand in for and repress 
her desire for physical contact with Paul. 
 
 
‘Cheap material cannot please’: sartorial status and human finery  
During the year that The Red Shoes and Corridor of Mirrors were in development 
and production, art critic Quentin Bell published his own idiosyncratic account of the 
meaning of clothing in the mid-century, On Human Finery. While he was not 
concerned with theatrical costume as such, he analysed the mechanisms of sartorial 
display as a quasi-theatrical spectacle which had real effects on the human subject: 
 
Fashion for those who live within its empire is a force of tremendous and 
incalculable power. Fierce and at times ruthless in its operations, it governs 
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our behaviour, informs our sexual appetites, colours our erotic imagination, 
makes possible but also distorts our conception of history and determines our 
aesthetic valuations.526  
 
This complex of temporal, political and libidinal power is presented by Bell as 
something imposed onto wearers by their clothes and has serious consequences for 
their agency and status. Disorderly dress both denotes a loss of social status and 
implies moral degradation; ‘so strong is the impulse of sartorial morality,’ he writes, 
‘that it is difficult, in praising clothes, not to use adjectives such as “right”, “good”, 
“correct”, “unimpeachable” or “faultless”, which belong properly to the discussion 
of conduct while, in discussing moral shortcomings, we tend very naturally to fall 
into the language of dress and speak of a person’s behaviour as being “shabby”, 
“shoddy”, “threadbare”, “down at heel”, “botched”, or “slipshod”.527 Later, he draws 
a firm connection between sartorial morality and hierarchies of class and wealth – 
‘pecuniary standards of value’, as he calls them.528 Discussing the ‘vulgarity’ 
displayed in ‘the ornate costume of the nouveau riche’, he asserts:  
 
[A] certain minimal display of wealth is usually considered essential; no 
excellence of cut, hue, or design will serve to redeem the sin of poverty. A 
cheap material cannot please, only ‘good’ materials are permissible, and 
these must be expensively worked.529 
 
As we will see later in this chapter, Bell was describing assumptions that were 
already being undermined by the invention of new materials and manufacturing 
techniques which would threaten such strictly enforced networks of value and 
meaning. Indeed, Bell himself saw these structures as irrational and in need of 
critical scrutiny: ‘The study of clothes,’ he points out in his introduction, ‘is a study 
of monstrosities and absurdities. It is […] a borderline science important to the 
historian in that it exhibits in a pure form the pursuit of status, and particularly 
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interesting to the art historian in that here, if anywhere, we can trace a direct 
relationship between aesthetic and social feelings.’530 
Bell’s historical and sociological method includes tracing the history of what he 
terms ‘sumptuosity’ as a form of conspicuous consumption intended to signal status 
from the early modern period onwards. He is unconvinced by social or political 
influences on changing tastes; his explanation for the ‘mechanism of fashion’ is 
hydraulic: innovations adopted by the aristocracy eventually overflow and trickle 
down to the working classes, become ‘vulgar’, and fall out of fashion only to cycle 
back to the top in the form of another novelty. It is clothing which exists outside this 
system, such as military uniform and ceremonial regalia, which imparts lasting 
status; and it achieves this by referring back to a pre-modern time when apparel was 
rigidly codified and the trickle-down of fashion was outlawed:  
 
Until the emergence of modern capitalism every civilized country has 
enacted sumptuary laws for the preservation of class distinctions, morality, 
thrift and industry […] Nothing was spared in the effort to curb fashion, but 
the history of sumptuary laws is a history of dead letters. All that remains 
today […] is a kind of legal ghost: the regulations which still govern the 
dress of peers and peeresses when the Sovereign is being crowned.531  
 
Taking place at the postwar turning-point of the century, then, the coronation of 
Elizabeth II crystallized the tension between timeless apparel and the flux of history. 
The ritual putting-on of clothes which conferred her status as monarch highlighted 
the dynamic process of meaning which took place when commoners, too, dressed 
dangerously.  
 
 
‘Dazed by ritual’: Materializing excess at the Coronation 
Maurizia Boscagli’s recent post-Benjaminian analysis of the twentieth century’s 
material turn, Stuff Theory, argues that clothes perform a dual function, both as a 
‘site of female spectacle’ and as a ‘mode of dissent against how subjects and objects 
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are supposed to relate’.532 Clothes, she writes, ‘partake of the duplicity of the 
talisman: as aesthetic objects they are charged with intimacy and thus occupy a 
potentially synaesthetic position in regard to the subject. Fetishistically invested, 
they also speak directly to, and of, desire and fantasy.’533 According to Boscagli, 
consumer culture determines that ‘the “use” of clothes is always unnatural, for it is 
contra use value, and is, instead, semiotic and libidinal’.534 In certain instances, she 
argues, this dissonance creates ‘rifts in the modern protocols of visuality, moments 
of break with the bourgeois systematization of subjectivity and materiality indexed 
by the spectacle itself.’535 Such rifts occur when the wearers of clothes – and these 
are all women in Boscagli’s deliberately gendered analysis – become conscious of 
this unnaturalness and perform it by misusing or subverting conventional dress. 
However, although she argues that ‘the Spectacle increasingly intensifies during the 
twentieth century’, and chooses literary examples from 1922 (The Nausicaa episode 
in Joyce’s Ulysses) and 1983 (Die Klavierspielerin [The Piano Teacher] by Elfriede 
Jelenek), she passes over the mid-century hiatus in the commodity system and the 
rupture that this itself caused in the smooth workings of fashion’s regime of 
gendered decoration and desire.536 As the most spectacular female object of an all-
pervasive cultural gaze, the queen at the moment of her Coronation raised questions 
about the agency and autonomy of the mid-century woman, in that her power and 
presence were explicitly symbolic, constructed from the royal trappings 
superimposed onto her body and carefully designed to promote themselves as objects 
in a fantasy of affluence, while preventing her from becoming an object of sexual 
desire. The Coronation gown, designed by Norman Hartnell and thickly embroidered 
with symbolic references to the Commonwealth countries, appeared to be a solid, 
impenetrable casing: ‘When I first saw the dress on the stand at Hartnell’s 
workroom,’ one reporter confessed, ‘I got the impression that it was made entirely of 
glass. Such is the effect of the thousands of seed pearls, each set in its equally small 
saucer of silver, which entirely cover the white satin bodice and skirt.’537 Far from 
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subverting fashion, the royal personage retreated from it as much as possible and 
allowed her symbols to speak for her. The queen’s metaphysical status depended on 
her invisibility as a woman.  
During a coronation the crown – the traditional textbook exemplum of the trope 
of metonymy – implicates monarchy into the very mechanism of symbolic imagery; 
just as it condenses and concentrates the power of royalty within its own materiality, 
so it emphasizes the superstitious origins of the monarch’s supernatural potency by 
foregrounding a totemic object. The material symbol of the crown also conforms to 
Freud’s definition of the uncanny by summoning a superannuated (or even atavistic) 
cultural belief-system, and its autonomy and agency appear in the way it creates 
meaning and bestows it onto a human object. In Bill Brown’s essay on trivia, ‘The 
Tyranny of Things’, he examines such royal regalia as a way of explicating ‘the 
dialectic by which human subjects and inanimate objects may be said to constitute 
one another’.538 Meaning within this system is always contingent, according to 
Brown – produced by the communal agreement of those who participate in the 
symbolism: ‘Different subjects materialize the physical object world differently. And 
thus the appropriate analogy may be that the human subject must produce the 
material object no less than subjects must produce their king.’539 Brown reads Mark 
Twain’s The Prince and the Pauper as an examination of fetishization. In this fairy 
tale about sovereignty and symbolism, Prince Edward (son of Henry VIII) changes 
places with a poor boy called Tom, who happens to resemble him, and learns about 
the injustice and poverty blighting his kingdom. However, when he returns to the 
royal palace for his coronation, he is not recognized and can only prove his identity 
by producing the Royal Seal which he had hidden inside a suit of armour before he 
began his adventure. In Brown’s reading, Tom, the imposter-prince – who has 
known all along where the Seal was but mistook it for a nutcracker – has bypassed 
the royal object’s symbolic meaning in order to access its use value, while the 
coronation of the real prince is temporarily stalled by his inability to produce this 
repurposed, meaningless – and thus suddenly invisible – piece of ceremonial regalia. 
 
During the coronation crisis, the two boys and the court are locked in a 
moment of ritual without content. […] The ‘trivial thing’ that differentiates 
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the boys – that transforms their physical equality back into hierarchy – might 
thus be said to materialize the immaterial excess that differentiates a royal 
body from its brute physicality, the aura that is at once absent yet present: the 
royalty, phantasmatically transmitted by blood, that is in fact metaphysical, 
neither blood nor bone.540 
 
Just as commodities congeal excess value in Marx’s description of capitalism, so 
ritual objects congeal excess meaning within themselves, which is only released 
when subject and object fall into their correctly dialectical positions relative to one 
another.  
In keeping with this understanding of symbolic value, the coronations of the 
twentieth century were larded with layers of new traditions. A monarch called upon 
to function as a symbol is best presented within a context replete with other symbols. 
As David Cannadine pointed out in his contribution to the essay collection The 
Invention of Tradition, the public performance of royal pageantry was not the ancient 
practice it purported to be, but was introduced with the coronation of Edward VII as 
a bulwark against social unrest and new democratic rights: 
 
In England, as elsewhere in Europe, the unprecedented developments in 
industry and in social relationships, and the massive expansion of the yellow 
press, made it both necessary and possible to present the monarch, in all the 
splendour of his ritual, in this essentially new way, as a symbol of consensus 
and continuity to which all might defer.541  
 
Apart from the symbolic regalia worn and carried by the Queen herself, the trappings 
of other participants at the Coronation were also intended to materialize a 
differentiating excess; lengthy descriptions of the build-up to the ceremony dwelt at 
length on the excessively luxurious accoutrements of power: 
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In this roomy and lofty vestibule […] the robes and uniforms of many 
centuries began to assemble at 6am. The eye noted the Tudor anachronism of 
the Yeomen Warders and the axes carried by the Gentlemen-at-Arms which, 
on some Darwinian principle, have atrophied by disuse from weapons into 
glittering and tasselled ornaments; and then turned to the familiar red and 
blue and bearskins of the Queen’s Company of the Grenadier Guards, who 
lined the walls.542  
 
This anonymous Times correspondent wryly but tellingly emphasizes the superfluity 
of the layers of ornament here, which occlude the human beings inside them and turn 
them into so much wallpaper, even as they materialize their status; such atrophied 
anachronisms embody the same metaphysical surplus which imbues Elizabeth’s 
crown and Twain’s royal seal. And a later passage in the same report explicitly 
juxtaposes the use-value of a team of servants with the regalia of the leisured 
aristocracy: 
 
Two interludes which occurred just as tension was rising in anticipation of 
the arrival of the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh were typical of the 
contrast between the formality and the informality of most of the scenes and 
moods in the annexe. First a party of women in white overalls moved briskly 
over the deep blue carpet with soft brushes, making great men do their will 
and move aside. Secondly, there was a stir of concern as it became apparent 
that a nobleman, with an indispensable part to play, had mislaid, or had 
mislaid for him, his coronet.543 
 
Presented as comedy, these interludes in fact betray the fragility of the hierarchical 
distinctions supposedly marked by the white overalls and the coronet. The briskness 
of the women exposes the incompetence of the nobleman, who is not only incapable 
of looking after his own coronet, but depends on blundering – or recalcitrant? – 
servants who mislay it for him. Just as in The Prince and the Pauper, a missing 
token threatens the whole structure of the ceremony. Without the material symbol of 
the nobleman’s phantasmatic potency, a revolutionary tide threatens to turn; the 
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cleaners ‘[make] great men do their will’, begging the question of who really has ‘an 
indispensable part to play’. Like an actor in costume, the players in the ritual risk 
exposing the fetishization on which their double-identity depends, if they become 
separated from the clothes by which their role is instantiated. 
The Coronation’s presentation of a monarch as a mediated object, a symbol 
semantically fixed in a network of social and class tradition, is designed to 
emphasize and exalt her status and prestige. But in mid-century culture there was a 
strong countervailing assumption which resisted such inflexible systems of 
meaningful display. Just as, in Cannadine’s words ‘the archaic traditions of the 
Middle Ages were enlarged in their scope so as to include the modern splendour of a 
mighty [Victorian] empire,’544 so, in 1953, the splendour of monarchy had been 
quietly reconfigured to conform to new empires which were seeking to serve and 
exploit the mass-market desires of an incipient generation of consumers.  
The fantasy that sartorial power structures were unchanging was challenged by 
the new textiles and materials which were starting to reflect and enable postwar 
popular culture. The crowds who camped out in rain-lashed central London to catch 
a glimpse of the Coronation procession were likely to be sheltering under the new 
synthetic raincoats which heralded a mass-market aspiration for affordable utility. 
Lady Violet Bonham Carter noted in her diary the good humour of the crowds 
‘wrapped in soaked newspapers & plastic mackintoshes but burning with loyalty & 
full of good humour.’545 But a newspaper correspondent reporting on the street-
campers made a point of noting another coat’s absence:  
 
The crowds, in which women predominated, were clearly uncertain whether 
to wear overcoats against the cold or mackintoshes against the wet. Some 
wore both: but the duffel coat, now de rigueur for so many occasions, was 
strangely absent.546 
 
Duffel coats – introduced by the Royal Navy in World War I and reissued in their 
thousands to World War II servicemen – had flooded onto the army-surplus market 
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in the postwar years, marketed by a glove and overall manufacturing company called 
Gloverall. By the mid-1950s this article of military uniform had become the uniform 
of a certain kind of non-conformist, having been adopted both by the dissident 
agitators of the left and by a certain type of no-nonsense urban creative. Hugh 
Casson’s 1957 portrait of his friend and fellow Royal Academician Sir Robin 
Darwin depicts the artist wearing his own army-issue duffel coat with pride; Sylvia 
Townsend Warner’s diary from the 1950s recalls a visit by the epicene scholar and 
translator Enid Starkie, who appeared wearing ‘bright blue trousers, very baggy, a 
baggy scarlet duffel coat, a red beret, too large, and some bunches of red-gold 
hair.’547 And the actress Sandra Caron, when offered a new mink coat by her sister, 
the singer Alma Cogan, chose instead the gift of a duffel coat because she wanted to 
look like ‘a sort of beatnik’.548  
Duffel coats, as salvaged objects, reactivate their historical surplus and 
transform one meaning (military utility) into another (the refusal of capitalist 
fashion). Plastic macs, in contrast, rely on and perpetuate the surplus value generated 
by capitalism. While the duffel coat is a heavy object, disguising the body and 
offering the illusion of uniformity, the plastic mac is flimsy and transparent, its 
cheapness suggesting that it should be taken lightly, thrown away and replaced by 
ever cheaper mass-produced versions of itself. The fashion correspondent of The 
Times, in 1955, summarized the appeal of the earliest plastic macs: 
 
Plastic raincoats which can be rolled up small and stuffed in pocket, handbag, 
or suitcase owed little to fashion when they were first introduced and 
everything to function. They were utterly unbecoming, but they served as 
convenient cocoons, dispensed with the need for a raincoat proper, and were 
cheap enough to be thrown away and replaced by a new one when the plastic 
began to tear away from the buttonholes and rain seeped through the 
stitching.549  
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But while disposable synthetics were beginning to blur class distinctions among the 
middle classes, the position of commoners in relation to royalty remained carefully 
circumscribed in order to preserve the element of fetishization which characterized 
the coronation spectacle. For the royalist mainstream – whether fur-coated or plastic-
macked – the Coronation not only situated the new queen within a sanctioned 
historical narrative of continuity blended with progress, it was a performance which 
carefully staged their response in order to assert the consensual nature of class 
hierarchy. Spectatorship at the event was precisely modulated according to status, 
with the aristocratic audience in Westminster Abbey co-opted as lavishly costumed 
extras in the drama, while the well-off bought tickets for grandstand seats along the 
procession route, leaving the masses to jostle for any vantage point they could lay 
claim to. A ticket-holder in the £30 seats – Daily Express columnist Eve Perrick – 
noted the strict dress code of the middle-class spectators, which was both 
aspirational and bathetically practical: 
 
We seemed to have, although it was all quite unofficial, a kind of regulation 
dress. No ermine, mind you, but nearly all the women wore mink. And in 
place of coronets the men had come prepared with little plastic cosies which 
they fitted over their light-weight trilby hats.550 
 
Many non-ticket-holders found vantage points in the shopping districts of the West 
End. The royal route included Regents Street and Oxford Street, thus appropriating 
the resonance of spaces already imbued with acquisitive desire; the gold-and-glass 
carriage presented the new Queen like an expensively dressed mannequin in an ever-
receding vitrine display or an inaccessible shop window. It’s notable that Queen 
Sālote of Tonga briefly became a darling of the British press because she chose to 
brave the rain in an open-topped carriage, making her more accessible to the crowds 
than any of the home-grown dignitaries. It was popularity tinged with loss of status, 
however; Margaret Thatcher – who also had tickets for the stands and was protected 
from the elements – noted sniffily in her diary, ‘The queen of Tonga never wore that 
dress again. Mine lived to see another day.’551  
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Meanwhile, for those not in London, the Coronation was a television event 
rather than a live spectacle. The Daily Express championed the new technology 
which not only caught a ‘secret smile’ from the Queen at the moment she was 
crowned, but also ‘spread [it] across Britain into Europe and even behind the Iron 
Curtain into Berlin’.552 Angus Wilson, writing in the New Statesman, described his 
experience as part of a communal television audience ‘dazed by ritual’ at a hotel in 
Essex. He was impressed by the way this experience broke down both his own 
‘innate Republicanism’ and the ‘Rotarian, have-the-next-one-on-me-old-boy jollity’ 
of ‘the saloon bar gang’: 
 
It was fascinating to see them fight the strange beauty, the formal 
Byzantinism of the ceremony that appeared on screen. They were prepared, 
of course, for an occasional catch in the throat, a moment of lowered head, 
but the elaborate grace before them demanded less perfunctory reverence 
[…] It was nice to see the ‘gang’ so put out when they least expected it.553  
 
The phantasmagoria which so dazed the viewing public demonstrated the power of 
objects to produce metaphysical transformations, and because this phantasmagoria 
was itself mediated by the television screen it became even more uncannily 
powerful. Arguably, this moment summoned in the public a desire for objects which 
could perform a similar transformation on themselves – a desire never fulfilled by 
the eternal postponement of satisfaction offered by mass consumerism. Yet if the 
coronation promoted a consumerist motive force within society, it also provided its 
own critique in the way it turned the new queen into a spectacular ghost, an image on 
a screen, immaterial herself within the materialist spectacle of the occasion.  
Wilson goes on to describe the way local communities answered this 
performative paradigm by staging their own productions and inserting themselves 
into networks of meaning more politically nuanced than the distant event in London: 
a historical pageant which mixed Tudor themes with Norman architecture and a 
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Victorian sensibility; a village sports day; a morris dance patronized by ‘a large 
crowd contain[ing] a sprinkling of first-rate Osbert Lancaster intellectuals, including 
an old lady with grey earphones, purple ribbons round her hair and throat, a purple 
cloak, and a flatly benign expression that smiled at once upon a Co-operative Guild 
future and a Maypole past.’ His piece ends with a description of a dinner at which 
the guests recount their experiences as performers at another pageant, in Toppesfield.  
 
I was told the hostess had been a great success as Roxana; another guest told 
me he had been playing Wamba the Jester, while a lady who arrived late 
explained how exhausted she was “what with the rehearsal of Benjie’s opera 
and playing Katharine Howard”.  
 
The mention of Daniel Dafoe’s Roxana and Raleigh’s Ivanhoe suggest that this 
pageant had high cultural ambitions, but the throwaway reference to Benjamin 
Britten’s Gloriana – and the fact that Wilson does not elaborate further on it – is 
indicative of the ambivalent response that particular dramatic spectacle provoked in 
Coronation year. 
 
 
‘As crooked as her carcase’: the failure of royal glamour in Gloriana  
Britten’s contribution to the royal moment was not intended to elicit either a 
perfunctory catch in the throat or an upsurge of spontaneous royalism in otherwise 
Republican spectators; it was, in the words of librettist William Plomer, ‘an original 
opera with a serious theme’.554 The project had first been suggested by Lord 
Harewood, the Queen’s cousin, in 1952, and he was instrumental in choosing the 
theme of the reign of Elizabeth I, suggesting Lytton Strachey’s Elizabeth & Essex: A 
Tragic History as source material.555 But it was Britten who decided to frame this 
portrait of an elderly monarch, whose royal dignity is threatened by foolish 
infatuation, in terms of the material trappings of the queen’s constructed identity and 
status, and her vulnerability to human failings without them. The opera presents the 
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first Elizabeth as holding two incompatible identities in an uneasy balance: first she 
is the impermeable Renaissance monarch whose totemic glamour and rich apparel 
are worn as a carapace while plots, politics and intrigue swirl around her; then she is 
a vulnerable private woman in love with a man, Essex, who only professes to return 
her affection in the hope that he will gain preferment and influence. Six days after 
Elizabeth II had performed her role in the drama of the Coronation, the new queen 
was now once again in the audience instead of on the stage, but just as she had been 
literally hailed by the players in The Masque of Hope while still a princess, now she 
was being hailed symbolically by an opera which all too openly sought to suture her 
into the spectacle of the symbolically and physically divested monarch on the stage. 
The numerous brickbats hurled at the opera after the premiere arose partly from the 
sense that the living queen in the audience had been stripped bare by the treatment of 
her namesake – as indeed, metaphorically, she had been. Lord Drogheda, who was to 
become chairman of the Royal Opera House five years later, described the gala in his 
autobiography: 
 
Long remembered it was, but as a fiasco [...] Gloriana was quite long, the 
evening was warm, the intervals seemed endless, stick-up collars grew limp, 
and well before the end a restlessness set in. ‘Boriana’ was on everyone’s 
lips. Most distressing was that in one scene the elderly Queen Elizabeth I 
removed her wig from her head and was revealed as almost bald: and this 
was taken, for no good reason at all, as being in bad taste.556  
 
The scene in question – Act 2 Scene 1 – depicts the return of the Earl of Essex from 
his campaign in Ireland, where he has failed to defeat the rebellious Tyrone. Despite 
the protests of the Queen’s ladies in waiting, he insists on pushing through into her 
private chamber for an audience. As the stage directions put it: 
 
He steps forward and sweeps the curtain back, disclosing the Queen seated at 
her dressing-table, wearing an old, plain dressing-gown […] Her red-gold 
wig is on a stand before her, among the paraphernalia of her toilet. She has a 
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looking glass in her hand […] Wisps of grey hair hanging round the Queen’s 
face make her look old, pathetic and vulnerable.557  
 
The visual effect of the shabby, de-wigged queen was striking. Like Essex, Britten 
had broken the first rule of a constitutional monarchy; in Walter Bagehot’s phrase, 
he had ‘let in daylight upon magic.’558 And Britten, like Essex, was punished for it.  
William Plomer responded to the bad reviews by attacking the opera’s critics as 
envious mediocrities, whom he characterized as ‘philistine and puritan art-saboteurs, 
iconoclasts and ignoramuses, and those who fear and hate anything which does not 
flatter their prejudices and pander to their appetites.’559 He went on to dismiss the 
original gala audience as a group of shallow socialites, excessively interested in 
clothes and finery: 
 
An unmusical audience, consisting largely of important persons […] who 
were there for official or social reasons or out of loyalty and courtesy to the 
Queen […] Were these chatterers interested in anything beyond a plenteous 
twinkling of tiaras and recognizable wearers of stars and ribbons in the 
auditorium?560  
 
Plomer’s description suggests that the relationship between stage and auditorium 
was reversed at the opera’s premiere: the audience themselves, with the Queen as 
their diva, sought both to provide and to consume a shallow and primarily sartorial 
spectacle, while, for Plomer, the players on the stage represented a more authentic 
version of reality. Indeed, he and Britten had been determined ‘to shun anything that 
might smack of Wardour Street, Merrie England, Good Queen Bess, or the half-
baked half-timbering of debased twentieth-century “Tudor” stylings’, and had thus 
left an opening for a rival, crowd-pleasing phantasmagoria to be staged in the stalls 
and boxes. 561 But the idea that the lèse-majesté of the dressing-room scene was 
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merely a by-product of aesthetic high-mindedness, with composer and librettist too 
wrapped up in the purity of their art to consider protocol, is unconvincing given the 
brazenness of the irreverence.  
In fact, clothing is central to the opera’s commentary on the ceremonial fictions 
of the coronation it celebrated, and the second half of Gloriana plays out the rapid 
decline in Elizabeth’s power explicitly through images of performance and costume. 
While Act 1 shows the queen in full control of her royal glamour, and determined to 
quell her love for Essex in order to ‘die in honour, / Leave a refulgent crown!’, Act 2 
begins the unravelling of her carefully constructed persona.562 The act opens with a 
masque in her honour – a crowd-pleasing interlude which nevertheless impedes the 
main narratives of love, ambition and duty and forces the Queen into a ritual role at a 
time when action is called for. At least one contemporary critic, John W. Klein, 
considered this supposedly meaningless digression a bigger mistake than any 
potential insult to queenly dignity later in the opera: 
 
[Britten] devotes practically one whole scene (which is almost entirely 
irrelevant) to pageantry. This was obviously necessitated by the exigencies of 
the festive occasion, but inevitably – from a purely dramatic point of view – 
it tends to weaken his work.563  
 
Arguably though, this play-within-a-play reflects the events of 1953 somewhat 
pointedly. Like The Masque of Hope in 1948, it places the new queen into the heart 
of the drama by showing her proxy as a captive audience co-opted into a role within 
the spectacle, forced to sit and listen appreciatively to what Essex, in an aside, calls 
‘Tedious orations/ Dotards on their knees – / I for one could yawn myself to 
death.’564 While the stage Elizabeth is hemmed in by duty, trapped inside an empty 
piece of theatre, her courtiers, including Essex, plot to take control of the kingdom, 
and it’s from this position of weakness that Elizabeth takes the drastic step – in scene 
3 of Act 2 – of humiliating her romantic rival, Lady Essex, for choosing the wrong 
dress for a dance. In this scene, Lady Essex has entered wearing a particularly fine 
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gown in an attempt to persuade the gathered nobles of Essex’s high status. But 
Elizabeth is furious at being outshone, and rather than fall back on the laws of 
sumptuary which (as Bell pointed out) specifically outlawed this kind of threat to her 
status, like a petulant child she plays a prank on her rival. When the ladies retire to 
‘change their linen’ after a vigorous dance, Elizabeth steals the gown in question; the 
stage directions describe how ‘the Queen suddenly returns, unheralded and 
unattended, and wearing Lady Essex’s missing dress. It is much too short for her, 
and she looks grotesque.’565 She taunts Lady Essex: 
 
Too short, is it not? 
And becometh me ill?  
[…] 
If, being too short, 
It becometh not me 
I have it in mind 
It can ne’er become thee 
As being too gaudy! 
So choose another!566  
 
These bullying tactics do not strengthen the Queen’s position; the conspirators agree 
that this is ‘what comes of being ruled / By a king in a farthingale’ and Essex’s 
indignation leaves us in no doubt that his previous protestations of love for the 
Queen have been merely tactical when he exclaims ‘Conditions! Conditions! / Her 
conditions are as crooked as her carcase!’567  
The incident with the dress was very important to Britten. He borrowed it, 
almost word for word, from an unrelated scene in Strachey’s book, in which the 
owner of the dress was Lady Mary Howard;568 by transferring it to Lady Essex, and 
making it a crucial narrative turning point, he loaded it with political significance. 
Correspondence in the Britten archive shows that Plomer had wanted to have Lady 
Essex parade in the dress during an earlier scene in a private garden, but Britten 
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insisted the incident be moved into the dance at court.569 It seems likely that Britten 
wanted the dress incident to be concentrated in a scene of public power and status 
because he was making a point about how power is produced by costume. And the 
scene works in another way; along with the dressing-room scene which follows after 
the interval, it separates the actors on stage from their costumes, and places the 
material object centre-stage.  
In her work on theatrical costume, Aoife Monks has argued that ‘Costume is 
that which is perceptually indistinct from the actor’s body, and yet something that 
can be removed. Costume is a body that can be taken off.’570 Traditionally, 
audiences have been encouraged to see costume ‘simply as the clothes of the 
character’571 and thus ‘inextricable from our engagement with the illusion on 
stage.’572 But, just as Bill Brown’s Things become visible when they malfunction or 
get in the way, ‘sometimes costume remains stubbornly in view as costume, refusing 
to be meaningful, or exerting a power beyond its role in the fictional event.’573 In 
Gloriana, this break-down in the totalizing illusion of theatre is given a further twist 
when Elizabeth’s removable clothes are redefined as pieces of costume in royalty’s 
ongoing theatrical performance, thus revealing not only that the actor is playing a 
character, but that that character is in turn an actor herself, playing a further 
character in another level of fictivity. Just as in The Red Shoes, this creates nested 
layers of identity, but whereas in Powell and Pressburger’s film it is the impossibility 
of removing the shoes that contributes to their uncanny agency, in Gloriana the 
queen’s ritual trappings repeatedly slip away from her and threaten to reveal the 
private self which might come unstitched from her royal status.  
Heather Wiebe has argued that the dewigging of the Queen in the third act 
‘unveiled an uglier reality behind the Coronation’s carefully produced fantasy of the 
Elizabethan era’: 
 
The opera’s peculiar darkness speaks to an ambivalence within the 
Coronation celebrations about the structures of British – or, to be more 
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precise, English – identity. […] It probed a problem at the heart of this 
construction of identity, faltering at the line between domestic and expansive 
versions of Englishness.’574 
 
For Wiebe, the Coronation’s ‘self-consciously imperial character’ was challenged by 
Britten’s depiction of the first Elizabethan era, which right-wing commentators 
celebrated as the seminal incarnation of British achievement in culture and outward-
bound imperial power.575 Indeed, the arts in general, in her view, ‘fit uneasily into 
the Coronation display as a whole.’576 However, she tends to overestimate the extent 
to which the Coronation itself ‘presented the age of Elizabeth I as the original 
imperial moment;’577 as Cannadine has shown, the ceremonies and rituals were 
designed to bolster a Victorian construct of monarchy, not an Elizabethan one, and 
most references to the first Elizabeth were not politically aspirational but were 
blurred into a decorative fiction of ‘Merrie England’, along with maypoles and 
Morris dancing. What Wiebe does pinpoint, however, is the way in which Britten’s 
music complicates the opera’s claims to historical authenticity. She focuses on the 
musical significance of ‘Happy were he’, a melancholy lute song which Essex plays 
to Elizabeth, which is among the most beautiful moments in the opera: 
 
Happy were he could finish forth his fate  
In some unhaunted desert, where, obscure 
From all society, from love and hate 
Of worldly folk, then might he sleep secure.578  
 
The lyrics are based closely on a poem that the real Essex composed, so that the song 
seems to offer an authentic Elizabethanism rooted in what Wiebe calls ‘an English 
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pastoral already cloaked in melancholy – austere, solitary, unattained and 
unattainable.’579  
The postulated ‘realness’ of this moment creates a crisis of credibility within the 
fiction of the opera; a crisis which reaches its climax in the final scene, where the 
dying Queen, picked out in a spotlight on a darkened stage, stops singing and begins 
to speak quotations from the recorded speeches and letters of the historical Elizabeth 
I. Wiebe argues that these historical artefacts create ‘a strange collapse of historical 
and personal loss […] a moment of collapse in an opera whose ostensible function 
within the Coronation was to celebrate historical plenitude and presence.’580 I would 
argue, though, that this intimation of fictional collapse resonates also in ‘lost objects’ 
in the opera, namely, the wig and dress which become detached from their wearers. 
Essex’s fantasy of a simple hermit’s life, ‘content with hips and haws and 
brambleberry’, is based on a release from culture and a return to nature – a dream of 
objectlessness and an escape from surplus value and meaning. Perhaps the pervasive 
sense that this opera was somehow disrespectful to Elizabeth II arose, not just from 
its suggestion that her namesake was old, bald and weak, but from a more ambitious 
revelation of monarchy itself as a fiction which, like all fictions, must eventually 
collapse when confronted with history. Like the masquers in Oxford five years 
earlier, Britten was using the privilege of artistic licence to evoke the queen as a 
symbol of fictivity, and his message was not so much about nationalism and empire, 
but something more personal about the fragility of metaphysical excess and the 
obliteration of the self demanded by the metonymic trappings of status. 
 
 
‘It looks as if it’s wearing you!’: Science, synthetics and society in The Man in the 
White Suit 
The spectacle of the Coronation itself was, as design historians Christopher Breward 
and Ghislaine Wood put it, ‘a sophisticated design event, operating across the fields 
of photography, fashion and performance to project a new version of the Crown’s 
role in the life of the state.’581 In particular, they examine the Queen’s Coronation 
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portrait by Cecil Beaton, which shows the Queen in ermine, crown, densely 
embroidered gown and full regalia seated in front of a projected backdrop depicting 
Westminster Abbey. This, they argue, is a complex fiction and declares itself as such 
through its use of synthetic materials; the threshold between the flesh-and-blood 
monarch and the virtual background is marked by a curtain, a ‘bolt of blue and gold 
“Queensway” rayon silk, designed for Warner and Sons by Royal College of Art 
professor Robert Goodden to decorate the Abbey interior’.582 This ‘embodies the 
contradictions: a synthetic rendering of age-old symbols drawn back in a 
technicoloured sweep, like set-dressing on a Hollywood film set.’583 Arguably, 
indeed, this image not only ‘suggests the contingent and artificial nature of a grand 
state event in a democratic age’, but seems to emphasize the intransigent materiality 
of the royal regalia, and threatens the autonomous personhood of the sovereign 
wearing and holding the symbols of power.584 The rayon curtain, which is intended 
to link the seated queen with the religious, historical and ceremonial context 
represented by the fake, blurry and unconvincingly lit abbey, instead threatens to 
close behind her, and leave her stranded in possession of some elaborate but 
meaningless baubles. 
The tension between the fabric of tradition and the technological modernity 
represented by the rayon silk curtain had been played out in a more overtly political 
way in Alexander Mackendrick’s 1951 Ealing Comedy The Man in the White Suit.585 
The film follows the fortunes of an idealistic chemist, Sydney Stratton (Alec 
Guinness) who upsets the status quo in a northern mill town when he invents a 
thread that doesn’t break and never gets dirty. When he dons the first suit to be made 
of this pure white fabric, he is greeted by his employer’s daughter, Daphne (Joan 
Greenwood), as the harbinger of a social justice enabled by clothes which are 
eternally pristine:  
 
It makes you look like a knight in shining armour. It’s what you are. Don’t 
you understand what this means? Millions of people all over the world are 
living lives of drudgery fighting an endless losing battle against shabbiness  
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and dirt. You’ve won that battle for them. You’ve set them free. The whole 
world’s going to bless you. 
 
But instead of being the people’s champion, Sidney remains the underdog, harried 
both by the textile consortium running the weaving industry, who see a threat to their 
profits, and the mill’s workforce, who see a threat to their jobs. That the fur-coated 
industrialist and the dungaree-wearing shop steward should join forces against the 
Oxbridge scientist in his college scarf and cricket jumper is typical of the 
fundamental social conservatism which underlies many of Ealing’s ostensibly anti-
authoritarian tales of insubordination, such as Passport to Pimlico (1949) and 
Whisky Galore! (1949). The film strives to restore its characters to the traditional 
balance which has been disrupted by the novel material of the white suit. That the 
material has its own agenda, quite separate from Sidney’s, is suggested by the fact 
that he disappears completely inside the suit when he wears it in low light, his face 
and hands blending into the shadows while the fabric’s artificial whiteness sings out 
– an effect remarked on by Daphne who declares ‘It looks as if it’s wearing you!’ 
Just as the queen’s personhood is occluded by the shell-like trappings of the 
coronation vestments, Sidney becomes, in effect, a version of H. G. Wells’s Invisible 
Man, who can only be manifested by means of his clothing.586 When, in the film’s 
climax, Sidney makes a desperate run from the combined forces of capital and 
labour who are determined to suppress his invention, his mad dash through the dark 
streets of the mill town is made ridiculous by the fact that he is wearing a suit that 
makes it impossible to hide. He is cornered, but as hands grab him, the white fabric 
falls apart like blotting paper. Technology turns out to be unreliable, the textile 
industry is saved, and Sidney – like the Emperor in his delusional New Clothes – is 
left standing in his underpants, revealed as a clown, until someone hands him an 
ordinary overcoat to wear.  
Although Daphne has compared him to a knight in shining armour, Sidney’s 
suit is not so much the emblem of a warrior, as the battleground itself. Yet only at 
the end of the film, when the luminous suit is threatening to give him away, does he 
realize he is in the wrong clothes. He bumps into his landlady, Mrs Watson, who is 
carrying the laundry she takes in to make ends meet, and begs her for a garment to 
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cover himself. Instead of helping him, the kindly Mrs Watson refuses him, 
unleashing the rebuke that makes Sidney understand the folly of his aspiration, and 
strikes the keynote of the film’s conservative condemnation of high-minded 
scientific utopianism: ‘Why can’t you scientists leave things alone? What about my 
bit of washing when there’s no washing to do?’ At this climax of its supremacy – in 
the next scene Sidney’s suit will fall apart amid gales of laughter – the white suit is 
an emblem of all that is sinisterly alien about science and modernity. The character 
of Sidney, once loveable as an underdog, now looms over the tiny form of Mrs 
Watson, his face in dark shadow, as the suit which is ‘wearing him’ takes control and 
attempts, like an artificial life-form, to survive and replicate itself. 
As well as commenting on the danger threatened by the thoughtless onrush of 
technological innovation, The White Suit was responding to a growing crisis in the 
real world of textile manufacture. The postwar slump caused by continuing 
rationing, recession and unemployment resulted in mass lay-offs of workers in 
Lancashire; in the summer of 1952, 33 per cent of spinning operatives and 22 per 
cent of weaving operatives were either unemployed or on short time.587 The ‘textiles 
crisis’, as it became known, prompted Sir Raymond Streat, chairman of the Cotton 
Board, to call an international conference at Buxton in September which concluded 
that the low demand was caused by a combination of ‘not just increasing Japanese 
competition, but also Korean War stockpiling, import controls in Australia and 
untimely price-fixing arrangements by the Yarn Spinners’ Association.’588 A US 
productivity team that toured the industry in the same year found ‘large elements of 
both management and labour dominated by an inertia which prevents them from 
seeing the future clearly[…] Their main effort at the moment seems to be directed 
towards the protection of the least efficient producers and the preservation of 
antiquated arrangements.’589  
As David Kynaston has written: 
 
The 1952 textiles crisis was a clear signal that it was time to stop privileging 
the great nineteenth-century export staples – coal, cotton, steel – and instead 
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start prioritizing the new, scientific, high-tech industries that could 
realistically be seen as having a future.590 
 
The shift in perspective towards technology and synthetic fabrics had begun during 
World War II. In the face of maritime attacks on supply lines, the importance of 
local sources of essential materials became apparent – materials which could be 
developed out of the new synthetic substances which had been discovered in the 
previous decade. The invention of PVC in 1933 was followed two years later by 
polyethylene – discovered by Francis Freeth at ICI in a Sidney-Stratton-like 
experiment conducted against company rules.591 Nylon also came onto the market in 
1935, and polystyrene in 1937; once the war began, these timely materials were 
eagerly put to use in radar sets, parachutes, insulators and much else. After the war, 
acrylics such as Dralon and polyester fabrics, marketed as Dacron and Terylene, 
promised a utopian combination of utility, cheapness and modern, vibrant colours. In 
her work on the Festival Pattern Group, which created textile designs for the 1951 
Festival of Britain based on atomic structures revealed by X-ray crystallography, the 
design historian Mary Schoeser traces the process by which science inserted itself 
into everyday material culture. She cites not only the invention of artificial fibres 
like Nylon and Terylene, but the invention of cyclamates (artificial sugar substitutes) 
in 1937 and the introduction of the first credit card (the Diners Club card) in 1950, 
and locates these developments within a wider context in the 1950s, which saw both 
the ‘natural’ order and the ‘old political’ order being challenged, via developments 
as diverse as the first embryo transplant for cattle (1950) and the creation of NATO 
(1949). 
But for individuals creating costumes and settings for themselves on the 
domestic stage, technologically enhanced fabrics also promised to overturn the social 
codes governing the status of materials. The introduction of rotary screen printing in 
the 1950s (replacing the use of copper engraved rollers) meant that dye could be 
applied to the fabric in layers, creating ‘fine lines and crisp textural effects’: 
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Printed texture is a very important element because it disguises cheap cloth 
and it was something that was done in the 1940s, when chevrons, 
herringbones, tweeds and so on were printed onto completely plain rayons 
just to give them a look of quality.592 
 
In 1956, the former mining company 3M began marketing Scotchguard and for the 
first time it became practical to put printed fabrics on furniture, too, in order to 
emulate more expensive weaves. Whereas Quentin Bell in the late 1940s had 
unquestioningly asserted that the sumptuosity of a fabric could never be usurped as 
the key marker of taste and value, new synthetic fabrics and technological 
innovations were indeed about to displace the idea that ‘a cheap material cannot 
please’. But it was not just the cheapness of a printed tweed – or the disposability of 
the plastic mackintoshes worn by the Coronation watchers in 1953 – that offered a 
new understanding of how clothing might transform its wearer. The ascent of Mount 
Everest showed that technical fabrics had the power to transport the human subject 
into hitherto inaccessible realms.  
 
The crucifix and the cloth cat: disputed materials on the summit of Everest 
In one sense, the Everest expedition was a riposte to the idea that the British were no 
longer capable of grand adventures, and no longer valued the individual 
achievements of an elite. The Spectator, in a review of Gloriana which Wiebe 
perceptively calls a ‘thinly veiled attack on Britten’s homosexuality’, had accused 
the opera of betraying  
 
those magnificent Renaissance creatures, the Elizabethans, with their pride 
and ambitions, their reckless intrigues and their fierce contempt of death. The 
authors have not convinced us that they have really grasped the great heart of 
the Renaissance individualist; the whole man, hard and sensitive, artist and 
warrior in one.593  
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Everest seemed to provide proof that the new Elizabethans could be as magnificent, 
reckless and individualistic as their forebears, and could seize new realms of 
experience in their manly grasp. And the fact that the ‘conquest’ was a symbolic one, 
rather than a military invasion, meant it could be enjoyed without disturbing the 
narrative of progress that had left the Empire behind. The inconvenient detail that 
neither of the two men to attain the summit, Edmund Hillary and Norgay Tenzing, 
was British tended to be swept aside in celebrations of an expedition that was 
planned and executed by a largely British team, and led by the British army officer 
John Hunt. Recent accounts – like Peter H. Hansen’s – of the ascent have seen the 
party’s international flavour as suggestive that ‘Britain was attempting to redefine 
the “British Empire” as a “Commonwealth of Nations”.’594  
 
When Tenzing reached the summit of Everest, he waved from his ice-axe 
four flags representing Nepal, India, Britain and the United Nations[…] 
While the team included men from the British military, public schools and 
universities, Hunt expanded his talent search to include a Blackpool travel 
agent, two New Zealeanders, and Sherpa Tenzing[…] If Hunt had wanted to 
make the expedition narrowly “all-British” he could have done so. That Hunt 
chose Hillary and Tenzing for the summit party reflects not only a 
recognition of their abilities but also an inclusive definition of “Britishness” 
consistent with the expansive definition of the Commonwealth articulated at 
the time of the coronation.595 
 
Hunt’s own account of the expedition, published in the Geographical Journal in 
December 1953, does indeed emphasize the meritocratic system of selection he 
employed when recruiting members of the team, although this mainly applied to the 
Sherpas, who were whittled down to a select few during the long march through 
Nepal and the preparatory climbs during which the camps along the ascent route 
were established and stocked with supplies. Hunt’s language certainly smacks of 
imperial entitlement; he writes of the Sherpa men: ‘We had arranged for twenty of 
                                                
594 Peter H. Hansen, ‘Coronation Everest’, in Stuart Ward, ed., British Culture and 
the End of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 57-72 (p. 
58). 
595 Hansen, ‘Coronation Everest’, pp. 61-62. 
 237 
these splendid little men to do the most arduous carrying on the higher part of the 
climb’,596 and during the early stages of the expedition remarks that ‘the marches 
were short, owing to the slow progress of our laden coolies, and we had time to 
bathe as we waited for our cook Thondup to prepare breakfast.’597  
While he does not stint in his praise for the bravery and strength of Tenzing and 
the other Nepali climbers who reached the final stages, he did not, as Hansen 
implies, select Hillary and Tenzing as the intended summit party; the first attempt on 
the peak was tried by an English scientist, Tom Bourdillon, and a Welsh doctor, 
Charles Evans. Indeed, Tenzing’s strength and stamina meant that he alone was 
originally intended to take part in both the first and the second attempts – first as part 
of the support team for Bourdillon and Evans, and only secondly as a climber 
attempting the actual ascent. In the end, he was too ill to form part of the first 
support team – and he was not alone among the Sherpa men to suffer from 
exhaustion. When he and Hillary did make their ascent, Hillary recalled, ‘the high-
altitude Sherpas chosen to carry our camp high up the south-east ridge had all fallen 
ill except Ang Nyma, so there was nothing for it but to carry everything 
ourselves.’598 Clearly, the idea that the Everest expedition was a utopia of post-
colonial fraternity is oversimple; but another important shift in British self-image can 
be traced through the clothes and equipment that enabled the climb to succeed. 
Significantly, the 1953 expedition was the first to embrace nylon’s combination of 
lightness, strength and resistance to moisture. Whereas the unsuccessful Swiss 
attempt in 1952 had been equipped with various combinations of cotton, wool, silk 
and other traditional fabrics, Hunt’s expedition adopted nylon-lined smocks and 
trousers, tents of a nylon-cotton mix and sleeping bags with nylon outer layers.599  
Later, when news of the success of the venture reached Britain, reports of the 
ascent almost equated the contribution of British manufacturers with the climbers’ 
heroic qualities, emphasizing that the novel equipment was ‘manufactured after 
careful proving and experiment in conditions similar to those encountered or 
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expected at high altitude.’600 But another piece of specialist technological apparel 
made an even more crucial difference: masks delivering supplementary oxygen to 
the climbers. Michael Ward, who was expedition doctor in 1953, recalls that this was 
controversial at the time: 
 
Supplementary oxygen had been used [by the 1920s expeditions], but it had 
not seemed to confer any benefit in terms of increased climbing rate, and 
indeed some mountaineers seemed to ascend as fast or faster without 
supplementary oxygen than those who did use it.601  
 
The problem was that the weight of the equipment cancelled out the benefits of using 
it, but this was solved in 1952 by a combination of scientific advances in lightweight 
alloys, and by the research of Dr Griffith Pugh of the newly formed Medical 
Research Council. Pugh had worked for the mountain warfare training centre in 
Lebanon during World War II and went on to research the effects of extreme 
environments ‘as a result of the Korean war and increasing British interest in 
Antarctica.’602 The development of respiratory technology had also made progress 
thanks to wartime advances in diving and flying equipment, but it was Pugh who 
discovered the ideal flow rate of oxygen at high altitudes, which would produce a 
sufficient boost in work rate to compensate for the extra weight being carried. 
Although a number of later climbs have succeeded without oxygen – making use of 
the body’s ability to acclimatize gradually to altitude – Ward is clear about the 
benefits of technology: 
 
Without adequate supplementary oxygen at extreme altitudes the body is on a 
knife edge [...] Prewar climbers at extreme altitude had suffered from 
hallucinations due to hypoxia; some had died from cold injury; hemiplegia 
had been reported; dehydration was extreme, fatigue overwhelming, and loss 
of weight severe. Muscle wasting was great: F. S. Smythe in 1933 could 
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almost encircle the muscles of his thigh with the fingers of one hand. 
Fourteen deaths had been recorded on Everest up to 1952.603  
 
But the introduction of technological enhancement did not necessarily imply a 
cancellation of hierarchies. Instead, as Hansen notes, this new empire of technology 
could be used to perpetuate old ideas about British superiority which were 
supposedly being contradicted by the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ idea: 
 
On BBC television, Hunt described the ascent with a scale model of Everest, 
and the interviewer asked Bourdillon about the oxygen, Wylie about the 
porters, Hillary about the summit, and Tenzing about himself. Tenzing also 
demonstrated the oxygen mask and cylinders while Hunt described how they 
worked. After the ascent, scenes of Sherpas demonstrating the oxygen were 
repeated frequently, and represented visually an older ideology of European 
technological dominance that had formerly underpinned imperialism, but 
now bolstered images of British tutelage of the Commonwealth in the 
1950s.604  
 
In The Prince and the Pauper, the royal equipment had ‘materialized the immaterial 
excess that differentiates a royal body from its brute physicality’; on the summit of 
Everest, oxygen apparatus allowed the climbers to escape the limitations of brute 
physicality and attain super-human powers. Although in theory such equipment 
could be worn by anybody, in fact it represented another equally fetishized surplus. 
Membership of the band of elite climbers was based only partly on merit – it also 
depended on education, nationality and access to Western technology. The 
implication was that Tenzing – like the pauper-prince Tom – was misappropriating 
the techno-regalia of the future empire, and had to be put back in his place by being 
presented as someone who could access its use value, but would never understand its 
surplus meaning. 
Hillary’s account of the climb participates in this narrative of technological 
dominance by describing how he had to intervene paternalistically in order to help 
Tenzing with his oxygen: 
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I suddenly noticed that Tenzing, who had been going very well, was starting 
to drag. When he approached me I saw that he was panting and in some 
distress. I examined his oxygen set and, finding that the exhaust outlet from 
his mask was blocked with ice, was able to give him immediate relief.605  
 
Tenzing’s autobiography takes issue with this account – and other claims Hillary 
made about having to help him as he struggled up the mountain – in offended terms:  
 
Every so often, as had happened all the way, we would have trouble 
breathing, and have to stop and clear away the ice that kept forming in the 
tubes of our oxygen-sets. In regard to this, I must say in all honesty that I do 
not think Hillary is quite fair in the story he later told, indicating that I had 
more trouble than he with breathing, and that without his help I might have 
suffocated. In my opinion our difficulties were about the same – and luckily 
never too great – and we each helped and were helped by the other in equal 
measure.606  
 
When Tenzing and Hillary reached the top of the mountain, they removed their 
masks for the 15 minutes they spent there, in order to conserve oxygen – and perhaps 
also to reassert their humanity at the moment of their triumph. The removal of the 
breathing apparatus, like the removal of the Queen’s wig in Gloriana or the loss of 
the Royal Seal in The Prince and the Pauper, serves as a reminder that power is 
mapped onto the body of the human subject by a dialectical production of meaning 
contingent upon the placement, fit and operation of a prosthetic object. But the 
climbers also divested themselves of some other symbolic things during their short 
stay on the summit. Reuters reported that ‘along with Sherpa Tenzing’s gifts of 
sweets to the mountain gods, Sir Edmund Hillary left a small fibre crucifix at the 
summit of Mount Everest’. This synthetic crucifix, made of an early form of plastic 
derived, like rayon, from cellulose, had reportedly been given to John Hunt by a 
monk at the Benedictine abbey of Ampleforth, and was passed in turn to Hillary to 
                                                
605 Hunt and Hillary, p. 398. 
606 James Ramsey Ullman, Man of Everest: The Autobiography of Tenzing (London: 
Reprint Society, 1956) p. 260. 
 241 
be taken to the summit. Its symbolism and status was always contested, however: 
Hillary’s first account of the incident, given to reporters, only mentioned that he had 
buried an envelope in the snow, and he later explained that he thought it was up to 
Hunt to say what was in it.607 Neither Hillary nor Hunt was religious, and arguably it 
was the object’s man-made material which carried its primary symbolism of 
conquest over the natural world. However, in Tenzing’s account he emphatically 
denies any knowledge of this crucifix and seems to cast doubt on its existence: 
 
From my pocket I took the package of sweets I had been carrying. I took the 
little red-and-blue pencil that my daughter, Nima, had given me. And, 
scraping a hollow in the snow, I laid them there. Seeing what I was doing, 
Hillary handed me a small cloth cat, black and with white eyes, that Hunt had 
given him as a mascot, and I put this beside them. In his story of our climb 
Hillary says it was a crucifix that Hunt gave him, and that he left on top; but 
if this was so I did not see it. He gave me only the cloth cat. All I laid in the 
snow was the cat, the pencil and the sweets.608 
 
This discrepancy in the accounts of the summit-offerings indicates both the heavy 
weight of symbolism shared by the objects in question, and the divergent symbolic 
systems within which they operated. For Hillary and Hunt, rational men of science, 
such superstitious practices had to be presented as irrelevant, and carried out only to 
humour others’ beliefs: placing a synthetic piece of religious equipment in the snow 
was just about acceptable as a favour to friend, especially if it carried a submerged 
assertion of technological superiority in its material substance. To admit to burying a 
cloth cat, however, would threaten their status as serious adults and put them, in their 
eyes, on a par with Tenzing, whose uncomplicated religious action could have been 
ascribed to an insulting orientalist stereotype of non-Western naivety. On the other 
hand, it is possible to read Tenzing’s recollection as a mischievous retort to Hillary’s 
– and the entire British team’s – attempt to assert British superiority and infantilize 
the Nepalese climbers. This childish piece of cloth is contrasted, in his account, both 
with the four flags he carried tied to his ice-axe, and with the red scarf which he 
wore to the summit: fabric materializations of profound notions of loyalty and 
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identity. The scarf and been given to him by the Swiss expedition leader Raymond 
Lambert, with whom he had attempted to scale Everest the previous year. These two 
men had enjoyed a close and equal friendship which Tenzing pointedly contrasts 
with his relationship with the British party, who always drew ‘a line between them 
and the outsider, between sahib and employee’.609 Just before the expedition set off, 
he had had to quell serious unrest among the other Sherpas, who disliked the idea 
that they were only being loaned their clothes and apparel by the British, whereas 
other nations had given them their equipment outright as part of their wages. But for 
his part, Tenzing’s clothes and equipment declared his refusal to be entirely inducted 
into the British party:  
 
My boots, as I have said, were Swiss; my wind-jacket and various other items 
had been issued by the British. But the socks I was wearing had been knitted 
by Ang Lahmu. My sweater had been given to me by Mrs Henderson, of the 
Himalayan Club. My woollen helmet was the old one that had been left to me 
by Earl Denman. And, most important to all, the red scarf round my neck was 
Raymond Lambert’s.610  
 
Tenzing’s resistance to the uniform dress code of the British expedition 
acknowledges the symbolic potency of clothing and its implicit challenge to human 
agency and identity. Hunt and the rest of the Everest party wished to construct a 
narrative of post-colonial equality enabled by futuristic technology, which would 
erase the resentments of an imperial past; instead, they found themselves trapped 
within old power structures which the technology only served to reinforce. In 
Coronation year, an ancient idea of British monarchy was produced by the symbols 
of status as a kind of dream, phantasmagoria or fiction. Almost simultaneously on 
the other side of the world, a dream of the future was being produced by the symbols 
of science and progress – a new phantasmagoria, but a familiar fetishization of 
power. Yet technology’s darker aspect was already threatening an even greater and 
more troubling incursion into humanity’s nightmares. In the next chapter, we will 
see how atomic power came close to abolishing the hierarchy which put subjects in 
control of the object.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Bombs, prosthetics and madness: the troubling intimacy of things 
 
A summer’s day in 1940. The Brown family are at home in their neatly kept terraced 
house. They are all together in the sitting room: the children putting a record on the 
gramophone, the parents relaxing in armchairs, reading or knitting. Quietly and 
without fuss, they happen to notice that an incendiary bomb has fallen through their 
roof and landed in the bedroom upstairs. It nestles among their plain wooden 
furniture and begins to burn. Calmly, a voiceover explains: 
 
It burns very violently for the first minute but after that it can be tackled. 
Brown goes to ascertain the damage and goes to Smith next door for the 
pump they share. There’s no panic. A bucket, always kept full, is placed 
outside the front door. Miss Smith arrives. She has received training from the 
local authorities which you too can receive. Brown decides to operate the 
pump away from the heat and smoke. You’ll notice how Miss Smith keeps as 
near the floor as possible and plays a jet of water at the heart of the fire to get 
it under control. Brown Junior calls the Fire Brigade just in case.611 
 
In this public information film, How You Can Deal with Incendiary Bombs, the 
image of the stable family unit and the cosy division of labour is part of a soothing 
propaganda rhetoric: under the patriarchal guidance of Mr Brown and the local 
authorities, even young women and children can tackle enemy bombs easily. These 
small incendiary devices are merely uninvited guests in the family home, unwelcome 
in the intimate context of the bedroom, but familiarly domestic in scale.  
This early version of cosy wartime bomb-encounters did not go unchallenged. 
Later the same year, during the intense weeks of night-time air raids starting on 7 
September 1940, Humphrey Jennings collected dramatic footage of specifically 
domestic disruption for the Crown Film Unit’s propaganda short, London Can Take 
It!612 Tailored for the American market, it made a point of showing plucky 
Londoners giving up their right to a private home life, donning ARP uniforms after a 
hard day’s work, or queuing quietly outside public shelters. A voiceover, by US 
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reporter Quentin Reynolds, described them as ‘the greatest civilian army ever 
assembled’: 
 
I have watched them stand by their homes. I have seen them made homeless, 
I have seen them move to new homes, and I can assure you there is no panic, 
no fear, no despair in London Town. 
 
This rapid shift in emphasis from small bombs absorbed into and neutralized by the 
family circle, to large bombs battering the home front and expelling people from 
their domestic lives – if not through violent destruction then through their own sense 
of civic duty – acknowledged changing attitudes to the real devastation suffered by 
London on the 76 nights of the blitz. But as the war progressed and the air raids 
became more sporadic and geographically diffuse, the large-scale vision of public 
heroism against a dramatic nightscape, as promoted by Jennings’s films, contracted 
back down to the level of the hand-sized, daytime object; but this time there was no 
soothing suggestion that they could be neutralized with a homely bucket and pump. 
Two more Ministry of Information films warned against the domestication of 
unfamiliar things: Butterfly Bomb (1944) shows a young boy in his family’s garden, 
picking up one of the harmless-looking booby-traps – officially called SD2 bomblets 
– which were routinely dropped over communities in the north of England.613 The 
boy is instantly killed as his mother watches in horror. Dangerous Trophies: 
Unexploded Bombs (1945) depicts a man cycling down a country road and stopping 
to pick up what he assumes is a dud device.614 Despite being warned of the danger 
by a wise passerby, he resolves to keep it as a souvenir; promising glibly to ‘take the 
fuse out when I get home’, he pedals off with it, promptly exploding a few feet down 
the lane.  
In wartime, the public were repeatedly warned that the danger of these death-
dealing things depended on their small scale and apparent harmlessness; such objects 
invited domestication, only to reveal their true scope and agency once they had 
achieved close contact with their human victim. In bombs, the thing-world offers a 
treacherous intimacy, and it’s this intimacy which was repeatedly examined and 
interrogated in the culture of the immediate postwar period. By then, the war was 
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over but another type of weapon was threatening the integrity of the human subject: 
the atomic bomb. This new technology redefined deadly intimacy; after the first blast 
had obliterated the area surrounding its point of impact, the bomb continued to kill 
insidiously, via radiation which could invisibly penetrate and poison the body. At the 
same time, despite its ubiquity in the political discourse of the Cold War, this was a 
bomb with which few were intimately acquainted, since its power lay in its abstract 
potential for devastation rather than its immediate physical presence in everyday life. 
This retention of potential and the suppression of the object’s definitive conclusion 
finds echoes in the absences and narrative ruptures which characterize the postwar 
period’s treatment of bombs as cultural objects. In this chapter I will argue that 
atomic culture resonates with anxieties about objects and intimacy, and that this 
motif crosses and recrosses the threshold between traditional explosives and nuclear 
technology. In the first chapter of this thesis, bombs created new ecosystems of 
undead life, and left behind object-witnesses and rubble that told human stories. This 
final chapter shows how a very different understanding of bombs developed as 
World War II was replaced by the Cold War. In films including Powell and 
Pressburger’s The Small Back Room (1949), the Boulting Brothers’ Seven Days To 
Noon (1950), and Michael Anderson’s The Dam Busters (1955); as well as C. P. 
Snow’s novel The New Men (1954) and Marghanita Laski’s play The Offshore 
Island (1954), bombs leave no ruins behind them; instead, they take on a gothic 
aspect through their own ambiguous materiality, invading and compromising the 
fractured and ruined human body and giving birth to an uncanny absence and 
sterility.  
 
 
‘Now you see into the atoms themselves’: scale and the problem of nearness 
In 1946, the Daily Express released a polemical warning about the danger of the new 
technology in a film, The Atomic Age.615 It was released after the tests at Bikini Atoll 
in July that year, when two atomic bombs were detonated in order to test their effects 
on naval ships. The film consists of footage from the two Pathé reports of the tests, 
spliced together with a voiceover which swings between horrified accounts of the 
uncanny power of these weapons, and hopeful speculation that the science behind 
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them will provide benefits to health and industry. A rolling title at the start of the 
film indicates its uneasy ambiguity:  
 
The Daily Express presents these Pathé newsreels as a reminder that a 
menacing shadow lies across the vista of a world enriched by man’s fabulous 
discovery.  
Here we see once more the monstrous first-born child of the atomic age 
which in a moment of time, blotted out a great city and seared 92,000 people 
into oblivion. Yet it is still only a child, no more than eighteen months old… 
 
The conjunction of nightmarish destruction with the image of a small child echoes 
the code name of the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima, ‘Little Boy’, and is later 
reiterated by the voiceover’s description of the bombed ships lying ‘devastated and 
toylike in a boiling ocean’. By evoking the reckless destructive energy of a toddler, 
the image does not so much excuse the atom bomb’s mindlessness as warn against 
the idea that it is susceptible to reason, and suggest that it is all the more fearful 
because it touches the heart of family reality. While footage of the American tests 
safely distances the mushroom clouds by shooting them from miles away, Japanese 
footage of the casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, also included in the film, 
emphasize the bodily intimacy of the damage inflicted: a woman’s skin is marked 
with the pattern of the dress she wore when the bomb was dropped; a man’s 
wristwatch is removed to show that it has left a paler area on his badly burned skin; 
someone places their feet in the shadow footprints left by a man vaporized in the 
blast, to show the exact posture of the victim at the moment of his death. 
Repeatedly, the point is made that London or another city close to home could 
suffer the same fate: 
 
One bomb would kill 50,000 people, 400,000 would be made homeless. 
Many would die a slow death, as atom test animals are now dying at Bikini. 
We cannot afford to drift, as the clouds are drifting, into an atomic war. Here 
is the true challenge of our time: whether science is to be used to destroy us, 
or by releasing new sources of power, lighten the daily work of every one of 
us. 
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In fact, even advocates of the peaceful applications of atomic energy found it hard to 
use the idea of homely usefulness as an argument; it was to become increasingly 
important to stress that the technology could never be scaled down for personal use. 
In 1947, Prof J. D. Cockcroft, director of the Harwell atomic research and 
development plant in Berkshire, gave a talk to the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers which explicitly spelt out the incompatibility of the technology with 
homely and familiar spaces: 
 
Speaking of the possibilities of using nuclear energy for heat and power 
production, he said that owing to the intense radio activity in atomic piles 
cement shields had to be used to protect the workers. There had been much 
talk about an atomic motor-car, but one of 30 hp would need a 6ft concrete 
shield. An atomic propelled aircraft of 10,000 hp would need a 100ft shield. 
He said he would not recommend small atomic piles for central heating.616 
 
Instead, it was made clear to the public that atomic technology can occupy only one 
of two possible non-domestic spaces: either it is strictly corralled inside purpose-
built silos inaccessible to unauthorized personnel, or it will drift dangerously through 
the air in a deadly cloud. The unassuming domestic invader had become an object of 
bureaucratic alienation. 
The conceptual impact of nuclear weaponry is firstly one of dizzying scale – the 
vast zone of potential obliteration unleashed from the unimaginably tiny atom 
produces a kind of nausea which seems to challenge the concept of space and time as 
parameters defined by and arranged around the human. At the Festival of Britain 
Science exhibition in 1951, an introductory display plunged visitors into an 
immersive encounter with the new scale of the atomic age, where objects are not 
only unseeable but are on the brink of the unknowable. As the guide-catalogue 
described it:  
 
You come into the exhibition through five rooms which take you, step by 
step, into the heart of the matter. Going through these rooms you seem to 
shrink like Alice in Wonderland, and the things round you seem to grow 
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larger and larger. There are pencil and paper in the first room. Now you find 
yourself apparently shrinking, first to the size of the pencil, and then to the 
thickness of the paper […] Another step, another thousand times smaller, and 
you see the structure of the graphite crystals which make up the pencil lead. 
And then the last step, you are ten thousand times smaller than you began, 
and now you see into the atoms themselves.617  
 
This journey into the nuclear wonderland attempted to domesticate the atomic 
uncanny by framing it in terms of humble daily objects like pencil and paper, but it 
also acknowledged the strangeness of this conceptual leap. Writing implements also 
contain other worlds – they combine haptic familiarity with a creative potential to 
conjure up enormous vistas of new ideas. In On Longing, Susan Stewart describes 
how the human subject is reconstituted by exposure to things that are very small or 
very big: ‘While the miniature represents a mental world of proportion, control, and 
balance, the gigantic presents a physical world of disorder and disproportion.’618 The 
new technology encompassed both extremes. It wasn’t just the unimaginable 
miniaturization of the atom itself that the postwar imagination had to reconcile with 
the gigantic potential of bombs. They might appear in disguise, presenting 
themselves as compact, even domestic, objects like pen and paper, but then reveal 
themselves to be incomprehensibly bigger on the inside.  
Within this dialectic of scale, it is the giganticism of nuclear explosions which 
first attracted philosophical exploration. In his 1950 lecture ‘The Thing’ Heidegger 
began with the observation that modern technology has abolished distance in both 
time and space, yet ‘the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness’.619 
Heidegger assumed that new technologies made intimacy impossible, and he 
attempted to find consolation for this by contemplating the atom bomb not as an 
anomaly but as an exemplary object, the perfect Thing. Because its implosive force 
both gathers together matter and throws it violently outwards, it sums up the Thing’s 
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uncanny distancelessness which is ‘more unearthly than everything bursting 
apart’:620 
 
Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He 
does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission 
of what has long since taken place, has already happened.621  
 
The bomb’s violent scope and instantaneous effect make notions of relative time and 
space irrelevant; thus, the very existence of the atom bomb means that the absence of 
nearness should be contemplated philosophically rather than fearfully: 
 
What is this helpless anxiety still waiting for, if the terrible has already 
happened? The terrifying is unsettling; it places everything outside its own 
nature. What is it that unsettles and thus terrifies? It shows itself and hides 
itself in the way in which everything presences, namely, in the fact that 
despite all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains absent.622 
 
The atomic bomb abolishes distance by expanding so rapidly that it accomplishes the 
feat of being in two places at the same time – it repels the human subject by ‘placing 
everything outside its own nature’. For Heidegger, the Thing is that which gathers 
meaning and identity into itself, while simultaneously defining and excluding the 
human subject. In this, he was accessing a philosophical debate about how 
technology altered subject-object relations which had exercised modernist thinkers 
earlier in the twentieth century.  
In 1928’s One Way Street, for instance, Walter Benjamin had described the 
relationship between workers and technology as a compensatory one:  
 
Warmth is ebbing from things. Objects of daily use gently but insistently 
repel us. Day by day, in overcoming the sum of secret resistances – not only 
the overt ones – that they put in our way, we have an immense labour to 
perform. We must compensate for their coldness with our warmth if they are 
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not to freeze us to death, and handle their spiny forms with infinite dexterity 
if we are not to bleed to death.623  
 
The reference to ‘spiny forms’ references Schopenhauer’s ‘Porcupine Problem’ – the 
dilemma of spiny creatures who need to stay together for warmth yet are forced to 
keep away from each other’s quills. The porcupines  
 
huddled together quite closely in order through their mutual warmth to 
prevent themselves from being frozen. But they soon felt the effect of their 
quills on one another, which made them again move apart. Now when the 
need for warmth once more brought them together, the drawback of the quills 
was repeated so that they were tossed between two evils, until they had 
discovered the proper distance from which they could best tolerate one 
another.624  
 
Benjamin extrapolates this problem of intimacy onto relations between soft, warm 
humans and cold, sharp things. Describing the modern condition of urban and 
industrial workers who can expect no comfort from each other, but rather ‘feel 
themselves to be the representatives of a refractory material world’, he identifies a 
sense of hopeless yearning for union with the inanimate world that the human 
subject experiences as part of the metropolitan struggle for survival. In this version 
of modernity, ignoring these cold things is not an option: while they repel us, objects 
also have us in their grasp. People are slaves; they must labour to compensate for the 
impossibility of intimacy with the object world. 
By the 1950s, however, intimacy with things was not only possible, it had 
become a new problematic and a different kind of work. Benjamin’s workers were 
modernist subjects – fractured, alienated and reified by the mechanisms of modernity 
– but after the war, this version of subjectivity was already transforming into what 
would become known as the postmodern subject – contingent, conflicted and fluid. 
The reification critiqued by Benjamin and Georg Lukács yielded to an internalized 
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relation between the subject and the object which would later become the basis for 
Bruno Latour’s concept of the quasi-object.625 For Heidegger, however, the intimate 
compensations which Benjamin’s workers were obliged to undertake were redrawn 
as a serene reflection of the self in the thing-world. 
But the atom’s giganticism had a political aspect which made serenity 
impossible. The terror inspired by the intimate complication of human and 
technological agency was more than a primal emotional response. The concept of 
deterrence was beginning to create a dialectic of absence and action; a nuclear 
bomb’s mere existence, its mere potential for devastating action, was supposed to 
balance the existence and potential of an equal and opposite nuclear bomb on the 
other side.  
 
 
‘It was a personal matter’: putting things in their place 
At first glance, Powell and Pressburger’s 1949 war drama The Small Back Room 
does not appear to be an atomic film, but its central narrative about a physically and 
emotionally damaged bomb disposal expert provided an opportunity to examine 
problems of intimacy and distance in relationships between the human and the thing 
which resonated with the era’s growing atomic anxiety.626 Based on Nigel Balchin’s 
1943 novel of the same name, the film follows a scientist, Sammy Rice, who works 
for a small team at the cutting edge of weapons research. The film’s plot concerns 
his quest to understand a new type of German booby-trap bomb which has been 
killing children because it looks harmless but explodes as soon as it is touched. He 
speculates that, like the ‘butterfly’ bomblets in the public information film discussed 
earlier in this chapter, these may look deceptively domestic – ‘I should think the 
blasted things are mocked up as teddy bears or candy bars!’ – but this turns out not 
to be the case: the device Sammy is finally called upon to defuse achieves a different 
kind of intimacy. It gets close to him not by invading his domestic existence literally, 
but by coming to symbolize everything – every Thing – that is haunting and 
sabotaging him with its uncanny agency and quasi-subjectivity. Sammy is troubled 
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not just by the enigmatic maguffin he must find and defuse (for most of the film the 
bomb is absent, since no one has found an unexploded example) but by several other 
inanimate but uncannily powerful things: a brandy bottle he keeps on his desk at 
home to remind himself of his potential for alcoholism, the telephone which 
constantly interrupts and intervenes in his life, and a prosthetic ‘tin’ foot which 
causes him great pain and constantly tempts him to reach for the analgesic of 
alcohol. Foot, bottle and bomb conspire to frustrate him with their distanceless 
absence; each ‘presences’ as something that cannot exist, or cannot be allowed to 
take place. Sammy’s foot-pain is a phantom, the projection of flesh-and-blood 
feeling into a metal prosthesis, and it can only be alleviated by the obliteration of 
consciousness nestling within the forbidden bottle. Once unleashed, the alcohol will 
destroy Sammy’s mental clarity and steady hand, which he will need if he is to 
defuse the bomb. The ‘presencing’ of the prosthetic foot (in the form of pain) 
threatens to set off a chain reaction of presence ending with the ultimate assertive 
‘presencing’ of the bomb as it fulfils its function with its ‘final emission’. This 
presence, in Heidegger’s terms, exemplifies the cancellation of nearness: both the 
bomb and anything within its scope become instantly absent. 
Tim Armstrong, in Modernism, Technology and the Body: A Cultural Study, 
describes how pre-war modernism adopted the idea of prosthesis to conceptualize 
the increasingly elided boundary between the machinic and the human which arose 
from the incursion of technology into everyday life.627 In particular, he convincingly 
argues that the twin impacts of war and advertising produced the modernist body as 
fragmented object, a ‘zone of deficits in terms of attributes (strength, skill, nutrition), 
behaviours (sleep, defecation, etc.), with matching remedies’.628 Meanwhile, Vivian 
Sobchack has written about the tropological resonance of the post-modern prosthesis 
as an aspect of theories of cyborg or posthuman cultural theory, and questioned 
whether it represents a lost ideal of wholeness: ‘Those who successfully incorporate 
and subjectively live the prosthetic […] sense themselves neither as lacking 
something nor as walking around with some “thing” that is added onto their 
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bodies.’629 It is interesting to consider The Small Back Room in the light of these 
earlier and later cultural turns. Whereas the explicit and provocative otherness of the 
modernist prosthetic could be used to illuminate and understand the modern ‘body-
in-crisis’,630 and the cyborgian prosthesis is a visible challenge to outmoded 
categorical boundaries, during the mid-century it was the prosthetic’s dual potential 
both to disrupt the body, and to disappear into it, which became a locus of gothic 
unease.  
Only when Sammy has put the bomb in its place as an object to be decoded and 
dismantled, can his ‘tin’ foot achieve its proper nearness; by the end of the film he 
has accepted it as part of himself. This prosthetic nearness becomes indistinguishable 
from absence. Rather like the dirty window which became the emblem of Bill 
Brown’s Thing Theory,631 the thingliness of a prosthetic is only apparent when it 
causes difficulty or ceases to be transparent; Sammy’s artificial foot is, for most of 
the film, both mechanically and socially present and problematic. The film is full of 
reminders of what human feet feel and do: Sammy conducts a crucial conversation 
about the bomb’s fuse in a basement room which resounds to the pounding of 
footsteps above, while the feet are also seen as shadowy forms passing overhead on a 
translucent grating. Likewise, he has a regular date at a jazz club with his girlfriend 
Sue, where he sits by the raised dancefloor, surrounded by other people’s feet, but 
cannot join the dance. Powell and Pressburger underline this social awkwardness by 
introducing into this scene a minor character, Gillian – a woman tellingly described 
by Sue as ‘an incendiary bomb’ for her lack of tact – who badgers Sammy to dance 
despite his firm refusals.  
Sammy’s friction with the material world reaches a crisis at the start of the 
film’s final act, when his most potent things close in on him in his domestic retreat. 
Plagued by the pain emanating from his prosthesis, he succumbs at last to the bottle 
of brandy, in an incongruous Expressionist dream-sequence in which a giant bottle 
looms over him and threatens to crush him. This sequence foregrounds the artificial  
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and technological quality of film itself, as if to problematize the very notion of a 
seamless conjunction between human and thing-world; and it is at this very moment 
that the telephone rings with news that two unexploded specimens of the mystery 
bomb have finally been discovered. The solution to Sammy’s conflict lies in 
successfully confronting this deadly technology; he travels to Chesil Bank, where he 
learns that his colleague has been killed while attempting to defuse the first bomb. 
The second lies half-buried in the shingle, and in the film’s tense finale, Sammy 
grapples with it both physically and mentally, first struggling to loosen the cap that 
seals it, and then making a leap of deduction about its deceptively engineered 
interior. By correctly decoding the bomb’s structure, Sammy’s identity and sense of 
‘wholeness’ are recuperated, but at a cost: this act of defusing the bomb is not just an 
intellectual challenge but a sweatily physical and intimate encounter. ‘It was a 
personal matter,’ he tells the army officer supervising the operation when he emerges 
victorious from the struggle.  
In Andrew Moor’s analysis in A Cinema of Magic Spaces, Sammy’s battle with 
the bomb is read as part of a set of ‘therapeutic stories’ which shore up British 
identity and reaffirm a traditional concept of masculinity in the midst of postwar 
rubble and turmoil. 632  He draws a parallel between Sammy and the hero of A Matter 
of Life and Death: 
 
What is crucial is not just that Peter and Sammy are emblematic of the 
national culture’s troubled readjustment to peace, but the way their narratives 
of healing, and their recuperative trajectories, stitch up their traumatic 
histories and send them optimistically into a land fit for heroes.633  
 
I read both these films, however, as more ambivalent than this therapeutic agenda 
would suggest. As I have argued in Chapter 3, A Matter of Life and Death, with its 
preoccupation with transmissions of various kinds, is concerned with questions of 
dematerialization and spectrality, both in the human subject and in the wider culture. 
The Small Back Room seems not so much to look back on the trauma of World War 
II, as Moor suggests, but rather to look forward to the Cold War, where the culture 
and spectre of dematerialization is represented by the threat of nuclear obliteration 
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and the penetrative transmission of radiation. The Small Back Room ends with 
another representation of transmission and an exposé of the reification and 
fragmentation implied by the obliteration of space and time, life and death. When 
Sammy arrives at Chesil Bank for his climactic battle, he must first receive the 
posthumous report of his colleague, Dick Stewart, who – working alone to protect 
others in the event of an explosion – transmitted a running commentary of his 
unsuccessful attempt to defuse the bomb, via the field telephone. This was recorded 
in shorthand by a young ATS corporal, and in an excruciatingly poignant scene she 
reads it out – complete with Stewart’s witty quips and asides – to Sammy in an 
increasingly halting and broken voice. When it is Sammy’s turn to attempt to defuse 
the second bomb, he performs the same feat of ventriloquism as his dead comrade, 
relaying his own thoughts and memoranda via field telephone to the same young 
woman, who listens on headphones before speaking his words for the rest of the 
waiting army officers to hear. This unnamed female corporal – the dark counterpart 
of Gillian the tactless jazz-club ‘incendiary bomb’ – becomes aligned to, if not 
actually part of, the technology of Sammy’s professional life. In a reversal of the 
technological interface that, for Kittler, would characterize the media age as one in 
which the apparatus intervenes in the transmissions of the body, the ATS corporal 
becomes incorporated into the apparatus, first as a human phonograph and then a 
human loudspeaker. But while she models for Sammy a technophiliac ideal of 
perfect assimilation of the human into the thing, this is not the solution he must 
access in order to stand on his own two feet as a whole man. Powell’s handwritten 
screenplay emphasizes the triumph of his reintegrated subjectivity: ‘He looks just 
like any happy man with two feet[…] No longer outside the world, but in it: no 
longer talking to a man in uniform, but with him, as an equal.’634 The importance 
Powell placed on this moment of bodily reintegration becomes clear when the film’s 
final scene is compared to the climax of Balchin’s novel, in which Sammy can’t find 
the strength he needs to unscrew a vital component of the bomb and is forced to ask 
for help from the military officer supervising the operation. Despite the bomb’s 
successful neutralization and that fact that his brilliant analysis made a crucial 
contribution, he feels unmanned by personal failure. As the book closes he is left 
hunched in despair on a park bench back in London, watching the moon set: 
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I sat and watched it going and I knew there was no answer. If I’d been a bit 
sillier or a bit more intelligent, or had more guts, or less guts, or had two feet 
or no feet, or been almost anything definite, it would have been easy. But as 
it was, I didn’t like what I was, and couldn’t be what I liked, and it would 
always be like that.635  
 
Balchin’s Sammy remains an unhappy hybrid, certain that his prosthesis denies him 
access both to a fully human sensibility and to the implacable disinterestedness of 
material objects. For Powell and Pressburger’s Sammy, on the other hand, 
integration and acceptance of his metal foot depends on his ability to discriminate 
between different types of thing. By decoding and defusing the bomb, he has located 
the boundary between the transparent, incorporated prosthesis and the alien, 
technological Other – the same distinction Sobchack was to reiterate half a century 
later. By putting a limit on the troubling intimacy of a dangerously assertive Thing, 
Sammy attempts to put the thing-world back in its place and re-establish the 
possibility of distance which Heidegger would declare irrevocably lost. 
 
 
‘Shocked out of speech’: Fragmentation and integration in The Undefeated 
The Small Back Room was not the only film of this period to examine the encounter 
between human and prosthesis. Paul Dickson’s 1950 docu-drama The Undefeated, 
made to promote the work of the Ministry of Pensions, stages one war veteran’s 
experience of the compensatory power of replacement limbs overtly in terms of a 
psychological recuperation.636 The film’s protagonist, Joe Anderson, had been a 
wartime glider pilot whose legs were amputated after a crash, and who now also 
suffers from post-traumatic loss of speech. The voiceover informs us that the 
recuperation of his physical abilities must precede his mental recovery: 
 
He didn’t speak about it because he couldn’t. He’d been shocked out of speech by 
something that happened in the crash – something that only Joe knew about. The 
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doctors would have given a lot to know it too, but that would take time. Now the 
important thing was that Joe should walk again. 
 
His rehabilitation begins when he is fitted with a pair of false legs and inducted into 
a tough physiotherapy regime to teach him how to use them. But the recovery is not 
completed until his doctor arranges a meeting with Joe’s co-pilot, Lofty, whom Joe 
believed was killed in the crash. Seeing this man return, as it were, from the dead, 
enables Joe to return to life too – he breaks his silence to call out Lofty’s name.  
But as well as making the point that psychic integrity depends on the physical 
synthesis of body and material prosthesis, the film suggests a further relationship 
between human and technology. Joe is detached from his voice by the film’s very 
structure; the voiceover narrating his story is presented as belonging to an unseen 
welfare officer in the Ministry of Pensions who remembers Joe’s case – a man 
represented by a first-person camera which moves through London’s streets and 
around the corridors of the Ministry, but is never seen. Only at the end of the film 
does the narrator reveal that he is Joe Anderson, that he is an ex-patient now working 
as a welfare officer, and that the story he has been telling is his own. This moment of 
self-naming mirrors Joe’s naming of Lofty and produces a moment of radical 
integration of fragments: subject and object merge as the narrator and his protagonist 
align, and when the narrator is reunited with his/Joe’s body, Joe finds his voice a 
second time as his newly vocal mouth synchronizes with the voiceover to say the 
words ‘Joe Anderson’. This merging also fuses two actors together: Gerald Pearson, 
a real-life amputee who has played Joe’s mute body, and the Oscar-nominated 
professional Leo Genn, who supplied the voice.  
As in The Small Back Room, prosthetics have stood in, not simply for the 
human limbs they replace, but for the thing-world of technology in general; and like 
the Powell and Pressburger film, The Undefeated presents its audience with various 
paradigms of disembodiment and incorporation in order to explore the new object 
relations arising from the incursions of material agents into human discourse. The 
fact that Joe’s glider, like Sammy Rice’s bomb, is an explosive weapon of war 
underlines the anxiety that such incursions inspired. The crash scene is re-enacted by 
cutting from blurry actualité footage of a glider coming down, to a crisp and 
carefully staged scene of devastation. The camera roams across the wreckage, first 
lingering on sleek metal canisters – possibly bombs – that the glider was carrying 
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amongst its troop-supply cargo, and then moving to some scraps of paper bearing the 
remains of technical or navigational diagrams. Only then does it find Joe’s agonized 
form, enmeshed in the twisted remains of his aircraft, which seems attached to his 
torso like a nightmarish prosthetic appendage. Joe’s struggle to re-frame prosthesis 
as a benign incorporation is key to the film’s purpose, yet it is constantly sabotaged 
by the mechanics of the film itself, which violates its subject’s integrity at every turn 
by dismembering Joe into his constituent parts – voice/body, narration/silence, first 
person/third person, brisk official/wounded victim, Gerald Pearson/Leo Genn – 
tricks which film alone can formally achieve, and which therefore tend to stress the 
specifically filmic nature of the narrative. 
Writing just before World War II, Benjamin had already selected film for 
special consideration in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility’, as a medium with revolutionary potential both to exemplify and 
break through the estrangement from corporeal reality inculcated by the totalizing 
phantasmagoria of fascist spectacle and commodity culture. 637 In one passage he 
compares the cinematographer to a surgeon, who ‘makes an intervention in the 
patient’ but ‘abstains at the decisive moment from confronting his patient person to 
person; instead, he penetrates the patient by operating.’638 Susan Buck-Morss has 
glossed this dialectical form of cinematic intimacy, which distances by penetrating, 
by extending Benjamin’s surgical metaphor into an examination of anaesthetics: 
What happened to perception under these circumstances [ie during an 
operation using anaesthetic] was a tripartite splitting of experience into 
agency (the operating surgeon), the object as hyle (the docile body of the 
patient) and the observer (who perceives and acknowledges the accomplished 
result).639  
The Undefeated enacts just such a split as it layers its subject/object divisions and 
elisions, and brings the audience into the equation as an equally unstable third term: 
the film invites us to experience the world through the narrator’s eyes in the first-
person-camera sequences, suggesting that we share a surgical distance from Joe as 
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an object/patient/mute hyle, while denying us access to the internal consciousness of 
Joe-as-narrator and the crucial information that it is the patient’s point of view that 
we are sharing, even as we observe him observing himself going through his ordeal. 
For an amputee like Joe, the integrity of the synaesthetic system which Buck-Morss 
describes as extending beyond the body into the external world of stimulus, is 
interrupted by the permanently ‘anaesthetized’ prosthetic limb, and not until this 
sensorial blockage is overcome can the dynamic interchange between subject and 
object be restored.  
For audiences, Sammy Rice’s fragile victory may have offered a comforting 
resolution to the kinds of neurological shocks which for Benjamin categorized 
modern life, and which would certainly have been acknowledged by a population 
still learning to live both with real blitz damage and potential nuclear devastation. 
But Powell and Pressburger’s film, with its curious Expressionist interlude at its 
heart, also highlights the artificiality of cinematic rhetoric at the very moment when 
Sammy succumbs to the anaesthetic intervention of the brandy bottle, and makes a 
point of shaking us out of any phantasmagoric stupor. Similarly, research conducted 
by the Central Office of Information records that audiences watching The 
Undefeated were both troubled and stirred into a new kind of wakefulness:  
 
About a quarter of the audiences found that the film made them feel in some 
degree uncomfortable or ill at ease […] Many seemed to regard these 
feelings as salutary, in that it gave them an opportunity for expressing 
sympathy and gratitude in respect of men who, they thought, might be too 
easily forgotten.640  
 
Thus the film serves to act as a cognitive prosthesis, supporting audiences in the 
proper remembrance of the dismemberments and amputations of the war; but it’s a 
prosthetic that insists on its presence as an artefact, reminding them also that a 
technological thing-world is occupying the absences of human aesthetic experience. 
In Benjamin’s terms, the film distracts this forgetful audience even while supposedly 
reminding them of their forgetfulness: 
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Reception in distraction – the sort of reception which is increasingly noticeable in 
all areas of art and is a symptom of profound changes in apperception – finds in 
film its true training ground. Film, by virtue of its shock effects, is predisposed to 
this form of reception […] because it encourages an evaluating attitude in the 
audience but also because at the movies, the evaluating attitude requires no 
attention. The audience is an examiner, but a distracted one.641  
 
Buck-Morss highlights the importance of war in the final turn of Benjamin’s 
argument (‘All efforts to aestheticize politics culminate in one point. That one point 
is war’)642 and by making the point that aesthetics has its etymological basis in 
sensory experience, draws out the internal contradiction of a warrior aesthetic which 
supposes an ‘autonomous, autotelic subject’ who is ‘sense-dead’:643  
 
The truly autogenic being is entirely self-contained. If it has a body at all, it must 
be one impervious to the senses, hence safe from external control. Its potency is 
in its lack of corporeal response.644  
 
The creeping ‘metalization of the human body’ celebrated in the Futurist manifesto 
became an urgent cultural problem in the bomb-films of the postwar period, not just 
because of the ongoing industrialization and reification which Benjamin hoped 
would be exploded by film’s prosthetic access to the ‘optical unconscious’, but 
because a new category of thing – the tiny atom with its vast scope nestling within it 
– was manifesting a different kind of thingly agency, as well as a surgical ability to 
intervene in the human body. 645 At the same time, the concept of deterrence was 
beginning to create a new dialectic of agency and action; a thing’s mere existence, 
and its potential for devastating action, was supposed to make its potential action a 
political impossibility. Unfortunately, the icy paradox of mutually assured 
destruction depends on the sterile purity of machine logic – and atomic culture began 
to create new stories about what would happen when human subjectivity was re-
inserted into the zero-sum equation.  
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‘If I’d known it was going to be like this, I’d never have started’: Boffins as human 
prosthesis 
The Boulting Brothers’ 1950 film Seven Days To Noon seems to scrutinize such 
concerns about deterrence and human agency. 646 It concerns a nuclear research 
scientist, Professor Willingdon, who is appalled by the implications of his own work 
and steals a nuclear bomb with the intention of blackmailing the government into 
declaring a programme of unilateral disarmament. He carries the bomb in a small, 
plain suitcase: a visual signifier which mirrors the autotelic self-containment of the 
reified human agent who carries it. Willingdon himself is a blank. His past life and 
motivations remain unexplored and his robotic adherence to the concept of 
deterrence is presented as a monomania which cuts him off from considerations of 
the interests of his fellow human beings: in trying to end the possibility of nuclear 
war, he has put himself at the mercy of the very object he claims to detest, and 
sacrificed his own agency in order to carry, hide and further the interests of the 
suitcase bomb.  
As well as emptying Willingdon of his humanity, the film focuses on another 
kind of absence: the gradual emptying out of London as martial law is declared and 
evacuation enforced. Anti-nuclear films like Pathé’s The Mighty Atom had visualized 
the destructive power of atomic weapons by showing a map of London with a four-
mile circular area marked on it to indicate how much of the city would be vaporized 
if a bomb were dropped on Tower Bridge; Seven Days To Noon employs a similar 
image in a scene in which a committee of military and political leaders plan their 
response to Willingdon’s threat. Blankness, absence and obliteration infuse every 
aspect of the film. Even at a narrative level, it refuses to deliver any of the usual 
markers of the thriller genre in terms of fast-paced incident, ratcheting tension or 
complex characterization; scenes repeatedly fizzle out, their dramatic potential 
nullified. Instead, the film lingers on the details of the city’s rapid militarization, and 
the brutality of the evacuation, which is enforced via house-to-house inspections 
performed at gunpoint. In one scene a man takes advantage of the dark, deserted city 
and robs a jeweller’s shop; picked out by a spotlight while making his escape, he is 
summarily executed by an army sniper. 
                                                
646 Seven Days To Noon, dir. by John Boulting and Roy Boulting (London Films, 
1950). 
 263 
The emotionless mechanism of bureaucratic diktat emerges as the most 
chilling protagonist in the piece; here it is the human which presences as absence 
when the timid and misguided scientist displays a mindless lack of agency in his role 
as the bomb’s reified human prosthesis, which echoes the cold logic of the state. In 
One Way Street, Benjamin had already outlined the tendency of objects to enlist the 
human as a kind of flesh-and-blood prosthesis, compensating for their lack of 
warmth, and the loneliness of the enslaved subjects of industrialization is at the heart 
Seven Days To Noon, with Professor Willingdon akin to Benjamin’s ‘bus 
conductors, officials, workmen, salesmen’ who ‘feel themselves to be the 
representatives of a refractory material world’.647 The cold aloofness of the bomb’s 
inhuman logic is finally penetrated by Willingdon’s daughter, who approaches him 
during his final desperate stand-off with the authorities and appeals to his memory of 
family life. That this climactic scene takes place in a blitz-ruined church is also 
significant: the porous walls of the ruin suggesting the fallaciousness of his fantasy 
of a totalizing and hermetic one-ness between him and the bomb he carries. 
The figure of the obsessive scientist had by the mid-1950s begun increasingly to 
co-exist with the soldier as the archetypal human forced to grapple with the thing-
world. Whereas Joe Anderson was a military man who had to put his trust in the 
scientific theories of his doctors, and Sammy Rice was a technical expert whose 
conflicts with the military would be resolved by the end of the film, Professor 
Willingdon was finally hunted down and disarmed by men in uniform who relished 
the chance to return the city to the state-controlled certainties of a wartime footing. 
In 1955 the two figures of scientist and soldier were again brought together in 
Michael Anderson’s The Dam Busters.648 On the surface, this film provides an image 
of perfect co-operation between the two archetypes, with the eccentric inventor 
Barnes Wallis reliant on the dashing heroics of Wing Commander Guy Gibson in 
order to bring his theory about the bouncing bomb to fruition. But, like Seven Days 
To Noon, this is also a film about the way martial technology creates lacunae in 
human relations which the thing-world then fills. 
Like Willingdon, Barnes Wallis has an idyllic home life which the film 
sketches in during the early scenes, only to show him rejecting it and leaving it 
behind. Like Willingdon, too, Barnes Wallis’s mental health is shown to be 
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jeopardized by his work, although in this case his obsession is successfully 
harnessed to the war effort. His progression away from home and family is clearly 
signposted: his early experiments with his bomb concept are conducted on a 
domestic scale with the help of his children, using a catapult and a water-filled 
trough. As the film progresses, the setting of his tests becomes further and further 
removed from the quaint English cottage in which we first see him: first he transfers 
his prototype into an industrial space full of technicians and equipment providing 
precise measurements, then he moves to Chesil Bank (scene of Sammy Rice’s 
personal battle with a bomb) for full-scale testing under military supervision. 
By the time Wallis has been entirely swallowed by the military environment 
of the Bomber Command airfield, all suggestions of domesticity have been replaced 
by an atmosphere of public-school banter and an ascetic lifestyle of communal meals 
and plainly furnished barracks. The one discordant note of warmth and affection is 
sounded, not by a human, but by Guy Gibson’s dog. It is the dog which greets 
Gibson when we first glimpse him, climbing out of his aeroplane after a successful 
mission; it is the dog who sits at a table opposite him in his room while he relaxes 
and reads a newspaper. This faithful companion stands in for the wifely domesticity 
which Gibson denies himself, while the rest of the men in his company must make 
do with letters from home. These missives are echoed by the unopened valedictory 
letters left behind by the men killed in the bouncing bomb mission at the end of the 
film, and by the killed-in-action letters Gibson declares he is going off to write just 
before the credits roll. The absence of these dead airmen is represented only by 
words and by the material signifiers they leave behind: instead, it is the dog’s death 
which is shown and lingered over. As the men receive their final briefing for the 
Dambuster mission, the dog is roaming around the base, being turned away at every 
door by men telling him ‘He’s not in his office’, ‘Not in here, go on!’. Finally the 
weary dog reaches the outer gate of the airfield and is killed by a speeding car which 
rushes on without stopping. When the news is brought to Gibson he immediately 
links the dog’s death with the mission ahead: ‘I’d like you to bury him at midnight 
on the grass verge outside my office,’ he orders. ‘I’d like you to do it then, just about 
the time we’re going into the job over there.’ 
The film’s heavy emphasis on the death of the dog is a counterweight to the 
lightness with which the deaths of the men are brushed off. The dog represents the 
natural side of humanity which must be repressed if the men are to be subsumed into 
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the technology of war. The motif is again of a troubling intimacy with things which 
fill in the absence of human relations: while Barnes Wallis works feverishly in his 
role as the bomb’s proxy and human agent, the airmen succumb to a prosthetic 
attachment to their planes and weaponry, typified by the face-masks they wear which 
mediate their communications with each other and with the men in other planes. 
Without these masks, they are as mute as Joe Anderson, and they are silent in 
another crucial way too: the mission and the new technology is shrouded in secrecy. 
The men in the elite Dambuster squadron are socially and physically cut off from 
their comrades by this need for confidentiality, and the silent scenes at the end of the 
film, where the camera lingers on the dead men’s abandoned possessions, is the 
logical conclusion of this severing of humanity and language. The film’s 
ambivalence towards the military technology it is supposedly glorifying is expressed 
by the very man who invented the bomb, in the final conversation between Wallis 
and Gibson. ‘Is it true? All those fellows lost?’ Wallis asks. ‘Fifty-six men. If I’d 
known it was going to be like this, I’d never have started.’ Gibson, the trained 
soldier, recommends a dulling of the senses as the remedy for this human feeling: 
‘You mustn’t think that way […] Why don’t you go and find the doctor and ask for 
one of his sleeping pills?’  
Just as in The Undefeated and The Small Back Room, though, the anaesthetic 
regime of medicine, narcotics or jingoism is undermined by the film’s own 
determination to remind the audience of its fictivity. Barnes Wallis’s bouncing 
bomb, the essential object driving the narrative, never manages to insert itself 
frictionlessly into the cinematography, but is represented by a combination of 
mismatched actualité footage and special effects in which the bomb has clearly been 
painted onto the negative by hand – a measure demanded by the Ministry of Defense 
in order to preserve the finer details of its design. This cartoon bomb gives rise to 
explosions created by bluescreen matting, with a ‘hole’ introduced into the footage 
of the detonation site, through which an image of an explosion is projected. Thus the 
key moment in the film – the destruction of the German dam – is framed by clear 
markers of artifice and artificiality. Wallis’s homely garden experiment has 
culminated in a phantasmagoria of patriotic triumphalism, but that phantasmagoria  
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has been ‘exploded’ – in Benjamin’s terms – by ‘the dynamite’ of film and its 
undisguised technological manipulation of space and time. 649 
 
 
‘Doing what the machine wants’: C. P. Snow’s The New Men 
Film’s attraction to narratives of prosthetic intimacy and cinema’s potential for 
thingly self-commentary explains the prevalence of this medium in cultural 
responses to mid-century technological anxiety. One writer who did attempt to 
address these questions in a novel is C. P. Snow. The New Men (1954) is narrated by 
a staid and passionless civil servant, Lewis Eliot, and it tells the story of the rise of 
his younger brother, Martin, a second-rate nuclear physicist who reaches the heights 
of his profession at a secretive nuclear research plant through a ruthless willingness 
to capitalize on the mistakes of his colleagues. 650 Martin is one of the ‘new men’: an 
‘alien’ as Lewis describes him, able to ‘accept secrets, spying, the persistence of the 
scientific drive, the closed mind, the two world-sides, persecution, as facts of life.’651 
Snow repeatedly links this new mindset – which combines machievellian politicking 
with unreflective devotion to scientific progress – with a kind of mechanistic lack of 
humanity. ‘People who know about government machines all end up by doing what 
the machine wants, and that is the trouble we have got ourselves in today,’ says 
Arthur Mountenay, an older scientist whose qualms about the use of nuclear 
weapons mean he is gradually pushed out of the sphere of influence. 652 
When a scandal erupts about physicists who have been spying for the Soviets, 
Martin seizes his chance to demonstrate that he has absorbed the new realpolitik of 
nuclear research, while his maverick boss Walter Luke only absorbs the radiation 
that arises from their deadly work. During Walter’s first attempt to synthesize 
plutonium, one of the protective concrete containers cracks, exposing him to a 
radioactive leak. Visiting Luke in hospital, Lewis is struck by his deathly 
appearance: 
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For a moment I remembered him as I had first met him […] Then he had 
been ruddy, well fleshed, muscular, brimming with a young man’s vigour 
[…] Now he was pale, not with an ordinary pallor but as though drained of 
blood; he was emaciated, so that his cheeks fell in and his neck was like an 
old man’s; there were two ulcers by the left-hand corner of his mouth; bald 
patches shone through the hair on the top of his head.’653 
 
Unlike the amputees in The Undefeated or The Small Back Room, Luke has not lost a 
part which can be prosthetically added back onto his body, but has been subtracted – 
‘drained’ – by the vampiric, intangible thing which he has incorporated. Although 
able to say a few words, he is mostly silent and uncommunicative (‘Luke lay quiet, 
his face so drawn with illness that one could not read it’) and his primary worry is 
that he will be made sterile.654 The myth of autogenesis described by Buck-Morss as 
‘the fantasy from which aesthetics springs’ finds its opposite in the broken figure of 
Walter Luke – not a warrior but an intellectual, not encased in metal but all too 
porous, not capable of expression and self-reproduction but silent and non-
reproductive. 655  Instead, it is the ‘breeder’ reactor which is capable of creating 
something other than itself, and which capitalizes on human greed, curiosity and 
ambition to build an environment inimical to human life:  
 
Martin led me to the hangar. It was empty, not a single human being in sight; 
it was noiseless, the pile standing silent in the airy space […] He did not see 
the curious, sinister emptiness of the place […] He took me to the control 
room, a cubbyhole full of shining valves with one kitchen chair placed, 
domestic and incongruous, in front of a panel of indicators.656  
 
The incongruity of the domestic chair emphasizes the alienation demanded by this 
technological regime, and while Martin embraces his role as a ‘new man’ early in the 
book, it takes a cult-like initiation in the auratic presence of plutonium for Lewis to 
access this new form of inhuman intimacy. Martin lets him into the innermost heart 
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of the research plant and shows him ‘a floppy bag’ with ‘one corner […] weighed 
down, as though by a small heavy object, it might have been a lead pellet.’657 For 
Lewis this is a moment of unexpected, life-affirming intimacy:  
 
[Martin] looked at the bag with a possessive, and almost sensual glance. 
I had seen collectors look like that. 
‘Touch it,’ he said. 
I put two fingers in the bag and astonishingly was taken into an irrelevant  
bliss. 
Under the bag’s surface, the metal was hot to the touch – and, yes, pushing 
under memories, I had it, I knew why I was happy. It brought back the 
moment, the grass and earth hot under my hand, when Martin and Irene told 
me she was going to have a child…. I had been made a present of a Proustian 
moment, and the touch of the metal, whose heat might otherwise have 
seemed sinister, levitated me to the forgotten happiness of a joyous summer 
night.’658  
 
Lewis has reversed the revolutionary process described by Benjamin in the 
‘Artwork’ essay, breaking through the Atget-like scene of the empty hangar (with its 
potential to trigger a disruptive insight into the danger of the project), in order to find 
comfort in the auratic singularity of the authoritative object, a prosthetic illusion of 
intimacy. But what are we to make of this peculiar appropriation of Proust’s sensory 
epiphany? While Lewis accepts this joy as a gift, the reader is clear that something 
sinister has indeed happened here, some annexation of the human via the hot touch 
of metal. But while Benjamin’s workers in One Way Street had had to compensate 
for the coldness of industrial things, in the atomic age it is an uncanny warmness and 
intimacy that threatens the human. Lewis is comforted by the tactility of the 
plutonium pellet – like Professor Willingdon’s suitcase, it conforms to the human 
hand and so appears to be in the same category as the domestic, knowable objects of 
the everyday. Lewis has been transported to a moment full of the promise of a new 
life in gestation, but it is infertility and death that the plutonium is really gestating.  
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‘“Or something” doesn’t exist’: Use-value as resistance in The Offshore Island 
Marghanita Laski’s play The Offshore Island, written for the BBC in 1954, pitches 
atomic alienation against the power of heroic and ‘natural’ human communities.659 It 
uses the setting of a group of nuclear survivors to argue for a pure essence of 
humanity which emerges once commodity capitalism, technology, and geopolitical 
concerns have been removed. Over three acts, it depicts the attempts of the Verney 
family – Rachel and her teenage children James and Mary – to hold onto the small 
pocket of uncontaminated land they have nurtured for ten years since a nuclear war 
destroyed most of Europe. When American soldiers arrive, the family are told that 
they are being rescued and will be taken to the consumer paradise of America; by the 
end of the play, it is clear that this is a lie: American and Russian armies have in fact 
joined forces to cleanse Britain of any last survivors and plan to drop more bombs in 
a scorched-earth agreement designed to make sure that the territory is of no use to 
either side. Far from being saved, the Verneys gradually learn that they, along with 
any other ‘contaminated persons’, must either die where they are or be deported, 
forcibly sterilized, and incarcerated in ‘reservations’ in remote parts of North 
America.  
Dramatically, the play fails to rise above its strident political agenda, but it is of 
interest in the context of other mid-century attempts to assimilate the threat of atomic 
apocalypse into the prevailing culture of progress and consumer desire. When placed 
next to Laski’s The Victorian Chaise Longue, it highlights an implicit connection 
between new patterns of consumption emerging in the 1950s, and the annihilation of 
all consumption which seemed to be the inevitable outcome of the Cold War. In 
Laski’s novella, Melanie’s gentrified junk had insisted on the recursiveness of 
history and refused to succumb to the social amnesia of commodities severed from 
their origins. In The Offshore Island, a pure kind of use value has been restored, 
since the origin of every precious manmade object is tracked precisely by the 
resourceful survivors, who exploit the ontological fluidity of things liberated from 
economic exchange, and are thus capable of endlessly and freely repurposing them. 
In the opening scene, for instance, James and Mary argue over a knife that James is 
using to cut out pieces of a rubber tyre he has salvaged. ‘Couldn’t you have used 
your penknife or something?’ Mary asks. ‘My penknife has become a screwdriver, 
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and “or something” doesn’t exist,’ he replies.660 In this radical return of wartime 
make-do-and-mend, the family recycle the component parts of old commodities like 
their car, television set and telephone, which no longer serve any function. These 
things take on the gothic attributes of uncanny revenance which the play’s 
sentimentalist, Mary, finds uncomfortable; she wishes these commodity ‘skeletons’ 
could remain ‘alive as themselves’ rather than reappearing in pieces, their parts 
given new uses and meanings. 661 James, the pragmatist, argues that an object is only 
‘alive because it’s being used’.662 Like the shattered bodies of those who have been 
injured by conventional bombs, the repurposed commodities can overcome their 
dismemberment by rematerializing in new forms, but neither James nor Mary has 
come to terms with the atomization produced by nuclear weapons, which radically 
disincorporate and reincorporate bodies and things at a molecular level. They are 
presented with only two options by the American invaders: either succumb to their 
alienating system of control and industrial incarceration, or become so much atomic 
dust. Yet as a conversation between two of the soldiers makes clear, this latter option 
has been chosen by all the survivors they have met.  
It is Mary who is most tempted by the Americans’ offer; as she did with 
Melanie Langdon, Laski is interested in critiquing the role of women as the primary 
targets of, and conformists to, the fantasy that material objects can communicate 
personality or confer status. Pathetically, Mary has learned these norms only 
imperfectly, from old magazines; nevertheless, when she exchanges her string of 
pearls for a necklace made of shells, she has to be reminded that ‘they’re both 
valuable now, aren’t they, shells and pearls alike, according to how much you fancy 
them.’663 The honest, post-technological shell-necklace is contrasted with the ‘long 
glittering ear-rings’ presented to Mary by the Americans in an attempt to win her 
over to the idea of going with them – a gift Rachel sharply refers to as ‘beads for the 
savages’. The provenance of these ear-rings is not made clear, but when, in the final 
act, the Americans cynically relieve Mary of the mink coat she has produced in an 
effort to impress them, there is a strong suggestion that such relics are routinely 
confiscated.  
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In the end, however, both the Verneys’ survivalist tools and the Americans’ 
seductive commodities are overshadowed by the sterilizing immensity of absence 
promised by the atom bomb which has been sent to disinfect the space of both 
natural and cultural productiveness. Infertility is a constantly reiterated theme of the 
play: Rachel and her occasional partner Martin – the Verneys’ distant neighbour who 
visits twice a year to barter food and information – discuss the lack of successful 
pregnancies among the survivors, as well as the three miscarriages Rachel has had 
after Martin’s visits; despairingly, they make plans for Mary to move to Martin’s 
small community while James becomes a partner for Martin’s daughter. These plans 
would be futile even without the Americans’ enforced sterilization programme, 
however: fallout from the original war has made procreation impossible. Just as in 
Seven Days To Noon, the atom bomb has incorporated the human subject in order to 
reproduce only its own inherent blankness.  
Laski has set up two opposing thing-worlds in the play: the empty glitter of 
commodity culture and the threadbare dignity of utopian self-sufficiency. But the 
Americans’ surprise entrance at the end of Act One, wearing face masks and 
protective suits and communicating with an unseen authority via radio equipment, 
emphasizes their disalignment from any kind of human system and their assimilation 
into a radically alienated thing-world. Set against this terrifying inhumanity, mere 
reification and commodification seem quaint. Laski wants to present commodities, 
with their supple ability to tap into hidden channels of desire, as the deceptive 
gateway to the cold intimacy of the nuclear object. Benjamin meditated on the ‘spiny 
forms’ of the industrial thing-world which require human agents to warm them up; 
mid-century writers were fearful of being ineluctably subsumed into an enveloping 
cold.  
 
 
‘Stop worrying’: phallic weapons and comic bombs 
The Americans’ sterilization policy, and the prison camps set up for contaminated 
Europeans, of course evoke the Holocaust’s combination of eugenics and mass 
slaughter; for Laski, atomic weapons were allied not only with sterility and a 
facelessly destructive bureaucracy, but with fascism and Nazism too. This 
ideological othering of atomic weaponry was characteristic of the moment when 
atomic research ceased to be, culturally speaking, the preserve of scruffy, lab-crazed 
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boffins driven by obsession and intellectual pride, and instead became associated 
with megalomaniacs inside windowless, technologically advanced lairs, cut off from 
reality and the lives of their millions of potential victims. Ian Fleming – politically as 
far removed as possible from the leftwing, CND-supporting Laski – was one of the 
first to codify this formula in popular culture. In his 1955 James Bond thriller 
Moonraker, he describes the ideal spatial and ideological environment for a rogue 
nuclear warhead: an underground plant built by a diehard Nazi, carved into a cliff 
face and lined with concrete and gleaming steel, where monk-like, shaven-headed 
technicians in identical uniforms labour to bring the ultimate weapon to life.664 
Inside this sterile space, the Moonraker atomic rocket represents a fantasy of 
sexualized machinery, ready to seed the world with death: 
 
For several minutes [Bond] stood speechless, his eyes dazzled by the terrible 
beauty of the greatest weapon on earth […] Up through the centre of the shaft, 
which was about thirty feet wide, soared a pencil of glistening chromium […] The 
shimmering projectile rested on a blunt cone of latticed steel which rose from the 
floor between the tips of three severely back-swept delta fins that looked as sharp 
as surgeons’ scalpels. But otherwise nothing marred the silken sheen of the fifty 
feet of polished chrome.665 
 
The evil mastermind behind this bomb, Hugo Drax, has been posing as an English 
philanthropist who survived a near-fatal explosion during the war. In fact, we learn 
that the German bomb which disfigured and nearly killed him was planted by his 
own men, and when his wounded body was mistaken for that of an English soldier, 
he adopted this false identity as cover for his elaborate atomic plot. Thus he has not 
only deceived his adopted country, he has betrayed the heroic narrative epitomized 
by The Undefeated: he is a bomb lover, not a victim, and his chosen prosthesis is 
monstrously phallic agent of revenge. His secret target is London, but as Bond’s 
sidekick Gala reflects, it is obliteration and absence that Drax desires: 
 
The thin needle of the rocket. Dropping fast as light out of a clear sky. The 
crowds in the streets. The Palace. The nursemaids in the park. The birds in 
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the trees. The great bloom of flame a mile wide. And then the mushroom 
cloud. And nothing left. Nothing, nothing, nothing.’666  
 
In order to defeat Drax, Bond and Gala must negotiate an industrialized space which 
is designed to repel the human: they must crawl through painfully narrow ducts, 
swing from gantries and tolerate blasts of heat and steam before Bond can achieve 
his intimate encounter with the bomb itself. When he reaches it, he renders it 
harmless by re-setting its gyroscopic navigation system in a surgical operation which 
is reminiscent of – but more triumphantly straightforward than – Sammy Rice’s 
tense excision of the booby-trap’s fuse. In both cases, implacable technology must 
be countered by manual labour: both men use their hands to disrupt the inner 
workings of an outwardly inscrutable object. While Sammy’s hands compensated for 
his missing foot, Bond begins the scene with his hands themselves disabled: Drax 
has bound them with rope before leaving Bond and Gala to die in the rocket’s blast-
zone. In one of his less plausible feats of physical prowess, Bond escapes this 
bondage by means of a blowtorch which he operates with his teeth; once free, his 
warm hands can touch the cold bomb and force it to accommodate the human. 
Towards the end of the Cold War in 1984, Jacques Derrida wrote an emotive 
essay, ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)’ 
which yoked nuclear weapons and language together to express the void of meaning 
at the heart of deconstruction and différance.667 For Derrida, nuclear war is ‘a 
phenomenon whose essential feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and 
through’: 
 
Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon 
structures of information and communication, structures of language, including 
non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the 
phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a 
nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it.668 
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He goes on to argue that literature is uniquely threatened by the ‘remainderless’ 
annihilation of mutually assured destruction because it is the most purely 
technological (that is, textual) form of expression: ‘That is why deconstruction […] 
belongs to the nuclear age.’669 
As I have argued, however, nuclear narratives of the 1950s addressed this 
fabulous quality of presence and absence as much through gothic overdetermination 
as through a postmodern deferral of signification – or rather, it might be said that the 
links between gothicism and postmodernity can be clearly traced in the narratives of 
the mid-century. The tension between two ways of understanding a nuclear bomb – 
as an all-too-present autotelic object preparing to breed death, or an absent, coded 
symbol of codedness itself, is demonstrated by the two iterations of Peter George’s 
1958 novel Red Alert [aka Two Hours To Doom], which mark a transition in the 
cultural treatment of bombs-as-things at the start of the 1960s.670 George’s earnest 
thriller concerns an unhinged general, Quenten, who deliberately orders an 
unauthorized nuclear strike on Russia in the paranoid belief that it is the only way to 
vanquish America’s enemy. This scenario was freely adapted by Stanley Kubrick for 
the 1964 satire Dr Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb.671 In George’s original, the emphasis is on the chain of command which 
Quenten has imposed on the B-52 bomber wing under emergency ‘Plan R’. This 
plan makes all communication with the bombers impossible without a code which 
only they and Quenten know, which means that it is impossible for anyone else to 
tell them to abort their mission after the initial order is given. As in Seven Days To 
Noon and The New Men, the bomb has co-opted a human agent as a kind of 
prosthetic extension of itself, inspiring a cold-blooded obsession that obliterates 
warmth, compassion or reason. However, it is Quenten’s own hand that defeats him: 
after he commits suicide, his secret code is deciphered just in time by Major 
Howard, who interprets the general’s doodles on a notepad: 
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It was funny, he thought, flipping the pages and glancing idly at the scrawls and 
doodles there, how much of a man’s subconscious is revealed when he scrawls on 
a pad. His conscious mind may be busy with other things. But his subconscious 
often prompts him to scrawl thoughts which are hidden deep beneath the 
surface.672  
 
As in The Undefeated and perhaps The Small Back Room, human psychology is both 
the cause of, and the solution to, the object-world’s attempts to commandeer human 
agency and make it subservient to techno-logic. But in Red Alert, the bomb itself, as 
a thing, barely makes an appearance except as an abstract threat, whereas by the time 
Kubrick came to adapt the novel, the missile’s stubborn thingliness was placed 
firmly at the centre of the action. He turns a minor incident in the novel, in which a 
missile temporarily sticks in the damaged bomb-release mechanism of the B-52, into 
the film’s mock-triumphant finale, as the bomber’s cowboy commander Major 
‘King’ Kong rides the missile, whooping, into oblivion.  
Meanwhile, the character of Strangelove – entirely Kubrick’s invention – 
represents an ironic resolution of the conflict between warm hands and cold 
technology. Strangelove’s disobedient, Nazi-saluting limb is not a prosthesis but an 
alien invader insisting on its own version of history, and symbolizing an over-
assertive thing-world; its fascist eruptions clearly signify Kubrick’s attitude to the 
autotelic object. Meanwhile, the elusive three-letter code which will cancel the attack 
becomes part of a sinisterly overbearing technological interface between human and 
thing – like the bomber crew of The Dam Busters, the B-52 crew are entirely 
occupied with the minute adjustments required by their equipment, while Major 
Kong’s lack of autonomy is emphasized by the fact that he can only read out pre-
determined orders from a book as they fly towards certain death. Back in the War 
Room, technology is overtly fetishized; the politicians and generals sit in front of 
giant screens, while communication with the Russians is mediated by a telephone 
hotline.  
Indeed, the idea of telephonic interventions into human communication, so 
central to The Small Back Room, is curiously echoed at the start of Dr Strangelove 
when army chief General Turgidson communicates with the Pentagon from the 
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lavatory in his bunker by shouting his answers to his bikini-clad girlfriend, who then 
relays them into the phone, listens to the response, and then shouts it back to 
Turgidson. The mediation of The Small Back Room’s corporeal/corporal girl/phone 
apparatus was a chilling reminder of the creeping otherness which the thing-world 
was seeking to impose on the human subject. By 1964, this prosthetic incursion 
could be played for laughs, but it also serves to foreground Kubrick’s decision to 
return to the thing and insist that his audience contemplates its potential for 
intervention. In the figure of the Strangelove – whose very name suggests an alien 
intimacy – we find a filmic riposte to Heidegger: to accept philosophically the atom 
bomb’s inevitable presencing – to ‘stop worrying and love the bomb’ – is presented 
as the idea of a fascist madman. 
Kubrick’s comic treatment of Cold War atomic politics was symptomatic of a 
general shift in attitudes towards the uncanny objects of modernity. The 1960s thing-
world was, in a sense, just as threatening to the human subject as it had been in the 
immediate postwar period, and perhaps more so; but as the century matured and 
consumerism took hold, gothic warnings about the animation of the inanimate lost 
their sense of deep unease and became more playful. This thesis concludes by 
assessing the impact of mid-century gothic and the ways in which it influenced the 
next cultural turn. 
  
 278 
Conclusion: Beyond the mid-century 
 
 
There was no end to the ways in which nice things are nicer than nasty ones. 
Kingsley Amis, Lucky Jim (1954)673  
 
 
This thesis has argued for the existence of a postwar moment, lasting roughly ten 
years from 1945-55, which was distinct from the later 1950s and the emerging 
cultures of youth, protest and neophilia which flowered in the 1960s. What, then, 
became of mid-century gothic? If its stories of alien objects capable of infiltrating 
and intervening in the human realm contained a warning against the creeping 
interchangeability of people and the consumer goods which offered to define and 
placate them, then this warning was often drowned out by the normative bellow of 
advertising and mass culture. As the 1950s progressed, and the Cold War made great 
geopolitical struggles a question of abstract, bureaucratic concern rather than ‘a 
personal matter’, a new appetite for distracting pleasures took hold. The heroes (and, 
more rarely, heroines) of literature’s Angry Young Men movement and cinema’s 
New Wave refused to be bullied by over-assertive objects, and instead set out to 
prove that they could seize hold of them and repurpose them at will. An early 
example of this new attitude can be seen in Kingsley Amis’s Lucky Jim (1954). Jim 
Dixon’s epiphanic realisation that ‘nice things are nicer than nasty ones’ marks the 
moment when this turn begins in British literature. Amis presents his banal 
observation as a revolutionary insight because he wishes to make explicit his own 
rejection of the norms against which Dixon – a stroppy young historian – is 
rebelling; yet, as the examples discussed in previous chapters show, there was 
already a strong antinomian impulse in mid-century gothic’s interest in recalcitrance. 
Lucky Jim made its point by retrospectively defining the postwar decade as an era of 
dull conformity and excessive obedience, when in fact – as Doris Lessing observed 
in the quotation from The Four-Gated City cited in the Introduction – really ‘the air 
had cleared well before’.674 Perhaps the more telling cultural difference between the 
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earlier and later periods is the way non-commodities receded from view as objects 
worth paying attention to. The mechanism of shifting desire and partial satisfaction 
can already be seen in Dixon’s proto-countercultural rebellion, which is expressed in 
terms of a restless need for personal fulfillment, rather than any considered position 
of political dissatisfaction. 
In one of the key points of the novel, Dixon is invited to a social weekend by his 
head of department, and disgraces himself by sneaking off to get drunk in the local 
pub and then setting fire to his bed by falling asleep with a lit cigarette. The house of 
his host, Professor Welch, is replete with the solid English furniture and folksy 
knick-knacks which represented bohemian good taste to the previous generation; 
Dixon literally burns through these layers of cultural sediment and awakens the next 
morning with a hangover but a characteristic lack of angst. Buoyed by the attention 
of a pretty girl who offers to help him, he approaches the task of disposing of the 
charred remains with glib pragmatism, cutting away the burnt areas of sheets and 
blankets with a razor blade, repositioning an expensive rug in order to disguise the 
scorch marks, and hiding a damaged table among the other junk in a nearby lumber 
room: 
 
He unrolled a handy length of mouldering silk and spread it over the table-
top; then arranged upon the cloth thus provided two fencing foils, a book 
called The Lesson of Spain, and a Lilliputian chest-of-drawers no doubt 
containing sea-shells and locks of children’s hair; finally propped up against 
this display a tripod meant for some sort of telescopic or photographic 
tomfoolery. The effect, when he stepped back, was excellent; no observer 
could doubt that these objects had lived together for years in just this way.675  
 
Dixon’s ad-hoc curation of this mismatched set of objects is intended only to conjure 
up a sense of random junk gathered together for no purpose; unlike, say, the objects 
assembled for Jones’s Black Eyes and Lemonade, or the bombsite debris collected by 
Henderson and Paolozzi for Patio and Pavilion, Dixon’s exhibits are designed 
specifically to discourage the ‘tomfoolery’ of close looking. Instead, the mere fact of 
their superannuation is enough to provide camouflage for the recent conflagration. 
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Dixon is the archetype of a generation entirely unburdened by postwar trauma; 
moreover, he is the opposite of Benjamin’s revolutionary dreamer, awakened into 
consciousness by the piled wreckage of history. Dixon is a chimera, prone to pranks 
and disguises, and his drunken sleep does not provide access to radical rupture but 
merely catapults him into a scene of meaningless devastation which is all too easily 
consigned to an irrelevant past. Far from being haunted by uncanny debris, he is 
himself the impish spectre invading the Welches’ personal and domestic space with 
his own mischievous and destructive agenda.  
While mid-century gothic depended on a particular anxiety about time, Dixon’s 
decision to live for the pursuit of ‘nice things’ coincides with his stark rejection of 
history, both as an academic career and as a force in his inner life: he ends the book 
on a moment of triumphant laughter which openly mocks the past and its claims to 
ongoing relevance. This kind of ahistorical insistence on grasping the available 
pleasures of the now was precisely the impulse which also interested Roland Barthes 
from 1954-56, when he was writing the essays on consumer culture which would be 
collected as Mythologies. Myth, Barthes wrote,  
 
abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of 
essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what 
is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions 
because it is without depth, a world open and wallowing in the evident, it 
establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by 
themselves.676  
  
This view contradicts Adorno and Horkheimer’s more gothic reading of mythology 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment, where enchantment was understood as both the 
precursor and potential antidote to rationalism and reification, continually redefined 
in order to subsume each newly superannuated layer of the once-cutting-edge. For 
Barthes, mythology does away with such dialectical complexity, coating mass 
culture with an approachable veneer of quasi-natural contemporaneity. His essay on 
the Blue Guide book on Spain notes that ‘History is hardly a good bourgeois’ and is 
therefore without traction in commodity culture; he proposes that more up-to-date 
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guidebooks should ignore old churches and monuments in favour of ‘the urbanism, 
the sociology and the economy which trace today’s actual and even most profane 
questions’.677 A guide to modern culture, he argues, must primarily track and critique 
the workings of the dominant system of consumption; it can safely ignore the past, 
and indeed is required to do so in order to illuminate the eternal now of mass 
commodification. 
Whereas, in mid-century gothic, human subjects struggled to assert their 
individuality through their relationships with variously uncanny, recalcitrant or 
inscrutably technological objects, Barthes describes a mediation of the human which 
depends on the abolition of individuality and the triumph of a system of communal 
preferences encoded and regulated by consumerism. His review of the 1955 Citroën 
DS car, for instance, treats it as a magical object ‘from another world’ which seems 
to have no origin or history, and is outside the system of production and capital. Yet 
while seeming entirely new on the outside, inside it conquers the potential 
aggressiveness of its technological futurism by assuming a familiar domesticity: 
‘The dashboard looks more like the worktable of a modern kitchen than a factory 
control room’.678 Provocatively, he calls this car ‘the almost exact equivalent of the 
great Gothic cathedral’, not for any ambition towards grandeur and sublimity but for 
the anonymity of its artists and the fact that it is ‘consumed in its image, if not in its 
use, by an entire populace’.679 Of course, gothicism in its original medieval form, as 
well as in later revivals, was always defined by a shocking unruliness rather than by 
the kind of glassy smoothness that characterized the Citroën car, but Barthes’s 
evocation of the gothic in this essay, and the implication that the same class 
hierarchies are at work in the reception of luxury consumer durables as operated in 
pre-modern monumental architecture, suggests that mid-century unease could still be 
discerned by the attentive critic, even in the shiny dreamworld of the automobile 
show room.  
In 1944, Elizabeth Bowen had observed blitz survivors piecing themselves 
together by collecting old fragments from the rubble; in 1964, Herbert Marcuse 
noted that ‘The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their 
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soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment.’680 One-
Dimensional Man, his influential study of consumerism and its ability to penetrate 
the personal, shows how the new became more important than the old during the 
intervening decades, yet his study echoes many of the concerns which underpinned 
mid-century gothic’s unease about the thing-world. Clearly, despite the new attitudes 
represented by the likes of Jim Dixon, such disquiet persisted into the 1960s. It is 
there, too, in Harold Pinter’s 1960 play The Caretaker, though it has lost its gothic 
overtones in favour of a sense of the absurd. 
The eternal present of consumerism, which offers to solve any longing for a 
better future by proffering an endless supply of fleeting pleasures, increases the 
sense of temporal and spatial dislocation in the play. Pinter depicts three men locked 
in an endless battle to define themselves and each other, who are thwarted by their 
inability to come to terms with the past, present and future. Davies the tramp 
constantly refers back to his difficult past; because he has become untethered from 
his possessions, and from the crucial ‘papers’ he left in Sidcup, he has lost his 
identity and can only piece himself together temporarily via a series of found objects 
which (he frequently complains) never quite fit him properly. Aston, who offers him 
shelter, is suffering from the cognitive effects of shock therapy and lives only in the 
present because he can no longer organize his thoughts with sufficient clarity to 
remember the past properly nor to progress with his future plan, which involves 
building a shed in the garden. Aston’s brother Mick, in contrast, always expresses 
his vision of the future confidently, although that vision changes from moment to 
moment. He makes extravagant claims about the transformation he will work on the 
flat they share, in terms culled from interior decoration magazines: 
 
Yes. Venetian blinds on the window, cork floor, cork tiles. You could have 
an off-white pile linen rug, a table in… in afromosia teak veneer, sideboard 
with matt black drawers, curved chairs with cushioned seats, armchairs in 
oatmeal tweed, a beech frame settee with a woven sea-grass seat, white-
topped heat-resistant coffee table, white tile surround.681  
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This is an unattainable fantasy: instead of such harmoniously assembled furnishings, 
replete with their fetishized material attributes, Mick’s flat is in fact piled with old 
rubbish, as described in Pinter’s at-rise description of the stage setting: 
 
To the right of the window a mound: a kitchen sink, a step-ladder, a coal 
bucket, a lawn-mower, a shopping trolley, boxes, sideboard drawers […] a 
couple of suitcases, a rolled carpet, a blow-lamp, a wooden chair on its side, 
boxes, a number of ornaments, a clothes horse, a few short planks of wood, a 
small electric fire and a very old electric toaster.682  
 
Like Lucky Jim’s Dixon, Mick is hoping to consign such old junk to a forgotten past, 
but he is finding it hard to extricate himself and his flat from this mound of stuff. 
Pinter shows how human relationships break down in the context of material 
uncertainty and inadequacy of meaning. Uncanniness and overdetermination are 
ratcheted up into an insistent, baffling irrationality – an effect that is just as shocking 
and frightening as a gothic intervention. Individual agency is compromised on an 
intimate level by forces seemingly outside, and yet intimately imbricated with, the 
human.  
Postwar things seemed remarkable in their ability to anchor themselves in space 
and time, creating vortices in the flow of history. Yet if an object’s tangible presence 
might be assumed to be a marker of its incontrovertible reality, what happens when it 
has to express the future, not the past, and becomes the inadequate avatar of 
unattainable desire? The past can sometimes be held in the hand as a relic, and the 
present is to hand all the time; but the future has no materiality; and when an attempt 
is made to materialize it, something else happens: its promise melts away or 
stagnates clumsily, so that the object is always unsatisfactory, disruptive. As the 
twentieth century progressed, the uncanny was increasingly associated with a 
technological other, and science fiction took the place of gothic as the genre which 
critiqued the totalization of mass culture. In contemporary culture, with the 
emergence of autonomous digital objects, the twenty-first century has searched for 
new ways of understanding the thingliness of things and their relationship with the 
human. Yet by paying attention to the mid-century’s preoccupation with nasty 
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things, we can regain a useful perspective on nice things’ power to shock and 
unsettle us. Uncanny agency and alien intimacy continue to focus our sense of 
unease wherever the animate and inanimate come together. 
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